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The Director of Central Intelligence

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ER 95-5283/1
 24 October 1995

MEMORANDUM: Director of Central Intelligence
 Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: RADM Dennis C. Blair (USN)

SUBJECT: DEPUTIES' COMMITTEE MEETING,
 24 OCT - BOSNIA

1. Purpose of meeting was to review NSC paper (attached) on Implementation Force (IFOR) issues.

2. Sandy Berger led the group for 2 1/2 hours through all the resolved and unresolved issues. Turned out some were actually resolved at Deputies' level and some needed to be sent to principals.

3. The following issues provoked the most discussion:

a. IFOR response to violence: DoD and JCS reps want IFOR limited to stopping violence in plain view. State representatives want IFOR to provide on-call protection for international organizations.

b. Preconditions for deployment of IFOR: JCS and DoD representatives want fundamental conditions for peace (ceasefire, start of withdrawal, etc.) in Bosnia to be confirmed prior to IFOR deployment. State representatives are afraid that if the preconditions are too stringent, rejectionist elements in Bosnia can cause enough incidents to prevent IFOR from being deployed.

c. Movement of IFOR throughout Bosnia. DoD and JCS representatives want IFOR to be in Republic of Serbsca only to protect IFOR lines of supply. State representatives want IFOR to be enough of a presence in Republic of Serbsca to impress the Bosnian Serbs.

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
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d. Movement of warring armed forces back into cantonments. The negotiating team is pursuing the idea of treaty language restricting Bosnian Serb, Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat armed forces to garrisons. DCI and other representatives question the practicality of verifying such movements and the force requirements to enforce them.

4. At the end of the meeting, DepSec State Talbott reported on the Clinton/Yelt'sin meeting of yesterday. President Clinton convinced President Yelt'sin that at a minimum, the Russians will provide a small number of engineer battalions to work with IFOR in the areas of mine clearance, logistic support and airlift. These battalions would liaison with IFOR but not be under NATO command. President Yelt'sin accepted this as a "minimum" package for Russian participation so long as Russian participation was not characterized as "supporting" or "secondary" forces. He hopes for a wider range of functions to be performed by a larger Russian force and Russian officers to be placed in the IFOR command structure. Detailed followup discussions were turned over to Secretary of Defense Perry and Minister of Defense Grachev. President Yelt'sin pushed hard for the Moscow Summit to take place on 30 October before the Proximity Talks. President Clinton undertook to convince Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjmann to attend such a meeting in Moscow. The US will insist that such a meeting be short and largely symbolic, but is willing to provide airplane transportation to make it happen.

5. NSC is to turn out one more draft of the paper for the principals to discuss at the meeting tomorrow.


D. C. BLAIR
RADM USN

cc: ADCI

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~~SECRET~~NSC Summary
of JCS PaperIFOR ISSUES

24 October 95

A. Resolved Issues

1. What is the Mission?

The primary tasks of the mission are:

- Assume command of the theater and immediately establish robust C2 capability;
- Establish the IFOR rapidly, building on in-place forces and limited early deployments followed by rapid introduction of substantial follow-on force;
- Control withdrawal of non-transferred UNPROFOR forces in coordination with IFOR deployment;
- Protect the force and ensure self defense and freedom of movement for the IFOR;
- Monitor and enforce compliance with the peace agreement in B-H, specifically,

--mark the internal lines and areas of separation between the parties, monitor, and if necessary enforce, the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed upon period;

--establish and ^{monitor} ~~man~~ a zone of separation;

--if necessary, assume responsibility for the emergency withdrawal of UNCRO forces;

--employ NATO air forces as part of IFOR;

--employ NATO maritime forces as part of the IFOR.

• Assume other missions as agreed in the peace agreement

2. What is our strategy for avoiding mission creep? (Q1)

- Language in the framework agreement should clearly state IFOR's mission is to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement. The IFOR will implement the military aspect of the agreement in coordination with civilian organizations (such as OSCE, EU, and the UN) which will implement the non-military aspects of the agreement.

