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AIR

19 Oct 54

RYBAT

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

Chief, SR

ATTN: ~~REDSOL~~/Smith

~~REDSOL/AMMOCHERARIO/Operational~~

~~Traffic Exchange with AMBARTHAGE 5 and 12; Information from
ARCAVATINA 6 Courier as Obtained by SHIOPIA and AMBARTHAGE 2;
SHIOPIA-ARCAVATINA 11 w/T Traffic.~~

1. Forwarded herewith are reports to be used as an aid in debriefing and evaluating AMBARTHAGE 19 and 20. These are as follows:

- a) Attachment (A): Information obtained from the ARCAVATINA 6 courier by AMBARTHAGE 2 and includes topic headings "Biographical Sketch of GORB (the courier)"; "GORB's Courier Mission"; "The New Organizational Structure of the Ukrainian Underground, etc."; "Current Status of the Ukrainian Underground" and "Other Comments on the Underground".
- b) Attachment (B): Traffic Exchange between SHIOPIA and ARCAVATINA 11.
- c) Attachment (C): w/T Messages from and to AMBARTHAGE 5 in 1954.
- d) Attachment (D): S/w Communication with AMBARTHAGE 12 in 1954.
- e) Attachment (E): Information obtained from the ARCAVATINA 6 courier and submitted to KUMARK by SHIOPIA. The information included here is in the form in which it was disseminated by the SR Division under the following COMB numbers: COMB-22651, 22651a, 22651b, 22651c, 22651d, 22651e, COMB-22964, 22964a, 22964b, 22964c, 22964d.

2. The information contained in the above attachments has not been culled for extraneous matter but is complete for each topic. Thus, all that was available at headquarters, pertinent to the purpose for which it was prepared, was included. For example, all that was obtained from the ARCAVATINA 6 courier by AMBARTHAGE 2 was included; traffic exchanged

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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE'S METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
VAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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- Page 2 -

with ABCARYHAGHS 5 and 12 is complete and the SHIOPIA debriefing of the
ABCAYATINA 6 courier is all that they forwarded to KURAK.

Attachments:

A thru H, as stated above.

Distributions:

2-Washington w/atts (DIRECT)
3-Frankfurt w/o atts
1-RI
2-SR/3

SR/3 ERish 16 October 1954

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ATTACHMENT A to EGMW-613

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF SKOB (THE COURIER)

1. SKOB was born on July 16, 1923 in the village of Husiatychi, Strilyska Novi rayon, Drohobush oblast. From 1942 to 1945 he was a teacher and superintendent of a primary school in Husiatychi and, at the same time, held the post of nadraionvii in the OUN youth organization "Yunistvo". In February, 1945 he was ordered to the OUN propaganda section in the Lvov Krai where he remained until March of the same year when he was transferred to a UPA detachment. From 1946 to 1949 he served as a propaganda chief in the nadraion Mykolayiv. From 1950 to 1953 he was a nadraionovii (chief of a nadraion) of Yavoriv, which is located in the Lvov okrug and Lvov Krai. (Note: Ukrainian underground structure is built on the following lines: Provid, Krai, Okrug, Nadraion, Raion and Kusch.)

2. SKOB was married to Ulana Miroslava GREKO who was born in 1922 in Truskavets, Drohobush oblast. She was killed in action in 1951 for which the Provid awarded her posthumously the Silver Medal for valor. Her only child, left with a peasant family, died in 1946. SKOB's parents were deported to Siberia; one brother was sentenced to 10-20 years in prison for illegal possession of arms in 1948 and his younger brother is somewhere in the Ukraine living with distant relatives.

3. As a nadraionovii of Yavoriv, SKOB had under his command six raions. His immediate superior was the okruzhnii of the Lvov Okrug, Mikhaylo. SKOB did not know Col. KOVAL personally, nor did he know any of the members of the UHVR Provid or of the UPA High Command. His first knowledge of Col. KOVAL came from the order of the day issued by the Headquarters after the death of General CHUPRIKA in which it was stated that Col. Vasil KOVAL had become Commander in Chief of the entire Ukrainian Liberation Movement. SKOB has not seen another document signed or issued under the name of Col. KOVAL. For example, he did not know of or see the order issued by Col. KOVAL on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the founding of the UPA which was issued in the fall of 1952. SKOB arranged, on his own initiative, the 10th anniversary celebration in his nadraion.

4. Superiors known to SKOB, other than his own immediate chief Mikhaylo, are as follows: CHERNETZ-CHORNOTA-YAREMA (Chief of the Lovo Krai); BOHUN, (SB Chief of Lvov Krai) and USMIKHMIRON (AECVATINA 11).

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5. SKOB met CHERNETZ for the first time in 1946. From 1947 to 1951 CHERNETZ belonged to the Lvov Krai and 1951 he became chief of the Lvov Krai. The first organizational meeting held between SKOB and CHERNETZ was in 1948 and the last of such meetings was held in May, 1952 which was also attended by MIRON. At this 1952 meeting, SKOB did not know who MIRON was nor did he know that he was sent to the Ukraine from abroad.

6. SKOB stated that as late as August, 1953 he was not aware of the conflict in the exigration. As far as he was concerned Col. KOVAL was the head of the entire liberation movement in the Ukraine and that BANDERA was only the OUN leader. SKOB stated that the name of BANDERA was well known in the Ukraine as was the name of General CHUPRINKA. SKOB also added that the UHVR and the ZPUHVR are recognized as the supreme organizations of the liberation movement.

7. Some time, either in 1949 or 1950, SKOB received the UHVR Information Bulletin in which there was contained an account of the emigration, i.e. the UNRada, that the ZCh had joined this organization, and that Mrs. Daria HEBET had gone to the United States.

8. The Ukrainian Underground's version of Gen. CHUPRINKA's death is as follows: While alone in a house in Bilohorshcha, he was surrounded by a number of MVD troops who, before attempting to capture him, engaged in a conversation with him. Apparently, CHUPRINKA was ordered to give himself up. Instead, he opened fire on the enemy, killing one MVD major, and then he took his own life, probably to avoid being taken alive.

SKOB'S COURIER MISSION

1. In the latter part of August, 1953, SKOB along with two bodyguards checked a dead drop in which he found a note requesting that he meet with couriers from the Mykelaiv nadraionovii in one of the villages of the Horodek raion. At this meeting, held on 25-26 August, SKOB learned that the Mykolaiv nadraionovii, VYKHOR, and BOHUN, SB Chief of the Lvov Krai wanted to meet him for an undisclosed reason. SKOB thus dismissed his own bodyguards and accompanied these couriers to this meeting. On the 28th of August SKOB met VYKHOR and BOHUN and later in the day USMIKH-MIRON arrived along with his two bodyguards. From this meeting place they departed for still another location where a meeting was held with the following attending: MIRON, BOHUN, MIKHAILO (Lvov Okrushnii)

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SKOB and ORLYK (a courier from Poland who accompanied SKOB to Poland). The meeting was held until 3 a.m. of the 29th of August. It was guarded by seven men.

2. The purpose of the meeting was to arrange for SKOB to act as courier in delivering a pouch to the West. His courier mission settled, SKOB was given the following instructions:

- a) He was to take with him two packages of mail. (These were sealed so that SKOB did not know the contents of the pouch.)
- b) SKOB was to be accompanied by ORLYK, at least as far as Poland.
- c) The pouch was to be delivered to either BANDEIRA or ASKOLD. (SKOB did not know the identity of ASKOLD).
- d) SKOB was instructed to maintain complete secrecy once at his destination and was to return to the Ukraine as soon as possible.
- e) He was to seek aid from the British.
- f) In the event he fell into the hands of the Americans he was to remain silent and insist on being turned over to the British.
- g) He was to make contact with BANDEIRA at an address on Bachmaerstr in Munich (specific address not given here).
- h) He was to be given 1,500 rubles as expense money for the trip.
- i) Finally, he was told that there was a conflict in the emigration and that he would learn the details of this upon his arrival in the West. Nothing more was told him regarding this.

3. Asked why he was chosen for the courier mission, SKOB said that probably because he was known by CHERNETZ and because he was familiar with the Polish-USSR border.

4. The courier mission began on 28 August when SKOB and ORLYK together with BOHUN, VYKHOR and three bodyguards departed from the meeting in the general direction of the border. Shortly after this departure, BOHUN, VYKHOR and the three bodyguards left SKOB and ORLYK who proceeded to a point where they were to meet SKOB's own two bodyguards. Upon meeting these bodyguards, SKOB left ORLYK with one of them while he and the other guard went to meet the raionovii of Krukenychi raion in order to transfer to him SKOB's duties as nadrayonovii of Yavoriv. SKOB remained in the Krukenychi raion until 7 September when he returned to where he had left ORLYK. On this same day they both changed into civilian clothes and in the evening approached the Polish border. On the

- 3 -

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SECRET

night of 8-9 September they crossed the border on the San river, leaving their two body guards behind.

5. The entire day of 9 September was spent in hiding on the Polish side of the border and in the evening of this same day they boarded a train on which they traveled to a place near Yaroslav where they remained overnight at a safehouse arranged for earlier by ORLYK. On 11 September both went to Yaroslav, accompanied by a woman who served as ORLYK's contact, and from there, leaving this woman behind, by train as far as Yelena Gora where they met DON, chief of contacts between Germany, Poland and the Ukraine.

