

UNCLASSIFIED

A305

SECRET

FINAL

Dayton History Project

INTERVIEW

RELEASED IN PART  
B1, 1.4(D)

**RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE**

**Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs**

**CHRISTOPHER HILL**

**Director, Office of South Central European Affairs**

July 10, 1996

Participants:

Chris Hoh  
Steve Engel  
Derek Chollet

Contents: /

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK H PEREZ  
DATE/CASE ID: 27 FEB 2009 200705000

SEEN AND APPROVED BY AMB. HOLBROOKE (initials) OK via DChollet (date) 12/26/96  
SEEN AND APPROVED BY AMB. HILL (initials) OK via phone (date) 12/18/96

OSD 287  
Box #22  
Tape Transcripts

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

Transcribed by Kathryn Chelsen  
Edited by Pat Attkisson

Richard Holbrooke, Chris Hill Interview  
July 10, 1996

CHRIS HILL: Let me pick up the story; let's deal a little with the so-called "secret mission."

CHRIS HOH: This is the one in Belgrade.

HILL: September 23 and 24.

HOH: Hill and Owen in Sarajevo, after the third shuttle. Holbrooke had come back here and you and Bob Owen and Jim Pardew went to Belgrade. You were there talking to Milosevic while Sacirbey was here talking to Lake and Christopher.

HILL: We went to Mostar on September 14 and there we met with Izetbegovic and Silajdzic. Although Izetbegovic was not very forthcoming, Holbrooke focused on Silajdzic. He was concerned that Silajdzic was looking especially grumpy and could, in fact, cause problems for the second set of principles, the further-agreed principles. The feeling was that Izetbegovic might be problematic, but if we worked with Sacirbey, he could essentially deliver Izetbegovic, provided we had Sacirbey on our side. At that point, we may still have been exaggerating the degree to which we could work with Sacirbey, who turned out to a little difficult later on. Although I think, overall, it's fair to say that Sacirbey wanted an

agreement and had maybe a better grasp of reality outside Sarajevo than Izetbegovic did.

HOH: But you knew you had to get to Izetbegovic.

HILL: Yes, but we felt that with Sacirbey, we had the Izetbegovic problem under control.

The problem was dealing with Silajdzic. So Holbrooke asked me to go with Bob Owen and with Silajdzic to Sarajevo to carry on the discussions in Sarajevo.

What Holbrooke had in mind was that the actual car trip -- which at the time we thought might be three hours because we had to go on the Mt. Igman Road -- Holbrooke thought the car trip would be an opportunity to try to break the ice with Silajdzic and get to know him a little better. Holbrooke knew that Silajdzic had written a thesis on US-Albania relations, and that I had been involved in the most recent chapter of US-Albanian relations. He thought it would be a good occasion to get Silajdzic into a good mood and a more trusting mood *vis-à-vis* the American negotiators. Holbrooke also knew that he personally had had problems with Silajdzic in the past and thought that having Owen and me working with him would be a good approach. So we got into the car early in the morning and Bob and I talked to Silajdzic for the next several hours going over Mt. Igman.

STEVE ENGEL (SE): Was Izetbegovic in the car?

HILL: No, Izetbegovic had gone on to another meeting somewhere else. I think he was going to talk to some troops or something so we did not subsequently see Izetbegovic when we went to Sarajevo. And so when we arrived in Sarajevo we

UNCLASSIFIED

4

separated -- Silajdzic went to his office; we went to the Embassy. We then met with Silajdzic and his people that evening for a fairly early dinner in a restaurant.

HOO: That would have been you and Bob Owen. Pardew was not on that part.

HILL: No, just Bob and me; Menzies accompanied us to the dinner. So we went over the further-agreed principles with Silajdzic and one of his lawyers (I cannot recall the lawyer's name; he had a big handlebar mustache; we would subsequently see him in Dayton, but not a big player).

HOO: The ambassador in Zagreb, Trnka?

HILL: I don't think Trnka was in that dinner meeting. We worked through the document and we did not find that we were having serious problems on it. There were some changes, but the basic outline of what we had was very much intact. The next morning we had a follow-up meeting with Silajdzic scheduled, but, the next morning, which must have been around 9:00 -- this was Saturday, September 15...

HOO: Which would have been Friday, actually.

HILL: No. We went to Sarajevo on a Friday and overnighted there on Friday the 15th. The next morning, Saturday the 16th, we met with the Bosnians -- that's correct because the meeting with Izetbegovic was on September 15.

HOO: 14th.

HILL: 15th. Yes.

SE: Yes. You went to Mostar on the 14th but you were still there on the 15th.

HILL: That's right. It was the 14th. So we left the morning of the 15th for Sarajevo, overnighted the night of the 15th there and on Saturday morning the 16th we had

UNCLASSIFIED

scheduled a follow-up meeting with Silajdzic, but he did not come to the follow-up meeting because he had some other things to attend to. So instead he sent Muratovic to the meeting who said he had read the document thoroughly. I think he had a couple of questions, but essentially it was a non-meeting or there was no negotiation because Muratovic was on board. We took this as a very good sign because we had not seen Muratovic as being in Silajdzic's camp especially, so that if Silajdzic gave his proxy to Muratovic, we saw that we had a pretty broad swath of Bosnian government officials behind us on this. Now, remember, the process that was going on with the Bosnians was to further flesh out some of the details of what this future Bosnian state was to be. Remember, first principles were to say Bosnia is a state comprised of two parts; the second set of principles was to show that in fact these two parts would work together through a superstructure. And we had made a lot of progress with the Bosnians in defining this superstructure. So Bob and I went back up Mt. Igman that late morning after the meeting with Muratovic. We left at around 11 in the morning and arrived at the top of Mt. Igman at about 12:30, Saturday the 16th, and we took a French helicopter to Split. From Split we rendezvoused with an American military C-21 and we flew to Belgrade on the 17th where we joined Holbrooke and the rest of the team, having dinner with Milosevic on the 17th.

HOH: So that would have been Holbrooke's second meeting in Belgrade, because he arrived in Belgrade on the 16th.

HILL: Yes, when Bob and I left Mostar to go to Sarajevo on the morning of the 15th, Holbrooke left Mostar to take a helicopter to Split to catch his plane to Geneva for a Contact Group meeting. So while Bob and I were in Sarajevo the night of the 15th, he was in Geneva with the Contact Group. He then went on to Belgrade on Saturday for dinner with Milosevic and that is where we rendezvoused with him on Saturday the 16th.

HOH: You say you made a lot of progress with the Bosnians, both Silajdzic and then his constitutional (*inaudible*) the next morning. One of the things that previously Izetbegovic had apparently objected to was how you were going to have this superstructure and how it was responsible for foreign affairs. Holbrooke had described your meetings with Izetbegovic in Mostar on that subject as long and difficult. Did you feel that you had gotten Silajdzic further along?

HILL: I think we were okay because there was never a question that the superstructure would have to be responsible for foreign affairs. It was simply a question of how much we were willing to spell things out. At that point there was a need for a certain creative ambiguity because we didn't want to get into the question of who would appoint ambassadors. You know, every political issue always comes back to personnel. We decided to essentially stay away from some of these nasty personnel issues, only half-joking that, well, we need to leave something for the peace conference.

HOH: Then you rendezvoused with Holbrooke in Belgrade.

HILL: Yes. The next day, Sunday the 17th, was the first day that the Sarajevo airport was to be open. So on Sunday the 17th, Holbrooke very much wanted us to fly into Sarajevo, which we did. We had a very long day in Zagreb for some private Sunday talks which Holbrooke had with Tudjman, accompanied by Galbraith. I attended talks with Pardew and Clark with Susak. These were Sunday morning talks. We then boarded our plane and flew into Sarajevo, and that was a big event.

HOH: That was the first use of the airport.

HILL: Yes, I think a French guy beat us to it in the morning.

HOH: But nobody paid any attention.

