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23 October 1995

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Associate Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
for Military Affairs

**FROM:** Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

**SUBJECT:** Deputies' Committee Meeting, 24 October, Time: 0700

1. **PURPOSE OF MEETING.** This Deputies' Committee meeting will continue discussions of unresolved issues concerning the implementation force (IFOR). A new paper was circulated this morning at the teleconference. [See **MEETING PAPER** tab.] The issues pertain to: IFOR mission, deployment, area of operations, timing, exit, Congressional strategy, and public outreach. Subsequent to this meeting, a Principals' Committee meeting will be held Wednesday to approve the Deputies' recommendations and also to consider sanctions issues related to the proximity talks. [redacted]

2. **BACKGROUND.** Sandy Berger and the other Deputies are becoming increasingly apprehensive that a disconnect is developing between what NATO planners anticipate for IFOR and what is being negotiated. NATO planners seem to be taking a minimalist approach on the mission of the force while the US negotiators seem to be taking a broader approach to the mission which could even include some police functions. [redacted]

3. Last week JCS briefed the President on IFOR. At that time the President indicated:

- He wants to avoid mission creep.
- He wants to maintain unity of command.
- He does not want IFOR to operate as a police force. [redacted]

4. **YOUR ROLE.** This is another of those meetings in which there is a minimal role for intelligence. You do not have any formal responsibilities for this meeting, but you might be asked to provide an intelligence update although none were asked for in last week's three meetings. Norm will update you on the latest intelligence tomorrow morning. [redacted]

## 5. POSSIBLE POINTS TO MAKE

- ☐ As of now, the cease-fire seems to be generally taking hold in Bosnia. Despite sporadic reports of some fighting, it is generally diminishing. One reason is both sides have worn down and need time for rest and refitting.
- ☐ The issue of Sector East in Croatia could be a wild card at next week's proximity talks. [redacted] Milosevic will try to forestall any discussion of Sector East in that forum.
- ☐ [redacted]
- ☐ The Croats might interpret a refusal by Milosevic to discuss Sector East as a pretext to launch an attack.
- ☐ Although reporting does not suggest an immediate attack, it is clear that the Croats are preparing for the offensive and could move on short notice. The timing of the attack remains uncertain, but it is clearly going to happen.
- ☐ Although Tudjman reportedly promised Holbrooke he wouldn't attack before 1 December, we could not rule out the Croats "finding" a failure to discuss Sector East or some other pretext--some Serbian provocation--that they simply cannot resist. A military settlement offers the advantage of allowing the Croats to ethnically cleanse the area.
- ☐ Should such fighting break out after the IFOR arrives in Bosnia to monitor a peace agreement, this could endanger US troops, especially if the Yugoslav Army intervened in response. [redacted]

6. **THE BRIEFING BOOK** In preparing for the meeting, you should read the **POLICE Tab**. That is a paper you tasked after last Friday's DC. The issue inspiring this tasking was is what, if any, police functions should be taken on by IFOR. Also, you should read the **HUMANITARIAN Tab** that notes this winter it will be Bosnian Serb refugees most at risk within Bosnia. Also, the **CROATIAN ELECTIONS tab**

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suggests that Tadjman is trying to weaken the role of the opposition and strengthen the dominance of his party.

Ray Converse

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