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(SEA POUCH)

Security Information

DISPATCH NO. EGMA 00713

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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
(ATTN: Chief, SR)

FROM : Chief of Base, Munich

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/ Operational

SPECIFIC— AEQUOR II Progress Report

DATE: 29 Sept. 1952

D. Office	Classification
Has 2 copies	
See para	
For info and files	✓

Transmitted herewith is AEQUOR II
Progress Report, 1 July - 1 September 1952.

[]

Approved:

[]

*not used
system*

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CS Classification: 74-126-44/1 thru 4
JOB # 62-860/35
Box: 11 Fold: 2

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- 2 - SR (~~was hand carried by R.L. Jewett on 26 Sept.~~) with 1 attach.
- 1 - EE w/1 attach.
- 3 - COM [] w/3 attach.
- 2 - MOB w/1 attach.

1 attach. herewith: Progress Report

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21 September 1952

AEQUOR II PROGRESS REPORT: 1 July - 1 September

1. Submitted herewith is a report covering the last month of the AEQUOR II team's training, the staging period prior to despatch, and the despatch itself.

PERSONNEL2. Non-Staff

Team members: CAMPOSANTOS 4, 6, 8, and 9
Resident housekeeping couple: CAMBISTAS 6 and 7

3. Staff

Case Officers: []

The breakdown of functions earlier established was maintained, with [] responsible for those relations with CAMBISTA 2 that directly concerned the team, op planning, briefing, legends, control indicators, etc. [] for equipment, packing and other matters connected with airborne despatch and survival, and [] for finances and the running of the training safehouse. [] in addition to concerning himself with certain op matters, maintained liaison with the administrative offices, coordinated the training programme, and served as chaplain to the trainees. All the case officers were responsible for maintenance of discipline and morale and shared in the task of escorting the trainees on recreational expeditions. In addition, all took turns in accompanying the trainees on trips to the medical office, etc.

W/T Instructor: []
Asst. W/T Instructor: CARGO
Consultants: CALLIDO
CACETA 1

TRAINING

4. Physical. Because of the heavy training and briefing load during the last month of preparation which kept the trainees busy from early morning till 10 or 11 in the evening, no formal P/T was scheduled. The trainees, however, generally played volley-ball for an hour or so every day, hiked for short distances in connection with their outdoor exercises, and went swimming occasionally when the weather was clement. During the Grafenwöhr manoeuvres.

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all of them showed themselves capable of carrying loads ranging from 80 to 90 lbs for considerable distances, and all of them jumped successfully with these loads. It was felt, therefore, that they were in adequate physical condition. Hardening marches with full equipment might, perhaps, have been worthwhile, but there was not time for them.

5. Tradecraft. During the reporting period training in T/C revolved mainly about discussions of the operational plan for the team's mission. It was felt that the principles of T/C could be more firmly implanted in the trainees' minds by relating them to their practical application in concrete situations than by considering them abstractly. This method served the additional purpose of elucidating the plan itself and justifying some of its more controversial aspects. CALLIDO made a most worthwhile contribution to the team's preparation in this regard.

6. Airborne and Reception. As all four of the activists had successfully completed a practice jump, no further airborne training was considered necessary--and, indeed, it would have been anticlimactic. As a result of the experience gained through permitting trainees to make practice jumps, [] has considerably modified his ideas on the training of agents in ADP techniques. Originally, he favored extensive pre-jump training using the army by-the-numbers method, which is calculated to teach soldiers to react immediately and automatically to the appropriate commands. This is no doubt the best method to use when the problem is to get large numbers of men to jump in rapid succession. With agents, however, who, at most, will jump in groups of five or six, and who, unlike paratroopers, will only be called upon to make one "combat" jump, this kind of training has proven unnecessary. The psychological advantages to be derived from lengthy on-the-ground training can be derived even better from an actual jump under conditions simulating those of an operational jump. And the self-confidence that a successful jump gives cannot be acquired in any other way. Given the basic will to jump and reasonable physical condition, all the agent needs is familiarization with the parachute harness, proper exit procedure, and the sequence of actions that follow the exit, viz., check canopy, release jump bag, prepare to land. The relatively slow rate of descent of the XT-10 parachute (even with the additional weight of the jump bag) makes extensive practice of landing techniques likewise unnecessary. On the other hand, the shape and great size of the XT-10 canopy make it almost impossible for the jumper to control the direction of his descent by pulling on the risers. This means that unless the DZ is quite large and unless the moment of exit is accurately calculated by the jumpmaster, there is a much greater chance that the jumper will land on unfavorable terrain (trees, marshes, water, etc.); and if for example, the jumper should land in a tree, the size of the canopy will make it difficult to free it and dispose of it rapidly. On the whole, however, the advantages of the XT-10 appear to outweigh its disadvantages.

7. [] and [] reviewed reception techniques with CAMPOSANTOS 4 and 6, and gave a basic familiarity with them to CAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9, to whom they were new. This involved principally the selection

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of DZ's and the calculation of where to set up flare paths. All the trainees were likewise familiarized with the assembly and operation of the modified radio beacon AN/URC-4 which they were to take with them. As provided for in the op plan, the team is to select and report on a number of suitable DZ's in their op area. These will be used for eventual sending in of supplies and reinforcements to the team. The unreliable nature of the large-scale maps available to us (General Staff RKKA 1:100,000 series, the survey work for which was done from twenty to fifty years ago) makes the selection of good DZ's dependent on local reconnaissance. The trainees were given additional practice in the use of the standard form for reporting on DZ's by W/T (see below under BRIEFING).

8. Fieldcraft and Survival. CACETA 1 gave a number of useful lectures to the trainees on these subjects and accompanied the group on the Grafenwöhr manoeuvres in order to give practical demonstrations. Nevertheless, the need for properly collated training material in Russian is still as great as before, and the remarks on the subject made in para. 9 of the Final Report on AEQUOR I (MGMA 09934) still apply. Well-rounded training in F & S requires adequate training materials in Russian, lectures and practical demonstration of the various topics (e.g. building a camouflaged bunker, making fires, setting traps, etc.) by someone such as CACETA 1 who knows both the language and the subject, and finally, extensive practice under field conditions. Although the AEQUOR II team had a little of all of these, it cannot be said that their training was as extensive or thorough in respect of F & S as it should have been. In particular, the exigencies of their W/T training made it impossible to devote enough time to these subjects.

9. W/T and Cipher. All four of the AEQUOR II team members took Commo training, CAMPOSANTOS 4 and 9 as regular operators, and CAMPOSANTOS 6 and 8 as emergency operators. All of them were likewise familiarized with the one-time pad cipher system. CARGO proved extremely valuable as a Russian-speaking auxiliary instructor.

CAMPOSANTO 4: By the end of his Commo training, he was adequately qualified to serve as a regular operator. He learned painfully and was easily discouraged by lack of progress. On the other hand, his remarkable memory ensured that once he had mastered a subject, it remained firmly implanted in his mind.

CAMPOSANTO 9: Although he spent somewhat less than half as much time in Commo training as CAMPOSANTO 4, CAMPOSANTO 9 had outstripped him -- especially in regard to sending and receiving speed -- by the end of July. His memory, however, is not as good as CAMPOSANTO 4's. But since the two of them will man the team's BASE, it is felt that between them they will be fully capable of handling the W/T traffic.

CAMPOSANTO 8: He was trained as an emergency operator -- a task for which his qualifications are adequate.

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CAMPOSANTO 6: Although originally intended as an emergency operator, his miserable performance in Commo training makes the chances of his success in that capacity extremely dubious. It is to be hoped that no emergency will ever be dire enough to require his services as an operator. For a discussion of the reasons for his failure in Commo training, see below under MORALE.

More comprehensive reports on the trainees' instruction and performance in Commo have been submitted through Commo channels by Control indicators for W/T messages are discussed in a separate report.

10. The AEQUOR case officers would like once more to make the perennial case officer's criticism of Commo training: it is too cut and dried and does not provide that variety which is desirable for pedagogical as well as for other reasons. This is especially true of the first months, when the trainees are given nothing but Morse code for hours on end. As much as possible, Commo training should be combined with the other aspects of the agent's preparation-- e.g. reports writing, cache description, DZ reporting, etc. To this end, the case officers see no reason why practice with the one-time pad (or with other simple cryptographic systems) should not be started at an early stage. Commo objects to this on grounds of security, but this is absurd, as by now, the Soviets must be assumed to be perfectly aware of our use of the one-time pad. The same may be said about familiarizing trainees with available W/T sets at an early stage in their training. Here again security objections are invalid since the Soviets are also, by now, familiar with RS-1's and RS-6's.

11. As a result of their experience with AEQUOR I and AEQUOR II, the case officers feel that basic Commo training should be prior to and separate from general training. Each project should, in effect, maintain two training groups -- one solely for basic commo training, and the other for advanced Commo training plus general training. According to this system, the team, as such, would not be formed until after its W/T men had passed through their basic training. At this time, they would be brought together with the non-W/T men to undergo general training with them. It would have the merit of permitting the W/T men to participate fully in other aspects of training and would, at the same time, obviate the necessity of carrying on instruction on two levels -- which has been the bane of previous training groups. It might also assure a constant reserve of (at least) semi-trained W/T men, who could always be thrown into the breach in case of defections. AEQUOR I, for example, might have been saved had a reserve W/T man been available.

