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STUDY, REVIEW, ANALYSIS of all CAPSTAN AGENTS'
PERSONAL HISTORIES, CONTACTS and ASSOCIATIONS

23 March 1953

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The attached study is a review and analysis of all CAPSTAN agents' personal histories, contacts and associations both before and after dispatch into Lithuania on CIA missions. These contacts and associations include individuals, organizations, and foreign intelligence services with whom the agents dispatched were directly or indirectly in contact, and are known to have or are suspected of having information or knowledge of either the agents' activities and/or mission.

In the course of this review and analysis certain compromises of the security of the mission and agents have come to light which indicate the possibility of Soviet knowledge of the missions.

Attached to this study are detailed diagrams illustrating agents' contacts and associations.

CAPSTAN agents reviewed in this study are:

a. Members of the first mission:

Juozas LUKSA @ SKRAJUNAS
Benediktas TRUMPIS
Klemensas SIRVYS

b. Members of the second mission:

Julijonas BUTENAS - Stone
Jonas KUKAUSKAS-KUKIS Jack AERMAN P 4

c. Candidates for the third mission:

Ceslovas BANKAUSKAS
Balys BEDARFAS

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SKRAJUNAS

INTRODUCTION:

Skrajunas^{1.} was dispatched by CIA on 4 October 1950 with Benediktas Trumpis and Klemensas Sirvys into Branischusen, Kaliningrad Oblast for the purpose of establishing support points inside Lithuania and establishing contact with the Lithuanian underground.^{2.} Skrajunas was recruited by CIA in Pfullingen, Germany on November 1949. ~~Before recruitment he was~~ ^{through VLIK} the "Special Plenipotentiary of the BDPS"^{3.} and ~~a~~ ^{was} experienced clandestine and partisan fighter.^{4.} CIA has received no w/t or s/w communications from Skrajunas since 19 February ^{14 JAN 1951} (SIC) 1951. Information has been received which indicates that Skrajunas is dead.^{5.}

BACKGROUND:

Skrajunas was born 10 August 1921 at Veiveriai, Lithuania. On 4 March 1941, while an engineering student at the University of Kaunas, he was pledged into the Lithuanian Activist Front, which was an underground clandestine anti-Soviet resistance movement. On 6 May 1941 he was arrested by the NKVD, but on 23 June 1941 was set free by Lithuanian partisans as the Soviets retreated before the German advance. He returned to the University of Kaunas as a student and again joined the underground, this time against the Germans who suppressed the Lithuanian Government, on 6 August 1941. While an active member of the resistance, Skrajunas continued his studies at the University and graduated in June, 1944. Immediately prior to his graduation, in April 1944, VLIK which coordinated the activities of the various resistance movements, including the one at the University of Kaunas, was liquidated by the Gestapo and most of its members taken to concentration camps in Germany.

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Skrajunas maintained close touch with students who were clandestine members of the resistance. In May, 1945 the Lithuanian Partisan Movement was organized for the purpose of uniting all partisan activities in and south of Kaunas. He became Chief of the Documents Section. At this time he was ordered to proceed south of Kaunas to contact all independent partisan groups and unite them with the Lithuanian Partisan Movement. He failed in this mission since it was discovered that the LPS (Lithuanian Partisan Movement) had been penetrated by NKVD agents. In September 1945, the LPS was reorganized and went underground. From November, 1945 up to the time of his mission to the west (December 1947) Skrajunas lived illegally. From January 1946-April 1947 he commanded a partisan group, and acted as Chief of Press and Information. In April 1947 he was sent on a mission to Poland to establish contact with Lithuanian organizations outside the Iron Curtain. Upon his return he was appointed Chief Intelligence Officer for the underground in his district. In December 1947, Skrajunas left Lithuania on a mission to the west.^{6.}

CONTACTS:

Individuals and the organizations which may have known of Skrajunas' mission before he was dispatched by CIA in October 1950:

- I. BDPS (Bendras Demokratinio Pasipriesinimo Szjudis) (General Democratic Resistance Movement):

Skrajunas left Lithuania probably sometime in October or November 1947 and arrived in Poland 1947 with a fellow partisan, Kazys Vitkauskas, alias Audronis. Skrajunas was sent from Lithuania by the BDPS as a "Special Plenipotentiary of the BDPS". Audronis was a special delegate of the BDPS Praesidium.^{7.}

It was the task of these two delegates to make contact with VLIK,⁸ and obtain aid and direction for the resistance inside Lithuania.

Because Skrajunas left Lithuania on a definite mission for the BDPS, it seems reasonable to assume that the resistance expected him to return at some time with a report on the result of his mission. It is possible that the BDPS learned of Skrajunas' activities while in the West and that he was being dispatched in 1950. The BDPS undoubtedly was informed by Deksnys of Skrajunas' arrival in 1950.

II. Jonas DEKSNYS: TELEPHONE

Skrajunas' activities in 1947 were known to Jonas Deksnys,⁹ a representative of the BDPS in the West. Deksnys was an underground member who had succeeded in missions to the West and in 1947 was living in Sweden. He is known to have been in touch with the SIS (Swedish Intelligence Service) and possibly also with the British Intelligence Service.¹⁰

When Skrajunas and Audronis left Lithuania in 1947 they were met in Poland by Deksnys and taken to Sweden.¹¹ In Sweden Deksnys took Skrajunas' documents and exfiltration information which he turned over to the SIS ^{12.}

At this time Skrajunas may also have been exposed to A. Vokietaitis and Vytautas Staneika.¹³

III. Swedish Intelligence:

Skrajunas' activities were known to the Swedish Intelligence Service (SIS) through Deksnys. On 16 February 1948 Skrajunas and Audronis were debriefed in Sweden by the SIS.

It appears that the SIS had plans for dispatching Skrajunas and Audronis along with their agent Deksnys into Lithuania as Swedish controlled agents. Apparently sometime between February 1948 and June 1948 either Skrajunas, the SIS or Deksnys decided that Skrajunas would not be dispatched on this mission.^{26.} However, Skrajunas remained in Sweden until June 1948 and was billeted with Audronis. It is reasonable to assume that because Audronis and Skrajunas were good friends that Audronis told him of the preliminary plans for the Swedish mission.^{27.} On 7 February 1951, Deksnys radioed Stockholm that "ADOMAITIS" had arrived. This was a well-known pseudonym of Skrajunas. Two breaches of security are apparent here. First, the fact that Deksnys knew that Skrajunas had arrived and secondly, the use of the name "ADOMAITIS". According to Dr. Rackis, "if the Russians did not know of Skrajunas' arrival before the message, they certainly did after the message."^{28.}

IV. FRENCH INTELLIGENCE:

Skrajunas' activities were known to the French Intelligence through Dr. Backis, Lithuanian Charge d'Affairs in Paris, who in turn was in touch with a French Colonel of the French Intelligence Service.^{29.} In June 1948, Skrajunas was invited to attend a meeting of VLIK at Baden-Baden, Germany in July 1948.^{30.}

In late August of the same year he went to Paris where he stayed until March 1949. In Paris, through VLIK members, he was interviewed by two members of the French IS who asked him to join two couriers, Jonas Kupstas and Jonas Kukauskas-Kukis^{31.} who were being trained by the French for an operation into Lithuania. Skrajunas agreed and was given parachute training; his companions were to operate w/t sets. However the French decided not to undertake the

mission and Skrajunas and others were released. It is reasonable to assume that the French learned all about Skrajunas' background and Skrajunas' and Audronis' trip from Lithuania. This information was probably also known to Kupstas and Kukauskas-Kukis.