HILL: Nobody paid any attention. I didn't watch French TV that night. So we arrived in Sarajevo. flares popping out of the side of the airplane -- CNN had really good coverage; freaked out my mother -- and Holbrooke talked with the press. Then we met with Izetbegovic in early afternoon; we were there with everybody: Muratovic and Izetbegovic. Silajdzic was not there. The tone of the meeting was rather discouraging because at that point we really were not talking about the further-agreed principles, but rather they were pressing us on some really picky matters. I can't remember what it was; Muratovic was bringing it up and, as I recall, it had to do with the question of access into Sarajevo. I don't know if the embassy did a cable on it. It was a little discouraging because Holbrooke wanted to take the occasion to tell them we had corrected the draft of the agreement to lift the siege of Sarajevo in which there was a question about the 82mm mortars and

whether those had to be removed; Holbrooke assured the Bosnians that in fact it was just, as he called it, a typographical error. Then Muratovic brought up a lot of issues relating to electricity and other things that we were simply not in a position to go out and verify. So we got into issues about minefields around electricity installations and things like that. In a way, it was good that we didn't get into the further-agreed principles in front of such a large government group because everyone would have disagreed; remember, the purpose of the trip was to go into Sarajevo and show the world that Sarajevo was being opened.

HOH: So as soon as you landed you basically accomplished your objective.

HILL: Basically yes, but instead Muratovic brought up all these issues that we were obviously not in a position to satisfy him on.

HOH: There is an indication from this memo that you got in at 2:30 in the afternoon and out at 5:30. Was there a meeting with Silajdzic and Izetbegovic where you didn't talk about constitutional issues at all but where they just kept pressing on the bombing campaign which would have been suspended by that point?

HILL: Well, the bombing campaign was suspended at that point and they had already given us an earful in Mostar. (*reading memo*) I see; they have us in at 1430 in this memo. I thought it was an hour or so earlier, but maybe not because the meetings in Sarajevo were around noontime as well.

HOH: But apparently, at the time the Bosnians seemed to think they were routing the Serb army; west of Sarajevo, at that point, there was a battle taking place. You



had just tried to deliver a message of military restraint in Zagreb that morning. Do you recall asking the Bosnians also to try to hold back their forces?

HILL: I recall our cautionary notes to the Bosnians; I recall our concern that somehow the Bosnians could get themselves over-extended and get slammed, and in that process we would have difficulty moving the peace effort. To be very frank, this notion that somehow we were giving red lights to the Bosnians, at the time, I don't recall that as going on. What we were concerned about was that the Bosnians would start losing, as they had many times in the past. I also recall very vividly in Mostar, late afternoon on the 14th, having a conversation with Silajdzic and in discussing their military offensive in the west, he said, "I do not understand why we can gobble up kilometers at a time out there while we can't take a single bunker around Sarajevo." He was offering the conspiracy theory that there may be a Croat-Serb agreement that the Croats take western Bosnia and the Serbs get eastern Bosnia.

HOH: And the Muslims weren't allowed to take anything.

HILL: Yes.

HOH: The fact of the matter is they didn't take much land around Sarajevo. Why do you think that happened?

HILL: That's an analytical question which I can't answer experientially, but I can give as an analysis that the Serb command and control in the west was not what it was in the east. And that in the east they had better interior lines of communication and were better able to hold their dug-in positions, whereas in the west it was a more

fluid battlefield. So this conversation with Izetbegovic and Muratovic was a little discouraging because Muratovic really hit us on a lot of things and it was very clear that the bombing campaign was the thing they liked the most and they didn't like to see that it was over. And even though they liked to see the siege of Sarajevo lifted, I certainly got the impression they would have been happy to have the siege last longer as long as the bombing campaign continued, to be very frank. Now, Holbrooke broke off that meeting with Izetbegovic and Muratovic and kind of chewed them out for not looking at the bigger picture. Then he went to see Lt. Gen. Rupert Smith and he was very tough with Smith in terms of making sure that the elements of the lifting of the siege -- that is, to make sure that the Serb checkpoints on the Kiseljak Road were removed -- were done properly. And that was part of what Muratovic was complaining about: that the UN said it was open but it wasn't really open. So, in a sense, Holbrooke was bringing up some of Muratovic's concerns with Smith. Frankly, some of Muratovic's concerns were a little unfair, certainly outdated at times. He was complaining about things that had happened a week before and, of course, the situation was quite different. But I remember Holbrooke taking a very strong line with Smith.

*(Richard Holbrooke [RCH] joins the discussion)*

HILL: Dick, I was talking about the aftermath of the Mostar meetings when you asked Owen and me to go to Sarajevo to continue the talks with Silajdzic.

RCH: You drove with him.

HILL: We drove with him; I have gone over all that. I explained that we had good talks with Silajdzic that Friday night and that the next morning, Saturday the 16th, we had equally good talks with Muratovic who said he was empowered by Silajdzic to represent the Bosnians. So Bob Owen and I then went off to Belgrade, met up with you when you had just come back from Geneva. We had dinner with Milosevic Saturday night and on Sunday morning we went off to Zagreb. You had private discussions with Tudjman and Galbraith while I went off with Pardew and Clark on Sunday the 17th to see Susak, and then we all went into Sarajevo. The purpose of the Sarajevo visit was to show that the airport was open and, in fact, we were really the first to fly in.

RCH: On which day were you in Sarajevo and Owen and I were in Belgrade and we had that bizarre telephone connection?

HILL: Later, that's later on. That's in relation to the cease-fire; we're leading up to the further-agreed principles. So, we arrived in Sarajevo -- the big accomplishment being that we arrived in Sarajevo -- then we met with the Bosnian government and Muratovic sat with Izetbegovic and they gave us a harangue about how, "This road's not open," "That road's not open," "Why did you stop the bombing?" It was a further harangue from what we had in Mostar. And I recall at the end of the meeting we were all a little discouraged because Muratovic had brought up a lot of minor issues and didn't seem especially focused on the peace process. The further-agreed principles did not even come up. But, in a sense, that was good because it meant that we had already had Silajdzic and Muratovic sign off on that

issue when Owen and I were there. It was good that it didn't come up in front of this panoply of Bosnian officials. You (Holbrooke) then went off to see Rupert Smith and you took a tough line with Smith, echoing some of the things Muratovic had brought up.

RCH: On what day?

HILL: This is on Sunday the 17th.

RCH: Got it. That's the meeting we had in a back room which was so nasty?

HILL: There was another nasty meeting; this was one of the first nasty meetings.

HOH: You were in Sarajevo just for the afternoon and talked to all the Bosnians and then, right at the end, you broke off to see Smith.

RCH: We flew in, we flew into Sarajevo, that is the point we want to stress.

HILL: Yes, that was the main accomplishment of Sunday the 17th; it was the first time we'd flown in.

RCH: It was the first time anyone had flown in in four months. We had made an agreement among ourselves that we weren't going to go back to Sarajevo until we went by plane for symbolic and emotional reasons, not because we were afraid of the road which Chris and Bob had just driven again, but because of the politics of it.

HILL: So when we left Sarajevo -- just to pick up the chronology -- we stopped in Zagreb. At that point, John Shattuck and Ambassador Galbraith came on the plane and gave us a briefing on what they had been doing. Shattuck had been

working with the Croats on the return of refugees, and Galbraith gave us a briefing on what he was trying to do in Eastern Slavonia.

HOH: To jump back to Sarajevo on the 17th for one minute: one of your colleagues described this meeting as going over with Izetbegovic and Silajdzic the five points you discussed with Milosevic the night before.

RCH: You've got all of these now? (*Wes Clark's reports.*)

HOH: No, we do not. We have a few of these Clark reports and so, actually, we don't have anything that lays out very clearly on the 16th in the evening what the five points were.

RCH: When you read these, you've got to treat these as very deliberately sparse and tactical. I read them all before they went in. Wes Clark had to send them. They were incredibly useful for chronology, but they are not terribly useful in what was really going on. But they help us figure it out.

HOH: But presumably those five points with Milosevic were on constitutional issues. They weren't things related to the halt of the bombing campaign and verifying the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

RCH: No, but there was this very dramatic...

HILL: ...typographical error.

RCH: Well, when we went back to Belgrade, remember, we had the meeting with Mladic and Karadzic on the 13th using the rule that it went on into the 14th but it was the night of the 13th. We flew to Zagreb in the morning and handed the paper to a rather stunned Janvier who said he was pleased but (*inaudible*). We

flew to Split. We drove to Mostar using radio contact with the world. Aric Schwan was trying to reach us to tell us that there's been this 82 mm/10 mm screw-up; we didn't know it. By the time we arrived in Mostar, we've got a firestorm on our hands with Izetbegovic, who isn't happy that we've stopped bombing. We deal with the cease-fire; he's ready for Sarajevo to have a few more days of shelling in return for NATO involvement.

HILL: I just made that point.