12. Photographic. During July, the trainees continued to practice the photography of documents under natural light with the Minox (see para 14 of MGMA 09934). Shortly prior to the team's despatch it was learned that the Minox Co. have just developed a gimmick that permits the Minox to take pictures at long range by attaching it to the eye-piece of a monocular or one side of a pair of binoculars. Unfortunately, there was not time to procure one of these before the team's despatch.

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13. Secret Writing. All of the trainees had achieved an adequate competence in this subject by the time [] of MKTOPAZ gave them their final instruction on 25 July. By then, CAMPOSANTOS 4 and 6 had had ten, and CAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 three training sessions. The team was assigned S/W system LION for communications to the West, and S/W system CENTAUR for internal communications. Addresses to be used for communications with the West and the safety and control indicators assigned to each activist are listed in a separate report.

14. Reports Writing. The unfortunate performance of the CACCOLAS made it clear that considerable attention would have to be devoted to this subject. The trainees were, consequently, given several lectures on its principles and a number of exercises. In this connection, those prepared by [] were found to be quite useful although since they dealt with intelligence reporting, they were not directly applicable to AEQUOR. More exercises of this kind should be prepared as the case officers rarely have time to make them up as they go along.

OPERATIONAL PLAN

15. The operational plan for the AEQUOR II mission is discussed at some length in MGMA 09934 and is set forth in detail in Annex "C" to MGMA 10455. In an earlier version, it may likewise be found in MGAA 243. It will be noted that the AEQUOR II operational plan differs in no significant respect from that intended for AEQUOR I. The similarity is not accidental; basic AEQUOR thinking has always envisaged the progressive despatch to selected areas of the BSSR of a number of CAMBISTA 1 teams, each of which would operate independently of the others, but all of which would have the same mission, viz., to collect operational data and to make a beginning towards the establishment of viable, long-term operational support facilities. Any subsequent linking of the teams on the inside would not be accomplished through horizontal liaison, but solely by the case officers.

16. It is evident that minimal support facilities are the sine qua non of long-term operations, and it is the contention of the AEQUOR case officers that any operation (at least in those areas of the USSR where DYCLAIM is not already in contact with local dissidents) that is not primarily calculated to promote their establishment is neither justified nor likely to be successful. It should be borne in mind in this connection that a successful operation must fulfill three basic conditions: the agent(s) must reach the target area, they must be able to survive, and they must be able to communicate regularly and securely with DYCLAIM. At the risk of laying themselves open to the charge of monomania, the AEQUOR case officers once more submit that the black base-cum-outside resident combination offers the best possibility for the fulfilment of the latter two conditions while, at the same time, laying the foundations for the establishment of those support facilities on the basis of which future intelligence and clandestine action operations may be mounted with a much greater likelihood of success than can ever be achieved by one-shot, unsupported operations.

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17. Candor requires, however, that mention be made of the two aspects of the AEQUOR II operational plan that are likely to prove troublesome in the implementation. First is the problem of feeding the base men throughout the winter. Since it is not likely that they will be able to survive solely on fish and game, CAMPOSANTO 8 will without delay have to set about gaining access to some nearby and secure source of food. Had the team been despatched in the spring, this problem would clearly have been much less serious: more food would have been available in the woods and fields, and more time would have been available to investigate and select sources of supply. As it is, unless CAMPOSANTO 8 was immediately successful, the base men may be forced by sheer hunger into abandoning the base and attempting to seek at least temporary shelter on the outside. This brings up the second problem, viz., that of legalization. This cannot be effected until the person wishing to legalize himself (CAMPOSANTOS 6 and 8) is registered with the local authorities. Even if we were in a position to be sure of the correct entries and serial numbers in the passport and voyennyi bilet, we are still obviously not able to protect the activists against backchecks. It can only be hoped that the traditional inefficiency and je m'enfoutisme of Soviet bureaucracy will keep such checks from being made. It is also possible that one or both of the outside men will be able to get help in legalizing himself from local dissidents. CAMPOSANTO 6 was given the name of a trusted individual who lives near the base area by CAMBISTA 2, and CAMPOSANTO 8, it will be recalled, is himself a native of the area.

18. During the early months of the AEQUOR II team's preparation, the case officers were somewhat apprehensive that the team members -- especially CAMPOSANTO 6 and, to a lesser degree, CAMPOSANTO 4 -- might still entertain notions concerning their activities in the target area that would vitiate the AEQUOR II operational plan. It will be recalled (see para 20 of MGMA 09934) that -- largely due to the subversive influence of CAMPOSANTO 2 abetted, unfortunately, by CAMBISTA 2 -- in the last week prior to the scheduled AEQUOR I despatch, a number of undesirable changes had tacitly been allowed to creep into the plan. This was another expression of the mistaken policy that then prevailed of making every concession in order to ensure that the team would be despatched. On many occasions, CAMBISTA 2, as a prudent politician, has played the old game of running with the fox and hunting with the hounds: while affecting to agree wholeheartedly with the case officers on matters of joint policy, he has not scrupled to ingratiate himself with the team members by encouraging demands and attitudes that would, in effect, vitiate those same joint policies. This was particularly true in respect to the operational plan and matters of discipline. Bearing this in mind, the case officers considered it advisable to have CAMBISTA 2 publicly and unequivocally committed to the operational plan well in advance of the team's despatch. In early July, therefore, the plan was gone over in detail with CAMBISTA 2. He once more reaffirmed his agreement with it and undertook to assume his share of the responsibility of seeing to it in his discussions with the team members that they likewise accepted it fully. Nevertheless, the principal burden of selling the plan to the team members still remained with the case officers. As matters turned out, CAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 accepted the plan without reservation -- although CAMPOSANTO 9 would have preferred to play a role more active than that of manning the base. CAMPOSANTO 4, now that he had been elevated to

Security Information

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the (honorary) position of Chief W/T Operator, was quite pleased with his lot. There remained only CAMPOSANTO 6, who was not fully in accord with the plan. His feeling was that all team members should attempt semi-legalization as soon as possible and only return to the base area on the infrequent occasions when W/T contacts were to be made. Fortunately, this heretical view was vigorously refuted by the other team members and CAMPOSANTO 6 eventually expressed himself as satisfied with the plan. The possibility is, of course, not excluded that he still entertains a private plan of his own.

MISCELLANEOUS

19. Financial Arrangements. No difficulties were encountered in making satisfactory financial arrangements; as originally planned for AEQUOR I, each is to be paid a monthly salary equal to the base pay of a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army. Payments will start with the month of despatch, viz., August 1952, and will be held in escrow. In addition, in the event of an activist's death or on the elapse of a two year period from the date of the last contact with him (personal, W/T or S/W), the sum of \$10,000 together with his accumulated escrow salary will be paid to the beneficiary designated by him. The question of a bonus, which proved so troublesome with CAMPOSANTO 2, never arose this time. Each activist, further requested that a percentage of his escrow salary be paid monthly to CAMBISTA 1. These percentages varied from 25% in the case of CAMPOSANTO 4 to 6½% in the case of CAMPOSANTO 9 -- a fairly faithful reflection of each activist's feelings towards CAMBISTA 1. Both CAMPOSANTO 4 and CAMPOSANTO 6 designated the Government of CAMBISTA 1 as their beneficiaries, while CAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 designated their families in the BSSR. All of these provisions were set forth in a document signed by each activist and attested to by CAMBISTA 2 and one of the case officers. In a subsequent codicil, CAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9 requested that, should political conditions make payments to their relatives impossible, the money be held in escrow by the appropriate organs of the U.S. Government until payment can be made. CAMPOSANTO 9 remarked in this connection that he felt that the Government of the U.S. rested on foundations somewhat more secure than those of the Government of CAMBISTA 1. Copies of these documents will be appended to a separate despatch.

20. With respect to money the activists were to take with them on mission, the case officers, after as careful a breakdown of anticipated expenses as our limited knowledge of Soviet prices would permit, estimated that a total of 200,000 rubles would cover the team's expenses over a period of two years and still leave^a sizeable emergency fund. On the basis of their own calculations, the team members arrived at a figure of 233,600 rubles for one and a half years. It was pointed out to them that their figures were not realistic -- e.g. they wanted 20,000 rubles for transportation when, for example, the III Class railway fare from Minsk to Moscow only costs 86.80 rubles. After some discussion (which was, however, marked by none of the acrimony that had accompanied similar discussions with CAMPOSANTO 2) they were persuaded to accept the case officers' figure. CAMBISTA 2 later suggested privately that a few more thousand be thrown in as a gesture and this was, in fact, done when 6,000 additional rubles were added to the total shortly before the team's departure for the staging area. In addition to

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rubles, the team was also given a nominal sum in zloty and DDR marks to be used in the event of an emergency exfiltration.

21. CAMBISTA 1 Authenticators. This matter, which had first been raised in respect of AEQUOR 1 (see para 13 of MGMA 09934) was once more brought up by CAMBISTA 2 early in July. He was quite insistent that independent CAMBISTA 1 authenticators be used in the W/T traffic to and from the team, saying that while his "heart told him to trust the Americans", an authenticator system would provide the only guarantee that they were playing square with him. He went on to allege that the team members would, in any case, insist on their use. This was another example of his practice of attributing notions to them that were in fact his own; CAMPOSANTO 9, for example, had never even heard of authenticators until the case officers explained their use to him; and later, after it had been decided to use them, both he and CAMPOSANTO 4 protested that they were completely unnecessary and served only to increase the length of messages. CAMPOSANTO 4 went so far as to ask one of the case officers what he should do if he wished to send a message that he did not want CAMBISTA 1 to see! CAMPOSANTO 8 was indifferent to the whole matter -- which only left CAMPOSANTO 6, and since as a non-W/T man, he would not be concerned with authenticators in any case, his opinion was basically irrelevant.

