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2 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ☐ ☐

SUBJECT: Muni 6172

1. CAVATINA's proposal to the U.S. (State Department) boils down to the fact that they want U.S. recognition and support for the Ukrainian national aspirations in return for which they promise to cooperate with other nationalities (including Great Russians) in the common struggle against the Soviets. The specific points which they propose and which they expect the U.S. to accept are:

a. End of U.S. discrimination against Ukrainian liberation efforts.

b. Establishment of a committee for liberation of non-Russian peoples of the USSR on a par with SONR.

c. Ukrainian radio broadcasts similar to RFE.

d. Admittance and support of Ukrainian youths to Free Europe University and technical schools in the U.S.

e. Admittance of Ukrainians to the U.S. as political refugees so they can agitate for the Ukrainian cause.

f. Assistance to send three CAV 3 representatives to the U.S. for maintenance of liaison with the Department of State.

2. The above demands can be analyzed as follows:

a. Point a above: The U.S. has not committed any acts which can be interpreted as discriminating against the Ukrainian liberation effort; on the contrary, every indication has been given to the Ukrainian leaders that the U.S. is in favor of supporting the principle of self-determination, which in itself implies that the door is open for assisting the Ukrainians in the achievement of their national aspirations. Therefore, we can assume that

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this CAV 3 demand is not based on any tangible evidence of U.S. policy, as it affects the Ukrainian problem, but is rather supported by their own misinterpretations and lack of understanding of the problems involved. We can, therefore, assume that with proper explanation a compromise can be reached on this point; our present relationship with ZPUHVR can serve as a basis for a compromise.

b. As far as Point b is concerned, no assurance can be given to them that this demand could be met at this time. However, there are some indications that SONR itself is going through an evolutionary change which eventually may make it necessary for us to establish a separate non-Russian political center. Moreover, if such an amalgamation between the Bandera and ZPUHVR will take place, U.S. support of the two most active Ukrainian emigre groups would in itself serve to strengthen the Ukrainian position and could be eventually expanded into a broader organization to include other non-Russian nationalities.

c. Point c above: This point offers few obstacles, inasmuch as it is our intention to eventually develop clandestine broadcasts which will serve the same purpose, if not a more effective one, as the RFE.

d. Point d: This is a minor issue. There are some indications that the admittance of other nationalities into the Free Europe University is actively being considered and may be eventually implemented. As far as admittance of the Ukrainians into the technical schools of the U.S. is concerned, that is purely a "technical matter" which depends entirely on the qualifications of the individual and the immigration rules. We can point out to them that there are many Ukrainians today studying in the U.S. technical schools, and that we will do everything in our power to give them as much assistance on this point as possible.

e. Point e: As far as this point is concerned, many Ukrainian refugees have already been admitted into the U.S., and some of them have joined the various political organizations which are engaged today in the promotion of the Ukrainian cause. Here again, admittance of refugees into the U.S. is governed by immigration laws. To appease this demand, we can always point out that it has been our policy to assist the various political leaders to come to the U.S. for the purpose of meeting the various Government officials. We have done this in the case of the ZPUHVR and there is no reason why we cannot do it in the case of the CAV 3 group. This is also applicable to point f in para 1.

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3. The proposals advanced in the subject cable, however, raise several important issues which have to be carefully examined before any decision can be made. The three principal problems raised by CAV 3 appear to be:

a. Their willingness to cooperate or amalgamate with the ZPUHVR faction. Although this has come to us as a fait accompli, discussions on this subject, carried on by the CAV 3 and ZPUHVR representatives have been going on for some time. The important question here is whether any definite decision has been reached at the time these discussions had taken place, and what is the present reaction of the ZPUHVR leaders to such a proposal. Would they (ZPUHVR) be willing to establish a common front with CAV 3, and if so, under what conditions. As yet, no effort has been made to ascertain from Hrynioch and others what their reaction is. It would, therefore, appear that this is one of the first things that should be discreetly taken up with the ZPUHVR.