RCH: It's a very good point and we were not psychologically prepared for it. First of all, we were physically fatigued; secondly, none of us realized until we arrived in Mostar how serious what we called a "clerical error," was (of course it wasn't a clerical error, but that's another story).

HILL: It was a screw-up, though.

RCH: Yes, but it wasn't a typo. It was an actual mistake, which in one of my favorite Safire columns got blamed on me. I loved that one. But I don't care about that. We cleared it up. We left Mostar on the...

HILL: On Friday the 15th and then you went to Geneva.

RCH: We spent the night in Medjugorje. We went to Geneva for the Contact Group meeting at the Russian Mission. That's the payoff to Ivanov. Got to keep the Russians on board. Theater -- pointless -- has to be done.

HILL: The real stuff was going on in Sarajevo.

RCH: That's right. You guys who stayed in Sarajevo, you're doing the heavy lifting, I'm just doing the theater. Then, we fly back to Belgrade. At that point you joined us in Belgrade?

HILL: Yes, I did.

RCH: We then have the second meeting, the past-midnight session. That's the night that Mladic is allegedly suffering from a kidney stone. We're offered a chance to visit him in the hospital which we turn down; we simply send him poisoned flowers. We all hope that this was Chinese-style kidney stones, the way they poisoned Chou En Lai. Unfortunately, it wasn't. That night we open up a weird, direct line to Rupert Smith's

END SIDE 1, TAPE 1

BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 1

headquarters. Smith doesn't believe a word of what we've done. He doesn't believe it's going to happen. He, like all the Europeans, can't grasp the fact that the United States is going to pull off in a matter of days what they failed to do in a matter of years. On the other hand, he recognizes the value of it. So he lays down for us a series of very tough conditions. He says that General Milosevic, the acting local commander of the *Malia* (sp?) Corps --- the actual commander, Milanovic, is gone; he absents himself -- we tell him that Milosevic (no relation to Sloba) is going to be the interlocutor. He says, "I don't believe it." We lay out this set of specifics. We're running back and forth from the patio to the house:

Wes, myself, Pardew, and so on. Chris (Hill) can give you the line-up in the dining room better than I can.

HILL: I sat with Perisic.

RCH: Yes, that's the one time Perisic attended the negotiations -- very important point. And they were calling Mladic in the hospital. We indicated no interest in ever seeing Mladic again because our concept was to negotiate with Belgrade, not Pale. But Chris can give you more of what happened in the room because I sat out on the patio talking to a really, really ambivalent British gentleman who was just barely able to conceal his disdain.

HILL: Well, skeptical.

RCH: Skeptical, negative. We spent that night in Belgrade.

HILL: Remember, that night in Belgrade we also cleared up the "typographical error" and we made sure that we had them on board for all the barriers being lifted on the Kiseljak road.

RCH: And the definition of the word "humanitarian."

HILL: Right.

RCH: Which was key.

HILL: Because the word humanitarian had taken on a certain Orwellian/UN context.

HOH: This was the agreement that humanitarian goods would be allowed into Sarajevo and Izetbegovic had objected to that when you were in Mostar?

RCH: Silajdzic had correctly pointed out that "humanitarian" had previously not included cement, glass, shoes.



HOH: So they wanted it to be "civilian."

HILL: Yes.

RCH: Yes and Milosevic (*inaudible*). And we had no problem and we should have probably pressed for much more that night. That was probably the time when we had them most on the ropes and we probably (*inaudible*). The next day you have Lake-Sacirbey. I have no idea what that was about except that...

HILL: No, that's the 24th. You've jumped to the next week.

HOH: You were in Belgrade the 16th. You were back in Belgrade by the next night but in between you had gone to Zagreb.

RCH: But the day of the 17th was a day that begins in Belgrade and ends in Belgrade and that's the first day anyone has gone to all three capitals. We were quite proud of ourselves. We were also very tired. That was a very long day. I assume, Chris (Hoh), you were in Washington, I assume the staff here couldn't possibly figure out where we were. Because with the six-hour time difference...

HOH: I can remember spending lots of time trying to figure out where you were and telling the Op Center they had to keep track and they got in trouble when they got it wrong and we always blamed them if the principals got the wrong information.

RCH: We had this concept of always stopping in Zagreb, which we didn't quite know why we were doing it at the time; we hadn't really thought it out, but in retrospect those...

HILL: Well, we knew at the end of the day we would need Tudjman.

RCH: Yes, but it was more intuitive than a staff study of options: yes, no, pros, cons.

HILL: So, when we were back in Belgrade on the 19th, Milosevic had taken another look at the further-agreed principles and by this time we had fleshed out some of the details of what the superstructure was going to look like and we had gotten it very specific, and we kept joking to ourselves, "Gee, we need to leave something for the peace conference here." Because by that time we had a presidency, we had a parliament, we had a constitutional court -- it was pretty good. And Milosevic had been brought along on each element, and as was his negotiating style, at some point he would look at something again and start pulling you a little back on it. So on the 19th, he said, "I would like you to leave Mr. Owen here in order to have him go through some of this with the Bosnian Serbs."

RCH: This is the 19th?

HILL: Tuesday the 19th.

RCH: Did we leave him there?

HILL: No, he said this is just -- and when we use the word "theater," he uses the word "technology" -- he said, "This is just technology; this won't change anything." But we simply want him to go through this with the Bosnian Serbs. Bob Owen gulped and at that point Dick Holbrooke said, "Well, maybe we could think about having him come back this weekend." And so that was the origin of my trip with Bob and Jim Pardew on the weekend. Jim wanted to come along in order to do some map discussions.

RCH: They also needed him for the plane.

HILL: We needed him for the plane.

RCH: You couldn't have had the plane without him.

HILL: I know, but I figured since we had the tape recorder going, I wasn't going to say that.

HOH: But you were happy to have him there, I'm sure. So at this point, people are back in Washington and New York getting ready for a meeting that the parties had agreed to. At the end of shuttle round three, you had agreement to get them in New York.

HILL: We had agreement on the 19th from Milosevic and others to meet in New York on the 26th.

HOH: So then you were in Belgrade -- you and Bob Owen and Jim Pardew -- going over these things.

HILL: We left Belgrade and came back to the States that night, the 19th. Then we had the key meetings on the 22nd where Sacirbey came and we spent pretty much all day, all Friday, with Sacirbey going over the agreement and the further-agreed principles. Sacirbey added some elements to it, again, more specificity. They were always seeking greater specificity on the superstructure, on what the superstructure was going to look like. So at that point, having gone all day with Sacirbey, Bob and I knew we would have a certain amount of work with the Serbs. Whereas we had told them we had Bosnian agreement from the previous week when we had met with Muratovic and Silajdzic in Sarajevo, we would now be coming back to Milosevic on Saturday the 23rd with further changes to the further-agreed principles. So Bob and I and Pardew arrived in Belgrade at

noon on Saturday the 23rd and met with Milosevic and showed him the document. There's a good report on this, almost verbatim, from John Burley, who accompanied us.

HOH: But you were doing more than technology, more than theater, because now there were changes.

HILL: Because of the Sacirbey negotiations on the 22nd there were changes that we had to sell to the Serbs.

HOH: This, among other things, is interesting because it indicates you were meeting with Karadzic as well as Koljevic and some others.

HILL: Well, what happened was, I told Milosevic that, of course, per his plan, we would be meeting with the Bosnian Serbs but it had to be with them as part of his delegation; that is, we were not having separate meetings with them. We were meeting with him, with his delegation, of whom they were part, and I was a little concerned that the foreign minister, Milutinovic, was not there. He produced a deputy foreign minister, Cicanovic, and he assured me that Cicanovic would be there throughout.

HOH: So, therefore, you had somebody from the FRY government leading the delegation.

HILL: Right. So Bob and I went out to this...

RCH: But we never met alone with Pale. Not in Dayton, not in Belgrade, not anywhere. Bildt regularly did. We couldn't stop him; we told him repeatedly not to; he got conflicting advice from the Euros in the Contact Group, and went ahead and did it

and does it to this day. It's a serious...for your history, I think, it's very important to point out that on the core decision -- the Milosevic strategy which we like to credit Bob Frasure with being the architect of -- that Bildt, to this day, never really disagreed with it.

Of course, the Russians never agreed with *(inaudible)*.

HOH: But you were able to do it your way, the American way, and you're meeting with the Bosnian Serbs, taking them through the principles but at the same time doing changes on the road to New York.