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maintain liaison

3. How does SICOR interact with IFOR if there is a violation? (Q5)

- The Senior Implementation Coordinator (SICOR) has no authority over IFOR. However, to the extent practical, the IFOR commander will coordinate his actions with the (SICOR). ~~The IFOR commander~~ can deal directly with civilians heads of each entity concerning military matters, in addition to CRO's.

4. What is the relation of the IFOR to the civilian police? (Q6)

- The USG should develop a plan for a civilian police component (indigenous and international) and a lead international organization should be solicited. The framework agreement should include authorities to organize a civilian police component of the peace implementation plan to assist governments and populations in developing local police forces.
- IFOR will coordinate with a civilian police representative through a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) established to coordinate military and civilian aspects implementation.

5. What violations do the police handle and what violations does IFOR handle? (Q8)

- While IFOR will provide for a secure environment, it will not have responsibility for police functions (e.g. crimes, property issues, stealing).

6. What, if anything will we do about election security? (Q12)

- The IFOR will create secure conditions for elections by completing its primary tasks of deploying forces to establish presence and separation between warring factions, and enforcing compliance with military aspects of the peace agreement.
- The OSCE should be solicited as the lead organization in the electoral component of the overall implementation effort, including the responsibility for an election security plan.
- IFOR will not have specific election security tasks.

state to write a separate paper on police issues. ↙

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7. Under what circumstances will IFOR use force against violations of the peace agreement? Who decides whether IFOR is responsible for handling a violation? (Q3, 3A, 4, 27)

- The IFOR commander is to implement the military aspects and ensure compliance of the peace agreement, in particular, withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed period and the establishment of agreed zones of separation.
- Entities firing from one territory to another into or across the zone of separation constitutes a violation of the peace agreement and the IFOR commander will judge when and what force will be used to stop the violation.

- Based upon the advice of the military commanders, the NAC will decide whether there has been a major breakdown in compliance with the agreement which would warrant IFOR withdrawal.

- *NAC will provide adequate full authorization to IFOR cd*
- The IFOR commander will arrange for NAC guidance through SACEUR at other key stages including, but not limited to, major changes in the pattern of military activity, requests for NATO to assume additional tasks, major breakdowns in compliance, disagreements with non-NATO troop contributors or other organizations that can not be resolved in theater.

8. Will IFOR stop attacks on UN or other international civilian agencies and their workers? (Q7)

- IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks on international civilian personnel or atrocities and human rights violations. However, IFOR forces are authorized upon the judgment of the commander to stop deliberate violence to life and person against international civilian personnel.
- IFOR will not provide routine protection for relief convoys and civilian movement, but, if attacked, IFOR forces are authorized to stop deliberate violence to life and person against international personnel.

9. What will IFOR do about attacks on indigenous civilians, atrocities and human rights violations? (Q3A, 7A, 9, 9A)

- IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks, atrocities, or human rights violations.

1. IFOR will stop violence in plain sight

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2. Issue of reaction to call for help from "over the horizon" to be decided by [unclear]

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- In accordance with the provisions of international law, the NATO Commanders are authorized to act, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces are present or have the means and opportunity, to stop deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the hostilities.
- Although IFOR will recognize the right of displaced civilians to return to their homes, it will not have responsibility for movement of refugee population.

(G. Who will provide security for inhabitants in the areas where the territory changes control from one warring faction to the other?

- The UNHCR and other organizations would retain responsibility for refugees and displaced persons.
- The NATO theater commander, within capabilities, should be prepared to consider requests for assistance.
- Additionally, the NATO theater commander may include supporting tasks of observing, securing, and preventing interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, displaced persons, and their property.

((. Should we demand that parties make tangible gestures of good faith, "indicators of seriousness," between initialing and signature and before deployment? (Q23)

- We should seek indicators of seriousness in the framework agreement that parties should commit to fulfill between initialing and signature of the peace agreement (e.g. cessation of hostilities, no patrols forward of friendly lines, shutdown of air early warning or defense radars), but their fulfillment would not be a precondition for rapid deployment of IFOR.

