DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DI SCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet

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COUNTERESPIONAGE ANALYSIS

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
RESUME

Basically this is an operation involving an agent whose status is in question regarding control and compromise. Among the basic reasons for the uncertainty regarding the status and adequacy of this agent is the fact that from the onset of communications between the dispatched agent and the base there has been no definitive form nor effective use of communications and cryptographic compromise signals, plans or program. At the time of dispatch in April 1951 the O.S.S. principle of leaving the development, training and implementation of cryptographic and communications compromise signals to the jurisdiction of the Office of Communications was still in effect in CIA. Possibly as a result of the specialized background of the personnel in the Office of Communications and the fact of their proportionately lesser experience in the field of agent and operational handling there was established by that Office a compromise signal that was an integral part of the beginning of the first message from the agent after his dispatch. Unfortunately, the Office of Communications was unable to receive the first portion of the first message from the agent and was, therefore, unable to determine the use or non-use of the compromise, safety or danger indicator. There was no subsequent request from the case officer nor the Office of Communications for a repeat of the first message from the agent in its entirety thus repeating the significant elements and establishing the status of the agent at the time of his first transmission.

Additional factors that pose questions regarding the status of this agent that are covered in greater detail in the body of this analysis are:

- <u>a.</u> Uncertain and modified use of the single control question given the agent and the subsequent correct answer when the question was exactly posed more than a year later.
- b. The curious non-productivity of this agent in terms of his original training, his briefing and the subsequent emphasis placed by headquarters in the form of instructions and directions, i.e. lack of contacts with city underground, desire of agent to emphasize propaganda effort, stated inability to legalize himself when he has numerous relatively intimate contacts with individuals who are legal residents of the area and while he himself has a background of demonstrated skill in document forgery, and
- c. Numerous other factors that are contributory to the current uncertainty of the agent's status.

Necessarily this analysis does not arrive at a definitive conclusion regarding the absolute status of the agent and of the operation in terms of control or lack of control. Rather it poses in as considered form as possible





the various factors and considerations that are felt to be applicable to the history of this operation and additionally this analysis identifies what are felt to be the major factors whose uncertain character suggest that continuing analysis be applied regarding their nature and importance throughout the course of operation.

The several recommendations posed at the end of this analysis are predicated not on a definitive determination of the status of this agent but rather they are posed with the view that they will be effective and valid working premises regardless of the status of the agent and the form and nature of control exercised over him if any.

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CONSIDERATIONS REQUIRING CONTINUING ANALYSIS


It is felt that it is desirable to present these factors in a generally chronological order but with occasional diversions for purpose of clarity and continuity.

It is interesting to note that Jack consistently becomes irritated when we ask retroactive questions regarding either events or his activities. Since our retroactive questions are usually in terms of detail regarding already transmitted information, there are several considerations that should be applied:

- a. If the agent is not under control then it is logical that this irritation is the result of an attempt to conduct the operation in as secure a manner as possible and, therefore, without written records and unnecessary materials that could expose to the security services in the area the nature of the operation were it ever compromised.
- b. If the agent is under control it is evident that the controllers have records of the operation in detail and are not placed at a disadvantage by our question series. However, it is logical therefore that such a reaction of anger and irritation would be an integral part of an effort on the part of the MGB to present a consistent and logical operational norm. As stated above, a normal operation would entail the natural irritation of an agent for such actions on the part of headquarters. Therefore, this item of reaction is not as important as would appear at first observation. It is only a factor to be further qualified by additional contributory evidence.


In messages #8, 10 September 1951 and #32, 26 April 1952, there is reference to the name GIRENAS. This name was used between Jack and one of the agents with whom he trained for French Intelligence. The name GIRENAS, it was determined on investigation, was used only between Jack and the man who had assumed this name. It was only with difficulty that we determined the identity of this individual. There are several interesting aspects to Jack's use of this name.

a. In message #8 to us Jack requested that GIRENAS be sent to do clandestine propaganda work with the partisans. The individual referenced GIRENAS is in fact trained and experienced in this field. In this respect it is logical that if JACK intended the development of such propaganda activities this request is logical and consistent with his needs.





- b. However, it should have been remembered by Jack that the name GIRENAS was developed between him and GIRENAS only and that it would be difficult for his case office to identify the individual.
- c. Therefore, it is possible that JACK intended to indicate to his case officer that something was unusual, different or wrong by the use of this name. The reasons for this action could include control status or an undefined lack of success in his mission that he could not indicate in the traffic otherwise.
- d. JACK and GIRENAS arranged between themselves only, that if JACK was able to contact GIRENAS' wife safely he would approach her with a recognition phrase. The phrase was not known to GIRENAS' wife at the time of JACK's departure but GIRENAS was to write his wife and inform her of the arrangement. The user of this recognition phrase was to be considered by the wife as being from or in contact with her husband and, therefore, trustworthy. Therefore,
- e. It is possible that JACK had attempted to contact GIRENAS' wife and found her unresponsive to the recognition phrase. Subsequently, by the use of the name GIRENAS in a message to us he tried to alert GIRENAS to write to his wife and alert or inform her of the recognition arrangements and phrase.
- f. It is interesting to note that all of these arrangements between JACK and GIRENAS regarding GIRENAS' wife, recognition phrases, the wife's address etc. were unknown to the agent trainers and handlers and were arranged purely on an individual basis between the two men. It was only after investigation following the receipt of the message referring to GIRENAS that the Agency determined the individual's identity, the nature of the relationship between the two men, and the facts of the above stated arrangements.
- g. In message #32, JACK refers to a suggestion by STEVE that they could use the services of GIRENAS. This is peculiar for it is definite that before dispatch STEVE did not know GIRENAS nor did he know that JACK knew a man by that name.
- h. It is possible that JACK by the use of this name, which he must have understood to be unknown to us, was attempting to indicate that something unusual had happened and,





therefore, to alert us that something was not normal, i.e. a cleverly arranged signal indicating compromise or control.