HILL: What we did with Cicanovic -- and I worked this out with Milosevic -- was that we would discuss the principles of the principles. That is, we did not want to get into a drafting exercise with the Bosnian Serbs. In fact, frankly, we didn't want to have to change any words. But it quickly became clear that this was going to be more than "technology," that the Bosnian Serbs were clearly not on board here. So that Saturday, till the evening, that is after lunch with Milosevic, we went out to a lodge in the Vojvodina place where we met many times before. I wish I had the name of it, it's not *Karadorcia (sp?)*, though. It's the other one closer to town.

RCH: That is listed in the updated version of Laura Silber's book. And by the way, did you notice in the BBC show they have the ABC outtakes never used in

B1

"Nightline" from that meeting taken just ten minutes before Karadzic and Mladic showed up? That's unbelievable. I saw the footage. I was just blown away.

HOH: So was I. I wanted to ask you, at that point, then, there were cameras in the room?

RCH: We gave them a shot of us talking for ten minutes. They retreated outside to get more footage later and as soon as they retreated Milosevic said Karadzic and Mladic were ten meters away. We cut the deal. I told, I think, Rosemarie Pauli-Gikas, to get them the hell out of there.

HOH: The press?

RCH: Yes, the ABC cameras which were there at the White House's request. With Sheila McVic, who is a great reporter, and she had a deal with us not to report, but she could not **not** have reported....

HOH: So the way the BBC presents it -- the proposal's made and then the cameras are there -- actually inverts the real order. The cameras were there at the time when Milosevic made some proposal and you're telling them, "He's made a proposal; we're going to take a break."

HILL: Remember, this was the only time Dick was really shook.

HOH: I've heard that.

RCH: I keep reading that. I don't remember being shook; I remember very clearly we were prepared for this.

HILL: I don't either. I remember you had the presence of mind to get the damned cameras out of there.

RCH: We also made three deals in regard to that which were very important. We said we would only meet with them if they agreed that Milosevic was the head of the delegation and would lead the process; secondly, that there be no historical bull----; and third, that they would agree to these terms in advance. Then when Karadzic and Mladic arrived, Milosevic tried to just have us stand there and I took our delegation to the woods, not because I was shook, but because I said to Milosevic, "We're not coming back out of the woods until they agree to these points."

HILL: Yes, we wanted Milosevic to preview the situation.

RCH: And we wanted Milosevic to understand that at all times we held him, and him alone, responsible for the behavior of these...

HILL: It was back to Wednesday night the 13th. But the point -- just to finish that off on the 13th -- the point there was that Milosevic said, "Hey, I've got them a hundred meters away, can I bring them here?" And it wasn't that we needed time to regroup. What we wanted was for him to preview the situation with them because we didn't want them walking in cold and start giving us historical lectures.

RCH: And you've already described how physically shaken Mladic was that night.

HILL: Yes.

RCH: Among the things we may have done wrong in the negotiations was maybe not to get more out of these guys during that thirteen-hour session. They were really rocked, and we should have probably gotten more out of them.

HILL: To finish off this weekend discussion: we'd had a very difficult session with the Bosnian Serbs. Although that Saturday, the 23rd, we were discussing principles of principles, we wanted to avoid the piece of paper. Sunday morning the 24th, we rejoined the discussion. We started it again fairly early, 9:00, and at that point we had them go through the paper, and they were in a pretty foul mood.

RCH: Was Karadzic there again?

HILL: Yes, and his wife in fact.

RCH: His wife?

HILL: His wife was there. So we had further discussions with them and they were not going well. So at about noontime, Milosevic came out there and he first talked to them and then he came over to me and I said, "Well, I think you're going to have to help them climb out of their tree on this, because we have to go with these further-agreed principles and we can't take major changes." So we worked out some language changes with Milosevic and these were coming down to issues of the co-presidency, the three-man presidency, and whether it would be six-man or nine-man, issues like that.

RCH: Which were not settled that day.

HILL: Yes. So at that point, Lake met with Sacirbey and...

HOH: In Washington?

HILL: In Washington. By that point Sacirbey had seen what we'd done in Belgrade and realized there had been some changes from his changes on Friday. He had expected us to go from his changes on Friday and just make it a *diktat* in



Belgrade. We were not going to be able to do that; we had to make some changes. But, to shorten the story a little, when we went back to Sarajevo that Monday morning -- when Owen and I went back that Monday morning and sat down with Silajdzic, we realized that there was another element brewing and it wasn't the changes that had come up between the meeting with Sacirbey in Washington on the 22nd and the Belgrade changes on the 24th. The new element was that Silajdzic was beginning to take aim at some of the presidency issues, which meant Izetbegovic.

RCH: That's the first time we really saw, foreshadowed, the horrible split of the Bosnian delegation, right? But you're missing one thing here. This was a three-ring circus. You're missing the discussions going on in New York City at this point.

HILL: We haven't gotten there yet.

RCH: No, because while you're in Belgrade, we have Lake-Sacirbey. In fact, Sacirbey had been with me in New York on the 23rd.

HILL: Saturday?

RCH: Yes, or Friday, we'd had meetings. You can check with Jim O'Brien.

HILL: No, Friday. I mentioned that on the 22nd. We saw him all day on Friday; we negotiated all day in Washington.

DEREK CHOLLET (DC): You were in New York on the 24th.

RCH: No, but we met on the 12th floor of the USUN building all day with a Pakistani, with the lawyers, and with Jim O'Brien.

DC: I have you going to New York on the 24th and attending the UN.

HILL: You, Bob, and I were with Sacirbey. Sacirbey met with the Secretary as well on the 22nd all day in Washington. Bob and I went directly from that meeting...

RCH: That's right. I've got two meetings both in New York when, in fact, the first was in Washington on Friday and the second was in New York on Sunday. That's right. And nobody wanted to come to New York among the Americans, but we had to do it, because we had to be in place.

HILL: So you started having lengthy discussions with Sacirbey over the weekend in New York on the 24th and those discussions went right through Tuesday morning on the 26th.

RCH: Don Kerrick was with me; you've got to ask Kerrick. Kerrick was with me when Sacirbey came to my suite at The Waldorf, when we had a really terrible screaming match.

HILL: The night of the 25th, when you had your screaming match.

RCH: Did we turn you around on the night of the 25th?

HILL: You turned us around on the night of the 24th.

RCH: That's what I thought. The screaming match was on the 25th. Sacirbey was out of his mind; he was so upset. We were hammering him because he had agreed on the 22nd with Chris (Hill) in the room on a piece of paper. Chris is going to Belgrade to pin it down. It isn't the minor changes that Chris and Jim and Bob are negotiating that are posing Sacirbey's problem; it's that Sarajevo is pulling the ground out from under him. The changes did not require going back to Sarajevo. What required it was that Sacirbey couldn't deliver. So he got hysterical. I mean,

really hysterical. In our room from The Waldorf, Sacirbey called Izetbegovic repeatedly. I called Izetbegovic and Milosevic. My memory is that we had already turned you around on the night of the 24th your time, afternoon of the 24th our time. Then, as you were trying to get in, I was on the phone to Izetbegovic and Milosevic. We were arguing over things like the word "direct" in front of the word "elections." Easily resolvable issues in a rational world, which this clearly wasn't. This is the moment from which my relationship with Sacirbey never recovered because we were both so angry. He really did try to run out of the room and there was a reporter in the hall watching it all, which we didn't know. But the issue here is there were two levels that you've got to analyze this on, one is the substance of what it was about, and the other is what really was going on, which I agree with Chris was the beginning of the breakup of the Bosnian movement. It wasn't really a government from April of 1992 until September '95; it was a beleaguered movement controlling only the city of Sarajevo. *(inaudible)* was under different political leadership; Bihac was obviously somewhere else; Mostar was somewhere else. And now they were beginning to actually realize that these New York principles were creating the glue that held the two entities together, and -- much more than any of us -- they understood what was at stake. None of us going into the New York meeting really understood what we were doing. We thought of this as a technical arrangement. We had created two entities in Geneva. We publicly announced there was no connective tissue. We were very proud of the fact that we were able to move it in three weeks to the

connective tissue. It was a technical problem for us: a constitutional court, a national assembly, a presidency, details to be worked out at some future conference. This was a conceptually brilliant meeting to do in New York. We couldn't have gone from Geneva to Dayton. But, in the course of it, that's when Secretary Christopher lost his temper like I've never seen him lose it before, the next day...