22. As it was finally worked out, 100 authenticator words were selected for East-West traffic and an equal number for West-East traffic. While the case officers hold these words in alphabetical order, CAMBISTA 2 and the two W/T operators each have a list of them in an arbitrarily selected sequence unknown to the case officers. Each message must include the authenticator appropriate to its number. As can be seen, the system only guarantees that if x number of messages is sent by the team, CAMBISTA 2 will see an equal number and in the same order that they were sent. It provides him (as was pointed out to him) with no guarantee that the contents of the messages will not be changed or that a whole message will not be replaced by one especially made up ad usum Delphini. Under these circumstances, one is tempted to wonder why CAMBISTA 2 was so insistent on the use of an authenticator system.

23. So that the case officers might be able to send emergency messages to the team in his absence, CAMBISTA 2 provided the case officers with the first six West-East authenticator words. When these are used up through either emergency or normal use, he will provide six more. As an additional precaution (should he, for example, be killed in an automobile accident) CAMBISTA 2 undertook to entrust a copy of his lists to CAMBISTA 4. Copies of both lists held by the case officers will be sent to Headquarters in a separate despatch.

24. At CAMPOSANTO 6's suggestion, each team member signed a declaration in which he expressed himself as satisfied with the operational plan, the equipment and the other team members. Each likewise signed that he recognized that serious consequences would ensue not only for himself but for the whole Belorussian cause if he now backed down. CAMBISTA 2 also had them all sign a military oath.

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BRIEFING

25. Safety and Control Indicators. Each member of the team was briefed on individual indicators for S/W traffic, and CAMPOSANTOS 4 and 9, the two W/T operators, each had a separate indicator system for radio messages. These indicators are all being submitted in a separate despatch.

26. The team members were given an advance listing of the VOA literaturnyie basedy to use in proving their bona fides. The last one given was that of 20 October on Aleksei Kol'tsov. Although we had a list (sent by Headquarters at our request) going as far as 22 February 1953, the case officers felt that it would be unwise to give the whole list at once, since, if one of the team members were captured, the entire list would be compromised. As it is, new lists for, say a month or two in advance can be sent to the team from time to time in our West-East W/T traffic.

27. Standard W/T Report Forms. In addition to general training in the composition of reports, the team members were briefed in the use of standard forms for the reporting of DZ's and document intelligence. According to this briefing, a minimal DZ report was to consist of (a) code name assigned to DZ (in all cases names of fruits), (b) coordinates of its centre, (c) length and width in metres, and (e) azimuth bearing (from grid North) of the DZ's long axis. An example of a report sent according to this form is Message No. 2 sent by the team shortly after their arrival in the operations area. It is recognized that a full report on a DZ would contain much more information, but since the team has a radio beacon and will be able to function as a small reception committee, it is felt that a report of this sort has enough data to permit location and use of the DZ it describes.

28. The operational maps carried by the team were ten cloth-printed sheets of the N-35 block of the General Staff RKKKA 1:100,000 series. In giving a map reference, therefore, the team members were briefed to give first the abbreviated sheet number and next the grid coordinates carried to one decimal. A typical map reference in a W/T message should look like this: 78427833, which stands for Sheet N-35-78, Grid East 42.7, Grid North 83.3. It was felt that this system of giving map references would be more convenient for the team to use than the geographical coordinate system and would also be less subject to error.

29. In reporting pasporta, the team members were instructed to give (a) republic of issue, (b) edition, (c) serial number, (d) number of militsiya issuing office, (e) place of issue, and (f) date of issue. The same sort of data are to be reported for voyennyie bilet'y. Again, it is recognized that these are minimal data, but within the limitations of short W/T messages, it is felt that they will be adequate.

30. Partisans. Belorussia is a country of many forests and almost impenetrable swamps; and, since the war, the population of the western provinces has been rapidly and ruthlessly gleichgeschaltet with their eastern brethren -- a process that cannot but have aroused a considerable measure of disaffection. Thus, the objective conditions, in the form of suitable terrain and adequate motivation, are present for the existence of partisan bands. While no evidence

Security Information

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is at hand pointing to their existence, and while it is unlikely that any large bands are left, the possibility that small partisan-type groups might be met with by the team could not be ignored. It should be borne in mind that such groups might not necessarily be politically inspired, but might be criminal outlaws. In either case, however, the establishment of contact with such groups would be of considerable interest to both DYCLAIM and GAMBISTA 1. The greatest problem for the team will be the establishment of secure contact with such groups. Here, the VOA broadcasts may prove useful. If political partisans are found, the team will be in a good bargaining position in virtue of their having W/T communication with the West, and by means of that link they will be able to summon medicaments, money and other supplies that the partisans would have difficulty in procuring locally. How the team will handle any partisans that they may run across will, of course, "depend on the terrain and the circumstances"; for the American part, the team could promise the partisans that we would make every effort to assist them.

EQUIPMENT

31. In Annex "A" to the present report [] has listed the equipment taken on mission by the team and discussed some of the equipment problems faced by the case officers. As with AEQUOR I (and probably because CAMPOSANTOS 4 and 6 had, to a certain extent, been spoiled), the chief equipment difficulties with the team members again revolved about the problem of how many weapons and how much ammo was to be taken. As [] points out in his annex, the case officers feel that they now know enough about equipment problems to make up a basic TE for missions of the character undertaken by the AEQUOR II team. With future teams, therefore, it should be possible to avoid the lengthy and occasionally bitter discussions with the team members that have caused so much trouble up till now. The team members can simply be presented with a standard allotment.

32. The team members have been asked to report from time to time on the value of the items that they took along. This also should prove useful. It is earnestly hoped that those parts of the present progress report that discuss equipment problems (together with similar parts of the progress reports of other projects) be centrally studied and evaluated in Headquarters. The results of this study of field experience should then form the basis for recommendations to the field for the equipment of future missions and should also suggest the direction that research into new kinds of equipment should take.

LEGENDS AND DOCUMENTATION

33. In summary form, the legends of each of the team members are set forth in Annex "B" to the present report. Generally, the remarks on legends and documentation made in paras 21, 22, and 23 of MGMA 09934 remain equally valid for AEQUOR II, in which the same legending pattern was followed. Certain problems not mentioned there should, however, be discussed. In all cases, the team members are to explain their presence in the operations area by saying that they have been discharged from their former place of employment. To support this they have the appropriate entries in their documents and, in addition, each of them has a separate spravka attesting to the same fact.

Security Information

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The rub is that, so far as is known here, it is not possible for a person to be discharged simply at his own request, and those cases in the Kodeks zakonov o trude according to which discharge is possible, are not applicable. It is only hoped that CAVAN is right when he says that little attention is paid to the strict observance of these regulations. In any case (since this is a recurring problem), it would be highly worthwhile if DYCLOTH were to make a special study of the reasons for which it is possible for Soviet citizens to be discharged from work. The study should not be confined to the regulations, but should also examine the circumstances under which persons are known to have been discharged. This would require the study of old interrogation reports, and possibly the special interrogation of former Soviets now in the West. In any case, the study should be made from the standpoint of satisfying the special requirements of agent cover and documentation.

34. Since [] of MKTOPAZ is presumably making a separate report on the documentation given to the AEQUOR II team, this matter will only be dealt with cursorily in the present report. All four of the team members had (a) a pasport, (b) a voenyi билет, (c) a trudovaya knizhka, and (d) a discharge spravka (plus spares and blanks of the latter). In addition, each of them carried a small certificate signed by CAMBISTA 4 attesting to their membership in CAMBISTA 1 and requesting that aid and assistance be given them by all patriotic Belorussians. The names on these CAMBISTA 1 certificates differed both from the team members' real names and from those used in their Soviet documentation.

35. Because according to the plan CAMPOSANTOS 4 and 9 are not to leave the base until the Spring of 1953 or later, the deregistration and discharge dates in their documents were left blank -- to be filled in at the appropriate time in the field. To do this the team was given the appropriate inks and pens to take with them. In anticipation of an immediate despatch, these dates had already been filled in in the documents of the other two team members before the group left CSOB for the staging area. As it was, the team was not despatched until almost a month later. This meant that there would be a gap of over a month between the time that CAMPOSANTOS 6 and 8 were deregistered in their last place of residence and the time they once more reappeared in public. This would, obviously, be a gap of time too large to explain away readily. Fortunately, it was possible to doctor their documents by placing a "2" in front of each of the dates. In this way, their deregistration could be advanced from the early to the latter part of August. In the future, it would be advisable not to fill in discharge and deregistration dates until the day of the final despatch. This would require taking the appropriate cachets, inks and pens to the staging area -- but that should present no insuperable difficulty. MKTOPAZ aged the documents of all the team members. In this connection, CAMPOSANTO 4 rightly pointed out that the deregistration and discharge cachets should not be impressed on the documents until after the ageing.

MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

36. On the whole, the last two months of the training and preparation of the AEQUOR II team were relatively free of the morale and disciplinary problems that plagued the last weeks of AEQUOR I. To some extent, this can

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be attributed to the differences in character between CAMPOSANTO 2 and the two new trainees, CAMPOSANTOS 8 and 9; the case officers flatter themselves, however, that to a considerable degree this fortunate situation was due to the Training Regulations (see Annex "B" to MGMA 10455) subscribed to by the trainees before the start of AEQUOR II. This is not to say that all proceeded smoothly at all times; there were several crises, but all of them were minor. In the early part of July, the trainees began to complain increasingly about the restrictions on their freedom imposed by the Regulations. The substance of their complaints was that the restrictions were not imposed for security reasons but solely to test their powers of endurance. They also felt that they were discriminatory in that the case officers and consultants were not subject to them, and finally, they considered themselves humiliated by regulations that implied that they were children unable to take care of themselves. CAMPOSANTO 6 became especially moody and intractable at this time. His efforts to learn W/T -- never very assiduous -- now became even more desultory and half-hearted. In talks with the case officers, he complained that constant preoccupation with his lack of freedom make it impossible for him to concentrate. Another factor contributing to his low morale was his gonorrhoea, which still seemed to resist even the most powerful anti-biotics. Soon the team's preoccupation with achieving a relaxation of the Regulations became an idée fixe: they accused the case officers of MGB-like harshness, and, on one occasion even that [] the champion of Great Russian imperialism, was deliberately trying to provoke them into a violation in order to call off the mission and thereby sabotage the Belorussian cause. This was said in haste, and was, of course, simply a verbalization of their general tenseness -- but it was nonetheless indicative of their frame of mind.

37. All of this faced the case officers with an awkward dilemma^X. They felt (in view of their experience with CAMPOSANTO 2) that any appeasement on their part would be fatal, yet some real relaxation of the Regulations was clearly necessary if learning efficiency was to be maintained. After a conference with CAMBISTA 2, a face-saving compromise was worked out: there was to be no relaxation of the Regulations as such, but on recreational trips, the accompanying case officer, instead of staying with the trainees at all times, would remain in a central location where they could get in touch with him in case of emergency. This preserved the spirit of the Regulations and, at the same time, gave the trainees the illusion of freedom. From then on until the moment of despatch there were no difficulties at all even though the old, stick-like-glue system was reintroduced while the team was in the staging area. At the moment of despatch, the team's morale could not have been higher.

DESPATCH

38. On 31 July the four case officers and the team drove from CSOB to the staging area, where they lived in a succession of pensions and hotels for the next 26 days. Little need be said about this period of waiting. To the normal pre-despatch tension was added (with cumulative effect) that produced by the daily disappointment of hearing that the weather had not yet broken. It was psychologically impossible to spend every day in the

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studying of legends and the rehashing of the operational plan, and the opportunities for secure recreation were few. Under the circumstances, therefore, it was difficult to keep the team members from brooding, and a certain deterioration of morale was inevitable. That no incidents or explosions ensued as the days of waiting stretched into weeks is solely attributable to the steadfastness and fortitude of the team members. It is said that familiarity breeds contempt; but even the most blasé among the case officers, who had fallen into the habit of thinking of the team members more in terms of their individual weaknesses than in terms of the mission that they were voluntarily undertaking, were forced into an admiring recognition of the team members' courage. It is one thing for a soldier in time of war, surrounded as he is by thousands of his comrades and supported by the moral approbation of his entire people, to undertake an heroic action; it is, however, quite something else, and requires a higher order of courage, for a clandestine activist to undertake such an action in time of peace -- knowing, as he does, that he will remain unrecognized no matter what its outcome, and surrounded, as he is, by the daily temptations of a civilian life to which he could easily return with none the wiser. And, in the present case, it required even greater fortitude to maintain the peak of determination that such an undertaking requires throughout a whole month of demoralizing idleness and in the knowledge that each day's delay meant a corresponding decrease of the operating time available in the target area -- and, consequently, an ever-increasing risk. Even when the August moon period had passed, and the team members were asked if they were willing to chance a jump in the dark of the moon, provided the aircrew were willing to fly, not one of them hesitated, although this would have provided them with a readymade and thoroughly understandable reason for backing out.

39. As it turned out, the mission was flown during the only 12-hour interval of decent weather in almost a month (see SRAN 6149), and weather reports on the DZ area since the despatch date have continued to indicate rain and cloudiness ever since. It is to be regretted that the decision to fly in the dark of the moon was not taken earlier; the team might, perhaps, have then been despatched in late July, during the new or first-quarter phase of the August moon. It seems curious, in fact, that this decision was taken so recently; surely the factors on which it was based have been known to those who concern themselves with these matters ever since the late war.

40. The first message from the team indicated that they were dropped some 10 to 15 miles from where the aircrew thought they had dropped them. It is believed that inaccuracies in the flight maps (compounded by low visibility) led the aircrew to mistake the town several miles NW of which the team were actually dropped for another one, some distance to the east and a few miles south of the intended principal DZ. This is quite possible, as, according to CAMBISTA 2, who is familiar with the area, the town short of which the team were dropped is represented on available maps (e.g. the AMS 501 Series 1:250,000) as very much smaller than it actually is.

41. During the waiting period, [] served, so to speak, as a cutout between the case officers and the Air Section. While indiscriminate multilateral dealings might, no doubt, have led to difficulties and flaps, a more direct relation between the case officers and the Air Section would, nonetheless, unquestionably have been preferable. Even the advent of []

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(whose energetic representations were of great help), did not entirely make up for the lack of personal contact. It was only by chance, for example, that the case officers discovered in time that the Air Section had the wrong coordinates for the principal AEQUOR II DZ. There was also some confusion over the direction of the final dropping run, which necessitated an awkward and undesirable last minute briefing of the team on a new IP (see para 7 of MGMA 09934). This sort of difficulty can be avoided in the future if, as [] suggested in a post-despatch meeting, the case officers are kept fully au courant of any changes in the flight plan that would affect the briefing of the team members.

SECURITY

42. In respect of security, the AEQUOR case officers have taken the view that the only information that needs at all costs to be protected is (a) the time of despatch, (b) the team's precise destination, and (c) the data in the team members' documents. The protection of other information -- such as the team members' true identities, those of the case officers, the fact that the team members were being trained for a clandestine mission, and even the fact that the team was to be despatched to the USSR -- while unquestionably desirable, was considered to be of secondary importance. While the possibility of internal treachery cannot be ignored, as a practical matter, it was something about which the case officers could do nothing in any case. They proceeded, therefore, on the working assumption that neither the team members, nor CMBISTA 2, nor CMBISTAS 5, 6 and 7, nor the case officers themselves, the consultants, the aircrew and the not inconsiderable number of DYCLAIM personnel who knew about the project from reading reports such as the present one -- were Soviet agents. If this assumption is granted, the case officers can say with certainty that the pay-off information, viz., time of despatch, and destination, ^{is documentally correct} was not compromised.

43. Assuming, therefore, the bona fides of those involved in the project, the case officers directed those security measures that were taken against external enemies, witting or unwitting. The case officers tried (a) to prevent the identification (by either the idly or the dangerously curious) of the team members, their training activities, or the safehouse with intelligence work, and (b) to prevent the trainees (especially while on recreation trips) from getting into trouble. The accomplishment of (a) was a matter of providing credible cover, and that of (b) was basically a question of seeing to it that situations where conflict was possible were avoided. This was the purpose of those parts of the Training Regulations (see Annex "B" to MGMA 10455) that forbade unaccompanied excursions and the drinking of wines and spirits away from the safehouse and placed certain cities out of bounds.

44. The personal cover of the team members while off the safehouse premises was that they were Icelanders undergoing technical training with the U.S. forces in Germany in connection with NATO. To substantiate this cover they all (with the exception of CAMPOSANTO 4, who had arrived earlier) had documents with Icelandic names (e.g. Finnur Sigurdsson) certifying to

Security Information

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their employment with the American Forces. Icelandic was selected as a cover nationality as the language is little-known and the likelihood of running into genuine Icelanders was considered remote. To satisfy the curiosity of neighbors, a sign was put up in front of the training safehouse with the inscription "Joint Universities DP Study Project". Contact with local people was not encouraged, but if unavoidable, the story was that the team members were summer students.

45. As far as the security of the team members themselves is concerned, the final CARRIAGE test given by [] on 1 August indicated the probability that all four of them had sent letters to friends without authorization. It is not felt, however, that any of them was guilty of any serious indiscretion in these letters. All of them likewise admitted to having sneaked out of the safehouse on one or two evenings in early July. These excursions had as their purpose behind-the-woodshed assignations with some girls who lived in the next house and whose acquaintance they had made over the back fence. According to the team members, these girls were very naive, and accepted the foreign-student cover without question. Aside from the disciplinary infraction involved, it is not felt that these few and hurried rendezvous resulted in any serious compromise of security.

46. On the occasion of his last visit, CMBISTA 2 had the team members each write several letters to former acquaintances, indicating that they were taking special military training in Spain. CMBISTA 2 undertook to have these letters mailed from time to time by friends of his in Spain. It was felt that this device would work as there has been considerable talk in emigre circles about military training under Franco's auspices. It is known, for example, that the London Poles are contemplating negotiations with this in mind -- and there are still many Belorussians in the Polish organizations in Great Britain.

47. CMBISTAS 6 and 7 continued to live in the safehouse until sometime after the team had been despatched. This was done to preserve the illusion that the house was still inhabited, and also to keep CMBISTAS 6 and 7 ignorant of the despatch date. After the team's departure for the staging area, CARGO continued to meet the trainees' scheduled W/T contacts to mislead possible monitors.

OPERATIONS

48. Two W/T messages have so far been received from the team. They will be discussed in the next AEQUOR II progress report.

