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 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Summary of Conclusions for
 Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: October 4, 1995
 LOCATION: White House Situation Room
 TIME: 8:30 - 9:45 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
 on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
 Anthony Lake

OMB
 Alice Rivlin

OVP
 Leon Fuerth

CIA
 John Deutch
 Norman Schindler

State
 Secretary Christopher
 Peter Tarnoff

JCS
 General Shalikashvili

DOD
 Dr. William Perry
 Walter Slocombe

White House
 Sandy Berger

USUN
 Amb. Madeleine Albright

NSC
 Sandy Vershbow
 David Johnson (end of meeting)

Summary of Conclusions

No-Fly Zone Violations

1. Principals discussed the U.S. negotiating team's recommendation that action be taken by NATO against Banja Luka airport in view of the recent increase in Bosnian Serb violations of the no-fly zone. Principals decided to defer a decision pending further developments and consultations with the delegation. (S)

Cease-fire/Proximity Talks

2. Principals reviewed the status of negotiations on a cease-fire. They agreed that while we would make an all-out effort to

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achieve a cease-fire, we would not make a cease-fire a precondition for the convening of proximity talks or an international conference. (C)

3. Principals agreed that the venue for proximity talks should be in the United States at a secluded location somewhat removed from Washington or New York, but close enough to permit "drop-ins" by senior USG officials as necessary to give impetus to the negotiations. They requested that a list of possible sites be developed on an urgent basis (Action: OSD/NSC). Principals agreed that, to manage the sensitivities of our Contact Group partners, we should work with the U.S. negotiating team to develop options for possible follow-on events in European capitals and Moscow (Action: State/NSC). They agreed, however, that we should preserve the option of hosting a final signing ceremony at a Summit hosted by the President in the United States. (S)

Russian Participation in IFOR

4. Principals reviewed strategy for incorporating Russian forces in the NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR), in preparation for the meeting between Secretary of Defense Perry and Russian Defense Minister Grachev. They reaffirmed the importance of ensuring that the IFOR command structure remained militarily sound, with no dual key. They agreed that Secretary Perry should put forward two options:

- If the Russians are prepared to accept NATO operational control for their forces, a Russian brigade could be integrated into one of the three Allied divisions likely to comprise the IFOR. The Russian brigade commander would report to the division commander. At the political level, Russia (and other non-NATO troop contributing nations) would participate in a planning/coordination group that would advise and consult with the NAC, but not make decisions; decision-making would remain with the NAC. Russian liaison officers could be established at various levels in the NATO chain of command.
- If the Russians are not prepared to participate on the above basis, then we would suggest that they not engage in the military operation, but instead provide military forces to perform specific civilian tasks that would be under the purview of the Senior Implementation Coordinator. (S)

Military Stabilization

5. Principals reaffirmed that our goal should be to ensure that there is a rough balance of power between the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs by the end of the one-year peace implementation period. They endorsed a military stabilization plan that would

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involve both arms control/confidence-building measures and a program to equip and train Federation armed forces (S)

6. With respect to arms control measures, Principals agreed that we should seek to include in the peace agreement not only limited constraints such as separation zones, military flight bans and transparency measures but, if possible, a commitment by the parties to ceilings on CFE categories of equipment that would provide for a build-down of force. Principals agreed that an arms control package should be developed for the U.S. negotiating team on an urgent basis (Action: State). (S)

7. Recognizing that some arms control measures may not be attainable in the short term, Principals agreed that we need to develop a military assistance package that would provide the Federation with the minimum capability necessary to create a balance of power without stimulating a regional arms race (Action: OSD). This package would be subject to modification following a visit by an assessment team. Principals agreed, however, that the assessment team visit should be deferred until there is a cease-fire, although this decision could be revisited in the event efforts to reach a cease-fire bog down. (S)

8. Principals agreed that the United States should take the lead in organizing the equip-and-train effort so that we can exercise control over the types of weapons provided to the Federation and limit the involvement of Iran and other radical states. Given Allied skepticism about the equip-and-train aspect, however, our coordination should be conducted in a low-profile manner -- e.g., quiet bilateral approaches to potential contributors rather than hosting a multilateral donors' conference. As soon as we have decided on the necessary scope of the equip-and-train program, we should engage in early consultations with key allies (Action: State/OSD) (S)

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