Does the IFOR remain only 12 months? (Q28)

- The mission should have a finite duration but until we have a final peace agreement and final implementation plan, we will preserve our flexibility on the exact duration of the IFOR's mission while continuing to use 12 months as the planning figure.

Essential commitment to the peace treaty by participants will be necessary for IFOR deployment. Details will not be made public for fear of expectations.

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in the course of performing its duties

How will IFOR handle war criminals?

- It is not IFOR's mission to search and find war criminals. However, if the opportunity presents itself, the IFOR will apprehend a war criminal.

B. Unresolved Issues

1. Will the IFOR enforce implementation of the *military aspects of* peace agreement evenhandedly and symmetrically? (Q10)

- The Deputies agreed in principle on October 20 that the IFOR will enforce the military aspects of the peace agreement evenhandedly. Deputies must decide if they want to revisit the question of asymmetry, and if so, what will be the circumstances in which we will use force against the Federation.

2. What does IFOR do about reported "over the horizon" violations of the peace agreement or "over the horizon" reports of gross violations of human rights ~~within an entity's territory?~~ (Q3A, 4, 7A)

- JCS recommends that the USG propose the following decision: In accordance with the provisions of international law, the NATO Commanders are authorized to act, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces are present or have the means and opportunity, to stop deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the hostilities.
- On the other hand can IFOR ignore such a report and what would be the consequences?

As discuss above

3. Should there be an IFOR symbolic presence on the external borders, particularly the inter-Serb border? (Q11, 11A)

- This question is not addressed by the USG, the NAC decisions, or the framework agreement. On the one hand, the parties want to demonstrate in the peace settlement that there is no partition of the country. On the other hand the JCS points out additional task of monitoring the borders will have force implications.

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work by SACUR

4. Do we want a 20-km heavy-weapons-free zone of separation and/or a 2-km all-weapons-free zone within the zone of separation? (Q14, 15)

- The JCS recommends a heavy weapons exclusion zone in order to reduce the risk to the IFOR. The planned force structure is sufficient to monitor and enforce the provision. In addition the JCS recommends a 2-km no-weapons buffer zone to prevent incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities. The NAC and NATO military authorities have not addressed these provisions.

5. What is the nature of IFOR presence in Serb territory besides free access? (Q16)

Issue between JCS
and State

- Deputies agree that IFOR will have free access into and within the Bosnian Serb entity. IFOR deployments into the Serb entity will have safety and force implications for the IFOR. On the other hand deployment could produce a more secure environment and greater perception of evenhandedness.

6. Do we have a clear and defensible end state for IFOR to leave? (Q10, 29)

- Although we cannot guarantee peace, we should expect that within a year the military and civilian aspects of the implementation plan will create an environment that will allow the parties a reasonable opportunity for lasting peace. Can we accomplish the mission within the timeline? What are the key milestones for measuring success? Are these milestones pre-conditions for departure or date certain?

7. Should the IFOR HQ be in Naples, Sarajevo, or Zagreb? (Q20)

- Deputies agreed that the IFOR HQ should not be in Zagreb for the entire duration of the IFOR operations because of Bosnian government sensitivities and the importance of Sarajevo to the peace negotiations.
- The decision to place the IFOR HQ in Zagreb is a militarily sound decision arrived at by the military commanders responsible for the operation. The JCS recommends that if the HQ must move to Sarajevo for political reasons, the IFOR commander should be allowed to determine when it is logistically feasible to do so and that he be authorized to establish rear headquarters in Naples and Zagreb.

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General Tomlan has decided
HQ will be in Sarajevo

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Should we seek an agreement in the framework document (phase 2) for establishing in both entities cantonments for all military forces (weapons and personnel)?

- If the parties agree and cooperate, then cantonments will enhance security and stability. If the parties do not cooperate, the cantonments could disrupt stability and increase troop requirements.

a. When do we have to give the order to reposition? What is the timing and sequence for ACTWARNs, ACTREQs, and ACTORDs? How much time between signing and deployment? What kind of decisions need to go to the President? When? (Q21, 22, 24, 26)

- See notional timeline, JCS Information paper.

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