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ANNEX "A" TO AEQUOR II PROGRESS REPORT

EQUIPMENT

1. The following is a complete list of equipment carried on the AEQUOR II mission. The breakdown is made per individual dispatched. Note that the individual's equipment is further divided as to function, i.e. (1) container items, (2) W/T equipment, (3) weapons and ammunition, (4) food and cooking gear, (5) operational items, (6) base camp gear, (7) clothing, (8) personal articles.

A. CAMPOSANTO 4

<u>Item</u>	<u>Number</u>
Parachute, X-T-10, U.S.	1
Kit bag, U.S.A.F.	1
Equipment container, U.S. Army paratroop A-6 w/ harness	1
Packboard, U.S. Army Mountain Troop	1
Football helmet U.S.	1
Lowering rope, 25 foot	1
RS-1, receiver, transmitter, spare-parts units	1
RS-1, packing container and carrying unit	1
Crystals in waterproof container	15
One-time pads, encode, w/ waterproof container	3
One-time pads, decode, w/ waterproof container	2
Cypher instruction document	1
Schmeisser w/ container & 6 clips (32 loaded rds. each)	1
Pistol, FN Belgian type, 9 MM w/ 2 clips (13 loaded rds. each)	1
Pistolet, Walther, 6.35 w/ 1 clip (6 loaded rds.)	1
Box 6.35 ammo, 25 rounds	1
Box 9 MM ammo, 50 rounds	2
Canteen, Wehrmacht	1
Meatcan, Wehrmacht	2
Spoon-fork, German	1
Knife, hunting w/ scabbard, German	1
Pemmican concentrated food packet	6
Salami, canned, Danish, 2 lbs.	1
Dog-drag	1
Film magazines for Minox camera, German (total 500 exposures)	10
Compass, German	1
Signal, Crow-call	1
Teargas pencil w/ 6 cartridges	1
L tablet	1
K tablet	2
Secret writing ink capsules	12
Poncho-tent, Wehrmacht, camouflaged	1
Waterproof plastic bags	2
Sleeping bag, U.S. Army Arctic, w/o cover	1
Flashlight, dynamo, German	1
Cleaning patches, ramrod, oil	50
Candle	1
Leather oil, German	1
Boots, Soviet type	1
Soviet and German clothing complete	1
Extra shirt, sweater, underwear & socks	

Security Information

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A. CAMPOSANTO 4 (continued)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Number</u>
Flying suit, summer, U.S.A.F.	1
Wallet w/ complete personal documents (see attached Progress Report for exact contents)	
Pocket knife, Swiss Army	1
Moneybelt w/ 51,500 Rubles	
Soviet cigarette packs	5
Tobacco, 1/2 lb. tin, German	1
Cigarette paper, German packs	2
Cigarette lighter, British, w/ spare wicks, flints & 1 can fuel	
Toilet articles complete, Soviet & German	
Pencil flashlight, with spare lead, batteries & bulbs, U.S.	1
Ballpoint pen with 4 refill ink loads, German	1
Wristwatch, Swiss	1
Pocket chronometer, German	1
Notebook, Soviet, w/ calendar	2

The total weight of the above equipment which was included in the jump and carrying bundle was 97 pounds. This figure does not include the weight of the parachute, clothing worn by the agent, nor the various personal articles carried on his person at the time of the dispatch.

B. CAMPOSANTO 6

<u>Item</u>	<u>Number</u>
Parachute, XT-10, U.S.	1
Kit bag, U.S.A.F.	1
Equipment container, U.S. Army paratroop A-6 w/ harness	1
Packboard, U.S. Army Mountain Troop	1
Football helmet, U.S.	1
Lowering rope, 25 foot length	1
Generator, GN-58, modified w/o tripod, w/ 2 adaptors	1
Generator, GN-58, packing container & carrying unit	1
Schmeisser, machine pistol w/ container & 6 clips (32 loaded rds. each)	1
Pistol, FN Belgian type, 9 MM w/ 2 clips (13 loaded rds. each)	1
Pistolet, Walther 6.35 w/ 1 clip (6 loaded rds.)	1
Pistol, .22 w/ silencer & 3 clips, U.S. (8 loaded rds. each)	1
Box 9 MM ammo, 50 rounds	1
Box 6.35 ammo, 25 rounds	1
Box .22 ammo, 50 rounds	4
Knife w/ scabbard, German	1
Canteen, Wehrmacht	1
Meatcan, Wehrmacht	2
Spoon-fork, German	1
Penmican, concentrated food packet	6
Salami, canned, Danish, 2 lbs.	1
Binoculars, German	1
Dog-drag	1

Security Information

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Security Information

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B. CAMPOSANTO 6 (continued)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Number</u>
Film magazines for Minox camera (total 300 exposures)	6
Secret writing ink capsules	12
Compass, German	1
Signal, crow-call	1
Document falsification kit w/ inks, pen, transposition mat'l	
L tablet	1
K tablet	2
Map case, German, w/ 1/2 of 1 set of operational maps (cloth)	
Poncho tent, Wehrmacht (camouflaged)	1
Sleeping bag, U.S. Army Arctic, w/o cover	1
Flashlight, German dynamo	1
Cleaning patches, ramrod & oil	
Candle	1
Waterproof burial containers, plastic	2
Water bag, canvas 10 liter German	2
Boots, Soviet type	1
Soviet & German clothing complete	
Extra shirt, sweater, underwear & socks	
Flying suit, summer, U.S.A.F.	1
Wallet w/ complete personal documents (see attached Progress Report for exact contents)	
Money belt w/ 51,500 Rubles	
Pencil flashlight w/ spare batteries, bulbs & lead, U.S.	1
Pen, ballpoint w/ 2 spare ink loads, German	1
Flashlight, key chain type, German	1
Toilet articles complete, Soviet & German	
Wristwatch, Swiss	1
Notebook, Soviet, w/ calendar	2

The total weight of the above equipment which was included in the agent's jump and carrying bundle was 101 lbs. *

C. CAMPOSANTO 8

<u>Item</u>	<u>Number</u>
Parachute, XT-10, U.S.	1
Kit bag, U.S.A.F.	1
Equipment container, U.S. Army paratroop A-6 w/ harness	1
Packboard, U.S. Army Mountain Troop	1
Football helmet, U.S.	1
Lowering rope, 25 foot length	1
AN/URC-4 complete w/ battery, crystal & modified antenna	1
AN/URC-4 burial unit	1
Schmeisser machine pistol w/ container & 6 clips (32 loaded rds. each)	1
Pistol, Luger P-08 w/ 2 clips (8 loaded rds. each)	1
Pistolet, Walther, 6.35 w/ 1 clip (6 rounds loaded)	1
Pistol, .22 w/ silencer w/ 3 clips (8 loaded rounds each)	1
Box 9 MM ammo, 50 rounds	1
Box 6.35 ammo, 25 rounds	1
Box .22 ammo, 50 rounds	5

Security Information

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Security Information

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C. CAMPOSANTO 8 (continued)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Number</u>
Canteen, Wehrmacht	1
Heatcan, Italian army	2
Spoon-fork, German	1
Knife, hunting w/ scabbard, German	1
Pemmican, concentrated food packet	8
Salami, canned, Danish, 2 lbs.	1
Dog-drag	1
Minox camera w/ measuring chain	1
Minox light meter	1
Film magazines for Minox camera (total 500 exposures)	10
Compass, German	1
Teargas pencil w/ 4 cartridges	1
L tablet	1
K tablet	2
Secret writing ink capsules	12
Signal, crow-call	1
Bottle, 10 cc measuring (for mixing S/W)	1
Map case, German w/ 1/2 of 1 set of operational maps (cloth)	
Extra maps, 1/2 of 1 operational set, packed in carrying bundle	
Documents falsification kit w/ inks, pen, transpositional mat'l	
Field type medical kit (see next section for breakdown)	
Poncho-tent, Wehrmacht, camouflaged	1
Flashlight, German dynamo	1
Leather oil, German	1
Candle	1
DDT powder tin	1
Cleaning patches, oil, & ramrod	
Waterproof burial containers, plastic	6
Water bag, canvas 10 liter, German	1
Writing paper (100 sheets)	
Hand saw, U.S.A.F. survival	1
Spiral saw	1
Hatchet, U.S.A.F. survival	1
Entrenching tool, U.S. Army	1
Boots, Soviet type	1
Soviet & German clothing complete	
Extra shirt, sweater, underwear & socks	
Flying suit, summer, U.S.A.F.	1
Wallet w/ complete personal documents (see Attached Progress Report for contents)	
Moneybelt w/ 51,500 Rubles, 4,000 Zloti, 500 Ostmarks	
Soviet cigarette packs	5
Tobacco, 1/2 pound tin, German	1
Cigarette paper, German packs	7
Cigarette lighter, British, w/ spare wicks, flints, & 1 can fuel	1
Toilet articles complete, Soviet & German	
Pencil flashlight w/ spare lead, batteries & bulbs, U.S.	1
Ballpoint pen w/ 4 refill ink loads, German	1
Wristwatch, Swiss	1
Stopwatch, German	1
Notebook, Soviet, w/ calendar	2
Lipstick, anti-chap	1

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

The total weight of the above equipment which was included in the agent's jump and carrying bundle was 104 pounds. *