V. VLIK

Skrajunas' activities were ~~probably~~ known to VLIK through Jonas Pajaujis, *of Stockholm, Sweden,* member of VLIK since 1944, who contacted Skrajunas in Sweden in February 1948.^{32.}

On the invitation of VLIK Skrajunas attended a meeting of VLIK in 1948 at Baden-Baden, Germany. This meeting was also attended by Professor Mykolas Krupavicius, Mr. Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, Professor Juozas Kaminskas, Professor Juozas Brazaitis, Mr. Jonas Pajaujis, and Jonas Deksnys.^{33.} Deksnys attended as "Plenipotentiary of the Resistance" and Skrajunas as liaison between VLIK and BDPS.^{34.}

In Baden-Baden on the 9th of July 1948, the above-mentioned individuals signed an agreement in behalf of BDPS and VLIK. The terms were in general as follows: VLIK agreed to consider BDPS, or its successor, as the Supreme Resistance authority, while BDPS agreed to recognize VLIK as the supreme political group outside the country. In the agreement, BDPS reserved the right to give its approval in the case VLIK decided to form a Government in Exile but waived this right in case liaison at the time was found impossible. BDPS agreed to appoint a liaison man to work with VLIK. It was further agreed that this man would follow the dictates of VLIK in political matters.^{35.}

Skrajunas' activities were also known to the Military Section["] of VLIK. The Military["] Section ~~was under the direction~~ ^{consisted} of Colonel Antanas Sova. Because of lacking security on the part of VLIK and ~~the Military Section~~, especially Col. Sova, Skrajunas' activities became widely known. According to Dr. Backis, Col. Sova is guilty of spreading the news of Skrajunas' dispatch in October 1950. To quote Dr. Backis: "When Skrajunas returned to Lithuania in the fall of 1950, the operation was handled by us and was carried out successfully. A few days later numerous people in Germany and elsewhere seemed to know all about the operation. They knew when and from where he had left, how he had entered Lithuania, where he had entered, and where he had spent his first few nights. Since this information could have been known only to Skrajunas, the reception, VLIK, the Military Service and ourselves, the fact that the operation was common knowledge was a serious breach of security."^{35.}

According to Dr. Backis, Col. Sova ~~of the Military Section~~ was responsible for permitting the publication of a message from the resistance to VLIK radioed by Skrajunas from Lithuania in VLIK's bi-monthly bulletin, "Elta". The excuse^{*} given for publicizing this message was that it was requested by the Americans^{*}. This made public the fact that VLIK was in contact with the resistance.^{*} Dr. Backis reports that there was another security violation in connection with this mission: "one day in Germany, L. Prapuolenis... (not Deksnys) who is a member of VLIK was with M. Sembergas, a former Lithuanian Army Officer, when they were accosted by a certain (fnu) Kalvaitis. The latter claims to be a Lithuanian but is suspected of being German. He also claims to have some sort of a job with NATO.

Note: CIA forwarded message to VLIK some two months after receipt and stated that it had no objection to release. No harm in VLIK being in contact with resistance.
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At any rate he appeared to know all about the recent operation, discussed it fully and made it a point to state that this was another incident which proved that one could not work with VLIK."^{36.}

Skrajunas' activities could have been known to Birute SIMONAITIS^{73.} who was connected with VLIK from 1946 to 1948. Miss SIMONAITIS was secretary of the Lithuanian Red Cross in Reutlinger and assistant typist for VLIK. Sidzikauskas maintains that she knew nothing operationally. He claims that her part-time typing was sporadic and that he personally typed all confidential mail. However, Sidzikauskas reported that Skrajunas arrived in Pfullingen before Miss SIMONAITIS returned to Lithuania. Apparently he arrived in September 1948 from Paris. Therefore he admits she could have known about Deksnys, Skrajunas, and the former's trip to Lithuania.

Zakevicius reported to us that Miss SIMONAITIS was a "one-time VLIK secretary who in 1948 repatriated to Lithuania and had confessed that she had contacts with the German Communist Party in Tubingen. Subsequent newspaper articles which appeared in the Lithuanian Communist press proved beyond a doubt that she had revealed the activities of VLIK and the identities of its members."^{74.} Zilinskas reported that it was general gossip around VLIK that Miss SIMONAITIS and Sidzikauskas were on intimate terms and that "it could be assumed that she would have heard about his dealings in altogether secret matters."^{75.}

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VI. RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE:

Skrajunas' activities and mission could have become known to the RIS (Russian Intelligence Service) through the defection of Albertus Pesseckas.³⁷ This could have resulted from the fact that it is assumed that he reported Deksnys' mission to the RIS.

Pesseckas, a Lithuanian agent candidate for the SIS, had been originally scheduled to accompany Deksnys on his mission into Lithuania in April 1949. However, he was replaced by Audronis, who was dispatched in April 1949. On 26 December 1949 we learned from Zilinskas that on or about 20 December 1949 Pesseckas confessed that he was in the service of the Russians.³⁸ Pesseckas further confessed that he had been in contact with the Russians since August 1949. He claimed he was originally contacted by the Russians, was invited to work for them, and was offered pay for his services. He said the first 3 or 4 meetings were at the Embassy but later and recent meetings had taken place in areas on the outskirts of Stockholm. Pesseckas would proceed to a suburban location previously agreed upon, by streetcar or taxi, and the Russian contact would arrive at the area via Embassy car. Pesseckas admitted about 8 meetings. It is assumed that Pesseckas told the Russians all he knew concerning Deksnys, and the entire operation, the presence of the persons in Lithuania and other areas, and the existence of radio contact. He said that on one occasion he had identified Deksnys in a photograph presented to him by the Russians.

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He stated that this photograph appeared to be an enlargement made from an excerpt from a group photo. Possibly this came from an earlier underground photograph of Deksnys or from a picture taken from another local group photo. In any event it presupposes another Soviet source in Deksnys' circle, or perhaps more logically the photo was furnished by Pesseckas who even while confessing wished to mitigate, if possible, the magnitude of his crime. In any event Deksnys was exposed by name and photo and presumably the others were also exposed. The extent of the exposure can only be guessed at, but we must assume it is complete from an operational standpoint when it is recalled that Pesseckas was an intended traveller and was replaced by Audronis.

If as a result of Pesseckas' defection, Deksnys was taken by the RIS we can assume that they learned all about Skrajunas from him.

It is possible that Pesseckas himself learned about Skrajunas and reported it to the RIS. He was in Sweden when Skrajunas arrived in February 1948, and when Skrajunas left for Paris in June 1948 with Deksnys. It is not known if he was working for the SIS at this time but if he was it can be assumed that he knew of the trip and reported it sometime after August, 1949. He also might have learned of Skrajunas' activities from Deksnys or Audronis before he left the SIS.

Pesseckas may also have learned of Skrajunas' activities *indirectly* from Jonas Pajaujis. Pajaujis contacted Skrajunas when he arrived in Sweden in February 1948 and then accompanied Skrajunas and Deksnys to Paris for the purpose of discussing operations with the French. Deksnys and Pajaujis returned to

Stockholm. As a result of this joint effort, Pajaujis became familiar with Deksnys' operations. (Therefore, Pajaujis knew that Skrajunas was in France and would work for the French and would undoubtedly go on a mission.) Later when Deksnys and Staneika were no longer on friendly terms Pajaujis became Staneika's ally against Deksnys.^{69.} Staneika was also in touch with Pesseckas and played cards with him. It is therefore probable that Staneika, knowing of Pesseckas' participation, has confided in him and is also exposed.^{39.}

On 17 March 1950 it was reported that Pesseckas was no longer in Stockholm.^{40.} On 4 April 1950 it was reported that Pesseckas left Stockholm by boat for Leningrad on 31 March.^{41.}

VII. Zakevicius, Zilinskas and BIS (British Intelligence Service):

Skrajunas' activities and mission were known to the BIS through Zakevicius and Zilinskas.^{42.} Zakevicius is a Lithuanian national who prior to his departure for England and while in Stockholm, collaborated with the SIS on agent dispatches to Lithuania. He is known to have been in close liaison with the British IS since 1945 when he worked for the Swedish IS.