6. They accompanied DON to another location (location not given) where they remained to 28 September. Here SKOB met a courier from ZENON (head of the net in Poland) who informed him that ZENON desired to see him. Together with DON, SKOB went to see ZENON and spent 29 and 30 September with him. These meetings were held only in the day time since ZENON left in the evening for undisclosed reasons. Upon completion of their business, ZENON escorted SKOB to the house of one of his friends where he was to stay a short time pending further movement. (The keeper of this safehouse lived under Polish cover and it is possible that he is a member of the Communist Party in Poland. His neighbors apparently are aware of his clandestine activities but do not know that he is an Ukrainian.) SKOB remained here only a short time for this person got into an argument with his neighbor and to safeguard SKOB, DON put him up at his place, wherever that might be.

7. Between 2 and 14 October ZENON visited SKOB quite frequently and on 15 October took SKOB, without the presence of DON, to another safehouse where he was to remain for approximately three weeks. (Nearby to where he was now staying there lived two sisters who had a sister in the town of Yaroslav at whose place SKOB and ORLYK stayed while there earlier.) ORLYK, who evidently was being housed separately from SKOB during this time, arrived at this safehouse and, with SKOB, again returned to DON'S place where they remained from 6 to 30 November. On 3 December ZENON again made an appearance, introduced SKOB to an escort and on the following day - 4 December - SKOB arrived in Western Germany. ORLYK remained behind and was probably arrested along with DON and others who have been picked up by the Polish Security Services.

Note: This is as much as AECASSOWARY 2 reported regarding SKOB's exfiltration.

- 4 -

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THE NEW ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
OF THE UKRAINIAN UNDERGROUND AND OTHER COMMENTS
REGARDING UNDERGROUND ACTIVITY AS RELATED BY SKOB

1. The schematic structure of the Ukrainian liberation movement in the Ukraine is as follows:

UHVR, UPA HEADQUARTERS AND OUN PROVID

KRAI

,

OKRUG

,

NADRAION

,

RAION

,

KUSCH

Each of the above organizational units is isolated and is considered an operational entity in itself. External contacts are made through the use of prearranged dead drops and only between the lowest and next highest structure. The leadership of any of these organizational units consists of at least a unit leader, a propaganda chief and a chief of security, and in the event there are only two members in a unit (which is often the case in a Kusch which is usually made up of from two to three members), the chief doubles as propaganda chief,

2. The membership of the underground (those living illegally) has been reduced to a bare skeleton to cope with the current security measures being taken against it. In groupings other than the Kusch, only those necessary to carry out administrative functions and several guards who also serve as couriers make up a given unit. In other words, little attempt is made to recruit - from among the legally living civilians - members into the underground who would perform tasks of sabotage, enemy harassment, etc. Instead, the present day units are designed to remain as a nucleus which must survive indefinitely and new members are only brought in to replace a loss in this core.

3. For security reasons, meetings between groups are not to last longer than one hour and at a place at least 10 kilometers from any given dead drop. When such meetings are held, only the bodyguards of the superior unit can be present along with those engaged in discussions.

SECRET

4. In reporting, a Raion must report to a Nadraion once a month. A Nadraion must report to a Okrug at least every six months.

5. As stated earlier, every unit is isolated from the other and can only contact directly the next immediate unit above it. All vertical contact must be through dead drop arrangement and the system as a whole is designed to prevent the enemy from wrapping up more than one - and at most - two organizational units in any one given action. This system has proved very successful in preserving the underground and the liberation movement, however, because of this decentralization and lack of rapid communication operational activity has become very difficult, time consuming and tedious.

6. All members of the underground living illegally are armed and wear uniforms patterned after those worn by the UPA.

7. Cadres of the underground liberation movement are made up of the following:

- a) Illegals (Nelehalnyki): This group is the core or apparatus, all of whose members live illegally and in the underground, in the true sense of the word, which make up the Kusch, Raion, Nadraion, etc. headquarters and which leads the liberation and underground movement. Membership here is determined by the requirements of each individual unit in any given area.
- b) Legals (Lehalnyki): Although these people are members of the underground, they are considered as reserves, each subject to be called into the illegal core to replace those who have been killed or arrested. They live legally in towns, villages and kolkhozes and, as members of the underground, are charged with the following tasks:
 - i) To collect information as can be gotten from legal travel in areas other than their own.
 - ii) To prepare reports on activities in their own areas, i.e. the Soviet administration, schools, churches, the Red Army, etc.
 - iii) To report on any specific topics which may be assigned them, i.e. MVD activity, information on personalities, etc.

Legals are not used to give shelter to the illegal members nor do they distribute propaganda materials. They must act as model Soviet citizens, serve in the army when called to do so. (Following instructions here as contained in the UHVR Bulletin No. 9 - 1951

SECRET

"To the Brothers in the Red Army" wherein they are instructed to maintain good relations with nationals of other enslaved peoples in the service and in the event of war to defect to the underground or to the side of the USSR opponent.) Upon discharge from the service, the legal member of the underground must undergo a new security screening before he is again considered a member.

- c) Sympathizers (Sympatkyi): These are considered as an auxiliary force of the liberation movement. These are recruited on a wide scale, on an individual basis but are not members of the underground as in the case of the Legals. Their function is to support the illegals in the form of providing food, purchasing of technical equipment, providing shelter for the illegals when necessary, disseminating underground literature and procuring information about the security forces in their area. Occasionally, Sympathizers are recruited into a category of Legals although most all Sympathizers are potential active members of the underground.

8. The above organizational and cadre structure of the underground is only peculiar to the areas in the Ukraine (Western Ukraine) in which there is an ample amount of liberation activity and conditions suitable for it. In the central and eastern regions of the Ukraine underground activity is carried on by select individuals operating independently and not as a unit comparable to the Kusch or Raion in the Western Ukraine. Members here do not wear uniforms as they do in the Western Ukraine.

9. The general tasks of the Ukrainian underground and its membership are as follows:

- a) Each underground organizational unit, basically an independent body, operates on long-range political propaganda and security instructions. These instructions have been passed down by the Provid, are valid indefinitely and are to be carried out by subordinate units without constant supervision from above. It is obligatory that each member of the movement know the ideological and political platform of the movement and must disseminate this information as widely as possible. Current tasks of the membership are:
 - 1) To spread the ideas and positions of the movement among the people and especially to influence the Eastern Ukrainian in the liberation struggle by disseminating leaflets and other printed materials and by making personal contact with him.

SECRET

- ii) To maintain the morale and political convictions of the members and sympathizers on the highest possible level.
- iii) To maintain or preserve the net of the organization.
- iv) To maintain security.

10. Some specific assignments or tasks of the underground units from Okrug down to Raion are given below. The Raion level must report on the following to the Nadraion:

- a) The morale and moral level of its membership.
- b) The attitude of the people in the area.
- c) The personnel changes within the legal and illegal membership. (Reported by pseudonym.)
- d) Clashes had with the enemy.
- e) Tactics employed by the enemy or any change therein.
- f) Propaganda and organizational requirements.
- g) The attitude of the people toward the Soviet Administration, the Russians, the Communist Party members, Komsomol members, the Army, teachers, the militia, Ukrainians from the East, etc.

11. The Nadraion must report on the following to the Okrug:

- a) The general evaluation of its area of responsibility, report of its membership and its requirements.
- b) Enemy activity (MVD, Army, CP, Komsomol, kolkhoz admin).
- c) Schools, teachers, CP candidates.
- d) Factories, plants, new constructions and production.
- e) Churches, priests.
- f) Military bases, army movement, armament and training.

12. The instructions from the Okrug to the Nadraion are as follows:

- a) Direct clashes with the enemy must be avoided if possible.
- b) Agent penetration must be always looked for, and whenever there is a renewal of a broken contact, those involved should be investigated.
- c) Travel (illegal) should always be done in pairs.
- d) Awards are to be given to those instrumental in exposing agents or capturing members of the MVD.
- e) Passive sabotage in kolkhoses and sovkhoses is to be encouraged.
- f) Letters written by those deported or who are in slave labor camps to their families in the Ukraine are to be collected or copies made thereof and sent to higher headquarters.

- 8 **SECRET**

SECRET

- g) Addresses of slave labor camps, post office and field post office numbers are to be collected.
- h) The fighting traditions of the UPA are to be maintained by naming places after UPA heroes who fell at these places.
- i) Documents are to be confiscated from MVD personnel killed in action with the underground and families of the deceased are to be notified by mail that "so and so" was killed in action against the fighters for Ukrainian independence and that the death should be blamed on the regime and the party.
- j) Lower units are forbidden to publish any literature without first clearing it with higher headquarters. They are permitted to reprint, however, that which has been originated by those authorized. The Nadraion is permitted to publish an informational paper (Lystok Pravdy) which contains news of the enemy's activity as well as excerpts from foreign radio broadcasts.
- k) In time of war, mob lynching is prohibited. Instead, those arrested by the underground are to be jailed and tried under existing legal procedure.

SECRET

CURRENT STATUS OF THE UKRAINIAN UNDERGROUND

1. The cadre strength of the Ukrainian Underground Movement has decreased considerably since World War II. This reduction in force was brought on because of:

- a) Heavy losses inflicted by the enemy during the period 1945-1949.
- b) Mass deportations and recruitment of underground members and sympathizers into the Red Army.
- c) Provocative action by the enemy wherein it was able to effect penetration of the underground organization by its "agentura".
- d) Collectivization in the Western Ukraine.
- e) Lack of interest shown by the Western world toward the Ukrainian liberation movement and especially during the UPA raids to the West in 1947-48.
- f) Bolshevik propaganda identifying the underground with Hitler's work and current Anglo-American intelligence.
- g) Improvement in the living conditions of those living in mountainous regions of the Western Ukraine.
- h) Newly applied tactics of the enemy against the underground bases on intensified study of the underground's method of operation.