D. CAMPOSANTO 9

<u>Item</u>	<u>Number</u>
Parachute, XT-10, U.S.	1
Kit bag, U.S.A.F.	1
Equipment container, U.S. Army Paratroop A-6 w/ harness	1
Packboard, U.S. Army Mountain Troop	1
Football helmet, U.S.	1
Lowering rope, 25 foot length	1
RS-6 receiver, transmitter	1
RS-6, burial cans	2
Crystals in waterproof container	15
One-time pads, encode, w/ waterproof container	3
One-time pads, decode, w/ waterproof container	2
Cypher instruction document	1
Schmeisser machine pistol w/ container & 6 clips (32 loaded rounds each)	
Pistol, Walther, P-38, w/2 clips (8 loaded rounds each)	1
Pistolet, Walther, 6.35 w/ 1 clip (6 rounds loaded)	1
Box 9 MM ammo, 50 rounds	1
Box 6.35 ammo, 25 rounds	1
Canteen, Wehrmacht	1
Meatcan, Wehrmacht	1
Spoon-fork, German	1
Knife, hunting w/ scabbard, German	1
Pemmican, concentrated food packet	8
Salami, canned, Danish, 2 lbs.	1
Dog-drag	1
Minox camera w/ measuring chain	1
Minox light meter	1
Film magazines for Minox camera (total 500 exposures)	10
Compass, German	1
L tablet	1
K tablet	1
Secret writing ink capsules	12
Signal, crow-call	1
Extra maps, 1/2 of 1 set of operational maps (cloth)	
Poncho-tent, Wehrmacht	1
Sleeping bag, U.S. Army Arctic, w/o cover	1
Flashlight, German dynamo	1
Leather oil, German	1
Candle	1
DDT powder tin	1
Cleaning patches, oil & ramrod	1
Waterproof burial containers, plastic	6
Writing paper (100 sheets)	1
Spiral saw	1
Entrenching tool, U.S. Army	1
Waterproof matches, U.S.A.F. Survival	100

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

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D. CAMPOSANTO 9 (continued)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Number</u>
Assorted wire, nails, nylon cord, rubberbands	
File set w/ Emery stone, German	
Mosquito & fly lotion, German	1
Fishing kit, U.S.A.F. Survival, w/ extra net	1
Sewing kit, U.S.A.F. Survival	1
Boots, Soviet type	1
Soviet & German clothing complete	
Extra shirt, sweater, underwear & socks	
Flying suit, summer, U.S.A.F.	1
Wallet w/ complete personal documents (see attached Progress Report for contents)	
Moneybelt w/ 51,500 Rubles	
Miniature pack playing cards	1
Miniature chess set	1
Soviet cigarette packs	5
Tobacco, 1/2 pound tin, German	1
Cigarette paper, German packs (175 smokes)	7
Cigarette lighter, British, w/ spare wicks, flints & 1 can fuel	
Toilet articles complete, Soviet & German	
Pencil flashlight w/ spare lead, batteries, & bulbs, U.S.	1
Ballpoint pen w/ 4 refill ink loads, German	1
Wristwatch, Swiss	2
Notebook, Soviet, w/ calendar	2
Lipstick, anti-chap	1
Pocket knife, German	1

The total weight of the above equipment which was included in the agent's jump and carrying bag was 10 1/2 pounds.*

* This figure does not include the weight of the parachute, clothing worn by the agent, nor the various personal articles on his person at the time of the dispatch.

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SECRET**2. DISCUSSION OF GENERAL PROBLEMS OF EQUIPPING TEAM**

The problems of equipping a team for dispatch are many inasmuch as there can be no standard check list or operating procedure when there are such various type missions each with different methods for its success. The establishment of the AEQUOR mission of setting up a black base from which limited operations would be mounted helped define the basic requirement of what type of equipment would be desirable. But, even with missions and methods well set, the difficulties are not appreciably reduced.

There are always technical limitations which interfere with satisfactorily providing for a particular project's complete needs. Fundamentally this limitation is one of weight. First, there is the consideration of just how heavy a bundle an individual can jump safely attached to his body. (It was readily agreed among the case officers that, without friendly reception awaiting the AEQUOR team on the ground and, hence, the increased likelihood of losing an unattached supply bundle, the individual agent would jump only with his equipment fastened to his person and both suspended from one parachute.) With due respect for the XT-10 parachute, it is felt that an average sized man with a 150 pound bundle is approximately the maximum weight which can be properly and safely suspended. In addition, it is unlikely that a team of agents, each laden with a bundle of any greater weight, could exit en masse from the aircraft close enough together to guarantee their all landing near one another, as is so important. Secondly, regarding weight limitations, it is certain that whatever size bundle is jumped, under these conditions of non-reception, must also be carried off the DZ by the individual alone and in a quick, secure manner for at least 2 or 3 miles before it can be safely hidden or buried. When these factors were closely studied, the case officers decided that the 150 pound safety limit was far too great, and a rough 100 pounds was settled upon as the limit for any one agent's bundle.

With the weight limit established, other general equipping problems were introduced. Among these was the procuring and purchasing of items meeting the specifications of the AEQUOR mission. Radio gear took priority consideration. As only the RS-1 and RS-6 radio sets were available, we were obliged to accept them. Their weights exceeded what the case officers considered an appropriate part of the load (it was estimated that radio gear would have to represent more than 1/4 of the total load), and they bore indelible American manufacture markings which prevented their being properly sterilized. Nevertheless, they met our primary requirements of sturdiness and serviceability.

The case officers hoped, at the outset, to be able to dispatch only Soviet-made equipment. This was found possible only for most of the clothing and personal articles, of which MKTOPAZ had a good supply. Because of the total absence of 7.62 mm. ammunition, the limited REDSOX supply of Soviet weapons could not be used. Although there was an abundance of European service arms and ammunition for our purposes, it seemed ridiculous that there was not a large supply of such Soviet items from Korea

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for DYCLAIM penetrations of the USSR. The situation was similarly discouraging as far as base camp gear was concerned (since the dispatch it is reported that MKTOPAZ now has Soviet camping gear). German military and civilian items had to be made use of to satisfy our needs in this aspect of the equipping. The special equipment of packing containers, concentrated foods, operational gimmicks and medical kits could not, obviously, be provided as Soviet. REDSOX procurement channels produced our requirements. The REDSOX airborne section had a ready supply of containers which they had both procured from the U.S. Army and styled themselves. All of these items proved, under the strain of extended training exercises, to be eminently serviceable. The AERQUOR food requirements were also provided by the airborne section. [] and the Munich DYCLAIM medical office made up the medical kit. Such operational items as dog-drag, K and L tablets and secret writing materials were sent to us by MKTOPAZ.

With this collection of equipment available for experimentation, training and discussion by the case officers with the team members, the most frustrating process of equipping a team was put into motion. Because the case officers wanted to be completely fair in their apportionment of equipment to the team members, the agents were brought into the discussions completely. The results of this practice found the case officers and the team members taking opposite sides in the matter of weapons and ammunition. To the great disappointment of the case officers, the agents insisted they be equipped each with 2 pistols and sub-machine gun as an infantryman going into battle (if this had been allowed, about half of their total equipment weight would have been so consumed). The team members realized that this would have cut down on other equally or more important items, such as food, but continued in their insistence. Arguments became heated to the extent that working relations between the Americans and the agents were considerably damaged. The differences were repaired when compromises were struck, and the agents came around to accepting the American suggestions as based on greater knowledge and experience.

There are several lessons to be drawn from the above difficulties. There are two fundamental methods of approach to the agents as far as presenting their equipment is concerned. The one used depends on the nature of the agents. If they are a reasonable, intelligent and mature group, it is best to be quite open, discussing at length with the team first, about weight limitations. When these factors are fully understood and agreed to, discussion should be directed to the proportionate weight to be allotted to each type of equipment, radio, food, weapons, etc. If this hurdle is successfully mounted, the available equipment can be brought forward and a limited amount of picking and choosing by the agents is made possible. The result should be that in the end both agents and case officers are completely satisfied that their equipment is well-suited to their mission. However, a less open method of meeting their problems is necessary if the agents are more difficult to work with. In such a case the team members should not be brought into equipment discussions, for only bad feelings can come of the likely bickering back and forth. Near the time of the dispatch, it is advisable to present each agent with his individual equipment, complete and packed in container, as a fait accompli. This method can be completely successful if the agents accept it either as the American standard operating

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procedure for such matters or as representing the Americans' superior understanding of equipment needs. Of course, with either method, if the case officers' equipment ideas are to prevail, it is necessary to build up the confidence of the team in the American officers' special understanding of the equipment needs and their desire to provide the team with the best possible gear.

3. EQUIPMENT BREAKDOWN BY FUNCTION

In the more detailed discussion of the equipment that follows, the weight figures, which are broken down as to broad equipment function, should be kept in mind. The first figure opposite each breakdown represents the total weight of the equipment devoted by all four agents to that category; the second figure gives the same breakdown per man load. The combined totals are the team and per man total equipment weights, respectively. Again, these figures include only the weight of that equipment dispatched in the agents' jump bundle and not the equipment carried on their persons.

<u>Breakdown by Function</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Per Man</u>
1. Basic Container Items (A-6 container w/ harness, packboard)	28 lbs.	7 lbs.
2. Radio Equipment (RS-1, RS-6, GN-58, AN/URC-4 all complete and w/ burial & packing containers)	108	27
3. Weapons & Ammunition (This includes all the weapons w/ carrying containers except the 6.35 pistol and the 4 larger service pistols which were carried on the persons of the agents at the dispatch)	84	21
4. Food & Cooking Utensils (Pemmican, salami, knife, canteens & meatcans)	30	7
5. Operational Items (Refer to those items that fall between the cooking gear and the base camp equipment on the foregoing lists)	24	6
6. Base Camp Gear (Refer to the articles that fall between the operational items and the personal equipment)	102	26
7. Personal Items (Refer to the items that fall after the base camp gear)	32	8
Combined Totals	408 lbs.	102 lbs.