In 1949 before Deksnys left for Lithuania he named Zakevicius to replace him in his role as "Plenipotentiary of the Resistance". This made Skrajunas [?] his chief.^{43.} As a British agent, Zakevicius passed the information he received from Deksnys in Lithuania to the BIS.^{44.} At the same time, copies of these messages were made available to the []^{68.} Before Deksnys went into Lithuania he also set up a w/t link between himself and the BIS through Zakevicius without the knowledge of the SIS whose agent Deksnys was.^{45.}

It was agreed between the BIS, Zakevicius, and Deksnys that all traffic with the SIS would be kept on a very innocuous basis, while the BIS-Deksnys traffic would carry the "meat".^{47.}

It is assumed that all information regarding Skrajunas known to be held by the BIS was made known through Zakevicius.

Skrajunas' activities and mission was also known to the BIS through Zilinskas.^{46.} Zilinskas replaced Zakevicius when the latter left Sweden for England. Zilinskas has continued to inform both Zakevicius and []

[] on Swedish Intelligence activities in Lithuania.

VIII. Other Lithuania CIA Agents:

Skrajunas' mission was known to members of the second team who were dispatched 18-19 April 1951 from Germany into the Kaunas area of Lithuania. (The members of the second team were Julijonas Butenas and Jonas Kukauskas-Kukis). Skrajunas had assisted in the planning of the operation and selection of the agents. He was also known to all CIA personnel in the field.

When Skrajunas was dispatched he knew all the personnel in Germany and AIS clandestine training and operational methods. The case officer connected with the first team was [] The case officer connected with the second team was []^{47.}

Benediktas TRUMPIS

Benediktas Trumpis was dispatched by CIA on 4 October 1950 with Juozas Luksa and Klemensas Sirvys into Branischusen, Kaliningrad Oblast for the purpose of establishing contact points inside Lithuania and establishing contact with the Lithuanian underground. He was recruited by CIA in December 1949 through representatives of VLIK. At the time of his recruitment he was stationed in the 4204 Labor Service Company, Legaede Kaserne, Bamberg, Germany.

Trumpis was born 1 October 1919 in Radoiliskis, Lithuania. He graduated from the Siauliai high school in 1938. Subsequently he was employed as bookkeeper, railroad worker, and painter (in Pommern, Germany from 1944 until Germany's capitulation). Until 1946, Trumpis was held in the Lubeck DP Camp. Between 1946 and 1949 he served with the 4204 Labor Service Company. Upon leaving the Labor Service Company he was to inform his friends that clearance for his immigration to the U.S. had come through and he was taking free time prior to reporting to Bremerhaven.^{48.}

It is to be assumed that his background, purpose of mission and dispatch information were known to the members of VLIK, the second team, and CIA personnel in the field and headquarters.

It is not known that Trumpis was actually apprehended by the Soviets. His loss is assumed from the lack of any communications since early 1951. He was last assumed to be in an area approximately 50 km. southwest of Kaunas.

Klemensas SIRVYS

Klemensas Sirvys was dispatched by CIA on 4 October 1950 with Luksa and Trumpis into Branischusen, Kaliningrad Oblast for the purpose of establishing contact points inside Lithuania and establishing contact with the Lithuanian underground. He was recruited about March 1950 through representatives of VLIK. At the same time of his recruitment, he was stationed in the 4204 Labor Service Company, Lagaede Kaserne, Bamberg, Germany.

Sirvys was born 4 February 1926 in Kybartai, Lithuania. Until 1944 he was a high school student in Lithuania. Between 1944 and 1946 he was held in Hanau and Gunzen-Hausen DP camps. From 1946 until his recruitment by OSO, Sirvys served in the 4204 Labor Service Company in Bamberg, Germany.^{49.}

It is not known that Sirvys was actually apprehended by the Soviets. His loss is assumed from the lack of any communications since early 1951. He was last assumed to be in an area approximately 30 km. southwest of Kaunas.

It is to be assumed that his background, purpose of mission and dispatch information were known to the members of VLIK, the second team and members of CIA personnel in the field and headquarters.

Julijonas BUTENAS

Julijonas Butenas with Jonas Kukauskas-Kukis was dispatched by CIA on 18-19 April 1951 into the Kaunas area of Lithuania for the purpose:^{72.}

- a. Establishment of contact with the underground resistance forces in Lithuania.
- b. Reorganization of the underground resistance forces along more effective lines.
- c. Establishment of reliable w/t and s/w communication between Lithuania and the American Zone of Germany.
- d. Procurement of positive and operational intelligence.

Butenas was recruited in September 1949 through officials of VLIK. He had been living in an IRO camp in Pfullingen, Germany. He was originally recruited to act as a translator and agent instructor and it was not until 28 August 1951 that he was assigned to a team for dispatch.

From 1949, Butenas lived in a safehouse in Munich with Skrajunas and later, from about May, 1950, with all the agents who were being trained for the CAPSTAN dispatches; these included Jonas Kakauskas-Kukis who went on the same dispatch with Butenas, and all members of the first CAPSTAN team. About 25 August 1950 Butenas and Kukauskas-Kukis were separated from the members of the first team which was dispatched in October 1950. The second team was told nothing about the dispatch of the first. (However, it seems hardly realistic to assume that they did not know about it. Butenas and Kukauskas-Kukis were given their specific targets and operational data in January and February 1951.

*Note: * This is an error. BUTENAS was the jumpmaster of the Oct. 1950 Team.*

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Butenas and Kukauskas-Kukis made their first designated contact with the West on 15 June 1951^{50.} and contacted the partisans on 8 May.⁵¹ On 19 May 1951 Butenas separated from Kukauskas-Kukis and contacted the underground headquarters in the Tauras Region.^{52.}

According to w/t from Kukauskas-Kukis, Butenas together with an underground Unit Commander, Berzas, was killed in a farm house in the village of Altoniskiai, Lithuania by the MGB about 1 August 1951.^{53.} The farmer, Kazlauskas (fnu), had apparently been drunk and gossiped with the neighbors, one of whom informed the MGB.^{54.}

Persons who knew of the dispatch:

1. Members of VLIK

Mons. Mykolas Krupavicius, Prof. Juozas Kaminskas, Prof. Juozas Brazaitis, Dr. Petras Karvelis, Jonas Makauskas, Teodoras Sidiskis, Jonas Norkaitis, Mecys Valiukenas, Vytautas Vaitiekunas, Jonas Kavslionas.^{55.}

2. CIA personnel in the field:^{56.}

a. Operational:

1. Jumpmaster: []
2. Flight crew: [] pilot; [] co-pilot.

b. Staff:

1. [] case officer, in charge
2. [] FJCAPE case officer, assistant to
3. [] liaison with USAFE headquarters.
4. [] , adviser on air-drop techniques.
5. [] assistant to []
6. [] advisor on documentation
7. [] assistant for support, housing and administrative functions at the staging area.

c. Other Agencies:

1. Lt. Col. Russell Redman, USAFE, flight planning and briefing air crew.
 2. Major Frank R. Harrold, USAFE A-2 Office, weather briefing air crew.
 3. Group Commander (fnu) Hyde, RAF, liaison officer, refueling base in the British Zone of Germany
3. Members of the first team dispatched in October 1950:
- a. Skrajunas^{57.}
 - b. Trumpis
 - c. Birvys
4. Underground members in Lithuania whom first team contacted.^{58.}
(see chart)
5. Possibly Deksnys. Deksnys knew of Skrajunas' dispatch and arrival and it is possible that he also learned of the dispatch of the second team either through Skrajunas or the partisans.^{59.}

Jonas KUKAUSKAS-KUKIS

Jonas Kukauskas-Kukis,⁶⁰ "Jack", was recruited by OSO sometime in Spring 1950. He was dispatched on 18-19 April 1951 into Kaunas area of Lithuania with Butenas for the purpose of:

- a. Establishment of contact with the underground resistance forces in Lithuania.
- b. Reorganization of the underground resistance forces along more effective lines.
- c. Establishment of reliable w/t and s/w communication between Lithuania and the American Zone of Germany.
- d. Procurement of positive and operational intelligence.

Jack sent his first message on 15 June 1951 and continued sending sporadically until 29 November 1951 at which time he stopped sending. He reported again for the first time since his silence in April 1952 with the excuse that his silence was due to a faulty generator. The last message received from Jack to date was on 27 December 1952. It is not definitely established that Jack is under control but his long silence during the winter and the content of his messages seem to indicate that control is likely.

CONTACTS

I. RESISTANCE IN LITHUANIA:

In February 1938 Jack, at that time a student in Vilnius, then under Polish suzerainty, attempted to cross the Polish border into Lithuania to deliver OB intelligence to the Lithuanian Intelligence Service. He was apprehended by the Polish counter-intelligence, interrogated, and brought to trial. He was released because his act was determined to have been that of an irresponsible boy, rather than sponsored by an intelligence service. However,

the Polish counter-intelligence placed him under police surveillance and he was ordered not to leave the city limits of Vilnius without a special police pass. During both the Soviet and German occupations of Lithuania he participated in underground activities against the occupation governments. However, he claimed that neither he nor any of his immediate co-workers were ever compromised to the Soviets or Germans. In the summer of 1944 he made his way across Poland to Berlin where he gained employment with the Lithuanian Religious Center. In the fall of 1944 he volunteered for the "Reivyti Paratroopers Training School", which had been established near Danzig by the Wehrmacht for training Baltic and Soviet PW volunteers. Actually this was an intelligence school preparing agents for air dispatch into the Soviet Union. Because of the chaos surrounding the end of the war no one of the agents trained in the school were ever dispatched.

II. FRENCH INTELLIGENCE:

In 1946 Jack was attending the Johan Wolfgang University in Frankfurt. In October 1946 he was called by the operations chief of VLIK to Stuttgart and requested to perform a service for Lithuania. He agreed and proceeded to Pfullingen where he was introduced to a representative of the French Intelligence Service by another VLIK official. He received commo training from October 1946 to May 1947 at Pfullingen. His classmates included Jonas Kupstas and Balys Bedarfas. In May 1947 he was given leave and took this opportunity to continue his studies at the Staatliche Technikum for Textilindustrie, Reutlinger. In October 1947 he was called back to commo training, this time at Wenwald, and remained there until May 1948 at which time he was taken to Paris where he was

given intelligence training, including jump techniques by the French. There had been no contact with French representatives except their instructors, administrative matters being handled by Dr. Backis, the Lithuanian representative in Paris. In April 1950 when the French dispatch failed to materialize Jack and Kupstas were dismissed by the French case officer and were escorted by a French representative to Strasbourg where they were met by a representative of VLIK who sent them on to Munich.

III. CIA:

Members of the second team were billeted with those of the first team. Skrajunas worked with the CIA case officers on the plans for the second team. The original drop zone had been indicated from the field by Skrajunas. If the first team did fall into MGB control, it is reasonable to suppose that the MGB learned about the second team.

Jack's dispatch was also known to CIA personnel in the field, at headquarters, and to agents in the field who were trained but not dispatched at that time. These were: Jonas Kupstas, Ceslovas Zoromskis, Klemensas Jurgelevicius and Benius Razgaitis.
61.

Ceslovas BANKAUSKAS

Ceslovas Bankauskas, "Chet", was recruited in September 1951 in Detroit Michigan by a contract agent in a spotting assignment for a mission into Lithuania.

BACKGROUND:

Bankauskas was born in Moscow, Russia on 22 September 1915 and moved to Kaunas, Lithuania in the spring of 1920. He remained in Lithuania during the Russian and German occupation until 1944 when he and his wife escaped to Germany. In 1946 he worked for UNRRA as a registration officer, working as well on reports and statistics, billeting and documents. He was placed in charge of all files in the camp of his area. After being transferred to Schloss Kazelni in 1948, he stayed with an IRO team in Kempton. During this period he knew and was known by Russians and members of every other European nation. In June 1948 he was assigned to administrative duties at the vocation and training school at IRO (formerly UNRRA), Area 5, in Neuberg an der Donau. Students from all DP camps in the Area attended the school. He registered each arrival and departure. On 2 July 1949 Bankauskas arrived in the USA with his wife and son. He went directly to Detroit, where he lived until the time of his recruitment and training.

CONTACTS:

Bankauskas' activities and mission are known to the following people:

- I. Other members of the CAPSTAN/AEONIAN Project who are no longer connected with CIA: Marius Dambrauskas, Vladas Slikas, Juozas Andriusis, Justinas Liaukas,^{62.} Col. Reklaitis and Lt. Col. Tautvilas.^{63.}

A. Marius Dambrauskas was recruited by a CIA case officer in December 1951 and completed approximately 4 months training with Bankauskas. He was dismissed on 15 May 1952, effective 10 July 1952. Bankauskas and Dambrauskas were known to one another before recruitment as classmates at the military academy in Lithuania. CI knows that Marius possesses the following knowledge of CIA training methods and the proposed mission:

1. Underwent communications training since 17 January 1952.
2. Received one signal plan from the communications instructor, and had begun cryptographic training.
3. Received about three weeks tradecraft lectures, concentrating on an introduction to intelligence work. No details of tradecraft were given to him but much material was given on the organization and function of Soviet security forces.

4. He knows by alias, []
[] (communications instructor), []
cleared physician in Washington area, a physician living in Marlboro who came to examine [], the indigenous instructors by their true names, and Bankauskas by his true name, the servant couple at the training site by their true names, the owner of the site on which weapons training was conducted. He furthermore knows by alias Major Pietsch, from DOB, Gerald Sleeper from the same office and the two sergeants (Cook and Watkins) who acted as safehouse keepers during the last month of the trainee's instruction.

He also knows, by alias, Carcajou, and suspects him of being formerly connected with the Soviet Security forces. By alias, he is acquainted with Mr. Trianovski of DOB and suspects him of being a Russian of Ukrainian descent.

Information he received in addition to communications:

1. Location of two training sites used during instruction.
2. License number of covert automobiles assigned to the project.
3. Knowledge of US training of agents.
4. One method of gathering operational information (from newspapers).
5. Has seen many films classified "restricted" or "secret".
6. Received four hours of weapons training and daily physical conditioning.