HOH: That's on the morning of the 26th?

RCH: Sure. He refused to shake Sacirbey's hand; he was really p-----.

HILL: Let's get the sequence. At 4 in the afternoon, Sarajevo time (10 in the morning Washington time) on Monday, the 25th, we had completed our negotiations, and Silajdzic agreed to announce that they would indeed attend the New York meeting. In fact, Silajdzic and I went out to the cameras, and he announced to the press that they would be attending. This is at 4:00 our time (about 10:00 Monday morning New York time). We then flew to Ancona, Italy, and at around 5:00 (11:00 in the morning New York time) Washington and New York for the first time got a copy of the new paper as amended by Silajdzic. At that point, at around noon time...

RCH: At that point Phil Goldberg came to me and said it's not going to fly. Phil took one look at it (he was with me in the room; you must interview Phil on this), and he said the changes are bigger than Bob and Chris and Jim realized.

HILL: No, no, no, wait. I'm talking about the changes from the negotiations with Silajdzic on the 25th. So we made Silajdzic's changes and we got that to Washington and New York by about noontime Washington and New York time...

RCH: On the 25th?

HILL: On the 25th. That is the point at which Dick and others had to start dealing with Milosevic on the new changes. Because some of the stuff that we...

RCH: So Phil's immediate and correct reaction was based on the paper out of Belgrade, not the ...

HOH: Because he went up on Sunday, and I think I got up there later on Sunday. You were on the phone to Sarajevo, Dick, on Monday as well as Tuesday.

RCH: Well, let's get to Tuesday in a minute. Let's stick with Monday because Chris (Hill) is in the middle of the sequence. Tuesday is a long separate story.

HOH: But to make sure we've got it clear: on Sunday you had worked some of this with Sarajevo, but it didn't get finished come Monday in this area.

HILL: So one of the big issues that the Bosnians had insisted on was this idea of direct elections. And that was the issue that Milosevic really did not want to accept.

RCH: Although he did at Dayton.

HILL: He did at Dayton. But that was one of the main issues with Milosevic. That was a new element that the Bosnians now insisted on.

RCH: It's also a big argument over vital interests, each entity provided us (*inaudible*) which the Bosnians correctly feared would give the Serbs a chance to (*inaudible*)

which I think will probably come back to haunt us in the next round. That will be the 1997 problem.

HILL: But as evening fell in New York on the 25th, some very tough negotiations were continuing with Milosevic and the Bosnians and it was that night that you had your meetings with Sacirbey.

RCH: Yes, so Sacirbey stormed out on the 25th, you think?

HILL: Yes.

RCH: Okay. But he actually didn't get past the door. He was livid and I realized in the course of this that the emotion was that he feared for his job. Anyway, with time differences involved, sometime between 7 and 8 in the evening (New York time), I had my last calls (*inaudible*) and said...

HOH: Meaning Izetbegovic and Milosevic in their capitals?

RCH: Yes. I said, "Let's just go to sleep." Izetbegovic wouldn't take the calls any more; Menzies could no longer get through to him; Silajdzic was going off the screen. It was all foreshadowing Dayton.

HILL: You see, the irony is that Silajdzic was not upset about the changes in Belgrade over the weekend, the 23rd and the 24th. The irony is he was upset about the changes negotiated with Sacirbey on the 22nd. Those were changes from what he had seen the previous weekend.

RCH: The reason for this is very simple and we knew this at the time. We wanted the prime minister-centered system and Sacirbey and Izetbegovic wanted a presidential system.

HILL: As simple as that.

RCH: It was very basic. This was the beginning of Silajdzic realizing that there was going to be another round and our success would hurt him.

HILL: Does that help? Is that something new?

HOH: Yes, I think that does help. It still doesn't explain how when you went to bed after those last phone calls that you made to Izetbegovic and Milosevic on Monday the 25th ...

RCH: What happened on the 26th? Very simple...

HOH: I remember you were on the phone with Izetbegovic at 5 a.m.

RCH: 5:30.

HOH: 5:05.

RCH: I told Donilon and Christopher... was it 5:05, that call?

HOH: You said, "I'll see you at 5 in the morning." I got there at 2 minutes after 5 and you gave me a look like, "I've been here for hours, where have you been?" and Izzy was just coming on the phone.

RCH: You have the telcon log for the 26th? We're going to need it exactly.

HILL: Meanwhile, Owen and I and Pardew arrived at the Waldorf Astoria at 3:00 in the morning.

RCH: And even though we were still up, you refused to see us, refused to show up in the morning (*laughter*).

HILL: I think we came to a staff meeting at 8:30.

RCH: By which time Christopher and I were in our fourth meeting of the day.

HOH: You said to somebody the night before, "We have to start with Christopher very early."

RCH: Look, on the night of the 26th...you have here a call with the President on the 25th. Can you give more timing on that? I remember the call, but I don't remember much about it.

HOH: President Clinton?..

RCH: It says, "POTUS conference call with Christopher, Lake, Albright, Tarnoff, RCH." Let's get more specific on the 25th and 26th.

RCH: (*reads from daily log*) "Hill, Owen, arrive...at 9 a.m. Talks with Izzy and (*inaudible*). They leave Sarajevo 5 p.m. Arrival (*inaudible*). They call RCH in New York." Okay. Do you have the logs of phone calls from the 25th and 26th? Let's see them, because it will put details on Chris'...

END SIDE 2, TAPE 1

BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 2

RCH: ...Washington time, which would be 7 a.m. in Ancona. You wanted to make G---d--- sure that I knew what a hero you were, so you woke me.

HILL: This was on my way into Sarajevo.

RCH: This is the 25th at 2 a.m., my time. You want to prove to me that you've made your turn-around. You know I'm asleep, and you want to wake me.

HILL: This is the famous comment when you said, "We're all being inconvenienced. You're in Ancona and I'm up late."



UNCLASSIFIED

33

RCH: You thought you'd wake me, but I was still up. I've got to write this down, "1:57:

Hill calls from Ancona." This is too good.

HILL: I wanted you to know that I had made it back to Ancona.

RCH: *(reads)* "The watch adds Mr. P. Goldberg to the call." All right. "We're all being inconvenienced?" I'm going to write that down.

HILL: "I'm up late and you're in Ancona."

RCH: Okay. What the hell is "Joe Lake calling Underwood?" Why? "Albright asks whether someone has been trying to call her. Kornblum in London." Oh now, that's interesting. Why is Kornblum in London? I hadn't even remembered that; is he doing some Contact Group work?

HILL: Here I am talking to you.

RCH: This is all Washington time. This is you.

HOH: 1724.

RCH: You must be in Sarajevo.

HILL: That's right. In the middle of our negotiations. I gave you an update on where we were.

RCH: All right, so that would be 12:30 Hill/RH.

HILL: This is the one we sent from Sarajevo?

HOH: No, this the final.

RCH: Now, "Shattuck to Tarnoff." Okay. That's that; that's very helpful. Now we go on to the 8 a.m. watch.

HOH: Still on the 25th of September.

UNCLASSIFIED

RCH: *(looking at phone logs)* Who are all these other people? You think that things happening in Korea... I mean, what is this? China? Don't they know that...

HILL: There's only one issue.

RCH: Watch attempts to patch Bildt to me. "Unavailable." Attempts to patch Donilon. Give me...

HILL: It should be at around 11:00 that I talked to you. Ah, there's the Bob Owen call.

HOH: At 10:24 a.m.

RCH: This is on the 25th.

HILL: And this was a time when there was a five-hour difference with Europe, end of September? Usually it's six. So this was right at the end of our negotiations.

RCH: "Owen, Christopher." At what time?

HILL: 10:24. And then Secretary to Izzy.

RCH: I think this was Monday so I'm probably around for these. Do you remember these calls, Chris (Hoh)? Do you have all this on these calls? There must be a memcon of the Izzy call. You've got to get that.

HILL: The Izzy call was, "Delighted you finally got it."

RCH: Little did they know. Okay. You called me again.

HILL: That was to tell you that we got it.

HOH: That was at 10:46. You and Chris Hill and Bob Owen were calling Holbrooke in New York.

RCH: I wasn't in on the Christopher-Izzy call because Bradtke briefed me. Goldberg, Perina, Bildt get through to me, also Redman. I think I was trying to find out

from Redman what the history was. A conference call with...oh, my, now what happens here? 11:55, a conference call with Perina, me and Milosevic. That was a big one, obviously.

