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DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
21 November 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Acting Chief, Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting, 1045-1145, 22 November

THIS MEETING

1. A Principals-only Committee meeting has been called. Although the NSC still has not finalized an agenda, the discussion obviously will center on next steps--including strategy in Congress and in NATO--now that an agreement has been initialed. Also, there could be some discussion of recruiting volunteers for the International Police Task Force. Another topic that could come up is a Principals' discussion of implementation of the agreement in Eastern Slavonia (Sector East).

BACKGROUND

2. *Bosnia Settlement* We still haven't received the final details of the agreement reached in Dayton. We hope to have copies of the agreed map for you to hand out at the meeting. We understand that our experts and some at the working levels of State are concerned about the ability to enforce this agreement. Also, we are looking closely at the reaction of Bosnian Serb leaders to the agreement. Some of them, such as the Bosnian Serb Assembly President, Krajisinsk, were supposedly unaware of the agreement even 15 minutes before its announcement. Our analysts [] predict the Bosnian Serb leaders will be outraged at this agreement, which gives away most of Sarajevo.

3. With the initialing of the agreement, the clock on implementation is now ticking. By the latest schedule, the UN enabling force could begin arriving in 5 days. There would be a London Conference on reconstruction, perhaps within seven days. The treaty itself would be signed about 4 December in Paris. Under this ambitious timeline, the main force could begin deploying as early as 5 December. The Administration hopes to convince the Congress that deployment of the enabling force does not prejudice its expression of support and is happening as a matter of military prudence.

4. One issue that will come up in the next few weeks, if not tomorrow, is how to find volunteers for an International Police Task Force (IPTF). The latest thinking is that the US would provide as many as 200 to prime the pump for an international commitment of 1,500-2000. The residual would come from Europe, possibly including Eastern Europeans and Russians. A US contractor would provide logistic support for the US contingent, and IFOR would provide lift within country. The Bosnians want the police force to have a rapid reaction unit. This would cost \$50-65 million. Issues that are likely

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to arise are: funding; how they would be found, whether they are armed, and their mission.

5. *Eastern Slavonia* A key question is how to implement the 12 November agreement on Eastern Slovenia? It is clear there is no sentiment in the Administration to contribute an implementation force for this mission. JCS has indicated that any force requirements would be in addition to the 20,000 under consideration for Bosnia. As an OSD analysis points out, this force will have several different types of tasks than IFOR in Bosnia: These tasks might include:

- securing the Croatian-Serb border;
- establishing the schedule and procedure for demilitarization of the region;
- monitoring compliance with these requirements;
- conducting patrols through Sector East;
- facilitating the opening of transportation networks, energy facilities, and water supplies;
- providing security for and assist in the repatriation of refugees, distribution of humanitarian air, monitoring elections and human rights, and return unlawfully seized property;
- supervising mine clearing;
- and supervising maintenance of law and order by a new ethnically mixed police force.

6. The problem is the Croatian government, fearing that the agreement which is scheduled to last for up to two years, is just more Krajina Serb stalling tactics will be looking for signs the international community is backing off its commitment to implement an agreement and that the Krajina Sectors are backing away from eventual integration in Croatia. Intelligence received suggests that the Croats will not accept an extension of the UNCRO mandate, which expires 11/30, as a bridging arrangement for the new force. The Deputies are considering whether Tudjman would be content with a Russian/ Belgian presence as long as there is an American in the political framework.

7. The key to what Tudjman will accept and do depends on whether the implementation force is making tangible progress towards real implementation. If he decides that he is being jerked around once again, his patience could wear thin. Comments from the Krajina Serbs, such as the mayor of Vukovar, who said that Vukovar


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is and will always remain Serb, are clearly not helpful. One thing that is clear, the suggestion the other day at the EXCOMM by David Sheffer of US/UN that Croatia pays for its implementation force is probably a non-starter.

PREPARING FOR THIS MEETING

8. In the **MEETING PAPERS TAB**, you should read the summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Also, the included OSD and State papers on implementing an agreement in Eastern Slavonia could come up. You might want to examine the latest schedules for implementation of an agreement in Bosnia. In the **BOSNIA TAB** we have included our assessment of the political, economic, humanitarian, and military background at time of implementation. Sandy Vershow has asked us to reconsider the paper and see if we can look at ways to avoid pitfalls. The **THREATS TO IFOR TAB** provides most of the material we have written on the threat. We have also included a paper on reconstruction needs in Bosnia and Croatia. See **RECONSTRUCTION TAB**. In the **SECTOR EAST TAB** are two of the papers that the Balkan Task Force has produced for the Deputies on this issue: one an assessment of the prospects that Tudjman will be patient and the other on the environment faced by any implementation force. Also, we have included a short paper about what little we know of Russian intentions towards implementing the agreement in Sector East.

Ray Converse

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