Marius is known to have committed the following security violations:

1. He told his brother about his mission while on his Easter vacation. He included all the details of his training and dispatch including to the best of his knowledge the date of dispatch and names of others working with him.
2. Told his mistress about his mission and training. The fact that Dambrauskas had divulged operational information to his mistress was brought out in the first carriage test conducted on him.
3. Told Col. Reklaitis all that had happened since the latter departed.
4. Mrs. Bankauskas was told by Dambrauskas that her husband was in D.C. preparing to go on a mission into Lithuania. Dambrauskas

apparently told her that Bankauskas would parachute. Bankauskas feels that his wife must suspect something. He told her that he works for the Circle Construction Company.

5. Kupteis, a friend of Bankauskas who is also an acquaintance of Marius' mistress. Through this channel Kupteis was informed of Bankauskas' activities. It appears that Kupteis knew of Bankauskas' activities before New Years 1951-52.
6. Mrs. Kiadulas knows of Bankauskas' activities though her husband apparently does not.
7. Osteika family, who are old friends of Bankauskas' and the only family Bankauskas visited regularly on his vacation. Specifically, Bankauskas was told by Osteika that the following facts are rumored about him.
 - a. that Bankauskas is training for a mission into Lithuania.
 - b. that Bankauskas lives in Washington.
 - c. that Bankauskas is being paid the salary equivalent to that of a U.S. Army Captain. This last point is known only to Dambrauskas who is, therefore, undoubtedly the source.^{64.}

II. Other Agents who know of Bankauskas' Mission.

1. Klemensas Jurgelevicius and Benius Razgaitis who were recruited in the winter of 1949 through VLIK for a mission into Lithuania, but were never dispatched. In 1952 they were brought to the U.S. by [] for training with Bankauskas []

Because of personal dislike between Jurgelevicius and Razgaitis and Bankauskas, Jurgelevicius and Razgaitis decided not to undertake the mission with Bankauskas. They are now residing at a safehouse in the Washington area and are disposal cases of the Agency. These two individuals know about CIA activities in Germany and the dispatch of the other two missions.^{65.} They related the following information to Bankauskas:

- a. About their training in Germany.
- b. About Butenas and Skrajunas who were accompanied to mission by "[]". That they took off from Frankfurt airfield and were dropped in Lithuania 60 km. from their target. That later Butenas was surrounded by Soviets in one farm and perished defending himself.
- c. That Kulikauskas, "Kulik", who was called "Dzikas" (Jack) was dropped in Lithuania also. That for a long time he sent successive radio messages but that he ceased to operate when the Americans did not fulfill his requests. It is possible that he (Jack) was seized by the Soviets, because in the latest messages the security signals did not appear. He was also told that all secret missions of dropping the Lithuanian agents were performed by hired Czechoslovakian pilots using a repainted US plane.^{66.}
- d. [] Bankauskas was introduced to them by his true name.

2. Mr. Vadeika:

Bankauskas also suspects that information regarding his location and activities may be spread by Mr. Vadeika (or Vedeika) who was at one time interviewed by a CIA case officer as an agent candidate.

Balys BEDARFAS

Balys Bedarfas, "Bill", was first contacted in Canada by a cut-out in September 1951. The purpose of this first contact was to obtain information from him regarding Jonas Kukauskas-Kukis. In 1952 he was contacted again and this time recruited by CIA for a mission into Lithuania.

BACKGROUND:

Bedarfas was born in Kaunas, Lithuania on 14 April 1920. In July 1940 he visited Moscow, Russia as a sportsman. He left Lithuania for Vienna, Austria in July 1944 and worked there for several weeks. In August 1944 he left Vienna again, this time for Tilsit where he joined a German Intelligence Unit made up of Lithuanians who were being trained for operations into Lithuania. It was in this group that he first met Jonas Kukauskas-Kukis in November 1944. As the Soviets advanced, this group retreated further into Germany, until it reached Stettin. From Stettin he fled in April 1945 with Kukauskas-Kukis. With the advance of the Soviets he continued his flight to Anstadt, Bamberg, and Wurzburg where he contacted Vladas Bakunas, a VLIK member. In Bamberg he and Kukauskas-Kukis separated. According to Bedarfas, Kukauskas-Kukis had met some friends who went to Hannau, near Frankfurt and he wished to join them. Bedarfas preferred to stay at the Bamberg DP camp where he was in charge of women and children's welfare. However, both Bedarfas and Kukauskas-Kukis remained in contact with each other by mail.

In the summer of 1946 Kukauskas-Kukis approached Bedarfas in Bamberg and proposed a mission into Lithuania. Kukauskas-Kukis told Bedarfas that he was in contact with (fnu) Laugalys and Col. (fnu) Reklaitis as well as

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with Gen. Plechavicius. Bedarfas assumes that this contact with the French Intelligence was made by Vaclovas Sidzikauskas. Shortly before Bedarfas and Kukauskas-Kukis were to enter training, Gen. Plechavicius gave a party at Stuttgart to which he invited among others (fnu) Kaulakis, Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, Col. Reklaitis, Jonas Kupstas, Kestutis Skrabutenas, and Jonas Kukauskas and Bedarfas. Skrabutenas was with Kukauskas at the University of Frankfurt and according to Bedarfas was responsible for sensitive information relating to Kukauskas' mission discussed at this party being passed to various other people.

The training ~~which~~ Bedarfas and Kukauskas-Kukis received in Pfullingen was conducted in a private home occupied by a Nazi woman and consisted of radio instruction only. After several months of training Kukauskas-Kukis and Bedarfas left Pfullingen in May 1947 for Reutlingen where Bedarfas intended to study textile engineering. However, Bedarfas decided to emigrate to Canada. Toward the end of 1947, before Bedarfas left for Canada, he was invited by a representative of the French Intelligence Service to continue training for a mission with Kukauskas-Kukis and Kupstas. Since the French Intelligence Service chose only two persons for the mission, Bedarfas withdrew and departed for Canada.^{67.}

CONTACTS:

Bedarfas' activities and mission are known to the following:

1. British Intelligence Service through his association with the proposed joint CIA-BIS mission into Lithuania.

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2. Kaminskas, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party in VLIK, now living in New York. Bedarfas considers Kaminskas his political mentor and told him that sometime in the future he would undertake a mission. Bedarfas visited Kaminskas just prior to his flight to England for the joint mission.
3. Headquarters personnel.

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Attachment

JONAS DEKSNYS

Jonas Deksnys was a member of the SIS team dispatched into Lithuania in April 1949. Deksnys has remained in Lithuania from that date and has sent w/t messages which CIA has received from the British Intelligence Service¹⁴. and from Major Arkadi Valdin and Zakevicius.¹⁵ CIA was first placed in contact with Deksnys in November 1946 by Algirdas Vokietaitis.¹⁶

BACKGROUND:

Deksnys was born in Daugavpils, Latvia in 1914. Shortly thereafter he moved with his family to Kaunas, Lithuania and became a citizen of that country. He was arrested by the Russians on 15 June 1940 but he escaped from their custody at the time of the German invasion in 1941. During the German occupation he worked as an editor of a legal Lithuanian paper and at the same time became a member of the Lithuanian underground organization, LLKS, (Lithuanian Fighters for Freedom). This organization carried out activities such as the illegal publication of an underground paper, operation of illegal radio stations, and the maintenance of contacts with the Western allies. Deksnys served as the secretary of the Supreme Committee of Liberation. On 13 April 1944 Deksnys was arrested by the German Gestapo and interrogated for six weeks in Kaunas. He was sent to Germany and placed in custody of the highest political court in Berlin. He was to have been sentenced on 15 February 1945, but a heavy American raid on Berlin destroyed the prison. He was released by the American Third Army, 14 April 1945. At the time of his release he was in poor health and was placed in the American Third Army Hospital. During the convalescence he received the position of interpreter and had several contacts with American officers in the CIC. Upon