HILL: Well, you had obviously just gotten our further-agreed principles:

RCH: Do we have a record of this one? No, I don't think we would ever let the watch do this. That's an important one.

HILL: But if you're talking to Sloba at this point, it's because you knew we had a new piece of paper out of Sarajevo and you were going to have to sell him direct elections.

RCH: I've got to get a copy of this and get it all down. This is an important conference call. Are you going to check with Rudy Perina on this? Rudy has a very good memory on a lot of this, bottom line. By the way, I talked to Menzies, Chris. Have you talked to Menzies? He called me over the 4th of July. First time I've talked to him in five months and I told him about this project; he didn't even know about it.

HOH: We sent word saying, "Let us know when you're coming."

RCH: He is coming back and he has 300 pages of notes, all of which he says he will bring back. But you've got to send out a formal request.

HOH: There's a formal request at his embassy.

RCH: Just call; he's under a lot of pressure out there. *(reading from log)* "Call: Perina, Sloba, RH." Do you think this call is to brief Milosevic on talks on the Hill, in

Sarajevo? Donilon, Christopher, me. Attempted to patch Milosevic to me, unavailable. Hunter to Collins; Perina to Kerrick.

HILL: They don't even have my attempt to reach you when you were in with the Estonian Foreign Minister.

RCH: "Holbrooke to Milosevic." Some of these calls to Milosevic were direct. Phil Goldberg placed them. "Patch Perina to Goldberg. Perina to Hill." No, this is wrong, you were still in the air. Okay, we're still on the 25th. J---- C-----! We're still on Monday. Now we're at 4 in the afternoon. This is where it starts to get hectic. "Holbrooke to Menzies at 4:00."

RCH: You've got to send Menzies a message asking him for the papers.

HOH: Okay, good.

RCH: Here you are, Chris, you're on a call with Galbraith.

HOH: Now that's why I think that first one is a mistake. When they say C Hill, it was probably C Hoh in New York. But is there a particular call you're trying to find?

RCH: I'm trying to find out when I talked to Milosevic last.

HOH: The 25th?

RCH: Yes, here is 7:55 in the evening. I'm still calling Menzies.

HOH: Now at this point, there was an agreement reached by Owen and Hill and the Bosnians in Sarajevo which then had to be worked out with Milosevic. But you're still trying to reach Menzies, so it sounds like there was still some negotiations going on with the Bosnians.

RCH: Because I'm dealing with Izetbegovic part of the... yes, of course. This argument over direct elections cannot be settled that night. Chris and Owen are in the air.

HOH: Thinking they have an agreement.

RCH: They've got it. I'm on the phone with both men. They're arguing over one word. This brings us up to the morning of the 26th when all hell breaks loose and we go to sleep on the night of the 25th without a resolution. So I told Donilon or Liz Lineberry that we were going to have to start very early in the morning.

HOH: Meaning the Secretary on the phone to Izetbegovic very early the next morning.

RCH: Here's the watch, 2:35 a.m., New York time, "The Watch passed Mr. C. Hill EUR New York to SS in New York," so he must have called from the airport. "5:25 the watch attempts to patch Holbrooke to Menzies. Menzies is Izetbegovic. The call is terminated 5:30. 5:45 the watch attempts to patch Holbrooke to Menzies, unavailable. 6:15 watch patches Burton with Menzies at the Bosnian Presidency to Chris Hoh EUR." That's the same you described but you were one hour off if this is correct. "At 6:50, further to item at 6:15 the watch patched the Secretary into the call." So I'm on the phone for half an hour beforehand, well almost half an hour, well, more: 35 minutes. "6:53 the Watch patched the Secretary to Izetbegovic." He called. "6:57, attempt to get Perina to Holbrooke, unavailable, then patches Perina to Goldberg. Goldberg-Perina. Failed attempt to do a conference call, failed attempt for Galbraith to reach" you, okay. So this is the key sequence. If you give me a copy of that one particularly, it will help. The

other ones I think I may fudge a little. But that one, you remember that vividly  
Chris, that was when you and I started the morning together in that s--- little room.

HOH: My guess is that (*incredible*) late start because we were placing some calls directly,  
and when we couldn't get through we had the Op Center try.

RCH: You have to get Christopher's schedule. Didn't Christopher and I go into a  
Contact Group Ministerial with Juppe and company?

HOH: Yes, you had to break off to do these sideshow meetings with the Contact Group.

RCH: Do you have Christopher's schedule? Are they giving you difficulty on it?  
Because it's their project.

HOH: They are.

RCH: Are you talking to Donilon?

HOH: No. Donilon's been away.

RCH: I'm seeing Tom; I'll mention it to him. "Christopher and CG foreign ministers."  
That was at around 7:30 in the morning, I'm guessing. "Menzie's to Hoh at 8:21."  
Do you remember that call, Chris?

HOH: The calls all sort of blur together.

RCH: "Gallucci to Lake," that would be Korea. Ah, here! At 8:56 Sacirbey fails to  
reach me. At 9:22 you talked to Sacirbey. What was that? Is that when you  
knew they were going to renege? Remember now, on the Christopher call,  
Izetbegovic has agreed. That's why that piece of paper is so important.

HOH: With the earlier Christopher call, in other words, we had agreement.

RCH: You were standing there when Christopher spoke to us. Didn't he come into our room because of technical reasons? He came in; he didn't do this call from his office; he walked down to the staff center.

HOH: We had the call lined up.

RCH: Izetbegovic agreed with him on the phone. What time was that call?

DC: The 6:53 call?

RCH: Yes, that's when Christopher agrees. We call at 7 a.m. I thought it was much earlier.

HOH: You'd been going over a lot of the ground with Izetbegovic before.

RCH: But Christopher gets Izetbegovic to agree. Then, at around 9:30 in the morning, my memory is that Sacirbey calls and stiffs us.

HOH: I think all he was saying to me was, "I need to talk to Dick."

RCH: You have a call at 9:22 from Sacirbey to you. Although the way it was written, you were apparently calling Sacirbey. Chris, you have to get Chris (Hill) to focus on this. I can tell you exactly where I was when I got the call. I was upstairs on the 12th floor of USUN, looking over the arrangements. I was pulled out of the front room to the phone, where the cookies were. I'm standing there and Sacirbey says we can't go ahead with the agreement. I said the Secretary of State and your President have just agreed. He says "I'm sorry, we can't." I said, "You better get your a-- over here right away." I hung up the phone, I ran down one flight of stairs, where Christopher was sitting in Madeleine Albright's office, chatting with Donilon, getting ready for the meeting which was going to start at

10:00, and I said, "They are going to renege." That is the sequence; that I remember. This is the call to you. You must have gone up and got me and said Sacirbey is on the phone and transferred it up there.

HOH: Yes, that's right. We were calling down to USUN trying to get them to put the call up to that fourth-floor meeting.

RCH: Well, you did; you got it moved. All right, then we have a long period of non-Bosnia issues.

HOH: But at that point the talks were no longer being conducted by phone because Sacirbey came to USUN and walked in to see Christopher, who was in Albright's office.

RCH: Yes. That's the end of the usefulness of this for the time being. The next time the log becomes relevant is at 1540 in the afternoon. "The watch convened a conference call including the Secretary, the President, and Holbrooke."

HOH: And at that point you're saying, "This is what we've got an agreement on."

RCH: Yes. Now, in the intervening period, all the action is on the eleventh floor of the USUN.

HOH: The near-legendary statement about the Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Sacirbey.

RCH: "What the hell is going on here?" Well, we deliberately put it out to the press. Okay, do you have the sequence of what actually happened on the 11th floor?

HOH: No, I don't think we do.



RCH: Let me tell you what it is very quickly. Sacirbey comes in. Christopher and I are waiting for him; we agreed we would have no one else in the room. Christopher does not extend his hand and says, "What the hell is going on here?" Sacirbey tries to be friendly, but he is reneging. Christopher says, "We have an agreement; we've got everybody upstairs waiting. This is unacceptable." We then troop upstairs, and in view of the world's cameras we hold our photo-op. Christopher, like me in Geneva, makes the only speech with the cameras. The other Contact Group people -- Bildt, the three foreign ministers -- are sitting there. We roll the cameras out, and we adjourn immediately without even telling the Contact Group in advance why. They are in a state of shock.