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SECRET**4. DETAILED DISCUSSION OF EQUIPMENT****A. Basic Container Items**

The A-6 container with harness and the packboard were both found to meet AEQUOR operational needs completely. The individual agent's 100-odd pounds of equipment was nicely accommodated in the A-6, which as well lent itself to firm attachment to the U.S. Army Mountain Troop packboard for long distance carrying. Both items were easily sterilized.

B. Radio Equipment

The weights of the RS-1 and GN-58 Generator were considered inordinately great (28 and 27 pounds respectively). When these were combined with the RS-6, AN/URC-4 and packing, the total was pushed up to 108 lbs, or 1/4 of the allotted team weight. This large proportion had to be accepted if the team's radio needs were to be fully accounted for. In the future, the case officers conjectured that both the RS-1 set and the GN-58 could be replaced with lighter, but equally serviceable units for our needs. Perfection of the RS-6 is looked to as the replacement for the RS-1. Since no new generators are expected by the Communications Section, modifications of the present GN-58 will be necessary to lighten it. (The generator dispatched was modified for tree attachment, without the tripod.)

The separate radio units, RS-1, GN-58 and AN/URC-4 were each provided tailored containers by the REDSOX Airborne Section. Their design was calculated both to protect the item from the landing shock and to provide it protective carrying and storage cover. Each of these containers was a combination canvas and sponge rubber construction which stood up well during several training exercises. The case officers were convinced that no finer devices could have been made for our purposes.

In addition to the above container for the AN/URC-4, the communications section supplied self-sealing rubber mats giving the URC proper protection for burials. The RS-6 was also dispatched in zinc burial containers, guaranteeing successful burial for approximately 2 years. These special burial devices for the AN-URC-4 and the RS-6 enjoyed the faculty of being capable of repeated opening, closing and burial with only the minimum of special aids.

C. Weapons and Ammunition

As already mentioned, the number of arms and amount of ammunition which the agents wanted to take caused the case officers considerable anxiety. Although a compromise was struck on the issue, the project officers were never reconciled to the need of apportioning 1/4 of the total equipment weight to this element of the equipment. Had the team members agreed to eliminate 3 of their 4 sub-machineguns, which were the heaviest and most ridiculous item they each insisted upon, the total weight in this department could have been cut in half.

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Security Information

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Other helpful changes in weapons equipment would have been the elimination of the 6.35 mm pistols as the last ditch protector. Teargas pencils alone would have sufficiently served the purpose of disabling an over suspicious documents checker. Also, in place of the .22 pistols with silencers provided for hunting, a more accurate .22 rifle with silencer and telescopic sights should have been dispatched. The case officers attempted to have such a rifle made for the team, and were not successful.

The following is an ideal solution to the weapons problems of a black base operation. One sub-machinegun should be carried for the purpose of protection on first landing in hostile territory, as well as for use at the base camp in case of encirclement. Fundamentally, the sub-machinegun has only psychological value and is taken along only to help overcome the fear of the unknown. This is similarly the case with a service pistol for each team member. The weapon most vital to the mission is the .22 hunting rifle mentioned above. More than one of these should be dispatched if the team is larger than 4 or 5, and all intended to stay in the camp.

The overall weight of the above ideal proposed would be approximately 40 lbs for a 4 man team -- less than 1/2 of the weight carried by the AEQUOR team. Such a solution of weapons needs would, of course, be even more delightful if the sub-machinegun and service pistols were 7.62 mm Soviet weapons.

D. Food and Cooking Gear

The AEQUOR team carried food enough to last them approximately 2 weeks. The case officers had hoped that more food would have been dispatched, but the agents insisted what they had was sufficient. They were confident that all they needed could be procured locally by one means or another.

The principal food item dispatched was the concentrated pemmican food bars. This was selected by the agents in preference to the special food kits prepared by [redacted] although the latter had a higher caloric content. Pemmican, unlike the [redacted] ration (made up primarily of chocolate, dehydrated milk and eggs), was quite palatable and stomach-satisfying when properly brewed. This was due to the fact that pemmican, as a meat product, lends itself to making hot soup. With soup as the basic meal, additional possibilities present themselves. Almost any other food can be mixed into a soup, particularly the forest foods abundant in the AEQUOR operational area.

In discussing future food requirements with [redacted] the case officers learned that the caloric content of pemmican could be increased without increasing the weight to any great extent, by adding concentrated protein to the soup or the pemmican bar itself. It is expected that such a concoction will help solve the food problem for future black base missions.

Other than usual canteen cups and meat cans, the team members saw little use for special cooking gear. The Swedish Primus stove was ruled out when the difficulties of providing sufficient fuel were considered (of its kind the Primus is the best small cooking unit known by the AEQUOR project officers).

Security Information

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The case officers were confident that the agents' survival know-how would be a better guarantee of their good health than fancy cooking equipment.

E. Operational Items

The total weight of 24 lbs devoted to the above items was considered very reasonable by the case officers. The items themselves were found to meet the mission's needs, as well.

With only one of the items, here included, could any improvement be made. The operational maps printed on linen and provided the AEQUOR team by Headquarters, could have been more successfully rendered for our needs on nylon. Nylon material would insure more certainty against shrinkage or distortion due to wetness. In addition, the printing should have been in color rather than black and white. As a field expedient, colored pencils were used to fill colors in on the maps. Other than that, the cloth maps were found excellent for our needs. They were more durable than the originals, at the same time being exact reproductions. Care should, however, be taken to insure that all sheets are reproduced in the same size. This was not the case with those made from the German Ost-Europa 1:300,000 series.

F. Base Camp Gear

Because of our black survival requirements, a necessarily large amount of camping equipment was provided (1/4 total team weight). Although we were unable to obtain Soviet gear, that equipment which we did dispatch met high quality standards.

The hatchets and saws from the U.S.A.F. survival kits were of sturdy build without being increasingly heavy. Similarly the U.S. Army entrenching tool was highly serviceable. The camouflaged Wehrmacht poncho-tent, although rather heavy and bulky, was neatly adaptable, as the name implies, to use both as a raincoat and as a tent. Such broad usage, of course, is the ideal in all equipping. Only in the case of the sleeping bags were the case officers at all disappointed. Since at least 2 of the team would be spending the winter in a bunker, sleeping bags were necessary (note that 3 were dispatched for the team of 4). Only the U.S. Army Arctic bag was available. Even with the waterproof covering removed, their weight of 7 lbs was considered a bit high. In addition, the bag could not be properly sterilized without doing it damage.

The heaviest single item among the base camp gear was the medical kit. The 18 pound kit contained enough medicines, drugs, anti-bodies, bandages and incidentals for a 4 man team living 2 years in the black (also included was a good supply of spare multiple-vitamins capsules, salt tablets and halazone tablets.) The case officers considered that all this was necessary if medical needs were to be fully met. The kit was placed in waterproof burial containers so that it could be safely hidden or buried until it was necessary to use it.

Security Information

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In addition to the numerous special waterproof containers tailored for individual equipment items, such as the radios, AN/URC-4, medical kit, etc., a number of spare waterproof bags were dispatched for general base camp use. It was planned that those items which were not to be used continuously should be stored or buried in places reasonably near but not at the base camp proper. If the team had to evacuate the camp quickly and leave some of their equipment behind, at least some of it could be retrieved and used at a later date. For these purposes it was not possible to obtain that kind of waterproof burial bag which was easily sealed. The type we had the most of could only be sealed by a hot iron. This remains an outstanding equipment problem for black base operations.

G. Personal Equipment

Many of the items falling under this category were Soviet. MKTOPAZ provided full sets of personal clothing which were both Soviet and East German. In selecting particular suits for individual team members consideration was given to each particular man's legend in an attempt to give each his proper appearance. In addition to one suit, each man was dispatched wearing a loose coverall work uniform which he would wear while working around the base camp and in the woods. Soviet-type military boots were tailored individually for the agents after none of the standard sizes provided by MKTOPAZ were found to fit. Spare items of underwear, socks, sweaters, and shirts were dispatched with the team. However, all of their clothing was of light build, and hardly enough to protect them over the winter. The team members preferred not to take extra winter clothing with them as they felt that it would be easily obtainable on the inside. It was also agreed that the equipment weight could better be used for items more urgently needed than winter clothing (note that this decision was made when the dispatch date was set for early August).

Each of the ALQUOR team members was given a good Swiss watch which we considered important as far as keeping to a prompt radio schedule is concerned. The principal radio operator also carried a pocket chronometer to guarantee absolutely the accuracy of radio contacts. A combination pencil-light was provided each member for taking down radio messages at night and was found to be an unusually useful item.

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ANNEX "B" TO AEQUOR II PROGRESS REPORT

1 July - 1 September 1952

Summary of AEQUOR II Team Members' Legends

I. CAMPOSANTO 4

1. BARAN, Mikhail Semenovich was born on 27 November 1924 in the village of Belye, Mozyr raion, Polesiya oblast', BSSR. His father, Semen Iosifovich B., a poor peasant (bednyak) was born in 1900, likewise in Belye. His mother, Maria Ivanovna B. (nee ZARETSKAYA) was born in Belye in 1902.

2. BARAN's parents were married in 1923. He started school in Belye in 1930, and had finished four classes there by 1934. His father was ill with malaria (a common disease in Polesiya) and was not able to work at full strength. Little BARAN, therefore, had to work, helping his mother. He could not continue his schooling, because the nearest 7-year school was in Mozyr, some 12 km away, and he had to work near home.