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regaining his health, he wished to return to Lithuania secretly to investigate conditions there.¹⁷ In September 1945 with Ing. Brunius, leader of the Nationalist Party and LLKS and VLIK, he left the American zone and travelling via Poland he arrived in Lithuania in November 1945. According to one study, they had told only Juozas Kaminskas, VLIK Chairman, of their plans.¹⁸ After contacting and organizing the resistance, Deksnys with "Drunga", alias Valiulis, left Lithuania and arrived in the American zone on 14 December 1945.¹⁹ Shortly thereafter Deksnys was transferred to the French zone of occupation. Here the Lithuanian Committee (VLIK) had formed a small organization at this time. Because contact with the resistance in Lithuania was not good, Deksnys decided to return. On 1 May 1946 Deksnys and a friend, Vytautas Staneika, returned to Lithuania and established contact with the resistance groups. Staneika spent one month in Lithuania and then returned to Sweden, via Poland, with the help of Vokietaitis. Deksnys with the help of Vokietaitis arrived in Stockholm on 21 October 1946. On 7 February 1947 Deksnys reported that a resistance courier was to arrive in Gdynia and he was sending a courier, Alfonsas Rimeika, to meet him.²⁰ In May 1947, Deksnys went to Poland and met two more couriers, one of them Skrajunas, from the underground. He collected material from them which had been sent out by the resistance. Upon his return to Sweden in July 1947 he was arrested by the Swedish authorities and his information taken away.²¹ In January 1948, Deksnys met Skrajunas and Audronis, members of the resistance who were waiting on the Polish side of the frontier.²² On 16 February 1948 Deksnys returned to Sweden with Skrajunas and Audronis.²³

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Deksnys planned a mission with the Tilestonians and the Swedes to be dispatched to Lithuania in October 1948. This mission, however, failed.^{70.} He planned a second mission^{71.} dispatched in May 1949 with the following personnel: Deksnys, his w/t operator, Briedis, one Latvian named Sveic alias Jansons alias Valdemar, and two Estonians (one of whom died in route).^{24.} He also planned a third operation which was to start on 11 April 1950 with two Estonians and one Lithuanian traveller.^{25.}

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FOOTNOTES

1. Juozas Albinas Luksa, (true name), aliases: Juozas Adomaitis, alias used from time to time; Adam Mickiewicz, name in which he was issued "Titre d'Identite et de Voyage #49 AE 16870 by the French in 1949; Laurynas, alias used from time to time; Skrajunas, underground name assigned in October 1947 when he was about to depart to the west. (Source: PRQ, Part I.)
2. MGMA-2717-K.
3. BDPS (Bendras Demokratinio Pasipriesinimo Szjudis) (General Democratic Resistance Movement) is the Lithuanian Passive Resistance Movement in Lithuania. It was organized in 1946. According to Zakevicius the first chairman of the BDPS was (fnu) Markulis, alias Erelis. (Source: OELA-204, 26 November 1952). (See chart)
4. MGMA-2717, 17 April 1950. FSRO-2157. LSS-307 (18 July 1947). "Due to absence of Deksnyis from Lithuania, Juozas Luksa has been selected to sit as the active 7th(?) member of the BDPS Committee."
5. Message #76, 13 October 1952, from Kukauskas-Kukis.
6. Source: "Agent Loss Study", (CAPSTAN), prepared by SR/2, 7 Feb. 1952. (Apparently information was originally obtained from PRQ, Part I on subject).
7. According to Zakevicius, Skrajunas was dispatched by the "Zevys" BDPS group. Associated with "Zevys" were Gedminas (cryptonym), (fnu) Vasaitis (true name) and (fnu) Vabalis (true name). Maintaining contact with the "Zevys" group was (fnu) Miskinis and (fnu) Alekna, who were city residents. (The first BDPS group, the "Erelis" group consisted of Markulis, Lokys, Zaskevicius, and Vitkus who carried out the leadership of the BDPS until about 1947). (Source: OELA-204, 26 November 1952.)
8. VLIK (Vyriausiasis Lietuvos Islaisvinimo Komitetas) (Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania) was originally established in Lithuania sometime in 1941 after the Soviet army occupied Lithuania. It continued in existence during the German occupation until the latter part of 1944. In 1944 the VLIK leaders moved to the Wurzburg-Regensburg-Munich region. VLIK is now located in Reutlingen, Germany. (Source: FSRO-1638, 3 June 1945). VLIK was organized to represent the political parties which existed in Lithuania prior to the Smetona dictatorship which began in 1920. CIA has been in contact with VLIK since 1949 when CIA began to sponsor the dispatch of Lithuanian agents who had been recruited by VLIK.
9. See attachment.
10. Resistance Study. L. Shopis, SR/2.

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11. WSSA-261, 19 January 1948.
12. A. Vokietaitis, was an associate of Deksnys and a member of the "Lithuanian Fighters for Freedom" in Lithuania. Vokietaitis was selected as the individual to contact the western allies and arrived in Sweden from Lithuania in 1943.. In WSSA-1514, 6 March 1950: Vokietaitis was former representative of BDPS in Stockholm but since succeeded by Deksnys. Vokietaitis departed from Sweden and is living in Los Angeles, California.
13. Vytautas Staneika was a friend of Deksnys. He was dispatched by the Lithuanian resistance in May 1946. He was working with Vokietaitis as the nucleus of VLIK in Sweden.
14. BIS contact with the Swedes is through Vladas Zilinskas. (WSSA-1466, 9 Feb. 1950).
15. Zakevicius and Major Arkadi Valdin are CIA informants in contact with the Swedes. (WSSA-1466, 9 Feb. 1950). The original cipher and commo plans furnished us by Zakevicius on the Lithuanian stations were forwarded to Headquarters. Only during the initial phase of operations did Zakevicius have access to the actual cipher material. (WSSA-1485).
16. LSS-52, 22 November 1946.
17. WELW-5199.
18. According to Resistance Study, L. Shopis, SR/2.
19. LSS-52, 22 November 1946.
20. WSS-135, 12 Feb. 1947. (According to Arunas' report the active resistance sent "RIMVYDAS" to Poland unknown to the BDPS Presidium). Source: Arunas-MGMA-8667, 4 March 1952.
21. LSS-310, 24 July 1947.
22. WSSA-261, 9 January 1948.
23. WSSA-371, 1 April 1948.
24. WELW-5199.
25. STOC-761, IN-21683, 4 April 1950.
26. Writer's Comment: The difference in political views between Skrajunas and Deksnys may have been the reason for Skrajunas' refusal to go on the mission or for Deksnys insistence that he not be included. The difference in political views seems to be that Deksnys wanted Lozoraitis and the diplomats

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to represent the resistance in the free world while Skrajunas adhered to the Baden-Baden agreement which made VLIK the representative of BDPS in the West.