HOH: It's just the Balkan foreign ministers and the Contact Group reps.

RCH: Plus me, Christopher and Bildt. But it's Pauline Neville-Jones and Wolfgang Ischinger, not the foreign ministers. We then go back down to the eleventh floor where we take over the front offices. Christopher uses Madeleine Albright's office. Skip Gnome's DCM offices are used by the Contact Group, and the third office -- I think it's Inderfurth's office -- we let Sacirbey use. Christopher then did some very tough talk to Sacirbey and goes over to the General Assembly to deliver or attend a speech. Check on whether he spoke or not. That's the kind of detail that's easy to check and it helps a lot for the *(inaudible)*. I stay back. Sacirbey then leaves to make his speech.

HOH: Yes, there was definitely a Sacirbey speech.

RCH: That's key. Sacirbey makes a speech. Very important. Is that in here?

HOH: And when he left for that, we were wondering what he was going to say. Is he going to denounce the whole process? Is he going to go off the reservation?

RCH: He did. He announced publicly. He dug himself another one of those holes which are his hallmark, by giving a good sound-bite without thinking of the consequences. You know, when I was reviewing the material sent to me by Aric Schwan the other day, I saw that Sacirbey had done the same thing on the day of the memorial services at Ft. Myer. And it's a very clear pattern. That day (August 23) was supposed to begin with him having breakfast with me, after which he and I met with Christopher. When he came out of the meeting with Christopher he said -- and the wires reported -- that he would give the United States shuttle effort two months and if it didn't succeed then he would demand that we resume the bombing, dada; dada, dada. And of course immediately our spokesman had to say we're not operating on a timetable. That was minor, but in New York he dug himself in again. But we moved so fast that the story never got any altitude. It was a standard Sacirbey style: a great sound-bite. But he's not great at taking the consequences of the sound-bite. So he goes over to the UN, he gives a press conference on First Avenue as he's crossing the street. He says that we cannot accept anything other than direct elections, dada, dada, dada. He highlights the differences. We don't know he's doing this. We're sitting inside and the Contact Group people are sitting in Skip Gnome's office, very unhappy.

HOH: Because they had nothing to do.

RCH: They had nothing to do, and they didn't know what was going on. But as they always do when the chips are really down, they always let the Americans lead. They only get agitated later. And so, Sacirbey delivered his speech to the General Assembly, and vented to the press, and I guess strengthened his hand in Sarajevo in this weird internal political game that they are playing. He comes back across the street much, much more relaxed. Christopher rejoins us and we tell Sacirbey that the President of the United States will announce the agreement at about 3:00, but it looks to me it comes closer to 1540. The President made the announcement on the Geneva Principles, not us. Do you have that in the White House press materials? Okay, I have it. But the sequence is that we tell Sacirbey that we are going to go public at an hour certain, from the White House press room. The President of the United States is going to announce either that the New York meeting has failed because of Sacirbey, or it has succeeded. And then he calls Izetbegovic. We give him Inderfurth's room and he calls Izetbegovic and he comes back and says "Okay, we've got a deal." And that's how it happened. It was a very bad day.

HOH: And you say your relationship with Sacirbey has never really recovered from that.

RCH: No. It was too raw. I never could trust him again. Most of the other people in the building on the American side had never liked him. I was his closest thing to a friend but not after that. Okay, does that help you on New York? Big day in New York. That New York day has never gotten the attention it deserved.

HOH: And in the end, we did not say in New York that the elections would be direct.

Would you accept that? It didn't get accepted until Dayton.

RCH: Yes, because from the beginning Christopher and I took the position that the word "direct" was meaningless. That the United States did not have direct elections for its president; that Germany didn't have direct elections for its president, and that democracy and direct elections were not synonymous terms. Their position was, "That may be true in your country or Germany or Israel, but it isn't true in our country, because it's a symbolically important word." So once again, we forced them to accept our position with tremendous threats. But it is important to footnote right up front that we agreed with Izetbegovic. We would keep trying for "direct;" its absence didn't mean it was not agreed to. And we got it in Dayton. And by the way, we got it at Dayton quite easily.

HOH: And there was a statement made by the co-chairmen -- you and Bildt -- explaining elections where you threw in the word "direct."

RCH: Not only that, there was one other thing which you just reminded me of which is very important. Sacirbey extracted what he thought was a big concession, but in fact was a freebie. We agreed that President Clinton, in his statement, would talk about an undivided Sarajevo as a goal. This was easy for us, but it was extremely important for Mo Sacirbey. He was always able to say afterwards that he got the President to call for an undivided Sarajevo.

HOH: Which the Bosnians got at Dayton.

RCH: Yes, but at that time none of us knew we would get it. All we wanted to do was make *(inaudible)* believe that *(inaudible)*. No one thought we were going to get an undivided Sarajevo. It's arguably to be one of the biggest achievements of all possible.

HOH: But to jump for a second to process rather than substance: one thing you did in New York, Geneva, and other places would be to have these statements issued to the press where you could then spend or actually go into further detail beyond what the parties...

RCH: Well, the structure of Geneva and New York was statements issued by the Contact Group but not signed by the Foreign Ministers. *(inaudible)* followed by a statement by the co-chairmen, which theoretically included the Russians, finally followed by personal comments by Bildt and me. So at each level we could be a little more explicit. However, we stated long before Dayton that that wouldn't fly there. At Dayton, signatures would be required. We then decided to go from signatures to initials in order to get the Europeans on board and to give us a period of consolidation between the end of the Dayton process and the beginning of implementation. The switch from signing to initials, which I thought of basically to mollify the French, turned out to have enormous additional value to us. If we had been working on the one-year timetable on Dayton, we would now be thirty days closer to the end. The one year begins on December 20, rather than on November 21, and we had one additional month to prepare.

HOH: I wanted to jump to shuttle round 4.

RCH: Shuttle round 4 is the cease fire.

HOH: The cease-fire and heavy weapons withdrawal.

RCH: No, 4 is the cease fire.

HOH: And 5 you're calling...

RCH: Four is the shuttle that agrees on Dayton, although we didn't have Dayton chosen.

And 5 is because...I just realized something (*sentence inaudible*) and we have the obligation to use Strobe if possible.

HOH: Okay. But you mentioned, in talking about New York...

RCH: On Moscow, you should put overlap with Strobe.

HOH: But Silajdzic was an interesting character because you had to deal with him in a lot of ways and in some respects he understood, as I've heard you describe it, the potential for a future Bosnia. Better able to look into the future than perhaps Izetbegovic.

RCH: No, that's not what I said, Chris. I said they each understood where their own interests lay. Izetbegovic wanted a presidential system, because he would be president; Silajdzic wanted a strong prime minister system. He wanted to make the presidency a figurehead, because he would be prime minister. What you had was the foreshadowing of a split.

HOH: In New York. But generally Silajdzic...

END SIDE 1, TAPE 2

BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 2

HOH: Okay, Silajdzic in Dayton. On the 13th you had two long walks with Silajdzic.

Christopher was coming on November 14 to Dayton; he was going to Japan.

RCH: I think you'll find that one of these days -- probably November 5th -- was the French dinner at L'Auberge. I think you'll also find Strobe Talbott's dinner on the 6th. That's the dinner in honor of Strobe and Brooke. It was a high point, quite right. Where are you?

HOH: The 13th of November, the lead-up to Christopher arriving on the 14th.

RCH: Menzies says that he remembers this. Oh, this was my walk with Silajdzic.

HOH: You actually walked with Silajdzic twice that day and we're pretty sure about that because you then told Christopher you had taken two long walks with him.

RCH: Have you found my message from Sarajevo yet on Dayton? On the American venue?

HOH: I think that is a derivative product of it.

RCH: Yes, that is the derivative product.

HOH: We have not found the actual thing.

SE: It refers to your memo on the front of that, but so far we've been unable to locate the memo.

HOH: Not in Kennedy's office. Not in Strobe's office. This is actually some kind of missive from the region to Washington that may have been just from you to...

RCH: This is Kornblum's memo.

HOH: Making the arguments and then there's a paper that looks to me like the minutes of a staff project. But it does say this is the unanimous view of the negotiating team.

RCH: Although the memo gets it wrong on one point right away which is that it says here that I recommend that an international conference be held preferably in Washington. I very clearly said **NOT** Washington. Anyway, go ahead.

