

~~SECRET~~

Approved for Release CIA Historical
Collections Division AR 70-14
1OCT2013

29 September 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting, 30 Sept., 1700-1800,
The White House Situation Room

1. **PURPOSE OF MEETING.** This Deputies' meeting is primarily to consider unresolved issues of what to do after a settlement is reached, which is basically the same agenda as was intended for the last meeting. The DC agenda will include:

- the role of non-NATO states--particularly Russia--in any Implementation Force (IFOR);
- arms control and equip and training to stabilize the country after a settlement;
- a final look at the political infrastructure of the IFOR;
- the status of planning for economic reconstruction;
- and how to organize the US government effort during implementation--e.g. the political/military game plan.

SYNOPSIS OF MEETING PAPERS

TAB A-- JCS paper recommends that it is best to integrate Russian forces in the major Allies area of operations. Should that be impossible for political reasons, then the next best is to place the Russians in their own area, preferably avoiding direct contact with Croat forces.

TAB B-- This contains a series of JCS read-outs of this week's meetings with allies on IFOR planning.

TAB C-- This JCS paper--based on discussions with the Intelligence Community--concludes that only a modest lift effort is required that would include small arms and ammunition, man-portable air defenses, ground mobility, and perhaps small numbers of tanks and artillery. Training efforts will likely center on the new equipment and defensive skills and tactics.

TAB D-- This early draft of a State paper details the arms control regime that will need to go with lift and train to prevent an arms race in a post-settlement environment. Subsequently, State is revising this complex approach to a simpler, minimalist approach with little involvement of IFOR in lift.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TAB E: This **CLOSE HOLD** memorandum from Pardew to Holbrooke emphasizes that the next trip should seek to get a cease-fire throughout Bosnia, open the Gorazde road and normalize Sarajevo, begin territorial negotiations, and prepare for an international conference. It also recommends trying to replace Saoribey as the primary Bosnian contact with Prime Minister Silajdzic.

2. **YOUR ROLE.** You do not have any formal responsibilities at this meeting. Most of the meeting issues have limited relation to intelligence.

- However, you may be asked for an intelligence update on the fighting and any reaction to this week's New York meeting. Needless to say, we'll give you the latest intelligence at the prebrief.
- We have prepared a handout for you: a comparison of two maps Jim Pardew recently received from Serbian President Milosevic and Bosnian Serb "President" Karadzic. Pardew has asked us to compute the percentage breakdown.
- You might want to remind the Deputies that Croatian patience on Sector East is wearing thin and that the military solution is increasingly likely. If such fighting broke out after the IFOR arrives in Bosnia to monitor a peace agreement, this could endanger US troops, especially if the Yugoslav Army intervened in response.

Although Milosevic has judged it is not in his interest to have the VJ intervene, this judgment could change as the result of an attack on Sector East. If his calculation changes, the VJ--despite shortcomings--has the resources to intervene with sizable forces and sustain them in combat. (See VJ Strength Tab.)

- Meanwhile, the Muslims continue to press hard against the Ozren salient and recent intelligence suggests they plan to push hard towards Doboij at the northern edge of the pocket. In recent days both V Corps Commander Dudakovic and the Croats have said that their forces would attack Banja Luka--similar to the race for Berlin?
- Clearly the Bosnians are sniffing a victory and becoming increasingly disinclined to make any concessions to bring peace; meanwhile, the BSA may be less likely to make concessions now that its lines have been reestablished..

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Also, you might want to comment on the proposed arms control system in **Tab E**, which some analysts fear is unworkable.

3. PREPARING FOR THE MEETING. In particular, you should peruse **TAB E--Next Steps**--the memorandum from Pardew to Holbrooke. Of the BTF papers, you should particularly read the following tabs:

BOSNIAN LEADERSHIP. This paper analyzes the split among the Bosnian leadership that you requested.

VJ STRENGTH. This paper assesses the ability of the VJ to intervene in Bosnia and Croatia.

BOSNIAN SERB AIRSTRIKES. The NSC complained this morning about receiving numerous calls from Congress about Bosnian Serb airstrikes and the failure of the no-fly zone to prevent them. A JCS representative indicated this morning that they were unaware of any airstrikes and couldn't prevent them anyhow. **Our paper indicates that indeed there are recent confirmed instances of airstrikes.**

CEASE-FIRE. Admiral Blair requested this paper on lessons learned during previous cease-fires after this week's Principals' Committee meeting. The message here is that the cease-fires work when it is to the advantage of all the warring parties or when weather would impede such actions anyhow.

Ray Converse

~~SECRET~~