2. Because of this reduction of force, the Ukrainian Underground was forced to change its tactics, increase its vigilance and security measures and to begin operating less conspicuously than before in order to preserve its basic structure. It still suffers from a lack of arms and ammunition and also from the lack of proper food and medicine.

3. The morale of the members of the underground has remained on a high level and their patriotism has not decreased because of their current status. All members continue to endeavor to increase their level of knowledge and, during the winter months, spend most of their time in some form of training. For example, each member is required to attend and pass at least one of three courses considered by the underground as basis instruction for its membership.

4. Recently, the underground leadership began special instructions designed to combat fatalism among its members. Fatalism became widespread among the illegal members who were able to withstand all the rigors of the struggle for many years wherein they were confronted with death many times. Eventually, this induced an attitude of complete disregard for danger with those falling into this category believing that "what is destined to happen will happen".

SECRET

5. Continuous bunker life has had its negative influence also on the illegal underground members. It has become apparent that after spending an entire winter underground in a bunker a person loses all sense of movement and action, and once above ground, at least for the first few days, all appears strange to him. A sort of anxiety neurosis overcomes the person and actual fear besets him. The mere rustle of leaves frightens him and it is sometime before he gets used to the sight of villages and other normally living people.

6. After leaving a bunker a man smells of the earth, which smell is noticeable for quite a distance. His skin is very white and visibly porous. Before such a person can approach anyone without fear of being detected for what he is, he must "air" himself out for several days and even sprinkle himself with eau de cologne.

7. Because of the type of life they lead in the underground, the underground members live a completely communal life. All feeling of private or personal property disappears and there is complete equality as far as living conditions, food and danger are concerned. A leader of a unit is not only a superior but also a friend and educator to his subordinates. A leader does not expect special favors because of his position; things are as good or bad for him as they are for his subordinates.

8. Members of the underground have created a new manner of life, with their own customs, beliefs, attitudes, songs, etc. -- all brought on by their environment and situation. For example, they hate snow for it is not only symbolic of winter and the scarcity of food but when walked in, it affords the easiest means of detection for the enemy. The illegal member of the underground differs from others in that he wears a uniform -- another symbol of his position, even though instrumental in the death of many.

9. As far back as 1947, many members of the underground reached the conclusion that another world war would not begin soon and that only a few of them would be able to survive, perhaps only one to a Raion, the day when action to liberate the Ukraine would begin. Nevertheless, they assumed the position that, regardless of their numbers, whatever they did now to help the cause was worth the effort and someone would benefit from it. Today the underground counts about 50% of the population as its sympathisers. This is encouraging to the underground and gives it strength and determination to continue the struggle. National celebrations, patriotic songs, the underground press and other means of expressing sentiment also give life to the movement and to the members of the underground.

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OTHER COMMENTS ON THE UNDERGROUND

1. The effect the underground has had in its work can be shown by the measures taken by the Soviet regime to combat it. In 1952-1953 there was stationed in every Raion -- besides the usual MVD and Militia forces -- a force of from six to eight "oblavnik", led by a so-called "operativnik", whose task was and still is primarily to combat the Ukrainian underground. (These groups were formerly called "Section to Combat Banditism"-Otdel Po Borbi s Banditizmom-OBB.) These troops are armed with machine guns, grenades, PPSH's and rocket guns and are specifically charged with combing entire areas in search of underground members, organizing oblavas and recruiting agents for anti-underground activity.

2. On every kolkhoz there is a detachment of so-called "stribki" who are subordinate to or are an arm of the Militia and are responsible for safeguarding kolkhozes.

3. Through years of practice the underground (illegal) has made many improvements in the construction of bunkers. The most important improvements are as follows:

- a) The entrance cover of a bunker is now being built with a double lid the center of which is filled with a straw insulator to prevent moisture from penetrating out where it would melt the snow cover. These straw insulators act somewhat like condensers in that when placed in the ventilator tubes air from the bunker condenses and the water therefrom is caught in specially built containers. Through the use of straw insulators/condensers, snow is prevented from melting in the winter time and during the summer, leaves covering the bunker do not turn black.
- b) A ventilating system has been devised wherein fans, fashioned from cream separators, are used. These fans are manually operated.

4. A gimmick designed by the underground with which to walk in the snow is a stilt, the bottom of which is designed to simulate the footprints of a bear or bear.

5. Current underground bunkers are designed to house from two to four people only.

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ATTACHMENT B to EOMW-613

TRAFFIC EXCHANGE BETWEEN SMYOPIA AND AECAVATINA 11 (MIRON)

1. Between 15 and 16 May, 1951 SMYOPIA dispatched three groups of agents into the Western Ukraine. These groups were as follows: POMSTA's group (number in group not given); SKIL's group (number in group not given) and MIRON's group consisting of MIRON, SLAVKO, GENKO-KOBZAR, IHOR, VICTOR and VERES. MIRON's group arrived safely in the Lvov Krai where it was to remain to the present time and was taken over by CHERNETS-CHORNOTA-YAREMA. MIRON has been in W/T contact with SMYOPIA since August, 1951, his W/T operator being VICTOR who accompanied him on the mission. Another W/T operator, MARKO, was sent to MIRON in 1953. This operator transmitted for MIRON some time in July, 1954 when VICTOR was unavailable.

2. Messages transmitted are as follows:

- a) August 1951: MIRON reported his contact with CHERNETS and that SLAVKO was dispatched to the OUN Headquarters with a pouch. MIRON also criticized the OUN Provid for lack of a good contact system and for defects in the underground structure. In a contact with MIRON at this time, SMYOPIA asked whether MIRON would send couriers abroad. His answer was yes.
- b) Some time later in 1951: MIRON reported that SLAVKO had returned from his mission and reported that he had delivered the pouch to LEMISH (Col. KOVAL). MIRON further reported that, according to LEMISH, POMSTA was liquidated along with a few of his colleagues in the early part of June, 1951.
- c) Some time later in 1951: MIRON transmitted location of dead drops in the Ukraine to be used by couriers dispatched from Poland. (This was the last message transmitted by MIRON in 1951.)
- d) January 6, 1952: MIRON sent Christmas greetings to his friends in the emigration.
- e) April 4, 1952: MIRON reported that the W/T operators with him were alive and well but that he did not know the whereabouts of SLAVKO and KOBZAR.
- f) Some later date: MIRON transmitted greetings to BANDERA as the leader of the OUN in behalf of the homeland provid and over the signature of CHERNETS. (This message was printed in the fall of 1952).
- g) Some later date: MIRON reported that the Bolsheviks carried out oblavas in the Zolochiv and Sokal areas. He also reported that VICTOR had changed locations.
- h) July 6, 1952: MIRON reported that LEMISH received the pouch. MIRON also said that "Vasylo" (AECASSOWARY 5) was doing his work well (meaning work directed at MIRON) and that POLTAVA had been killed.

- 15 -

SECRET

SECRET

- 1) July 11, 1952: MIRON gave up hope of meeting with LEMISH because of AECASSOWARY 5's activity.
- j) August 14, 1952: MIRON reported that as soon as KOBZAR returned from a mission to the Eastern Ukraine couriers would be ready to depart for the West.
- k) September 6, 1952: MIRON reported that W/T operator IHOR was killed while out seeking supplies. (Note: IHOR never made W/T contact with SMOPIA.)
- l) October 14, 1952: (Message #18) MIRON identified the Carpathian Krai leader to 1951 to be BAYRAK.
- m) October 26, 1952: (Message #19) MIRON reported that the news he received of BANDERA's resignation as OUN leader was quite a surprise. He stated that he would attempt to see LEMISH in order to convince him that BANDERA had not deviated from organizational matters, etc. This message was in answer to one received by him on 3 October in which BANDERA addressed the OUN Provid in the Ukraine and announced his resignation as head of the OUN Provid.
- n) November 11, 1952: MIRON reported that Lovo Krai still recognizes BANDERA as leader of the OUN and will demand a conference to be called in the Ukraine for the purpose of making this recognition official.
- o) Some later date in November: MIRON reported that he had sent a coded letter to BANDERA via courier (ORLYK) to Poland.
- p) Early 1953: In a message dated 23 December, MIRON transmitted the contents of KOVAL's order of the day on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the UPA in which Dr. Hryniach, Chairman of the ZPUHVR was awarded the Golden Cross of Merit as was LEBED, KALINA (AECASSOWARY 4), Major BAIDA and SLAVKO (AECASSOWARY 6). VASYL OKHRIMOVICH (AECASSOWARY 5) was awarded with the Golden Cross of Valor II Class and promoted to Major in the UPA. MIRON was displeased that no one from the Lvov Krai was decorated.
- q) March 1, 1953: MIRON reported that the underground had suffered heavy losses in the winter and that he would give more details following his meeting with CHERNETS.
- r) April 17, 1953: MIRON reported his meeting with CHERNETS and told of the latter being ill.
- s) (Date not given): In a brief message MIRON relayed information on a radio factory in Lvov.
- t) (Date not given): In reply to the questions whether he had delivered to LEMISH information regarding BANDERA's resignation, MIRON answered in the negative.