27. Apparently there was a mutual distrust of the Swedes because Audronis and Skrajunas worked out a communication system between them whereby the SIS was to be by-passed, and Audronis could communicate with Skrajunas unknown to the SIS. (Source: "Agent Loss Study"). Audronis revealed this system to the BDPS. Skrajunas received his last letter from Audronis on 10 September 1949 written from Lithuania.
28. WFFA-9317, 27 September 1951, Source: Dr. Backis.
29. WSSA-646, 31 August 1948.
30. WFFA-9317, 27 September 1951, page 10, Source: Dr. Backis. Deksnys when he visited Paris and Germany in July 1948 was informed of the possibility of sending an individual under the facilities of the French. Skrajunas had been picked by [] as the individual to be sent to Lithuania under the facilities of the French. (WSSA-646, 31 August 1948).
31. Kupstas and Kukauskas-Kukis were both recruited later by CIA for a mission with Skrajunas but were not dispatched with him.
32. See section on RIS for further activities of Pajaujis. Sidzikauskas' debriefing revealed that Skrajunas accidentally met Pajaujis in Stockholm. Pajaujis wrote to Krupavicius of his meeting with Deksnys. As a result of this, Skrajunas, Pajaujis and Deksnys went to Baden-Baden.
33. WSSA-662, 9 September 1948.
34. Skrajunas and Audronis when they left Lithuania in 1947 carried a mandate from the Lithuanian resistance naming Deksnys as "Plenipotentiary of the Resistance". (Source: WFFA-9317, 27 September 1951, Dr. Backis.
35. WFFA-9317, 27 September 1951, page 12. Source: Dr. Backis.
36. Ibid., p. 13.
37. Albertus Pesseckas was born 26 January 1921 at Birzai, Lithuania. He received a general education. During 1943-1944 Pesseckas served in the Latvian Battalion on the Eastern Front. In 1945 he deserted from the German army in Norway and escaped across the Swedish frontier. (Source: Resistance Study, [] SR/2).
38. See WSSA-1395, 27 Dec. 1949.
39. WSSA-1395, 27 Dec. 1949.
40. WSSA-1537, 17 March 1950.

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
41. STOC-761 (IN 21683), 4 April 1950.
42. Dr. Stasys Zakevicius, alias Zymantas, is now a representative of LRS (Lietuvos Rezistencijos Santarve), (Union of Lithuanian Resistance), an anti-VLIK organization in England. (Source: Dr. Backis). This is the group with whom BIS is "cooperating" and carrying on Lithuanian operations. (British contacts with SIS are through Vladas Zilinskas - Source: WSSA-1466, 9 February 1950, p. 2.)
43. WFPA-9317, 27 September 1951, Annex #2. Source: Dr. Backis.
44. Zakevicius and Deksnys were not satisfied with the agreement at Baden-Baden and preferred to ally themselves with the Diplomats, the last official representatives of the Lithuanian Government abroad, who are opposed to VLIK. Skrajunas upheld the Baden-Baden agreement. According to Dr. Backis, Zakevicius refused to carry out Skrajunas' orders and put out various rumors against him. (WFPA-9317, 27 Sept. 1951).
45. The BIS has copies of the Swedes' signal plan and ciphers given to Deksnys and so they are able to monitor all the broadcasts. (MGMA-10913, 18 Aug. 1952.
46. "Vladas Zilinskas was named Commercial Attache at the Legation in Stockholm in 1939 and has been there ever since. Actually in Stockholm he is supposedly working for an insurance company. He is (probably) working for the BIS and some...(believe) he is an "International Agent"... He is a member of the Union Resistant Lithuanians and is head of this organization in Stockholm. He is also a member of the Lithuanian Liberal Group. He is a collaborator of Zakevicius and...Lozoraitis." (Source: Dr. Backis, WFPS-9317, 27 Sept. 1951.
47. MGMA-10913, 18 August 1952.
48. "Agent Loss Study", SR/2.
49. "Agent Loss Study", SR/2.
50. Msg. #1, 15 June 1951. Source: Kukauskas-Kukis.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Msg. #5, 4 August 1951, Msg. #22, 15 November 1951.
54. Msg. #11, 5 October 1951. A prospective agent who lived with Butenas during part of the training cycle and is now in the U.S. reported that he had specific information about the death of Butenas. (Source of this information and the individual now in the U.S. are unknown to the writer.)
55. File #9314, "Personalities". Document not dated but believed to be the membership of VLIK in 1952.

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56. MGMA-5610, 18 April 1951.
57. Skrajunas was informed by w/t that Kukauskas-Kukis and Butenas were going to be dispatched. Headquarters' message to Skrajunas on 1 March 1951: "Be prepared receive Steve and Jack in period 14-27 March." On blind broadcast to Skrajunas on 12 March 1951: "March operation delayed until May. Await instructions." Even if Skrajunas was not informed of the exact time of arrival of Kukauskas and Butenas, he did know the approximate time of arrival. ←
58. Because Skrajunas was in contact with LLKS (Lietuvos Laisves Kovos Sajudis) (Lithuania's Struggle for Freedom Movement) the dispatch of the agents was probably known to the LLKS. In message on 20 November 1950 from Skrajunas: "On October 17 we contacted the underground." In message on 19 November 1950 from Skrajunas: "Stan is with Supreme Command in Suvalkija". In message on 27 November 1950 Skrajunas mentions the LLKS. ↙
59. Message on 24 November 1950 from Skrajunas: "Deksnys in hands of MGB. Audronis was killed."
60. Aliases: Kukis, in his native village; Kaufmann, in France from 3 August 1948 until 27 June 1950; nickname: "Dzykis".
61. Kupstas and Zoromskis remained in Munich awaiting a future assignment. They are now being processed under PL 110 to immigrate to the USA. Zoromskis suffered from a mental disturbance, paranoid schizophrenia, and required hospitalization. During heavy drinking spells, partly attributed to his breakdown, he may have committed security violations. Kupstas is presently on interrogation assignment for CIA in Germany. Jurgelevicius and Razgaitis were brought to the U.S. in 1952 for final training and dispatch into Lithuania with Ceslovas Bankauskas. However, personal clashes resulted in their refusal to undertake a mission. They are presently considered for permanent residency in the U.S. under PL 110.
62. Dambrauskas, Slikas, Andriusis, and Liaukas were four of the 16 candidates spotted by either Mickelevicius, Tautvilas or Reklaitis and interviewed by a CIA case officer, who agreed to go on a mission. Andriusis received a POC on March 6, 1952, #2077; a request was made for a POC for Slikas on 22 September 1952. Andriusis withdrew from the project before he entered training. Slikas and Liaukas withdrew soon after they entered training because they no longer desired to go on the mission.
63. Col. Reklaitis and Lt. Col. Tautvilas, who had been recommended by Sidzikauskas, were the indigenous instructors for the agents. They were recruited by CIA and began training on 30 July 1951. However, for personal reasons they did not fit in well and were released; Tautvilas on 26 January 1952 and Reklaitis on 7 April 1952. They were replaced by Ausrotas. They undoubtedly knew all about the agents and operations up until the time they left the employ of CIA.


64. Memo for Chief, SSD, 18 September 1952.
65. Bankauskas related to Mickelevicius that Jurgelevicius and Razgaitis told him that in Germany one of their instructors of Indian origin was very frank with them and related much information. (Letter to Walter Onosko from Mickelevicius, 4 September 1952.)
66. Letter to Walter Onosko from Mickelevicius, 4 September 1952.
67. Source of all information on Bedarfas: "Bedarfas Personal File".
68. The original cipher and commo plans furnished us by Zakevicius on the Lithuanian stations were forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to our WSSA-956. (Only during initial phase of operations did Zakevicius have access to the actual cipher material.) (Source: WSSA-1485).
69. WSSA-639, 27 August 1948 mentions break between Deksnys and Staneika and fact Staneika tries to discredit Deksnys. Staneika also alleged to [] that Deksnys was maintaining contact with the BIS in Stockholm, and was being paid monthly for this service. He also told of Deksnys having passed to the British the information regarding the tentative expedition to be sent to Jigland, together with the code to be used, transmission schedules, etc."
70. WSSA-456.
71. WSSA-459.
72. Attachment to MGMA-5959, 8 June 1951. Investigation of CAPSTAN April Drop Operation.
73. Birute Simonaitis returned to Lithuania toward the end of 1948. She is the daughter of the former President of the Directorate of Klaipeda and head of the 1920 resurrection, now in the British Zone. He is now the President of the Council of Lithuanian Miners. Her mother and a sister were expelled into the Russian Zone, but returned to Klaipeda. (Source: Sidzikauskas; DI: 15 Sept. 52)
74. Sidzikauskas, DI:15 Sept. 52.
75. Questionnaire for Sidzikauskas, 8 Sept. 52 (Filed in Simonaitis Personnel File.)