NOTE: It must be recognized that "control" could well include hostile or uncooperative Partisan control.

In message 10, 25 September 1951, JACK mentions two individuals, STUKAS and KELPSA. These are individuals about whom we might question JACK in the future to determine his reaction or non-reaction, the amount of information he will provide and the manner and completeness of the materials we receive. Additionally, if JACK is exfiltrated these are personalities about whom we would want to interogate him, not only for reasons of positive operational interest but also to assist in the determination of possible control and doubling.

Throughout JACK'S training and during the early stages of the operation in message 2, 2 July 1951 and messages 5 and 6, 14 September 1951, we requested military and political information. It is interesting to note that JACK has at no time provided this type of information in any form. The only related information he has sent even sporadically has included only the physical locations of major MGB headquarters and personalities. Additionally, these responses have been in answer to our specific and repeated requests for such information. the number of contacts that he should have in this area and the number of legal residents known to him whose allegiance is presumably to the Partisans, it appears reasonable that more MGB personalities should be known and identifiable and that a number of unofficial MGB installations should be known as such by the local population. In a presumably forceful and relatively unpopular occupation by foreign forces, both military and political, it would seem that the individuals involved in the conduct of that occupation and the installations that they use and occupy both officially and covertly should be subject to considerable scrutiny and detailed observation by the local populace simply because they represent the foreign and the undesirable. repeat, there has been a remarkable lack of this type of information in response to our detailed requests. While this reaction is only suggestive, future analysis should tend to validate or discredit this consideration.

Throughout the course of the operation JACK has reported on little other than the activities of the partisans. Recognizing that activities of the type in which JACK is engaged are rather pressing and strenuous experiences, it is reasonable that the perspective of a participant will be selectively and unconsciously distorted in terms of the value system of his environment. Accordingly, the reporting by such an agent will reflect the emphases that he feels to be appropriate to the situation with a commensurately lesser emphasis on that which appears to be of lesser importance.







Therefore, the apparently skewed reporting practice by JACK should not be viewed solely with alarm and suspicion at this point especially considering the pressures of this environment and its conditioning influence for a period of 20 months.

On 14 September 1951 we asked for details regarding STEVE'S death. Two messages later on 5 October we received a vague, general answer to our specific questions. In terms of the above and the considerations of perspective that apply to this operation it would seem natural that JACK would consider the matter of the death of a friend with whom he had trained to be a matter of importance and interest to not only himself but also to the base. Therefore, with this assumption of importance and interest on the part of JACK it is reasonable to expect that he knew or determined the details of STEVE'S death very quickly, not only for reasons of his personal acquaintance and friendship with STEVE but also in order to determine and evaluate the possibility that some unknown compromise had informed the local security services of the location of STEVE and also the rest of the partisans. This form of detailed status evaluation is fundamental to any operation of this type. Therefore, it appears reasonable to assume that JACK was fully aware of the details of STEVE'S death from the time or shortly after the time he was first informed of the raid. Several considerations that may qualify why he did not more fully inform headquarters in this matter are:


- a. JACK may have felt that he had more information than he could logically transmit to headquarters for their evaluation and, therefore, since he had already evaluated the situation and found it satisfactory he would inform us only regarding what he felt to be the most salient details.
- b. It is possible that JACK is under control and that the "death" of STEVE was only a convenient means of his disposal from the operation. Were this true, it is possible that the controlling case officer had not previously developed the details of STEVE'S death and, therefore, it was necessary to coordinate with a central MGB headquarters or in Moscow. This would, at least in part, explain the time delay and also the overall dearth of details.

For the period 27 November 1951 to 2 April 1952 JACK did not respond on schedule. Subsequently on reestablishment of contact he informed us that he had "trouble" with his generator and that this was the cause of his contact failure. Just prior to this five month lapse of contact we were inquiring in detail regarding contact points, drop sites, the availability of Partisan personnel to handle aerial supply drops and to adequately accept and protect additional personnel. It would appear that this is not a time at which MGB

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controllers of an operation would cease contact for a five month period and risk the cancellation of these preparations and all that this involves. However, the facts are that the AIS did not intend nor were they prepared to satisfy the resupply discussion that had been in progress since September 1951. Not only was winter approaching with what are usually severe weather conditions but the dispatch of additional personnel into circumstances that undoubtedly sorely try the partisans and consequently to further tax the already minimal accommodations is not logical. Even though the additional personnel would bring with them, via the air drop, a certain amount of food, medical supplies etc., these supplies could not be sufficient to provide for the needs of the added personnel for the hazardous winter period. In short, November is well after the dispatch season and the development of an operation in that area during the winter months is untenable at present. It is possible that the MGB, because of their knowledge of the area and local operating conditions were aware of these qualifying factors and suspected that we were using the pretext of prepared resupply to acquire additional positive information. Therefore, by suspending contact for this period they not only seized the initiative and responded in a manner that we would not normally expect to be found in a controlled agent operation but, also, they accrued time for a leisurely reevaluation, re-analysis and detailed reinterrogation of the agent. Additionally, with the timing of this suspended contact it is possible for the MGB to decide, without pressure, the future limits and dimensions of the operation as well as the several avenues of exploitation that are both available and profitable. Furthermore if JACK is under the control of an MGB-local security service liaison this period will provide time to coordinate the exploitation course and to effectuate better liaison relationships for the future. Credence to the above comments is lent by the fact that during the five month period of difficulty with the generator it is reasonable that some auxiliary power source could be provided. This auxiliary power could be in the form of the conversion of local power to operate the transmitter or at least the acquisition of subsidiary power units from JACK'S legal contacts. Additionally, it would appear reasonable that before a five month period had elapsed local assistance could have been acquired to repair the generator.