- 12 -

SECRET

SECRET

- u) (Date not given): MIRON reported that KOBZAR and two of his friends were liquidated while attempting to exfiltrate on a courier mission. This message was in answer to SMYOPIA's query regarding three Ukrainians reported killed near Karlsbad, Czechoslovakia.
- v) July 8, 1953: MIRON asked for support and stated that he planned to meet DON (chief of contacts in Poland) in September.
- w) September 3, 1953: MIRON reported that SKOB and ORLYK departed for the West. He also reported that a pouch containing information on the results of the 4th ZCh Conference and the election of BANDERA as the ZCh leader had been dispatched to LEMISH. (This information re the ZCh Conference was sent to MIRON by BANDERA with instructions that he and his colleagues refrain from getting involved in any disputes concerning the title of the GUN leader and to recognize LEMISH since, in not opposing him, they would be able to be in a better position to operate along the "right" line.)
- x) September 9, 1953: MIRON reported the arrival of couriers (from Poland?) with a pouch in which was contained the information of the 4th ZCh conference and BANDERA's election to the post of ZChGUN leader. MIRON further reported that the homeland was still for BANDERA even though some breaks in the ranks occurred with the arrival of PILIP (AECASSOWARY 5) to LEMISH's headquarters. MIRON said that neither he nor CHERNETS intended to liquidate LEMISH, but that the underground recognizes only BANDERA. The membership opposed to foreign influence in its decisions. (Note: This message was in answer to BANDERA's letter in which he asked whether it was true that the Lvov Krai was isolated and whether MIRON had taken steps at replacing LEMISH.)
- y) October 13, 1953: MIRON reported that maneuvers were held in the Horodetsky, Yavorivski, Mikolayivsky and Shohiretsky raions.
- z) On October 1 AECAVATINA 5 sent a message to MIRON without the consent of BANDERA in which he stated that the Homeland sent a message (via KUBARK link) recognizing the mandates for AECASSOWARY 2 and the ZPUHVR. Therefore, AECAVATINA 5 requested that MIRON discontinue the arguments regarding the GUN leadership and to subordinate himself to LEMISH immediately. In the event MIRON was unable to carry out this subordination, continued the message, he was to report to DON in Poland and then exfiltrate to Germany. BANDERA also sent a message to MIRON at this time in which he advised MIRON to avoid conflicts in the HOMELAND and advised him of his (BANDERA's) stand re the establishment of the triumvirate. (This same message was passed to KUBARK by SMYOPIA for transmittal to AECASSOWARY 5.)

- 3 -

SECRET

SECRET

- aa) November 10, 1953: In the only message signed by CHERNETS, the following was sent: the Lvov Krai stressed the weakening of the underground work which it blamed on the OUN Provid in the Ukraine. The Lvov Krai and USMIKH (MIRON) recognize the leadership of LEMISH in the Ukraine and they shall always subordinate to him in organizational matters. The Lvov Krai and MIRON considered, prior to his resignation, BANDERA as the chairman of the OUN Provid, but now recognize LEMISH. The Lvov Krai accepted the transfer of the leadership of the Lvov Krai from CHERNETS to MIRON because of the former's illness. LEMISH will be advised of this transfer as soon as possible. Support for the homeland was also requested in this message.
- bb) (Date not given): In answer to the question as to CHERNET's position, MIRON replied that CHERNETS was the leader in the Lvov Krai since 1951, being appointed to that post by MAKSYN to succeed HORNOVI.
- cc) November 23, 1953: MIRON reported that in line with SB work he was working on a case which was of extreme importance to the organization.
- dd) January 22, 1954: (Via pouch to Poland) In reference to his message of 23 November (cc above) MIRON reported that he was able to learn that PILIP, known in the Ukraine as KUZMA (AECASSOWARY 5) was in the services of the MVD. In 1953 KUZMA arranged a meeting with the Zaravno nadraionovii BUREVIY to which he came accompanied by the Bolsheviks. BUREVIY and others were thus liquidated. In December, 1953, stated MIRON, he personally spoke with an underground member from the Rohatyn area who escaped from the above mentioned oblava and who personally saw KUZMA with the Bolsheviks. This person knew KUZMA and was able to identify him. MIRON further stated that KUZMA betrayed the entire contact set-up with the Carpathian Krai which had only recently been reconstructed with difficulties and was a channel to LEMISH. Leaders ZALIZNIAK, SIRKO and BUREVIY and others have been killed.
- ee) April 2, 1954: MIRON requested to know if his message of January 22 was received.
- ff) April 20, 1954: MIRON reported alleged betrayals in the Rohatyn area and the fact that someone from above was trying to contact him. He also reported heavy losses in the Lvov Krai caused by betrayals of the underground by the civilian population. He stated that CHERNETS intended to go abroad and that he, MIRON, was not yet in contact with MARKO. (Note: MARKO, a W/T operator, infiltrated with ORLYK in August 1953. They first made contact with SKOB who brought them to his okrushni.)

- 16 -

SECRET

SECRET

- gg) May 18, 1954: MIRON warned that a certain contact point used by couriers coming from Poland was not to be used since it was under surveillance. MIRON further reported that those trying to contact him (see ff above) alleged to be from LEMISH but since they had no written identification he refused to accept them. MIRON said he did not know the whereabouts of LEMISH, but that various rumors were being circulated regarding LEMISH's activity.
- hh) June 5, 1954: MIRON stated that the OKHRIMOVICH case has been finally explained by the Bolsheviks. His comments re this case were somewhat similar to the official communique, emphasizing the fact that OKHRIMOVICH had betrayed all including contacts abroad.
- ii) July (date not known) 1954: MIRON reported heavy oblavas in SKOB's nadraion. He also said that his W/T operator VICTOR was being hunted (by the Soviets?). MIRON also reported that LEMISH had moved from the Carpathian Krai because of the OKHRIMOVICH case and that SLAVKO had left for the Eastern Ukraine. (Note: MARKO served as MIRON's W/T operator for the first time. Prior to this, MARKO sent one other message on his own in which he transmitted a synopsis of the OKHRIMOVICH communique as taken from the press there. He made no comments regarding this case.

3. Some added notes on SMYOFIA operations into the Ukraine are as follows. Of the six men accompanying MIRON to the Ukraine, only three remain alive today. These are: MIRON, the W/T operator VICTOR and SLAVKO who was reported to have gone to the Eastern Ukraine. VERES was killed in the fall of 1951 (circumstances of his death are unknown), KOBZAR was killed in late fall of 1952 in Karlsbad, Czechoslovakia and IHOR was killed in 1952.

4. The second group infiltrated and led by POMSTA was liquidated in the Carpathians and of the third group dispatched in May, 1951 only SOKIL remains alive. When this group jumped it lost one pouch. The W/T sets were retrieved along with another pouch which it carried and which were buried for future disposition. SOKIL, along with Zenko BROZHIK (GAYOGHA) and YUZIO exfiltrated to the West at a later date. In the fall of 1952 SOKIL and another W/T operator by the name of HAY attempted another infiltration via Czechoslovakia. On this mission SOKIL was allegedly killed and HAY returned with the pouch he was carrying. MIRON claimed to have learned of POMSTA's death from CHERNETS who, in turn, got the information from LEMISH.

5
- 17 -

SECRET

SECRET

CONTACTS WITH VSEVOLOD

1. Contacts with VSEVOLOD had their beginning in 1950/51 when two couriers - W/T operators, YARENKO and IVAN arrived in VSEVOLOD's area of operation. These two operators were originally sent separately to Poland from Germany where both reported to ZENON. ZENON then dispatched them together to the Ukraine along with two other couriers, DUB and HAY. Once in the Ukraine YARENKO and IVAN separated from DUB and HAY (nothing has been heard of DUB since), and headed for the Sambor area where IVAN had relatives. It was in this area that they first established contact with VSEVOLOD. They have remained with VSEVOLOD ever since and have been W/T communications with SMYQPIA and Poland with both men transmitting.

2. In 1951-52 messages initiated by VSEVOLOD consisted mainly of routine technical matters to keep alive the contact, some information on the place they were residing and the transmittal of contact points and passwords. Some time in 1952 VSEVOLOD reported that he had no contact with his superiors but that he was the leader of the Drohobush Okrug and only maintained contacts within his own area of responsibility. In the summer of 1952 he reported that he had gone to the Stanislaw area to establish contact there. When asked about the possibility of making contact with the Love Krai, VSEVOLOD replied that this was impossible for him to do although he did not say why it was impossible.

3. On 24 September 1953 VSEVOLOD reported that he had established contact with the leader of the ZURAVNO nadraion (Voynyliv area) who claimed to have contacts with higher headquarters. From this nadraionovi VSEVOLOD learned that to 1951 the leader of the Carpathian Krai was a certain BAYRAK. Following the death of BAYRAK, KUZMA (AECASSOWARY 5) took over the Carpathian Krai. In this same message VSEVOLOD asked for support from the West.

4. On or about 18 October 1952 DON dispatched ORLYK, LUBOMIR and VORON to the Ukraine with instructions that VORON proceed to VSEVOLOD's headquarters. VORON succeeded in contacting VSEVOLOD from whom he received a report on the area which he, in turn, delivered to DON personally. (This report has since been transmitted to SMYQPIA.) The report from VSEVOLOD, dated July 1952, was addressed to AECAVATINA 5 although originally it was addressed to the chief of the Carpathian Krai but when VSEVOLOD lost contact there he decided to send it to AECAVATINA 5

- 18 -

SECRET

SECRET

instead. Some of the information in this report was as follows: a list of those killed and arrested by the enemy, i.e. OSTAP and CHORNOTA killed in 1952, KAMIN, KHOLODNY and raion chiefs VORON and BUINY surrendered to the enemy, and an account of the lack of leadership in the okrug as well as an account of the difficult conditions there.