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
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
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
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
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

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BROADWAY LITHUANIAN OPERATIONS

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POSSIBILITY OF CONTROL OF ARUNAS AND HIS TWO W/T MEN: VAINORAS (Soviet agent posing as a resistance member furnished a list of people to Broadway allegedly members of the Lithuanian resistance. This list was given to VAINORAS BY THE MGB and contained among others, the name of Kestutis (the name used for ARUNAS by Broadway) and Brolis (brother of Vekietaitis), who was a member of the BDPS, according to ARUNAS.

- = w/t contact
- = s/w contact.

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Source: Att. to WELA - 9892

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Security Information

MGMA-1957
16 Dec. 1949

The TILESTONE Operation of May 1949 was originally planned to take place in May 1948. The Lithuanian elements of the operation was represented by DEKSNYS, AUDRONIS and BRIEDIS @ TEOFILIS. During all of this time contact with the Swedish Intelligence was carried on only by Deksnys @ PRAPUOLENIS @ HEKTORAS. Audronis was in constant communication with the BDPS and was informed on the plans made for the expedition's reception in Lithuania.

In November 1948, D suddenly informed Audronis that the operation would take place by Christmas but the the Swedes had categorically refused to allow Audronis ' participation. D immediately started looking for other Lithuanian candidates and finally found three individuals of practically no education at all. The operation was again postponed and two of the individuals located by Deksnys departed for Canada instead of Lithuania.

The operation was finally definitely planned for Spring 1949, and Audronis was reinstated as a member in good standing. On the night of 2-3 May 1949, Deksnys, Audronis and Briedis, two Estonians and one Latvian, successfully landed in Lithuania at the place designated by the BDPS.

BACKGROUND ON AGENTS PARTICIPATING:

1. DEKSNYS: In the Spring of 1946 , he made a second trip to Lithuania accompanied by one STANEIKA @ MESKIS @ MAJOR. STUOGA. This time D remained in Lithuania till Fall 1946, and returned as a member of a Polish repatriation train from Lithuania. From Poland , he made his own way to Sweden. D's return from Lith in the fall of 1946 took place under circumstances which have not as yet been cleared up, and are presently being investigated by the AEGEANS. ((Field Comment: It appears that prior to his departure from Lithuania, D was ~~XXXX~~ living together with an individual in Vilnius who later turned out to be a MGB penetration agent of the Underground. ~~SECRET~~ Security Information *Comment - Lithuanian? (initials?)*

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Deksny's political attitude is rather obscure. He is definitely anti-Christian but no political group looks upon him as one of their members. He is actually an individual Lithuanian who is being employed by a foreign power as their intelligence agent. D is ambitious and enterprising, often motivated by good intentions which he can not completely carry out due to his rather weak character. He is a heavy drinker who loses all self-control when under the influence of liquor.

Deksny's behavior during the preparations for the last operation was very strange. D did all to withhold any info on the planned operation from Skrajunas, the Special Representative of the BDPS, as well as from VLIK, however approximately twenty Lithuanian individuals living in Stockholm were kept regularly informed on the "top secret" operation. D fully realized that Audronis' cooperation was essential to the success of the operation, as Audronis was the only legitimate tie with the Underground. At the same time he feared, with good reason, that Audronis would keep Skrajunas and Pajaujis fully informed. On occasions D threatened Audronis with the "Swedish Intelligence" if the latter tried to communicate with Skrajunas. ((Field Comment: In spite of D's threats Skrajunas was kept fully informed on the TILESTONE operation by Audronis and, as a matter of fact, as we know now Audronis and Skrajunas had a secret plan of commo arranged, by which they could by-pass D and Briedis.))

Despite D's requests, A maintained secret contact with Skrajunas and Pajaujis, In addition Audronis investigated D at the request of the BDPS. Audronis wanted to return to Lithuania at any cost and to bring with him a report prepared by him and Skrajunas on the general situation abroad, on VLIK activity, and on Deksny's. This Audronis succeeded in doing as testified by his letters to Skrajunas. It was previously agreed with Audronis that he would not write any personal letters to Skrajunas but that all letters from him would be ~~SECRET~~ to be directly from the BDPS Command. As a result of Audronis' ~~SECRET~~ Security Information of Deksny's, the report


delivered to the command was highly unfavorable to Deksnys. Audronis' evidence included certain letters stolen from Deksnys as well as evidence of the fact that large amounts of "official" funds made available to Deksnys have been misappropriated. A copy of the Baden Baden Agreement was also taken by Audronis ~~XXXX~~ for BDPS approval as well as the recommendation that Deksnys be excluded from all further activity. ~~XXXX~~ Another report prepared by Audronis deals with the "surprising superficiality and carelessness with which the whole expedition was organized and sponsored". As to Skrajunas' official standing, it should be noted that the latter is not an agent of any foreign power but the Special Plenipotentiary of the BDPS Command and the only individual outside the Iron Curtain with whom the BDPS is in communication.

From an analysis of two documents (MGMA-1912 and MGMA-1947) it seems quite clear that DEKSNYS when he returned to Lithuania in 1949 was not in contact with the BDPS. In fact it appears that he was trying to establish his own organization apart from the BDPS. This is quite plausible in view of the fact that SKRAJUNAS and AUDRONIS were sent out of Lithuania in Dec. '47 for the purpose of investigating the activities of DEKSNYS.

"Skrajunas states that he originally joined Deksnys as Deksnys appeared to be the only channel through which the attention of great powers could be brought to the Lithuanian resistance movement. At the same time, Skrajunas had strong reservations against the self-appointed representative of the "BDPS Delegation Abroad". The BDPS Command in Lithuania itself charged Skrajunas with investigating Deksnys' position. Deksnys is remembered in Lithuania as the "betray-er of VLIK to the Germans". This unpleasant label is attached to him justly or unjustly by a coincidence of unfortunate facts, namely, that two or three days after Deksnys' arrest by the Gestapo, all members of VLIK were rounded up at night from their homes and shipped to concentration camps in Germany. During Deksnys' first trip to Lithuania, the Underground Command could not understand why this man was picked for the assignment but accepted him as the only link with the western world. Both Skrajunas and Audronis soon found out that Deksnys, far from being accepted as a representative of the Underground Command, was actually "nothing more than an agent recruited and utilized by a foreign power or a group of foreign powers". Both Skrajunas and Audronis concluded that Deksnys' status was unsatisfactory and decided to contact foreign powers through VLIK representa-tives on their own, without Deksnys' assistance or involvement. (MGMA-1912, 5 Dec. '49.)

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D. WELA-8595
4 June 1952

(2) WELA-8674
15 June 1952


(3) Names corrected Zakevicius from
Poland in 1951.

LLKS UP TO APRIL 1952

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
(SOURCE: EDVARDAS)

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*According to Dr. Baskis:
LL.K.S. formed in 1948 with
"Vytautas" as chief.

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Source: Edvardas.
Encl. to WELA - 8832
Encl. to TS/81893
& July 1952.