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21 September 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence**FROM:** Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force**SUBJECT:** Deputies' Committee Meeting, 20 Sept., 1430-1600,
The White House Situation Room

1. PURPOSE OF MEETING This Deputies' meeting is primarily to consider unresolved issues of what to do after a settlement is reached. Also, the Deputies will discuss the appropriate military-to-military contacts with Croatia, given their Dr. Jekyl and Mr. Hyde character regarding offensives in Bosnia and Croatia. Finally, Congressional strategy will be discussed; in this morning's interagency teleconference there was mention that the schedule of consultations should be accelerated given recent press coverage.

2. YOUR ROLE You do not have any formal responsibilities at this meeting. Most of the meeting issues have limited relation to intelligence. However, you may be asked for an intelligence update in one of the critical areas below. Needless to say, we'll give you the latest intelligence at the prebrief. Also, you might want to comment on the proposed arms control system in Tab F, which some analysts fear is unworkable..

-- *Status of the Croatian/Muslim Offensive.* The Croats seemed to have stopped their offensive in western Bosnia, but this seems to be as much as the failure of the offensive thus far as US demarches. Reporting the last few days suggests that the Bosnian Serbs have managed to consolidate their lines in western Bosnia.

-- Meanwhile, the Muslims continue to press hard against the Ozren salient and recent intelligence suggests they plan to push hard towards Doboy at the northern edge of the pocket.

-- Clearly the Bosnians are sniffing a victory and becoming increasingly disinclined to make any concessions to bring peace; meanwhile, the BSA may be less likely to make concessions now that their lines have been reestablished..

-- *Prospects for Serb Intervention.* As it stands now, we don't see Milosevic intervening if Banja Luka appeared ready to fall. Should it go, however, the rest of

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western Bosnia becomes untenable and the northern corridor becomes irrelevant. A major refugee flow to Serbia could strengthen the hardline nationalists and complicate Milosevic's lift, but we think he can still hold on. A Croatian attack on Sector East possibly could still result in Serbian intervention, but even that is by no means certain.

-- *Stabilization Package in a Bosnian Settlement* This paper proposes an arms control and limitation paper regime to ensure balance of arms after a settlement.

-- The enforcement mechanism offered in the paper seems weak: to reimpose the arms embargo. As mentioned above, all of the warring parties have managed to get weapons even with an arms embargo through friendly countries or via the gray/black arms market.

-- Moreover, getting the Security Council to agree to reimpose the arms embargo on only one party might tempt a veto depending on the country under consideration.

3. PREPARING FOR THE MEETING In particular, you should peruse the following meeting papers Tabs A--Continuation of Air Support beyond the Implementation Program, B--Russian and other Non-NATO Participation in NATO Implementation Force, C--Guidelines for Defense Relations with Croatia, and F--Stabilization Package in a Bosnian Settlement. Also, you should read Laying the Foundation of Implementation (IMPLEMENTATION tab) and the papers in the **ALLIED VIEWS ON PEACE AND IMPLEMENTATION** tab. Finally, you should refresh your memory reading Bosnian Serb Defense in Western Bosnia and the Implications of the Fall of Banja Luka (MILITARY SITUATION tab) and Triggers for Yugoslav Army Intervention (SERBIAN INTERVENTION tab).

Ray Converse

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