b. The second important problem is contained in the expressed desire of CAV 3 to break away from the British and to cooperate with us. This in itself is rather startling, inasmuch as most of the CAV 3 support, if not all, has so far come from the British. What are the reasons which prompted this decision. Subject cable does not contain an answer to this question. Even more important is the fact that for obvious reasons we cannot accept such a proposition without first discussing it with the British. In this case, we are not sure what the British reaction will be. On the operational level, it appears that some agreement has been reached to implement joint U.S.-British operations into the Ukraine next spring by infiltrating teams composed of ZPUHVR and CAV 3 agent personnel. On the basis of this cable, it is not at all clear now that even though we and the British may consider such an approach feasible and desirable, it is not at all certain that CAV 3 would be willing to cooperate unless an overall agreement along the lines outlined in this cable has been first reached. Therefore, it would appear that before making any concrete plans for training, not to say anything about dispatching joint ZPUHVR-Bandera teams, this new development would have to be discussed with the British in order to develop a coordinated approach to both CAV 3 and ZPUHVR leadership.

c. The third problem is more complicated and may not be an easy one to solve. Although from the operational point of view CAV 3-ZPUHVR collaboration is desirable, not only because it would increase the reservoir from which potential agent personnel could be recruited, and not only because it would establish a more coordinated operational approach to the Ukrainian resistance, but also

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because the collaboration of the two factions would put us in a more advantageous position to exercise control over the major Ukrainian elements. We have to agree with the Field comment that such a unification would place us in a more dominant position of controlling the political activities of both groups.

d. The question of whether the operational expediency should prevail over the political, is one that would have to be decided before any action can be taken. As pointed out above, operationally such a unification would not be of an immediate benefit to QKACTIVE. However, on the basis of previous experience, we can assume that through the control and direction which we will be able to exercise over the unified forces, we will be able to direct them into those channels which will be of greater eventual benefit to us. One of the reasons why the major "separatist" minority groups have been so reluctant in joining any organization in which the Great Russians predominate has stemmed from their insecurity and distrust of the Great Russian objectives and motives. On the other hand, we can assume that the better organized and the stronger the minority faction, the more willing it will be to cooperate with the Great Russians in an anti-Bolshevik front. Moreover, such a unification would be of "political" benefit to us, inasmuch as it would serve to eliminate the one faction which has been so critical of U.S. policy. By absorbing it into an organization which represents a more democratic view, its extreme policies will undergo a transformation and will eventually lose their extreme identity. On the other hand, to continue to ignore the CAV 3 faction and to continue to classify it with a "vicious bandit" label, represents a negative approach which in the long run does not solve the problem. If we do not make an attempt to exercise positive influence over such an organization, we can expect no constructive action from it.

e. Inasmuch as neither the CAV 3 nor the ZPUHVR factions are at present included in QKACTIVE, nor is it unlikely that either one will collaborate with it unless some of their terms are accepted, any U.S. attempt to unify the two factions would have no direct effect on QKACTIVE, as both organizations will continue to free-wheel outside of its orbit. In the long run, however, through careful guidance and direction we can bring about a transformation of the policies of a unified organization which either will make it acceptable to QKACTIVE or else at least will serve to neutralize its negative effect on QKACTIVE activities.

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4. The reference made in the cable concerning the financial support requested for CAV 3 newspaper clearly indicates that CAV 3 would be willing to collaborate with the U.S. if we support their newspaper. Whether such financial support is practicable and desirable at this time is debatable, for if we are really interested in bringing about the unification of the CAV 3-ZPUHVR factions, separate support of their newspapers would only serve to create confusion and deepen the gulf between the two organizations. What probably should be done is that if such a unification takes place, the unification should also apply to their newspaper-publishing activities. This may not be an easy pill for the two factions to swallow. However, if they are sincerely interested in the unified approach, this "pill" can be sold.

5. On the basis of the foregoing, the following recommendations are suggested for your consideration:

a. That a discreet attempt be made to ascertain Hrynioch's views concerning the proposal advanced by CAV 3.

b. That this problem be discussed and coordinated with the British in order to develop a common approach. This, however, should be done only if Hrynioch's views are such that a unification of the two organizations would appear possible.

c. That Eastlower be instructed that the proposition advanced by CAV 3 has been forwarded by him to the proper authorities and is now under serious consideration; that he be instructed to cable any new developments that have occurred since then, and also his reasons why he believes that such a proposal was advanced by CAV 3.

d. That the proposal advanced in the subject cable be discussed with Mr. Poor, and if no agreement is reached on that level that this entire issue be presented to the higher echelons for decision.

FDS:MGN:jga

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