Contary to the training, orientation and briefing to military and political targets, JACK has shown a marked consistency throughout his mission toward the dissemination of propaganda materials. This emphasis of effort is in particular contradiction to Agency directives. In practice, propaganda distribution is virtually antithetical to the procurement of positive operational intelligence. The basic orientation and operational methods are necessarily different. Therefore, whatever JACK'S allegiance or status of control, the directional course of this operation is such that it has effectively precluded, either volitionally or by default, the procurement of any volume of positive intelligence. We have at this time no effective means of determining the volume, quality or nature of the propaganda efforts of the ZALGIRIS detachment and are totally dependent on the scope of reporting of





BROADWAY and Consequently, it must be recognized that we are not in a position to effectively evaluate even this trend of effort toward propaganda distribution.

JACK has sent some 5 contact points involving 12 people who he states may be considered reliable. If JACK is controlled, this would appear to be a relatively large number of individuals for a control organization to expose under the circumstances for it would require that they either monitor the activities of these individuals at all times to detect contact from our agents in the area or to maintain these individuals as informants. However, if these individuals are informants, the MGB is risking that their status will be known to the neighbors and relatives, and consequently to other agents we have in the area, for such status does not long remain unknown in many instances. It is possible, however, that only a portion of these individuals are informants and that some of these individuals are totally unrelated to intelligence activities. This procedure would both reduce the MGB monitoring manpower required and would also negate any effectiveness to our agents contacting these persons for they would, in fact, have no local stigma as informants and at the same time no contact with intelligence activities, and probable moderates & of an inch authorities

It is interesting to note that JACK has in messages #21, 21 April 1952 and #64, 25 August 1952 made reference to Vytautas Medisauskas, a student at the Polytechnic Institute at Kaunas. This student is stated in and a supplementary message, #65, 29 August 1952, to have been born in France but there is no definite date or year of birth provided. Without this information we are unable to request our (Pr our own installation to check and investigate this man for it is essential in the French 🥕 system of recording vital statistics that the exact date of the subject's are birth be known. This one item appears to be the only absolutely essential information in tracing and validating an individual's location and history of birth in France. While the above facts are only contributory information they should be considered in view of the fact that any MGB operation would certainly have available the fact that French vital statistics are predicated on a chronological dating system. It is recommended that since there is, in another operation, reference to the Polytechnic Institute at Kaunas and that this clinic may be a nodal point in other operations, that the student Vytautas Medisauskas be the subject of more than the usual investigative effort. We should inquire of JACK the crucial information regarding the date of his birth in the context of an inquiry regarding similar information on other personnel recommended by JACK. Thereafter, with this data a portion of his background may be validated or discredited.

In message #4, 26 June 1951, JACK states "settled with Zalgiris detachment". Again in message 77, 14 October 1952 JACK states that Frank is the leader of the Zalgiris detachment. It would seem worthy of investigation to



determine how, under what circumstances, at what time and by what method Frank assumed or was appointed leadership of this detachment. If for no other reason than the knowledge of the criteria of leadership in this area and among these partisans this investigation should be made for it may well assist subsequent teams in the establishment of rapport and the maintenance of an effective and profitable relationship with partisan groups in this area.

It is interesting to note that the Birutenai detachment is mentioned only once throughout the entire course of this operation. In message #4, 26 June 1951, JACK states that this detachment was close to where his aerial supply container landed. In message #25, 6 April 1952, JACK states that he subsequently returned to where he buried the aerial supply container and was unable to locate it. If this is true he should, therefore, have traveled close to the Birutenai detachments position. It would be well to query JACK further regarding the location and his knowledge of this detachment.





CONTROL SIGNALS AND QUESTIONS


At the time of dispatch, the agent was provided a compromise program consisting of three basic elements:

- a. A communications control signal that was to preface the first message and would specifically indicate either control status or freedom from control.
- b. A routine cryptographic signal involving the use or nonuse of the number eight (8) at the end of each message.
- c. A specific cryptographic control challenge also involving the digit 8.
- d. The use of a specifically worded control question to which there was a specifically worded answer to indicate freedom from control.

The details of each of these elements are as follows:

- a. The agent was instructed that in his first message to us he was to reverse his call signals for the first message contact only if he was not controlled.
- b. The routine use of a constant digit 8 would indicate freedom from control, any other digit would indicate control status.
- c. When base challenged the agent with a series of digit 8's the agent was to respond with any number but 8 if uncontrolled and with the digit 8 if under control and
- d. Control question "What color hair does Mike have?" with to uncontrolled answer "Mike has no hair".

Throughout the course of the operation confidence in the compromise plan has been interrupted with periods of uncertainty. For example, when combined messages 11 and 12 on 17 October 1951 were transmitted to JACK a pronounced modification of the control question was employed. Instead of asking the exactly worded control question "What color hair does Mike have?", which was felt to be too obviously a control question, the question was rephrased "Can you utilize capabilities of Mike, who compares favorably with Steve for such work? He is black-haired fellow whom you may remember we spoke of". The agent prior to dispatch was not briefed that there were possible variations from this exactly worded control question. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that at the very least this rather drastic alteration of an exactly





worded control question was confusing to JACK to the extent that all significance was obscured both by the unrelated context and the vagaries of the phraseology. The conclusion that the agent was confused is supported by the fact that in message 17 on 30 October 1951 JACK replied "Mike, regarding whom you speak, I am not able to remember".

Additional confusion regarding the use of the compromise plan is found in that JACK did not reply to a cryptographic challenge accompanying messages 13 and 14 transmitted to him on 12 November 1951. However later in message 20 three days later JACK asked for a repeat of these two messages that accompanied the cryptographic challenge. These messages were repeated again on 17 November. It is not clear at this time whether or not the repeated messages that were sent to JACK were again accompanied by the cryptographic challenge. The field has been queried but has, at the time of this report, not replied. Again on 9 April 1952 accompanied by message number 18 a cryptographic challenge was posed to JACK. At the next contact on 15 April when JACK transmitted message 27 to us the challenge was not answered. The files at headquarters do not indicate the form of the challenge although it is presumed that it was the same as that previously used. In all cables from the field to headquarters the statement "crypto signal normal" has been included. It is not clear in records available at headquarters whether this statement refers to an indicator that is routinely attached to or a part of each transmission from JACK if he is not under control or some other form of safety indicator.