HOH: So Silajdzic was one of the people you were dealing with a lot in this somewhat conflict-ridden Bosnian delegation. At that point, you were trying to get the message to the Bosnians that we can't go on like this forever, we're going to have to close down these negotiations. And you told Christopher that you'd given Silajdzic a pretty tough message: "This is not getting us anywhere". And Silajdzic seemed to be more upbeat about the whole thing. I'm just wondering what you remember of these long walks with Silajdzic and what it tells us about where the Bosnians are coming from.

RCH: The problem with this is that each walk is at a different moment of the process, and I have not yet been able to reconstruct what happened in which walk. Sometimes I talked to Silajdzic about his dreams of the future, sometimes we didn't talk about this at all. He told me about his childhood and his wife living in Istanbul. He took these walks with Kati [Marton] also which were even weirder because he wanted her to co-author a book with him on Dayton, and she said, "I can't do that. I'm married to the head of the American delegation." He was trying to work out what he could do. He wanted to write a book; he wanted an



agent; a lot of this had nothing to do with the negotiations.

B1

But, in one of the talks, I did get him to agree to start talking one-on-one to Milosevic. At about that time, somewhere in the process, The New York Times ran a story saying that the Americans considered him the swing man. And I went in to see Izetbegovic and Sacirbey was sitting there. Silajdzic was not there. Sacirbey had the Roger Cohen article in his hand. This is easy to date because it was the day of the article. He was hammering that article on the table saying there is only one swing man around here and that's Mr. President. Izetbegovic's glaring at me assuming that I'm the source of the leak. In fact, Cohen is a good reporter and everybody understood the Silajdzic role and, in fact, over twenty-one days, the amazing thing is how little leakage there was. But again, you saw the tremendous anger between Sacirbey and Silajdzic. So leaving aside the technical part of it, which I can't reconstruct yet...I've got to get my head on it, and the chronology is going to have to be minute-by-minute, fill-in-the-blank. You've got to put down things like Roger Cohen's article and the explosion caused until it starts falling into place. Leaving that aside, I can tell you that we were watching the Bosnian delegation disintegrate. Meanwhile, Krajisnik was sending us direct messages all day long. Written, formal-type messages demanding to see us and

demanding to know what the map discussions were on this and that. I take these notes to Milosevic and say, "What do you want me to do with them?" and he'd throw them in the waste can. They don't talk to these guys.

SE: We have these.

RCH: You have that already?

SE: We had the letters.

RCH: Oh, you do have the letters, good.

HOH: Part of this was the disintegration of the Bosnian delegation, but part of what they were facing -- seems to me; tell me what you think -- is they went for a peace deal in that they were giving up a lot of their aspirations for their country, things that some of them, at least thought ...

RCH: Are you talking about the Bosnians?

HOH: Yes. At some point they might be able to win on the battlefield. And it seemed that there was a moment somewhere in Dayton where they made the psychological choice: "Yes, we are actually going to go with the agreement, which means we're not going to be able to pursue a military solution unless things really fall apart way down the road."

RCH: I don't think they were thinking that rationally because a military solution could only be achieved by their having a kind of counter-ethnic cleansing. They could not politically control the whole country as long as vast chunks were preserved. Particularly Banja Luka. What were they going to do about Banja Luka? If they tried to drive the Serbs -- all the Serbs of western Bosnia, which is 600,000 or

700,000 -- out of homes they had lived in forever -- I don't mean generations, I mean forever -- then they would have lost world support and they would have certainly created a further crisis. And finally, they couldn't do it without Croatian artillery and tanks and the Croats wouldn't give them any. So the military solution you talked about was not available to them. They were, however, angry beyond angry at the evil perpetrated on them by the Serbs over the previous four years. And they were not -- because the war was a contemporaneous event not a few years in the past -- they were unable to do anything that smacked of reconciliation because these were the actual ethnic cleansers, the mass murderers, at least one of whom, is physically in Dayton: Krajisnik. Krajisnik is going to end up being the Serb (*inaudible*) the presidency with Izetbegovic now, and they had been in the Parliament before and they knew each other well. They all knew each other, but whatever they had known about each other was swept away by the blood on the hands of the Serbs and the Bosnians. Therefore, when Milosevic had to confront what he was doing in Dayton, he did not do it in the rational manner of your question, Chris. They didn't sit down and say, "Um, it's done." They already had the 51-49; they had agreed to it. They now viewed it as a huge mistake, **huge**. But at the same time they viewed the lines on the map, particularly around Brcko and Posovina, as some kind of moral commitment to the Secretary of State. And the most difficult moments for Warren Christopher in Dayton were when Izetbegovic repeatedly would look at me and say, "You agreed to the underpass in the Posovina."

HOH: In other words, any departure from the Contact Group...

RCH: No, if it was a departure in favor of the Federation, they loved it. Like the Livno Valley was not part of the Federation Alliance; they now have the Livno, they were damned if they were going to give it back because it created a strong corridor from Bihac to Sarajevo, which now exists. They wanted to pocket what they had won militarily and add what they were owed on the map without giving anything back. They actually had 55 percent, as they showed on the BBC show at one point. They came very close to a miracle outcome in Dayton, and then

[REDACTED] Once he had

Sarajevo unified and the Gorazde corridor -- two huge territorial issues -- had he then said, "Okay, we've got a deal right there," he might well have forced Milosevic into accepting worse than 51-49. Now, could Milosevic have done that? I don't know. But I don't believe they ever went to Dayton trying to unify the country under Bosnian control because they couldn't do it themselves and Tudjman wouldn't agree to it. They were just in Dayton to see how much they could get, and I don't think they ever could have let Dayton collapse, except they were so [REDACTED] they almost did anyway. It wasn't rational what happened in Dayton, but that's the way these things go.

HOH: Part of it -- jumping to November 17th -- may be explained perhaps by Izetbegovic saying he doesn't want to sign documents. He told Perry on the 17th he wouldn't sign documents that had Republika Srpska as a party. Now this was

something that, I think, you thought, at least most of us in the US side had thought, had been worked out in Geneva.

RCH: Yes. Well, that was just that he hadn't been in Geneva and he had to go through the motions. They always try to make you renegotiate what they prior negotiated.

HOH: Okay. Good to know. Jumping around in no particular order, I was going to ask you about tennis games.

RCH: Do you have the dates for those?

HOH: We've got two. One we're not real clear on who you might have had as a partner.

RCH: Chris Hill.

HOH: Both times?

RCH: Yes, it was Chris and me against ...

HOH: Granic and Susak?

RCH: No, no, it was Tudjman. Granic never played tennis. Both times we played tennis it was Tudjman and first time it was Tudjman and a gynecologist, a very, very good player, a Croatian I know who was traveling with the party to play tennis, basically. And then the second time, there was a very good-looking girl from the Croatian office in Geneva who was a superb player, who was there as a back-up, and then there was Susak who would play when his back permitted. But it was always Tudjman, Chris and me. There were three and the fourth varied. We only played twice.

HOH: We showed tennis games scheduled on November 8th and then one

November 11th. On November 8th there was some reference to progress being made on the Federation deal because the Federation document got initialed on the 9th. Do you remember what might have been a sticking point on the Federation? That might have gotten resolved?

RCH: I let Steiner have it. Chris will know. Or Phil Goldberg. Weren't you there at that point?

HOH: I was, but I don't know what was going on with the Federation talks.

RCH: I want to point out that Subak refused to sign the Federation (*inaudible*). He felt that it wasn't fair to the Croats, and so he sent me a letter that morning saying he wouldn't sign. I went to Tadjman and Tadjman said he's going to sign, and he still didn't sign, so I think Prlic signed. But you can check, Chris.

HOH: Yes, I was busy doing Eastern Slavonia at that point.

RCH: I see in today's papers that the defense law was finally approved.

HOH: The decision's kicked down (*inaudible*).

RCH: I've got to upstairs to see Tarnoff.

HOH: Okay. Let me just ask if you remember anything about the other tennis game which was on November 11th.

RCH: Yes, that was the one where Susak's back collapsed on him.

HOH: But at that point you had done the Eastern Slavonia agreement. Do you remember what was discussed?

RCH: At the tennis game? Nothing. Just played tennis.

DC, SE: But there was a report that there was some deal struck on the tennis courts.

RCH: They were just teasing you.

HOH: So you're going to see Tarnoff now. It would be a good time to take a break.

END OF INTERVIEW

#