3. BARAN's father died in the spring of 1935, whereupon BARAN's mother sold the ancestral cottage and, with BARAN, moved in with her cousin, who lived in Dedovka, a small village near Lyudenevichi.

4. The mother's cousin, SAVCHUK, Ekaterina Pavlovna (Tetya Katya) was an elderly woman -- also a widow -- who took care of pigs on the kolkhoz "Chervonyi Styag (Krasnoye Znamya)" to which she belonged. (Note: This is not the real name of this kolkhoz. CAMPOSANTO 4 could not remember it.) She owned her own khata. Both BARAN and his mother worked on the kolkhoz. BARAN was, nevertheless, able to complete 7 years of school in Lyudenevichi in 1938. After finishing school he continued to work at odd jobs on the kolkhoz.

5. In 1940 recruiters came around and BARAN, bored with his life and anxious to see the world, signed up to work on port construction in Odessa. After a week or so of this work he took off and made his way to Minsk, where he got a job as a laborer on the construction of a new aviation factory. Shortly after the start of the war he and a number of other young laborers were evacuated eastward. After being shunted around for two or three months (everything was very disorganized at the time), during the course of which groups were dropped off here and there, BARAN and some thirty others ended up in Chkalov, where BARAN was put to work building and expanding a local aerodrome.

6. BARAN was called to the colors on 10 June 1942.

(Military legend)

7. After the war, BARAN heard that his mother had died during the Hitlerite occupation, and having no one to go home to, he decided to return to Chkalov. In Chkalov he got a job as a gruzchik in the "Krupyanoi zavod Nr. 3". (Current employment legend). Security Information

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8. After working in Chkalov for several years, BARAN eventually decided to return to Belorussia. He consequently requested release from his job. (Note: The date of release will be filled in in the appropriate documents by CAMPOSANTO & himself.)

II. CAMPOSANTO 6

1. BOBROVNICHI, Mikhail Akimovich was born on 10 November 1924 in Gomel', BSSR. His father, Akim Timofeyevich B., was in 1886 born in the village of Popovka, Gomel' oblast'. In 1913 he married Efrosiniya Sidorovna BUGRIMOVA. Their first child, Yakov, was born in 1914. BOBROVNICHI's father served in both the World War and the Civil War. After his return, he moved to Gomel', and it was there that BOBROVNICHI was born. The father worked in the Gomel' Locomotive and Railway-car Repair Shop. BOBROVNICHI's family lived in a one-storey house together with several other families at ul. Karpovicha 58. (Note: This house was completely destroyed during the recent war.) A third brother, Ilya, was born in 1927.

2. BOBROVNICHI started school in 1932. At this time, his elder brother was already working, and the younger brother was still being taken care of at home. He himself was living with his paternal grandparents in Popovka. He completed six years of school there, and then moved back to Gomel', where he finished his last year in the secondary school in Vorovskogo. This was in 1939.

3. In 1940 he entered the FZU attached to the Gomel' PVRZ (Locomotive & Railway-car Repair Shop) where he learned electro-welding. He finished in May, 1941 and worked in the Repair Shop until the Germans attacked.

4. His elder brother was mobilized immediately and BOBROVNICHI has never heard from him since then. Not wanting to be caught by the Germans, who were advancing rapidly, BOBROVNICHI and the rest of his family fled eastward. With the exception of BOBROVNICHI himself, all of them were killed on the road between Bryansk and Kursk during the course of a fascist strafing attack. Shortly thereafter, BOBROVNICHI was impressed into a semi-military unit, the job of which was to dig trenches and erect defense works near Bryansk. By September, he had retreated with this unit as far as Moscow itself, where they did the same sort of work. Later, BOBROVNICHI got a job as a welder in the repair shops attached to the Kiev Railway station in Moscow, where he remained until his mobilization.

5. He was called up on 14 April 1942.

(Military legend)

6. Having no immediate family left, BOBROVNICHI elected to return to Moscow on demobilization. There he got a job with a factory belonging to the GUSHOSSDOR (Current employment legend) as a welder.

7. In the summer of 1952, BOBROVNICHI gave up his job and returned to Belorussia. Among his reasons was the fact that his welding work was having a deleterious effect on his eyes.

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III. CAMPOSANTO 8

1. KAMINSKII, Viktor Petrovich was born on 19 June 1923 in Vilno. His father, a carpenter by trade, was born in 1890. His mother, Anastasiya Iosifovna K. (nee Sycm) was born in Oshmiana in 1901. When she met KAMINSKII's father, she was working as a serving girl in Vilno. They were married in 1922.

2. KAMINSKII lived in Vilno with his family until 1925. In that year, his mother died in childbirth. He was then sent off to Novogrudok to be brought up by his maternal aunt, Dorota PISARUK. She and her husband, Janka, had no children of their own. They lived at Valevskaya 29 (Polish: Walewska). (Note: This house totally destroyed during the recent war.) Uncle Janka was an izvozhik, who owned his own cart and horse.

3. KAMINSKII started school in 1930. The school was "Szkola Powszechna Nr. 1" and was situated on the marketplace. He completed six years of school in 1936. At that time he went to work helping his uncle. His uncle was troubled by rheumatism and could not work as hard as formerly.

4. The Red Army liberated Novogrudok from the rule of the Polish pans on 17 October 1939. At first, KAMINSKII kept on working with his horse and cart, but gradually economic life came to a standstill. By the spring of 1940 there was almost no work.

5. In the spring of 1940 notices were posted calling for volunteers to work in the Donbas. KAMINSKII signed up, and, with a group of others, was sent to Novo-Kramatorsk, Stalino Oblast', UkSSR. Other volunteers went to the coal-mines. In Kramatorsk, he lived with a family named KHMELEVSKOI in Apt 1, at ul. Karpinskogo 1 in the 17th uchastok. KAMINSKII worked as a construction laborer in the "Mashinostroitel'nyi Zavod im. Stalina".

6. KAMINSKII stayed in Kramatorsk until he was called up for military service in the course of the general mobilization in the summer of 1941.

(Military legend)

7. KAMINSKII's father had died during the war and both his aunt and uncle were killed in June 1941 when the Hitlerites bombed Novogrudok. A friend of his in the Army, MOROZOV, Mikhail Mikhailovich who came from Astrakhan, had been demobilized before KAMINSKII. He wrote, saying that living conditions were good there and jobs easy to get. KAMINSKII therefore asked to be sent to Astrakhan when he was demobilized.

8. When KAMINSKII arrived in Astrakhan in the summer of 1947, MOROZOV helped him to find a place to live. This was an ugolok in the apartment of Boris Sergeyevich and Nina Petrovna ABRAMOV at ul. Voroshilova 32. For this ugolok, KAMINSKII paid 50 rubles a month. He got a job in the artel "Konditer", and worked there until the summer of 1952, (current employment legend) when he was released at his own request to seek another job in his homeland.

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IV. CAMPOSANTO 9

1. DUBROVSKII, Mikhail Vasil' evich was born on 22 October 1924 in Osipovichi, Mogilev oblast', BSSR. His father, Vasilii Mikhailovich D., was born in 1903 in the village of Doroganovka, not far from Osipovichi. His mother, Maria Petrovna D. (nee DUBOVETS) was born in 1906 in the same village. The father was a peasant.

2. When DUBROVSKII's grandfather died in 1922, the small ancestral holding passed to the eldest son, Konstantin. The other sons then left to seek their fortunes elsewhere: Dmitri went to Leningrad, and DUBROVSKII's father moved to Osipovichi, where he worked at a succession of odd jobs.

3. DUBROVSKII's father and his younger sister, Nina, died in the typhus epidemic of 1933. DUBROVSKII was also ill, but recovered. He and his mother then moved in with a family who lived in a small, one-storey wooden house at ul. Karla Marksa 8. The husband, Abram Grigoryevich KATS, worked as a cobbler. His wife, Rosa Abramovna, did not work. They had two children, Khana and Moisei (Moika). DUBROVSKII was brought up as one of the family.

4. He started school in 1932. Lacking the steady influence of his father, he did not study hard. In any case, he had to start the second class over again because of his illness. He did not complete seven classes until 1940. His mother, during this period, had worked at various odd jobs. By 1940, however, she was working steadily as a helper in the buffet of the railway station.

5. After finishing school, DUBROVSKII did not want to remain in Osipovichi. His mother, consequently, wrote to his uncle Dmitri, asking if DUBROVSKII could come to Leningrad and live with him. Dmitri agreed.

6. Uncle Dmitri was the vakhter of a student obshchezhitie at Perevoznaya ul. 8b in the Oktyabr raion. In this obshchezhitie lived students from two institutes, the Leningradskii institut inzhenerov vodnogo transporta (LIIVT) and the Leningradskii institut inzhenerov zheleznno-dorozhnogo transporta (LIIZhDT). DUBROVSKII helped his uncle, and did odd, menial jobs.

7. When Leningrad was invested by the Germans, DUBROVSKII was mobilized from time to time to work on the construction of defenses. He also served as a fire-watcher. He volunteered for military service in October, 1941.

(Military legend)

8. Uncle Dmitri died of hunger during the first winter of the siege, the KATS family were liquidated by the Germans, and DUBROVSKII's own mother died in 1946. He returned to Leningrad on demobilization and got a job in the factory "Znamya Truda" (current employment legend). After working there for several years, he decided to return to Belorussia, and, consequently, requested release from the factory. (Note: The date of release will be filled in in the appropriate documents by CAMPOSANTO 9 himself.)