The control question "What color hair does Mike have?" was posed on 21 October 1952 in message numbered 74 and 75. The exact wording as taught the agent before dispatch was used and the question was placed in a cover context where it would not appear obvious. In message number 83 transmitted by JACK on 23 October 1952 the control question was answered correctly. There was a difference, however, between the answer transmitted by JACK and that which he was taught before dispatch. The difference was that JACK used the abbreviation "M" and not the full name "MIKE" as he was instructed. It is possible that JACK was under control at the time we made the original reference to MIKE in messages transmitted to him on 17 October 1951 when the altered control question was posed. Additionally, it is possible that subsequent interrogation by his controllers disclosed the full correct question and the correct answer. In that event it is possible that JACK, when the correct question was posed, attempted to indicate that something was wrong and that his generally correct answer was invalid by means of the substitution of the incomplete "M" instead of "MIKE". The he wishen I will except

make a get the in take on briefly.

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RADIO CONTACT AND DIRECTION FINDING

On 6 June 1952 in Message #45, JACK's readability was very low. He refused to transfer to an alternate frequency although he did change to a second frequency. It is interesting to note that he stopped transmission after only 15 groups of an indicated 80 group message. He did, however, state his next contact time.


In message #53, on 21 July 1952 from JACK, it appears significant to note that he complained of the length of the contact time as being excessive. Interestingly enough, this was the approximate time of our first attempt to RDF his transmission.

Of JACK's messages, numbers 35, 40, 48, and 62, were complete garbles and we were unable to decipher any parts of those messages. This fact when considered in view of JACK's claim to extreme caution in encipherment is difficult to reconcile. At present we have no specific information regarding the location of this garble, i.e. whether it is JACK's garble or inaccurate or erroneous use of code pads, inaccuracy in transmission by JACK or an error within our own communication system. In this respect, it is recommended that a detailed analysis of these garbles be made to determine:

- a. Is it possible that JACK did not encode correctly by some error such as using the wrong pages in his code book. This has happened before in other operations.
- \underline{b} . If not the above reason, what are the most likely other reasons for this type of garble which seems rather unique.

In agent communication of this type it appears absolutely mandatory to determine the reason for such lack of communication and inadequacy of contact by being certain that our own contact techniques, retransmission and communication channels are not at fault. With this information we are in a position to analyse a garble or an inadequate transmission and, therefore to evaluate:

- a. Accidental garbling by the agent by neglect, lack of training, emotional envolvement of the agent at the moment of encipherment or other presently unknown factors.
- <u>b.</u> A control effort on the part of an organization, or individual or influence on the agent in an effort to confuse, stall for time or procrastinate by the use of incomplete, distorted contacts or by ciphery-garbling. These are standard techniques in an effort to postpone answers and regain the initiative in an operation.






AGENT INACCURACIES

In the course of the operation there is one specific instance of inaccuracy of positive information from JACK regarding which we have corollary data. In message 43 transmitted 21 May 1952 JACK refers to an "abundant snowfall" during the preceding winter. From a BROADWAY source there is a presumably reliable report to the effect that the 1951-52 winter in this area was relatively mild and that snowfall was delayed until the first of March. There are several considerations to be applied to this point of inaccuracy. The more important appear to be:

- a. It is possible that the BROADWAY source is either controlled, or not an accurate or adequate reporter.
- b. It is possible that JACK was simply not adequately expressing himself and that the conflict of reports is the result of incomplete communications.
- c. It is possible that, because of the unknown geographical separation of the BROADWAY source and JACK, each of the respective reports are true and accurate and that the discrepancies in weather are due to conditions inherent to different geographical locales, different altitudes, topographical characteristics, etc. This matter has not been examined by competent area and meterological specialists. It is recommended that such an examination be conducted in order that this contributory information be available for analysis in the proper perspective.
- d. It is possible that JACK is under control and that the controllers are deliberately stating false information in an effort to determine our reaction. By such a process they could infer, in part, our assets in the area and guide their conduct of the operation accordingly.
- e. Additionally, it is possible that JACK is under control and that the controllers are deliberately transmitting inaccurate information with the assumption that we have adequate parallel assets in the area whose reports will demonstrate the inaccuracy of this information and subsequently alert us to the possibility of control. In short they would, by design, create a suspicion of the competency or status of the agent. From such a program the controllers would be able to obtain considerable information regarding our handling of an agent whose status or quality was under suspicion. They could determine, for example, how long chronologically does it




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take us to detect the inaccuracy, make a decision regarding the implications of such inaccuracy, formulate a program of action and implement that program, whether that program is simply to ask for a clarification from the agent or whether that program is a gradual curtailment of sensitive intelligence directives.

JACK, in message 34, 29 April 1952, makes a very brief reference to "OMHL" soldiers. When asked regarding this abbreviation in subsequent messages he states he knows nothing about such soldiers and that he does not know what the letters "OMHL" mean. Reference to the operational communications contact report, which is not available to headquarters at this time, should reconcile whether JACK actually transmitted this abbreviation or whether there was a garble in Agency communications. It is recommended that such an examination be conducted. If there has been no Agency garble it must be presumed that JACK deliberately or accidently made an error in encipherment. A wholly accidental error would appear less probable for JACK claims to exercise extreme care in encipherment and has reacted rather sharply to previous requests that he be more careful. Assuming for the moment no Agency communications error in this matter, there are several possible answers:

- An honest and legitimate error in encipherment by JACK of a given, presently unknown group of soldiers. This appears less probable for throughout the ensuing discussion of the letters "OMHL" JACK did not correct our misunderstanding but rather stated that he had not sent the indicated letters.
- b. It is possible that JACK is under control and that the use of these letters is for the deliberate creation of suspicion and confusion to the Agency. Credence is lent this possibility because either a controlled or an uncontrolled agent would logically be expected to reconcile the confusion by a retransmission of the message containing the questioned letters.
- trolling case officer made an error in releasing or using the letters of an existing organization with only partial authority to do so, and that subsequently the above described tactics were employed to terminate discussion of the subject. Considering that JACK may be jointly controlled by an MGB local security service liaison and that he may be actually handled by the local security service, this possibility of accidental release assumes greater importance.



