

C05962543 **SECRET**  
DECL:OADR**SECRET**REV 2: 11/18/95,  
1230 hrs.**RELEASED IN FULL**STATE Paper  
22 Nov 95  
PC Meeting**EASTERN SLAVONIA: TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION**

- o Transitional Administration to be established by the UNSC as the UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). (NB: Should it be determined that this should not be a UN operation, the appropriate UNSC "grant of authority" should be arranged instead.)
- o UNTAES to be headed by a UN Transitional Administrator with broad authority over civilian and military aspects of implementation.
- o Similar to UNTAC in Cambodia, UNTAES would not be tasked to administer comprehensively (i.e., "govern"), but would exercise "direct supervision or control" over those aspects of government which could most readily assure free and fair elections and carry out "supervision" of any aspects that would ensure a return to "normal day-to-day life". Thus responsible for overseeing the transition from Serb-dominated to Croat-dominated administration of what amounts to a moderately-sized county government and several municipalities torn by ethnic warfare and resentment.
- o In this case, the Transitional Administrator should be designated by the UNSC vice a Special Representative designated by the UNSYG.
- o The Administrator, resident in Vukovar, would be responsible for political and representative functions, including coordination with Croatian (and Serbian) national authorities, plus IFOR and SICOR/HiRep as necessary. He would be assisted by: an Executive Administrator (responsible for integrating civilian functions and coordination with UN agencies, NGOs and IFIs) and a Military Force (MILFOR) Commander (for military implementation).
- o To dampen Croatian and Serb concerns as well as to leverage UNTAES participation by other nations, the Administrator should be an American - especially if the decision is made not to employ U.S. troops as part of the MILFOR.
- o To extent practicable, UNTAES should work to complement the efforts of, and share resources with, other international operations in the former Yugoslavia.
- o UNTAES would incorporate much of current UNCRO materiel and personnel assets in Eastern Slavonia, both civilian (approximately 10 persons) and military (1500 troops). These assets would require substantial augmentation, however, given UNTAES's fundamentally different and expanded missions (both civilian and military).

**SECRET****REVIEW AUTHORITY: Robert Homme, Senior Reviewer****SECRET**



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### FUNDING

#### UNTAES

- o Croatia should be approached to pay a substantial portion of the costs of UNTAES.
- o Remaining UNTAES costs to be funded by all UN member states according to the usual UN scale of assessments. It needs to be determined whether these costs should be paid for under the UN budget or the peacekeeping budget, both of which are in serious financial trouble.
- o Refugee repatriation and rehabilitation programs to be funded by voluntary contributions (perhaps as part of the Bosnia Civilian Implementation/Reconstruction Conference pledges).
- o We need to push for a realistic sense of expenses and look for creative ways to keep costs down.

#### Friends of Eastern Slavonia

- o Commission to be funded by voluntary contributions from member states/organizations.

### CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

It is assumed that:

- o Congress would object strenuously to any participation of U.S. military forces in Eastern Slavonia, most especially were it to be a UN Chapter VII peacekeeping operation;
- o Even as Congress balks at U.S. military participation, it would also have strong reservations about the most likely alternative: a UN-led operation;
- o Obtaining Congressional support for paying a U.S. assessment under either the regular UN budget or the peacekeeping budget will be a steep, uphill battle;
- o Other NATO member nations would participate in the MILFOR in their national capacities, not as part of IFOR or as part of a separate NATO force which lacked U.S. ground forces.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

- o UNTAES should be established as a UN-mandated Chapter VII peacekeeping operation.
- o No U.S. forces in MILFOR.
- o Support Option 1.B. of OSD 15 November paper, i.e.: International military force (MILFOR) established via a new UNSCR as a force distinct and separate from UNCRO, while building upon UNCRO materiel and personnel assets.
- o U.S.-drafted UNSCR should be presented promptly to forestall the imminent departure of UNCRO peacekeepers.
- o UNTAES Administrator should be an American. It needs to be determined whether this role is best filled by active-duty or retired civilian USG or UN employee, or perhaps retired U.S. military officer.
- o It needs to be confirmed that appointment of the Administrator by the UNSC (as requested by the peace agreement) is preferable to appointment by the UNSYG (normal UN procedure).
- o MILFOR commander should be from a NATO member nation - not Russian (current UNCRO practice is to rotate Belgian and Russian commanders every six months.)
- o To provide leadership and leverage commitments from other nations, U.S. should commit U.S. monies and personnel (amounts TBD) on the civilian side, e.g., USAID, ICITAP.
- o Croatia should be approached to pay substantial portion of UNTAES costs, recognizing that absent significant pressures, a positive response is not likely.
- o OSCE should be approached to determine receptivity to leading on human rights monitoring and conducting of elections.
- o Continuing Congressional consultations on Bosnia should include references to Eastern Slavonia, its key role in providing framework for Bosnian peace and the need for U.S. to support implementation of agreement. Congress must not be blind-sided on Eastern Slavonia.

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Bosnia Sequencing Plan -- Version A  
(Enabling forces deploy to Bosnia before S-DAY)

11/20 I-DAY. Dayton peace agreement initialed.

11/21 +1 day POTUS requests "expression of support" from Congress for U.S. participation in IFOR. Begin Hill briefings on peace agreement, IFOR, reconstruction package.

UNSC enacts resolutions on arms embargo lift and economic sanctions suspension. Resolution introduced covering IFOR, UNPF-IFOR handoff, and civilian implementation, with vote to come after peace agreement is signed.

11/22 +2 days POTUS briefed on NATO OPLAN.

11/24 +4 days OPLAN reaches NAC from MC.

Hill leadership briefed on impending deployment of 1,100-strong NATO enabling force.

11/25 +5 days NAC approves OPLAN, including annexes on Command and Control, Rules of Engagement, Legal, Civilian-Military Relations, Public Information, and UNPF-NATO Transfer of Authority.

NAC authorizes deployment of enabling forces.

SACEUR issues ACTORD for deployment of enabling forces.

NCA issues deployment order for U.S. troops in enabling forces.

Enabling forces begin deployment in Bosnia and elsewhere.

11/27 +7 days London Implementation Conference.

12/04 +14 days S-DAY. Peace agreement signed (in Paris?).

UNSC approves resolution on IFOR and remaining implementation issues.

NAC approves deployment of IFOR main force.

SACEUR issues ACTORD for IFOR deployment.

NCA issues deployment order for U.S. forces in IFOR.

By this day, Congress approves resolution supporting U.S. participation in IFOR.

12/05 +15 days NATO deploys IFOR main force. Within 96 hours, IFOR accepts transfer of authority from UNPF, establishes ARRC HQ in Sarajevo, and begins affecting withdrawal of residual UNPF elements.

12/11 +21 days Possible Moscow Implementation Conference.

12/15 +25 days World Bank-organized donors' conference, location TBD.

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REF: U.S. deployment of IFOR

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