5. In his first W/T contact with the West in 1954 VSEVOLOD reported the losses suffered in the past winter and the need of aid. He also reported that couriers he sent to the Zuravno nadrainovii BUREVIY did not return from their mission and therefore he has taken certain precautionary steps. In the message sent him at this time he was warned not to try to contact KUZMA and was informed of the arrests in Poland and advised not to use the contact points there.

6. On 2 July VSEVOLOD sent the following message: "The Bolsheviks are carrying out an extensive propaganda campaign among the population regarding virgin lands in the East. They have also organized resettlement programs for Kasakstan, Altai, Krasnoyarsk, Kurgan, and Novosibirsk and other oblasts. These resettled are given support, supplies and free transportation. Through raion radas (soviets) recruitment for resettlement in the Khabarovsk, Arkhangelsk and Sakhalin areas are being carried out. Those recruited for resettlement must pass a medical examination, fill out special forms on which they list members of their families, and work specialty. Single men and women are given top priority in this resettlement recruitment campaign."

7. No one with whom VSEVOLOD is in contact in the West really knows who he is. The one person who was in a position to report on VSEVOLOD was VORON, the courier dispatched by DON to contact him. However, since his return to Poland, VORON has been arrested. Approximately at the same time (April 15, 1954) the arrests were made in Poland, DON reported that he planned to dispatch couriers to VSEVOLOD. It is very likely that these scheduled to act as couriers were arrested and consequently no one was sent to VSEVOLOD.

8. Evidently VSEVOLOD does not now have contact with higher headquarters (from Krai up). The last time he had contact with the Carpathian Krai was when BAYRAK was still chief there and it was at this time he received direct news of the death of General CHUPRINKA and the elevation of Col. KOVAL.

9. In what few contacts he had with the West via W/T (all W/T messages transmitted by VSEVOLOD's W/T operators were signed by him only), VSEVOLOD has not mentioned or questioned the ZCh conflict nor has he been informed of it be AECAVATINA §.

- 17 -

SECRET

SECRET

ATTACHMENT C to EGMW-613

W/T MESSAGES FROM AND TO ASCARTHAGE 5 (NOTEE) -- 1954

In the chronological order in which they were received and sent, messages from and to ASCARTHAGE 5 are as follows:

A) From ASCARTHAGE 5 on 24 July 1954:

1) "FRIENDS: AM ADVISING YOU AS TO WHAT HAPPENED TO ME AND WHY I HAVE BEEN SILENT SO LONG. IN APRIL, ALONG WITH THE RAIONOVII, I WENT TO A PREARRANGED FIRST SPRING MEETING AND WHEN WE APPROACHED THE POINT WE SAW SOLDIERS THERE. SOMEHOW, I DON'T KNOW HOW, WE MANAGED TO FLEE. IT BECAME NECESSARY FOR US TO WANDER IN THE WOODS A LONG TIME AND I LOST CONTACT WITH THE PROVIDNIK. NOW I HAVE BROKE UP MY RADIO AND WANT TO ASK WHAT I SHOULD DO FURTHER. I AM STAYING WITH CIVILIANS AND AM UNABLE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH ANYBODY FROM THE UNDERGROUND. CONTACT ME WITH IVAN. I WILL LISTEN TO YOU ON BLINDERBROADCAST AS FOLLOWS: JULY 28; AUGUST 3, 11, 21, 29. I SINCERELY GREET YOU ALL. MAK."

2) SIGNAL CENTER COMMENTS:

- a) Confirmation digit (3) indicates control.
- b) External cryptographic procedures were correct; no keying text skipped from preceding message; message and system indicators were correctly used.

3) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS:

- a) MAK failed to give message number. (Should have been #84.)
- b) MAK did not receipt for messages sent to him during the winter months. In the past he always receipted for such messages in his first spring contact with us.
- c) In the past MAK always began his messages with either no salutation or with the word "Doctor". In this message he began with an ambiguous "Drugi" (friends).
- d) The message, compared with others that MAK has written, does not appear to have been written by MAK. Words in this message which he would not use are as follows: "Saldativ" in reference to soldiers instead of his usual "Bolsheviks"; "radiestantsiyu" instead of "radio apparat"; and the misspelling of the words "movlem" (which should read "vmovlem"), "tsivilnokh" (which should read "tsivilnikh") and "raionovom" (which should read "raionovim").
- e) It is unusual that MAK cannot make contact with someone from the Underground and in his very first message requests to be contacted with Ivan. What good will Ivan do him, especially since MAK has a radio. This is obviously a Soviet scheme to

SECRET

locate Ivan. MAK no doubt told his captors that Ivan is present in the area. On the other hand, Ivan also might be under control and in MAK's request to contact Ivan, the Soviets are trying to lead us to believe he is clean.

- f) In reference to the "providnik" with whom MAK claims he lost contact, this appears to be an attempt to lead us to believe the "providnik" might be Hrusin and that MAK does not know he was reported captured and shot by the Soviets. Now it is possible that MAK, although he heard that a VO Okhrimovich was captured and shot, did not know that this was Hrusin for he might not have known Hrusin's real name. And on the other hand, if the Soviets in fact caught Hrusin, it is possible that he did not reveal his pseudonym "Hrusin". However, if they caught both MAK and HRUZIN it would have been a simple matter to bring both together for identification purposes and it seems unlikely that if this were the case, MAK would not identify HRUZIN as HRUZIN even if the latter only gave the name Okhrimovich to the Soviets.
- g) MAK makes no reference to Hrusin although as mentioned in (f) above, the use of the word "providnik" might be for the purpose of leading us to believe Hrusin is meant. Those who wrote the message should know that their information regarding Okhrimovich reached us through their press facilities. The question is, why would they want us to believe that MAK knows nothing about Okhrimovich's capture and that for our information, MAK spent the winter successfully but was unable to meet him in the spring. Perhaps they are anticipating questions about Okhrimovich but through the use of the name Hrusin; thus in the event they are in the possession of our winter messages addressed to Hrusin but whose identity has not been revealed either by MAK or Hrusin, and they receive a question from us reading "We heard over radio Kiev that the Soviets captured Hrusin, etc." they would automatically connect Hrusin with Okhrimovich.

B) To AECARTHAGE 5 on 28 July 1954:

1) "MSG #171. MAK. WE WERE PLEASED TO HEAR FROM YOU AFTER SUCH A LONG PERIOD OF SILENCE AND THAT YOU WERE ABLE, WITH GOD'S HELP, TO PASS THE WINTER SUCCESSFULLY. TELL US PRECISELY WHERE YOU ARE NOW AND HOW YOU CAN BE REACHED IN ORDER THAT WE MIGHT HELP YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. RADIO KIEV ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE IN MAY ABOUT V. O. OKHRIMOVICH. WHAT DO YOU KNOW ABOUT THIS AND WHAT ARE THE PEOPLE THERE SAYING ABOUT IT? WITH WHAT PROVIDNIK, AS YOU MENTIONED, DID YOU LOSE CONTACT? GLORY TO THE UKRAINE. BOHDAN."

SECRET

2) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS:

- a) The above message is in answer to the message received from HOTEZ on 24 July. It appears almost certain that HOTEZ is under control, therefore, the above message is written accordingly. The phrase "God's help" is a dig at the Soviets holding MAK. Reference to help is in answer to MAK's request to contact Ivan (Carthage 12). The above answer is a stall. Query about Okhrimovich is made in this manner in order not to use the name Hrusin in the event the Soviets do not know who Hrusin is or was. In his message to us MAK mentioned that he lost contact with a providnik. The question above is which one--Hrusin? Glory to the Ukraine is also a dig at the captors.
- b) In line with the control of MAK, subsequent messages will be determined on the basis of incoming messages. However it is planned never to tell where Ivan is and eventually to ask MAK to exfiltrate.

C) To AECARTHAGE 5 on 11 August 1954:

1) "MSG. #172. MAK, WE ARE WAITING FOR AN ANSWER TO OUR LAST MESSAGE TO YOU. GIVE MORE DETAILS RE YOUR ACTIVITY FOR PERIOD FROM YOUR LAST CONTACT WITH US LAST FALL TO APRIL OF THIS YEAR. ARE YOU ATTEMPTING TO REESTABLISH CONTACT THERE ON YOUR OWN OR IS THIS NOT POSSIBLE TO DO? THROUGH OTHER CONTACTS WE LEARNED THAT EXTENSIVE MANEUVERS ARE BEING HELD THERE AND ALONG WITH THIS OBLAVAS. IS THIS ACTIVITY BEING WAGED IN YOUR AREA? BE CAREFUL. GLORY TO THE UKRAINE. BOHDAN. END OF MSG."

2) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS:

- a) Since sending the controlled message of 24 July, nothing more has been heard from MAK. In complying with the blindbroadcast schedule he sent us, one message was sent him on 28 July and a QRU on 3 August. Rather than send another QRU on 11 August, which might alert the Soviet captors of MAK that we are aware of the control, the above message (172) was sent.
- b) Naturally, the above message was written as though MAK is not under control. Reference to the maneuvers and other contacts is fictitious, included to make the Soviets believe we have other operators in the area.