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In messages #29 (regarding distance), #46 (regarding numerical number of persons), #56 (regarding locations), transmitted on July 30, 1952, JACK answered our questions with numbers and repeat numbers that were not the same, i.e. "52 repeat 26 and 48 repeat 29". At very least this is a most curious practice. It could be a provocation technique on the part of JACK's controllers. Although at the present time we are not certain that JACK actually created this confusion because we have made no check on our own communications to determine whether these errors occurred in JACK's transmission to us or our own retransmission to Washington. With this lack of information, therefore, we cannot adequately evaluate whether this confusion could be "honest" errors on the part of the agent; errors of deliberation on the part of controllers or; our own communication and clerical errors. It is recommended that inquiries be made to the field in order that the exact nature of these difficulties may be determined.

In message #57 on 30 July 1952, JACK stated that he had contacts on the Lithuanian-Polish Border. Presumably reliable information on the status of this border indicates that it is extremely difficult to penetrate and that rather extreme security safeguards have been erected to prevent passage. It is well-known that this border was an effective escape route until approximately the end of 1948-49, therefore, this statement on the part of JACK which has not been pursued further by the Agency may well be a provocation with the intent of diverting or drawing our attention to a decoy area in order to initiate future re-use.

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SEGUNITY INFORMATION

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LEGALIZATION

JACK, in message 20 transmitted 15 November 1951, states that in 1950 three men were legalized from the Zalgiris detachment. There is no indication or explanation of the process or method for such legalization nor the result. If it was possible for legalization to be accomplished at that time it would be valuable to determine the reason that JACK states that legalization is difficult now. Undoubtedly, there have been changes in the process since that time, although no references have been so stated. Additionally, it is interesting to note that although memory and references to events in the 1950 period are possible there are no references or records available regarding relationships, composition or effectiveness of the LLKS.



LETTER DROPS


At the time of dispatch JACK was provided with two letter drops, one located in Munich, Germany and one in Montreal, Canada. On 7 April 1951 in message 25, JACK indicated that he had posted three letters - two letters to Germany and one to Canada. There is no indication that these letters arrived at either destination.

Assuming that JACK is uncontrolled and that he correctly addressed and innocuously posted these letters or did so via a reliable friend so that they did, in fact, enter the postal system of Lithuania, it may be assumed that the reason for their non-arrival is due to:

- a. A Lithuanian internal censorship system, either routine or special, that examined and detained these letters.
- b. A censorship program in Lithuania with a policy of examining mail crossing the border out of the country detained these letters.
- c. RE GERMAN ADDRESS. Censorship on mail entering a German occupied zone. With regard to the letter addressed to Munich, Germany it is possible that postal examination is conducted by the U.S. Occupation Forces on all incoming mail from a given area including Lithuania.
- d. Censorship of mail from Lithuania and adjacent areas as it passes through any other border controls en route to an occupied German zone.
- e. RE CANADIAN ADDRESS. Censorship of mail entering Canada when either posted from a given area or routed via a given postal route.

Assuming JACK is under control it is possible that his controllers intended to:

- a. BY NOT SENDING LETTERS BUT SENDING RADIO MESSAGE determine our reaction to the fact that the letters did not reach either destination.
- b. BY ACTUALLY SENDING EITHER OR BOTH LETTERS via resources in the area of each address, determine the identity of the addressee and the related organization, thus providing an opportunity for several forms of action solely at their option.




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It is difficult to evaluate these various possibilities without an investigation to determine the various postal practices both within the respective countries and occupied zones through which the mail from this part of Lithuania is routed. In the portion of this analysis termed "Recommendations" it is suggested that such an investigation be conducted to assist in determining 1) if either or both letters were actually posted and b) if posted the most probable point or points at which these letters were interrupted and lastly 3) if interrupted, for what reason i.e. suspect location where posted, routine or special postal regulations, border controls, etc. Additionally, it is recommended that these letter drops be tested immediately to determine that they do, in fact, function and, by elementary laboratory methods, to determine that the mail is not tampered with between a controlled point available to the Agency or allied services and the destination.

An investigation of these points alone will reveal valuable positive intelligence regarding the feasibility of providing an agent with letter drops when he is dispatched into given areas where the address itself on a letter may inaugurate special controls and handling methods.





AGENCY PATTERNS, TRENDS AND MATERIAL EXPOSED

The trends and pattern of operational activity posed by the Agency in the conduct of this operation are rather specific. For example, in the training and dispatch of the agent there was constant and specific orientation of interest toward political and military reporting. The agent's briefing was in this direction, specifically, and it is to be expected that this was a realistic need on our part or the agent would never have been so prepared. However, throughout the course of the operation there has been only the most cursory attention given both by the agent and by the Agency toward specific items of reporting that included this category of information. To a counterespionage analyst of any controlling organization who would have at his disposal the complete interrogation of JACK, this deviation from the entire program of training and orientation provided JACK would suggest several important symptoms. Some of these factors are as follows:

- a. At or just subsequent to the time of dispatch there was a pronounced shift of interest on the part of the American Intelligence Services toward executive operations of the type conducted by the partisans and, therefore, while the AIS has not recommended these operations continue, there has certainly been nofirm position assumed by the AIS regarding JACK's position relative to such activities of the partisans. In short there has been, in effect, passive acceptance on the part of AIS of this operational course with only periodic tentative efforts to alter the activities of the partisans, and particularly, the reporting characteristics of JACK. It is true that AIS influence on the relatively autonomous partisans is difficult to exercise via long range and tenuous liaison but at least control of JACK's activities would be exercised.
- c. The agent handling on the part of the AIS has been without threats, strong positive assertions of authority, and coercion of the agent. This characteristic appears in rather strong counter-distinction to the operational

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SEGURITY INFORMATION

handling characteristics of the MGB, the British, and the French. Therefore, it is possible that this pattern is symptomatic of AIS agent handling and that in instances wherein sponsorship of an agent is not known this particular characteristic would be strongly suggestive, if not definitive, of an agent's dispatch source.

