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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

Summary of Conclusions for
SVTS Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: September 15, 1995
LOCATION: Secure Video Teleconference System

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

OVPLeon Fuerth
Rick SaundersSTATEPeter Tarnoff
John KornblumDEFENSEJohn White
Walt SlocombeUSUNDave Scheffer
James O'BrienCIAJohn Gannon
Norm SchindlerJCSWilliam Owens
John WalshNSCSandy Vershbow
Sue BremnerSummary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met September 15 to plan for September 18 meetings with the French on post-settlement implementation issues. They reached the following conclusions about potential areas of agreement with the French on the shape and mandate for the political implementation structure:

- settlement documents should establish the political implementation structure and its mandate;
- the UN should give approval for the structure through a Security Council resolution;
- there should be a senior civilian head;
- the head should be charged with coordinating among the various actors responsible for post-settlement programs;
- the head should serve as an interface with the parties;
- the NAC would oversee military implementation by the IFOR;

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- the Commander of the IFOR, CINCSOUTH, would maintain liaison with the head of the political implementation structure and with the UN. (S)

2. As for areas of disagreement, Deputies identified the following key requirements for the U.S. on which we could not compromise:

- the IFOR and its force commander would not take political guidance or be required to coordinate with the UN or any entity, other than the NAC, through SACEUR;
- we cannot agree to the French suggestion that disputes in the NAC would be referred to the UN Security Council;
- the UN would not be permitted to select the head of the political implementation structure, although we would want the UN to approve the choice made by the Contact Group;
- while we can agree that a French officer (the present UN Force Commander) could become the Deputy Force Commander of the IFOR and retain operational control over residual UN forces in Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, we cannot agree that the Deputy Force Commander should also be the Land Force Commander as the French propose. We continue to favor making the Ace Rapid Reaction Force (ARRC) Commander the Land Force Commander for the IFOR. (S)

3. Deputies noted their previous decision that the head of the political implementation structure might have direct authority over some entities in country and decided that questions on the scope of the head's authority should be deferred until the terms of the settlement were better understood. (C)

4. On the issue of whether the head of the political implementation structure should be an EU national (as proposed by the French) or an American, Deputies decided we could ultimately accept a European but that we should seek to obtain European concessions on other implementation issues before agreeing. (C)

5. Deputies noted their previous decision that non-NATO troops interested in participating would need to be integrated into IFOR under NATO operational control but deferred discussion of how that would be done. They agreed that JCS and OSD should revise the existing paper on non-NATO involvement to include specific options for integrating Russia and other non-NATO countries while preserving a unified NATO chain of command (Action: JCS/OSD). (S)

6. Deputies asked State to revise its paper on the political implementation structure and circulate it by COB Monday for submission to Principals (Action: State) (C).

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