SECRET

SECRET

D) From AECARTHAGE 5 on 16 August 1954:

1) "MESSAGE 1; FRIENDS; I RECEIVED YOUR RADIOGRAM. I AM HAPPY TO HEAR THAT YOU WILL HELP ME SOON. TELL ME HOW AND WHEN YOU WILL DO THIS. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE IF YOU COULD SEND ME PEOPLE. IT IS BECOMING VERY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO LIVE ALONE. NO ONE KNOWS ABOUT ME EXCEPT CIVILIANS FROM ONE HOUSEHOLD WHO SAFEGUARD ME. I HAVE A SMALL DUGOUT (KRIYIVKA) IN THE FIELDS. V. O. OKRIMOVICH HAS BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT BUT HOW THEY CAUGHT HIM NO ONE KNOWS. PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICANS DROPPED HIM (HERE).

2) "MESSAGE 2; I LOST CONTACT WITH THE BOLOCHOW RAIONOVII WHEN IN THE SPRING WE SEPARATED AT THE POINT AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER HE WAS KILLED. THROUGH HIM CONTACT WITH HIGHER HEADQUARTERS (PROVID) WAS MAINTAINED. I WAS UNABLE TO MEET ANYONE AT RESERVE POINTS KNOWN TO ME. NOW I AM IN THE BOLOCHOW AREA. I CAN BE CONTACTED IN THE VILLAGE OF POLANICA THROUGH .. GARBLE .. ON THE ROAD FROM BRZAZA TO BOLOCHOW. PASSWORD IS "WHERE IS THE ROAD ..GARBLE.. WITH 21 digits missing. MAK."

3) SIGNAL CENTER COMMENTS:

- a) Confirmation digit indicates control (digit 33333)
- b) External crypt procedures were correct; no keying text skipped from preceding message; message and system indicators were correctly used.
- c) Field signal good with signal fading toward end of contact.

4) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS:

- a) MAK failed to give message number and did not receipt for last two messages sent him although correct message numbers used by us.
- b) Message began with ambiguous "Druzi" as in his first message to us.
- c) It is unlikely that MAK uncontrolled would use the word "radiogram" as is used in the above message.
- d) Answers to questions sent him are as follows:
 - Q. Tell us precisely where you are now and how you can be reached in order that we might help you.
 - A. Now I am in the Bolochow area. I can be contacted in the village of Polanica, etc.
 - Q. What do you know about the capture of Okhrimovich and what are the people there saying about?
 - A. Okhrimovich has been written about but how they caught him no one knows. People believe that the Americans dropped him. (Here we are led to believe MAK does not know who Okhrimovich is.)
 - Q. With what providnik did you lose contact?
 - A. The raionovii of the Bolochow area. (This is further explanation of the mishap he and his providnik had in April and which he reported in his first message.)

- 4 -

SECRET

SECRET

Q. Are you attempting to reestablish contact there on your own or is this not possible to do?

A. I was unable to meet anybody at reserve points known to me.

e) Questions sent him but to which answers were not given are as follows:

Q. Through other contacts we learned that extensive maneuvers are being held there and along with this oblavas. Is this activity being waged in your area? (This question was not based on fact.)

Q. Give more details re your activity for period from your last contact with us last fall to April of this year.

f) MAK makes no further reference to contact with Ivan (ABGARTHAGE 12) to follow up his original request in his first message which we ignored. It is possible that since there are indications that Ivan has been caught MAK's captors will no longer bring up this subject but instead will work on the aid from us routine as seen in the request for aid and people in the above message.

E) To ABGARTHAGE 5 on 21 August 1954:

1) "MSG. IN PARTS BEGINS, MSG. #173: MAK. WE RECEIVED YOUR RADIOGRAM. REPEAT FROM WORD POLANICA SINCE WE WERE UNABLE TO DECIPHER FROM HERE. WE CONSIDER AID TO YOU TO BE OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE AND ARE NOW CONSIDERING PLANS ALONG THESE LINES. HOWEVER, WHAT IS STILL MORE IMPORTANT IS THE NECESSITY OF STRENGTHENING OTHER METHODS FOR THE ENTIRE MOVEMENT. BECAUSE THE ENEMY HAS CENTERED HIS ATTENTION ON THE UNDERGROUND WHERE HE HAS HAD SUCCESS OF WHICH YOU ARE FAMILIAR, IT IS NECESSARY TO INCREASE FURTHER THE WORK REGARDING LEGAL ASPECTS. TO DO THIS, WE ARE CONSIDERING SENDING DOCUMENTED PEOPLE THERE WHERE UNDER LEGAL COVER THEY COULD CARRY OUT NECESSARY WORK AND BE A RESERVE FOR THE FUTURE."

2) "MSG. IN PARTS ENDS, MSG. NO. 174: THROUGH YOUR ASSOCIATION WITH MEMBERS OF THE PROVID YOU SHOULD KNOW THEIR VIEWS REGARDING THIS ASPECT OF OPERATIONS, ITS FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTATION AND ITS WORTHINESS. THEREFORE, SEND US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THESE VIEWS ALONG WITH YOUR OWN THOUGHTS SO THAT WE CAN BEGIN THIS PLAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BE CAREFUL. GLORY TO THE UKRAINE. BORDAN." END OF MESSAGE.

3) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS:

a) Deceptive message.

- 5 -

SECRET

SECRET

F) From ARGENTHAGE 5 on 2 September 1954:

1) REPEAT OF GARBLED PORTION OF LAST MESSAGE RECEIVED BEGINS: "YOU CAN CONTACT ME IN THE VILLAGE OF PELYANTSE THROUGH --garble--ILKA, AT THE THIRD HOUSE ON THE RIGHT ON THE ROAD FROM BRZHA to BOLECHOW. THE PASSWORD IS, 'WHERE IS THE ROAD TO HOSZOW?' ANSWER, 'THROUGH CHOVAHANI.' MAK."

2) "ONE PART MESSAGE BEGINS (No number given): IN THE FALL (1953) I RECEIVED SOME MONEY FROM THE PROVID WHICH MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR ME AND MY FRIENDS TO PURCHASE ENOUGH FOOD FOR THE WINTER WHICH WE SPENT IN A KRIIVKA IN THE FOREST. EARLY IN THE SPRING I MADE CONTACT WITH A RAION PROVIDNIK AND TOGETHER WITH HIM ATTEMPTED TO REACH THE PROVID. I HAVE ALREADY TOLD YOU WHAT HAPPENED TO ME FURTHER. FOLLOWING THE EVENT THAT TOOK PLACE AT THE POINT, I ATTEMPTED TO MAKE CONTACT (WITH THE PROVID) ALONE BUT THIS I WAS UNABLE TO DO. MANEUVERS ARE NOT BEING HELD IN THE AREA. YOU WROTE THAT YOU HAVE OTHER CONTACTS WITH THE HOMETLAND. MAYBE THROUGH THEM YOU COULD CONTACT ME WITH THE PROVID SO THAT I WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE ALONE. IF YOU KNOW THE ADDRESS OF IVAN'S RELATIVES (PARENTS) SEND IT TO ME AND PERHAPS THROUGH THEM I MIGHT AT LEAST MAKE CONTACT WITH IVAN. WHY DID YOU BEGIN NUMBERING YOUR TELEGRAMS FROM 171? I RECEIVED FROM YOU ONLY NOS. 150 AND 151. I SHALL BE LISTENING TO YOU ON BLIND BROADCAST AS FOLLOWS: SEPTEMBER 8, 14, 20 AND 26. MAK."

3) SIGNAL CENTER COMMENTS:

- a) Confirmation digit (33333) indicates control.
- b) External cryptographic procedures were correct; no keying text skipped from preceding message; message and system indicators were used correctly.

4) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS:

- a) Further indication of control as shown in this message is the fact that in repeating the garbled portion (only partially garbled), the part of his last message repeated was identical to that sent before, showing that, contrary to instructions - which would be followed if not controlled - the cipher text was not destroyed after transmission.
- b) The message, down to where he mentions maneuvers are not being held in his area, is in answer to our message of 11 August (172) in which we asked for more detail of his activity since last fall, and in which we stated that through our "other" contacts there we learned of extensive maneuvers being held there.
- c) Other than repeating the garble as requested in our 21 August (174) message, no further answer was given to this message. (Evidently Moscow has not yet figured out how to answer the rest of the message.)

SECRET

SECRET

- d) In reference to his query as to the numbering of our messages, our message number 171 was the first message we sent to MAK following receipt of his first message to us this year. Message 151 was the last we sent to him in November 1953 and the last he probably received prior to his capture. (Our message 152 was sent on 5 December.) It is likely that from the time of his capture to when he began listening again several of our messages sent after 5 December were not received by him, and possibly none until after he made the first contact. In any case MAK's captors are leading us to believe that messages 152 through 170 were not received. In the event they, in fact, did not receive a single winter blind broadcast and then received a message from us showing a gap of twenty missing messages, they might have assumed this to be a challenge gimmick or provocation on our part and therefore they are questioning it. The answer, of course, of why we began numbering from 171 should be that we sent twenty messages during the winter. If they ask us to repeat them all, our answer will be that since these messages were intended for the provid (which, in fact, they were) and since MAK does not have contact with it, there is no use in repeating these messages until he again makes contact with the proper people.
- e) Although not being as direct in their approach to contact with Ivan as they were originally, it appears as though they (the captors) want us to believe that Ivan is not controlled by having MAK want to contact him. (The last S/W letter from Ivan indicated possible control.) Our answer in reference to Ivan's parents' address should be that we do not have it. We could answer this question, at the sacrifice of Ivan if he is being held, by stating that we believe Ivan to be controlled and therefore should not be contacted. This might convince the Soviets that we believe MAK is really uncontrolled.

g) To AECARTHASE 5 on 8 September 1954:

1) "ONE PART MESSAGE, MSG NO. 175, MAK. WE CONFIRM RECEIPT OF YOUR LAST RADIOGRAM. REPEAT IN FULL NAME OF ILKA BECAUSE WE WERE UNABLE TO DECIPHER IT. WE DO NOT KNOW THE ADDRESS OF IVAN'S PARENTS. WE BEGAN NUMBERING OUR TELEGRAMS FROM 171 BECAUSE DURING THE WINTER WE SENT YOU 20 MESSAGES VIA BLIND BROADCAST - FROM 151 TO 171. WE ARE WAITING FOR AN ANSWER TO OUR LAST TELEGRAM. GLORY TO THE UKRAINE. BONDAN."

2) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS:

- a) Since the proper name ending with Ilka was garbled twice, perhaps deliberately to test our interest in the information sent us, a request was made in the above message for the full name.

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- b) It was considered best to tell MAK we had sent 20 messages during the winter BB schedule just in case part of these messages were received and his question of why we began numbering from 171 was used as a test to determine whether we suspected any control. A true answer here will allay some suspicion without any harm for if a repeat of these messages is requested, which is very likely, we can say that since MAK is not in contact with the Provid, there is no point repeating these messages (originally sent for the Provid) until he again establishes contact with that body.
- c) It is hoped that the answer given re Ivan and his parents will cause MAK's captors to cease their questions in this respect, at least for the time being.

H) FROM ABCARTHAGE 5 on 13 September 1954:

1) "FIRST OF TWO MESSAGES: I NEED HELP AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARDS CONTACT WITH THE PROVID. SINCE SPRING I AM WITHOUT CONTACT AND NO LONGER WANT TO BE LEFT ALONE. AND SINCE I AM SERVING NO USEFUL PURPOSE, I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR PLANS REGARDING ME. YOU ASKED ME ABOUT MATTERS WHICH ARE DIFFICULT FOR ME TO ANSWER. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THE MEMBERS OF THE PROVID ARE AWARE OF YOUR POSSIBILITIES OF SENDING PEOPLE HERE FOR WORK UNDER LEGAL COVER. WHAT THEY THINK OF THIS TODAY I CAN'T SAY. I BELIEVE THAT IF YOUR PEOPLE HAVE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS THEY COULD LEGALIZE THEMSELVES HERE IN TOWNS BUT YOU MUST CONSIDER THE DIFFICULTIES IN FINDING A PLACE TO LIVE AND A PLACE TO WORK BECAUSE THE PEOPLE IN CHARGE OF SUCH THINGS HERE ARE ALL OF A SECURITY TYPE."

2) "SECOND OF TWO MESSAGES: THEREFORE IT IS BETTER TO DROP PEOPLE WHERE YOU DROPPED ME AND I COULD MEET THEM AND ADVISE THEM HOW ITS BEST TO TRAVEL AND TO HIDE. THESE PEOPLE COULD ALSO CONTACT ME THROUGH SHENHA ILKA, OF WHOM I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED. IF YOU DROP PEOPLE IN AREAS UNKNOWN TO ME THEN I CANNOT GUARANTEE THEIR SAFETY. I CAN SEND YOU DEAD DROPS FOR CONTACT PURPOSES. IT WOULD BE IDEAL IF YOUR PEOPLE WOULD ALSO BRING THE SAME DOCUMENTS FOR ME TOO SO I COULD WORK TOGETHER WITH THEM. IT WOULD BE BEST TO DO THIS (SEND PEOPLE) BEFORE WINTER SETS IN. MAK."

3) SIGNAL CENTER COMMENTS:

- a) Confirmation digit indicates control; external crypt procedures were correct; no keying text skipped from preceding message; message and system indicators used correctly.

4) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS:

- a) This message was in answer to ours of 21 August in which we stressed the need of strengthening the legal aspects of the underground movement and our desire to send legals there and our request for his advice re this. There is an obvious attempt to discourage sending documented people there, at

SECRET

least to areas other than MAK's, and an attempt to channel all agents into one direction (the enemy's). Apparently, our deception material has taken hold and the Soviets might really believe we are preparing a dispatch soon.

- b) MAK's control is further shown by the constant use in the messages of the words "your people". Uncontrolled, he would never consider himself separate from anyone in his organization and reference to others about to be sent in would be "people" or "our people" etc.
- c) A suggested answer to the above messages will be as follows:
"We have advised member of the provid Ulasa about you. The drop in Polansia which you sent us will be passed on to the provid as soon as possible. The reason why members of the provid have had difficulty contacting you is because the provid changed its location to a point quite a distance from where you are now. We must send people to the provid and therefore cannot now drop people into your terrain. Send us the pseudonym of the raionovii who you reported fell so we can include it in our archives. We received information that people from the Ukraine are being deported to cultivate virgin lands. Have any been deported from your area for this purpose?"

I) To AECARTHAGE 5 on 20 September 1954:

1) "ONE PART MESSAGE, MSG. No. 176. MAK. ALTHOUGH WE STILL DO NOT HAVE CONTACT WITH THE PROVID, FEEL WE MUST SEND PEOPLE TO THE PROVID AND THEREFORE CANNOT NOW DROP OUR PEOPLE INTO YOUR AREA. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO GIVE YOU AT LEAST MATERIAL AID WHICH WOULD MAINTAIN YOU UNTIL SUCH TIME CONTACT BETWEEN YOU AND THE PROVID IS EFFECTED, WE ARE PREPARING TO SEND YOU NECESSARY THINGS THROUGH OUR FRIENDS. THEREFORE, FOR THIS SEND US THE DEAD DROP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT PEOPLE FROM THE UKRAINE HAVE BEEN DEPORTED TO CULTIVATE VIRGIN LANDS. HAS THIS BEEN THE CASE IN YOUR AREA? SEND US THE PSEUDONYM OF THE BOLECHOW RAIONOVII WHO YOU REPORTED FELL. WE NEED IT FOR OUR ARCHIVES. GLORY TO THE UKRAINE. BOHDAN."

2) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS:

- a) Deceptive message.

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J) From ABCARTHAGE 5 on 7 October 1954:

1) (No message number) "TWO MONTHS HAVE PASSED SINCE I HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH YOU AND HAVE TOLD YOU ABOUT MY DIFFICULTIES BUT ONLY NOW YOU HAVE TOLD ME THAT YOU CANNOT HELP ME MAKE CONTACT WITH THE PROVID. WINTER IS JUST AROUND THE CORNER AND I DON'T KNOW WHAT'S TO BECOME OF ME. ALL IS QUIET IN MY AREA BUT IT IS STILL NECESSARY FOR ME TO EXERCISE THE GREATEST PRECAUTION LESTGARBLE....."

2) SIGNAL CENTER COMMENTS:

- a) No confirmation digit.
- b) External crypt procedures correct; no keying text skipped from preceding message; message and system indicators were used correctly; the above is 100 groups which is all that was received; last 25 groups doubtful. Contact lost.

3) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS:

- a) Due to the extreme garble at the end of the message, the probably blind broadcast schedule included therein (we had none for the month of October) was not received. It is possible that HOTEK is aware of the fact that base lost him and will therefore attempt another contact to conclude this message. In the event he does not do this we will attempt to contact him according to plan and to instruct him to repeat that portion of the message not received.

K) From ABCARTHAGE 5 on 8 October 1954:

1) Remainder of message received 7 October is as follows: "GARBLE .. I CANNOT HOLD OUT TOO LONG. IS IT NOT POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO SEND BOHDAN (ABCARTHAGE 3) HERE. HE HAS A LOT OF ACQUAINTANCES IN THIS AREA AND I AM CERTAIN THAT WE TWO COULD MAKE THE NECESSARY CONTACT WITH THE PROVID FOR YOU. DOES HE, BOHDAN, KNOW THE PROPER PEOPLE FROM CIVILIAN CIRCLES HERE WHOM I COULD USE IN MAKING CONTACT WITH SOMEONE IN THE AREA SO I WOULDN'T HAVE TO REMAIN ALONE. I REQUEST YOU ASK HIM AND LET ME KNOW."

2) Other message sent on 8 October is as follows: "I AM SENDING YOU A DEAD DROP. ALONG THE ROAD FROM BOLECHOW TO BESARABOV THERE IS A RIVER. 4 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST FROM THE VILLAGE OF BRZAZA THERE IS A BRIDGE ACROSS THE RIVER BRZAZA NEAR HILL 626. THE BRIDGE IS ABOUT 20 METERS LONG AND IS ABOUT 6 METERS HIGH. 10 METERS FROM THE BRIDGE

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SECRET

IN THE DIRECTION FROM BRZAZA TO BESARABOV THERE IS A PINE TREE ON THE RIGHTHAND SIDE OF THE ROAD NEAR WHICH IS A STUMP 2 METERS HIGH. UNDER THE PINE TREE, ON THE SOUTH SIDE, THERE IS A BOTTLE BURIED FOR CACHING OF MESSAGES. IS THIS THE TYPE OF DEAD DROP YOU ASKED ABOUT? AM I TO GO TO THIS POINT? WHEN? OR IS TO BE USED ONLY AS A DROP FOR PACKAGES? IF I AM TO USE THIS POINT AS A MEETING PLACE WHO SHOULD I EXPECT TO MEET THERE AND WILL THERE BE A RECOGNITION SIGNAL BETWEEN US? THERE HAVE BEEN PEOPLE FROM ALL RAIONS WHO HAVE OF THEIR OWN VOLITION LEFT FOR THE EAST TO CULTIVATE VIRGIN LAND. EARLY THIS SPRING A GROUP OF YOUNG PEOPLE FROM BOLECHOW DEPARTED, MOST OF WHOM WERE CHAUFFERS, TRACTOR DRIVERS AND COMBINE OPERATORS. THE BOLECHOW RAION PROVIDNIK WAS SL. P. D. BARVINOK. I WILL BE LISTENING TO YOU ON BLINDROADCAST OCT 11, 15, 21, 25 AND 29. MAK."