- d. There has been less than specific and positive use of the compromise program with which the agent was equipped at the time of dispatch. The use of the materials has been inconclusive and the results difficult to interpret. In part, this is due to the nature of the elements of the compromise program itself and the techniques with which the agent was provided by the Office of Communications. Additionally, if JACK is under control this absence of definitive action on the part of AIS should certainly be instructive.
- Prior to the presumed failure of JACK's generator and his consequent lack of transmission for a period of five months during the winter of 1951, the AIS had been actively discussing resupply even though it would have been impractical and disadvantageous to do so at that time. After the five months' loss of contact there was no further comment on the part of AIS regarding resupply. There has been none since. At the time of this suspension of contact there existed certain suspicions regarding JACK's control status, the result of the several factors previously discussed (no reaction to challenges, uncertainty regarding first message, etc.) Immediately following the reestablishment of effective radio contact the prepondering emphasis of AIS instructions shifted from previous directives toward the establishment of legal status. Additionally, he was then provided two more letter drops. This matter of legalization has been subsequently pressed with some vigor by AIS. Without doubt, legalization is an avenue that may well be pursued legitimately by any intelligence service in the establishment of its agents and such action is in consonance with long term intelligence goals. However, the timing of this new emphasis by AIS just following a period of inactivity and suspicion, the result of non-reaction to compromise elements, and a period of suspended contact, it would seem that such a shift of basic intelligence emphasis appears to have been undesirable. I feel that the matter of instructing an agent to legalize when he is under suspicion of control is rapidly becoming a pattern of AIS handling.






In this operation and in several others, the AIS has consistently directed the agent to legalize himself after he reached suspect status. In each instance the AIS after issuing these instructions did not (could not) follow the logical course of indicating in detail to the agent how to accomplish this goal. Therefore, the fact of this instruction, its timing, its form and the AIS follow-up has established a pattern that, to an astute MGB analyst, in a central point, and with access to the records of several AIS operations, should have evolved this particular series of events as prima-facie evidence of AIS suspicion of control.

As stated above, the matter of legalization of an agent is unquestionably consonant with the long term desires of most intelligence services and, therefore, the directional orientation is valid; however, it would appear desirable that in the future an agent be instructed regarding legalization at a time when he is not approaching suspicion of status and in a manner that will not expose the adequacy of our information regarding the sensitive subject of legalization processes.

In messages 38 and 39 transmitted on 5 June 1952 the Agency instructed Vytautas MEDISAUSKAS, a student at the Kaunas Polytechnique Institute, to join the Communist party and ingratiate himself with the organization. While this instruction would appear to be a standard technique for any intelligence organization it appears that this is the first time that this particular instruction has been specifically given to an agent. If control is present this fact, of course, assumes infinitely greater importance.

In successive messages after the reestablishment of communications with JACK, the Agency has demonstrated and exposed extreme interest in 1) the city underground, 2) legal contacts and their identification, 3) the identity of refugee organizations that have the allegiance of the partisans, and 4) a desire for the establishment of a cooperative partisan-city underground relationship (thus implying that such a relationship does not now exist.)

To the extent that the Agency has inquired regarding these subjects that are, in fact, matters of vital interest to the conduct of clandestine operations in this area, there has been an accurate exposure of particular interest and, correspondingly, an exposure for analysis of those areas where previous activities have proven inadequate and suggested, therefore, wherein future operations will be centered.





RECOMMENDATIONS

Basically these recommendations will consist of two parts. The first division will involve the steps felt necessary for the determination of information contributory to a more positive understanding of the status of JACK and the operation. The second division will consist of recommendations regarding the future course and conduct of the operation in view of the presently uncertain status of JACK and of the environmental setting. The term "environmental setting" is used for, as stated before, it is possible that JACK is under the control of the partisans.

- l. Check with TSS to determine if JACK's secret writing materials would still be usable. If so, instruct JACK to again write to one or more of the letter drops. We should specify which one and, also, specify approximately when he should post the letter. This process will not only answer the question of the usability of these forms of communication but will also provide an estimate of time necessary for the use of this media of communications when necessary for emergencies. Additionally, if controlled, the MGB will be placed in a position that they must react either by passing the letters or by stopping them. This in itself should require a certain time period, each element of which is exposed to us on analysis.
- 2. Regarding the letter drops in Munich to which JACK claims to have sent a letter, it is recommended that we determine that our own occupation forces did not examine and detain this letter or, further, that they did not initiate an investigation about which the Agency is not aware.
- 3. It is suggested that inquiries be conducted of the appropriate area desks to determine the internal postal practices and the most likely points of detention of such mail. This investigation plus our handling of the operation may well result in specific positive information of value to later operations.
- 4. It is recommended that investigation be conducted of the local weather conditions in the general geographical area of JACK and the BROADWAY source to assist in the determination of the possibility that two different forms of weather conditions could co-exist.
- 5. With regard to the status of the cryptographic pads and the fact that he may be near the exhaustion of these supplies, it is recommended that we not mention or suggest any interest or concern in this matter. This is for several reasons:
 - a. If JACK exhausts the cryptographic materials that we know he had in his possession at the time of the dispatch, and without a break in continuity of communication, uses the pads that were, according to our records, issued to STEVE, this in itself indicates that some



arrangement was made between JACK and STEVE regarding the transfer of the pads. This fact of transfer is not necessarily implied to be voluntary nor involuntary but merely indicates the fact that such a transfer has been made. There is the possibility that JACK received from STEVE his code materials for a logical reason. At the early part of the operation JACK was to remain at a . secure haven, comparatively speaking, while STEVE was to proceed into a relatively hazardous area. Under these circumstances, it is logical that such sensitive communicative data and cryptographic material would be left in a place of security and not subjected to compromise with the agent. At a later time, JACK can be queried regarding the time, location and circumstances of the transfer of these materials if it appears appropriate and advisable to do so.


- b. It is possible, because of lack of experience, that JACK is not aware of the fact that he is nearing the end of his pads. It is possible that with the press of other activities and the requirements and the consistent strains of the relationship with the partisans he has overlooked this matter. This would appear on first consideration to be unlikely, but considering that this is the first operation of this type in which JACK has participated, and additionally, that this is the first time that he has used such a cryptographic system, it is not unreasonable that he has not recognized or considered the problem.
- c. If JACK is controlled it is possible that the MGB will use the shortage of such materials as a means of forcing us, on short notice, to alleviate the situation. They would gain materially from such a provocation for any action on our part including inaction would be revealing. The implementation of a provocation involving a lack of these communication data, that would be crucial to the operation on a very elementary basis and would force us to resupply the agent, thereby exposing our re-supply methods, channels, and facilities at a time and under circumstances wherein we were not able to utilize previously prepared facilities nor to establish facilities on a moments notice to satisfy this potentially terminal provocation.
- 6. Under the above circumstances there are six specific courses of remedial action. These courses are dependent upon the determination of the priority and importance of this operation and the extent to which we, as an intelligence service, wish to extend ourselves in the conduct of this operation.

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- a. If the agent has not destroyed his cryptographic pads in the course of the normal operations, it is possible to instruct him to reuse these cryptographic pads in a somewhat secure manner. This could be affected without delay or security hazard by a cable of instructions to the agent.
- b. A code system of the Hermes type, could be taught to the agent with the remaining cryptographic materials in future contacts. This is not recommended, at this time, for such training would be time consuming, difficult, subject to uncertainty and error and would compromise a new concept of communication security that would seem less than desirable under these circumstances.
- Z. It appears definitely feasible that as an interim measure JACK could be taught a double transposition numerical cipher system in connection with a memory interruptor phrase. This system would be less complicated than other systems and would be more adaptable to instruction via W/T. Additionally, if JACK is controlled the compromise of a double transposition cipher system would represent less loss than any other.
- d. JACK could be instructed to construct a new set of one-time pads with relatively little time and detail involved. This is not considered to be desirable for reasons of cryptographic security. It would be applicable for an interim period and would serve only as a time delay mechanism, while we implement one or more of the re-supply possibilities.
- e. Direct re-supply of code materials, both encoding and decoding, to the agent, via an appropriate dead-drop. If these drop facilities are available, or can be made available, they are without doubt the most desirable course of action available to us, for they not only indicate our capabilities of logistical and communicative supply, but also suggest our evaluation of the importance of this operation to us, and to that which we represent; provided a direct contact link to JACK in the eyes of his colleagues and therefore establishes his bona fide; would be the first specific, positive evidence of an objective nature that would indicate JACK's contact and support from the "outside".





- f. There is little doubt that if a provocation involving these materials is inaugurated it will be of extreme importance to the controllers for there is little question that the MGB is vitally interested in American Intelligence Service alternative forms of communication, cipher and code systems, and emergency methods and procedures. To reiterate, by the simple process of prepared inaction on our part in not requesting information regarding this matter we retain the greatest latitude of action and initiative. Any development of this operation regarding the matter of code materials will be significant.
- 7. Additionally, it is recommended that at the earliest possible date a dead drop containing code pads and materials be placed in a location available to JACK, and about which he may be instructed at the appropriate time.
- 8. It is suggested that the operation conduct in the future include the following instructions to JACK:
 - a. Train several radio operators in full.
 - <u>b</u>. Procure documents by whatever means JACK feels to be appropriate, thus not committing ourselves to any specific course of action.
 - c. Arrange for specific support points for exfiltration and subsequently infiltration.
 - d. The inauguration of several deceptive operational interest areas, i.e. data regarding detailed communications, light plane air fields, etc.
 - e. Train other agents among your group in the several techniques that were taught you during your training with us.
 - f. Adroitly phrased questions regarding names referred to in message #67, on 9 September 1952.
 - g. A series of specific operational re-directions and reorientations toward the above objectives. Such operational re-orientation of the agent would be appropriate at this time and very probably would assist a better perspective on the part of the agent and the partisans. This would be appropriate whether JACK were under control or not.



August 1975 (1976)



9. Since we, in message #69 on 9 October 1952, specifically committed ourselves to supply JACK financially in order that he would be able to legalize himself, it is important for JACK's status among the partisans and his maintenance of bona-fides, that we satisfy this commitment or justify very carefully our reasons for not doing so. Additionally, it is important to our relations with JACK that we discharge this responsibility to maintain our own integrity and stature.

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- 10. Instruct JACK to identify PIUTONA and NEMYRAS referred to in message #77 on 14 October 1952. It is recommended that a full name check be conducted on all personalities mentioned by JACK throughout the entire course of this operation. It would seem advisable to later disseminate these names through liaison to other organizations that might have this information and that such names be placed in an "alert" file wherein this division would be informed automatically when at any time in the future this information was obtained about these individuals. Also, it is felt that consideration should be given to non-AIS liaison channels for the same purpose.
- 11. In the most recent messages to JACK it is important to recognize that we have shown a new initiative and markedly increased activity level for certain types of information. These include code names, identification signals, selected meeting and gathering sites, basic self-identification and a number of other items that at very least would be considered extremely sensitive information by the partisans and, additionally, would be virtually definitive for purposes of pin-pointing an organization and its activities. If these changes of activity level and interest area are timed carefully, it is possible that they will not create as much reaction or alert the controllers to the extent that they would if they were not a part of the normal operational course. Therefore, it appears advisable that we make the insertion of these messages a gradual and natural part of our instructional pattern and not by means of separate messages which induce suspicions or attention to this type of imquiry. In short, if JACK is under control, it is necessary, by a somewhat gradual series of steps and envolvements, to decrease the activity level and at the same time minimize their recognition of a new pattern of interest or the inauguration of a new directional sequence.
- 12. It is suggested that consideration be given a positive course of action leading to exfiltration of JACK and/or representatives of his partisan group. It is felt that this exfiltration could be inaugurated in the coming spring. Within the latitude of movement afforded by our suggestions re such exfiltration of either JACK or his appointed representative, lies the fact that if JACK is under control, either by the partisans or by an MGB-local security service, those controllers will have the option of sending JACK, sending their own representatives, or not responding. Any of these reactions, either exfiltration of JACK and/or representatives, will not be definitive either regarding JACK's status of control nor the security of the operation. Such reaction, however, will be suggestive and most certainly contributory to analysis.

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
- 13. Much of the future exploitation of this operation and the methods of handling involve the fundamental matter and basic decision of what assets, materials and personnel we are willing to expose and invest in the operation. It is on this basis of relative value that many of these recommendations are made. If, for example, the calculation of risk indicates that we are forced by pressure of circumstances to supply personnel directly and in a traceable manner to the operation, then the risk and accordingly the returns must be proportionately greater than if the operation requires only the maintenance of its present activity level and the exposure of more innocuous materials.
- 14. It is suggested that we ask for more specific identification and useful details regarding all persons throughout the operation. This is to be performed over a period of time.
- 15. In the future it is recommended that we and emphasize additional assets in the area and that these mythical assets will assume certain responsibilities for some of the directives previously given to JACK. These factious assets can be made to appear as new assets, or existing assets or both. Regardless, the introduction by subtle inference of additional resources unknown to the MGB will arouse their interest and may well cause them to expose their presence by their very efforts to enter the situation and to explore via JACK. If JACK is not under control, these assets will certainly be important as a morale consideration to JACK and additionally will relieve him of many requirements that he has not satisfactorily accomplished to date. Additionally, JACK's stature should raise proportionately in terms of his relationships with the partisans by the very fact of the existence of these additional resources in the area even though no direct contact occurs.
- 16. Record on tape all contacts in full throughout the rest of this operation. In view of the fact that controlled agent operations in other geographical areas have demonstrated the ability of the MGB to install their own radio operators into an operation to take the place of the agent, it is again recommended that "fingerprinting" be performed on a continuing basis in this operation due to the fact of question regarding the agent's status. It has been found in other operations that in a matter of only a few weeks, an MGB radio operator can simulate our agent's "fist" to the extent that without supplementary evidence it would be impossible to determine the identities of the agent operator in the field.
- 17. It is recommended that direction finding be instituted on a periodic basis to determine the physical locale of the transmitter. The only previous instance of direction finding on 22 September 1952, indicated that the agent transmitter was located in an area S.W. of Kaunas, Lithuania. This is identified as a "restricted" area. It would be desirable to determine the definition of the "restricted" area in terms of accessibility to outsiders, documents of inhabitants within the area and the restriction upon

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movement, activity, and travel within the area. For example: does this area have the characteristics of a forbidden zone, or is it simply an area in which travel is restricted to a comparatively minor degree. These facts, in conjunction with a detailed direction finding program, would be contributory to any program of analysis.

- 18. Suggest or instruct JACK that KABELIS make radio contacts for training purposes. This procedure will serve several purposes among them:
 - a. Provide opportunity for the MGB to debrief JACK and possibly remove him from operation. If this happens JACK's failure to return to contact will be suggestive in itself. Also, the technique whereby this transfer is undertaken by the MGB will be informative.
 - b. If JACK is returned to contact after a period it will be possible to more closely identify a substitute by means of consistent recordings. Without adequate and lengthy recordings this would be virtually impossible, for to repeat, other operations have demonstrated that the MGB is capable of substituting radio operators with such a marked degree of skill that detection would be virtually impossible without rather extensive data.
- 19. JACK has been consistently vague regarding "roundups" by the MGB and local security elements in the area. For example, he states in message No. 3, 25 June 1951, "roundups disrupted everything". It seems advisable to cover in detail, how, why, and to what extent these roundups disrupted the pattern of the local situation. This is at least important in the determination of the security of members of a subsequent team and the precautions that should be taken by subsequent agents to preclude exposure in travel. Additionally, these questions are germane to the determination of the status of this operation, especially with reference to the amount of importance, thereby revealed, regarding the MGB-local security elements and the mechanical conduct of road blocks, area searches, and security checks.
- 20. It is interesting to note that in message No. 2, 15 June 1951, JACK stated that the "container, bag, and chute buried on spot", while later, JACK on returning to the spot found the above materials were missing. The question arises, were they lost in terms of misplacement, were they stolen by individuals who subsequently learned of their location, were they discovered by security elements in the area or was their location misunderstood and misidentified by JACK. It would appear advisable to adroitly pursue this subject further with the agent.





In conclusion I again feel it necessary to point out that even complete adherence to the above recommendations will not provide a definitive answer to the question of control or lack of control status. At this point in the operation and with the operational history here represented it is impossible, short of terminal techniques, to answer this question. Again, what has been intended was the development of a series of operational steps and exploitive requirements that are not predicated on a definitive knowledge of the agent's status and which steps will pose operation and intelligence returns for the Agency regardless of thepresence or absence of control.

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