3) SIGNAL CENTER COMMENTS:

- a) Confirmation digit indicates control; external crypt procedures were correct; no keying text skipped from preceding message; message and system indicators used correctly.
- b) Field contacted 8 October 1652 Z; contact terminated 1803 Z. One message received contained 236 groups, the other 90 groups which was conclusion of message sent on 7 October.

4) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS:

- a) Recently, including the above message, NOTRE sent more groups per message than authorized. He was instructed to limit each message to 130 groups and prior to this year had done so. In the event his captors are aware of this message limitation and are deliberately sending more groups than authorized to test our belief in the play, our next message will contain instructions for the field to limit each message to 130 groups. It is possible, too, that MAK's captors are not aware of this group limit, with MAK using this over grouping as another means to let us know he is controlled.
- b) It is logical for MAK to request we send BOHDAN (AECARTHAGE 3) to him since he is familiar with the area in which MAK is now. Other than AECARTHAGE 10, AECARTHAGE 3 was the only other person known to MAK who might be prepared to be dispatched to the Ukraine. AECARTHAGE 3 had also once made contact with the provid and it is probably assumed by the opposition that he might still be considered as a key to the renewal of this contact. A suggested answer to this request might be that BOHDAN has TB and can't be dispatched. As for the names of civilians in the area, we can send him several names of people, some we know have been deported and some are Party officials, taken from the Bolekhiv Raion report brought out by AECARTHAGE 3 in 1950.

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- c) Until ABEVERSANT is prepared for dispatch using the drop MAK sent, reference to the use of the drop in subsequent messages will be carefully avoided or some statement will be made to the effect that plans are being made, etc.
- d) Reference to virgin land cultivation and identity of the Bolekhiv Raion providnik are answers to questions sent MAK on 20 September.

L) To ABOCATHAGE 5 on 15 October 1954:

1) "ONE PART MSG. NO. 177. MAK. BASE INSTRUCTS YOU TO LIMIT EACH MESSAGE TO 130 GROUPS. FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOU HAVE 260 GROUPS TO SEND DURING ONE CONTACT, DIVIDE THEM INTO TWO MESSAGES. IN YOUR MESSAGE OF 7 OCTOBER WE WERE UNABLE TO DECIPHER FROM WORDS "GREATEST PRECAUTION" TO "I CANNOT HOLD OUT." PLEASE REPEAT THIS PORTION. LISTEN TO US ACCORDING TO PLAN. GLORY TO THE UKRAINE. BONDAN."

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S/W COMMUNICATION WITH AECARTHAGE 12---1954

A) In the order in which they were received and sent, messages exchanged with AECARTHAGE 12 are given below along with pertinent comments. A brief resume of events prior to the initiation of this letter exchange is as follows: On 29 November, 1953, AECARTHAGE 12 was forced to transmit a danger signal via W/T while in the process of sending a message to us. Before going off the air, he was able to send, in clear text, words to the effect that he was being surrounded and was burning his papers, i.e. plan and enciphered text used at the time of broadcast. From this date, AECARTHAGE 12 has remained silent W/T wise. Not knowing his status, we continued sending to him on a bi-monthly blindbroadcast schedule, hoping that he was receiving us. This schedule was to be maintained until the middle of April, 1954, or until such time AECARTHAGE 12 again contacted Base. Our last message was sent to him on 12 March. Shortly thereafter, we received his first S/W letter.

B) S/W Letter from AECARTHAGE 12 on 18 March:

1) "IN NOVEMBER THE BOLSHEVIKS SUDDENLY BEGAN CONDUCTING OBLAVAS IN MY TERRAIN. I WAS ATTEMPTING TO SEND YOU RESERVE POINTS AND WHEN I CAME ON THE AIR THE LAST TIME THERE WAS AN AMBUSH. TWO OF MY FRIENDS WERE KILLED. MY RADIO, GENERATOR AND CRYSTALS FELL BUT I MANAGED TO BURN MY PLAN AND PAPERS. TWO OF US MANAGED TO REACH A RESERVE HIDEOUT. PLAN AWBELL, ENCODE AND DECODE PADS TO THIS PLAN, ARE SAFE. WE FIND OURSELVES IN DIRE STRAITS. I HAVE A MEETING WITH THE OKRUZHNIK IN THE SPRING. PRIOR TO THIS I WANT TO KNOW WHETHER I SHOULD WAIT FOR ANOTHER RADIO OR WILL YOU CONTACT ME WITH MAK, THE POINTS I GAVE YOU ARE IMPORTANT: WE WILL CONTROL THEM. WRITE TO ME AT THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS: OBLAST STANISLAVIV; RAYON KOSIV; SELO SOKOLIVKA, BILOSHCHAK VASILINA. WHEN WRITING, WRITE SO I WILL UNDERSTAND YOU. IF POSSIBLE, SEND ME AN ADDRESS THAT IS NEARER. 9/2/54. IVAN"

2) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- a) The letter was mailed to a letter drop in Canada arranged for by AECASSOWARY 2.
- b) A sample of AECARTHAGE 12's handwriting differs from that contained in the open text of the letter. For example, with one exception, all letters "T" in the open text are crossed rather than in the conventional Gryllie fashion as used by AECARTHAGE 12 in the sample on record. Perhaps AECARTHAGE 12's colleague wrote the letter for him, or AECARTHAGE 12 himself wrote the letter in a somewhat strained manner to make it appear different from what he would normally write.

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- c) According to AECARTHAGE 12's S/W instructor, AECARTHAGE 12 did write the S/W message himself.
- d) In reference to his losses at the time of the November broadcast, AECARTHAGE 12 states that his "radio, generator and crystals fell ..." and that he burned his plan and papers. "Fell" in this case means that they were captured by the enemy. He did, however, burn the plan and allied papers as he so stated at the conclusion of his last W/T broadcast.
- e) Regarding plan ANBELL, it is assumed that he has crystals for this plan as well as the other items he mentioned as safe, for when dispatched he was equipped completely with a reserve plan, including crystals. Thus, if he buried the pads and plans, it is logical to conclude that he buried the crystals too.
- f) In reference to contacting MAK, AECARTHAGE 12 means whether we, via W/T and using the information re the dead drops he had sent us last fall, will help him make contact with MAK.
- g) Re the sentence "the points I gave you are important, etc..." means he will service the drops on the schedule he gave us.
- h) In asking us to write so he can understand what we write in answer to him, he anticipates a letter in open text and perhaps none in S/W.
- i) His last sentence can be interpreted to mean that he wants an address somewhere in the USSR for speedier mail delivery. He no doubt bases this request on our 1953 W/T message to him wherein we told him it was possible for us to communicate with him by mailing letters from within the S.U. He probably assumes that if we can mail letters to him from within, that we also have addresses there to which he can mail letters.
- j) The return address on the envelope was as follows:
Obl. Stanislaviv; rayon Kolosivya; selo Dyatkivtsi; Stefan Ribchuk.
The S/W letter was dated 9 Jan. 1954; the letter was postmarked 7 February 1954.
- k) The return address as given in the S/W text is located in the same area in which the dead drop he gave us in his W/T is located. The safehouse address he gave us via W/T last fall is also located here, that is, in the village of Sokolivka.

C) S/W Letter from AECARTHAGE 12 on 29 March:

1) "ON 29 NOVEMBER 1953 I WAS AMBUSHED BY THE ENEMY WHILE I WAS MAKING CONTACT (W/T). TWO WERE LOST. TWO OF US WERE ABLE TO FLEE. I LOST THE RADIO. I BURNED THE DOCUMENTS. MY RESERVE PLAN AND CODE PADS ARE SAFE. I AM AWAITING YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. THE POINTS I GAVE YOU ARE IMPORTANT. I HAVE A MEETING WITH THE OKRUZHNIK IN THE SPRING. WRITE TO ME AT THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS: OBLAST STANISLAVIV; RAYON KOSIV; SELO SOKOLIVKA; BILOSHCHAK VASILINA. 10 JAN. IVAN."

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2) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- a) The above message was almost identical to the first one received via S/W. It was written a day after the first was written and was mailed from a different location; this one from the Kosiv rayon. The complete return address is as follows: Obl. Stanislaviv; rayon Kosiv; selo Snidovka; Yaroslav Dyachuk. Evidentially, ABCARTHAGE 12 wrote two identical letters and mailed them from different locations, hoping that at least one would reach us.
- b) The letter was postmarked 21 February 1954.
- c) The handwriting of the open text differed from that of the first letter; the paper on which this letter was written was different from the first, this one being of a poorer grade.

D) Open Text Letter to ABCARTHAGE 12 on 7 May 1954:

1) "MY DEAR: I WAS VERY GLAD TO HAVE RECEIVED YOUR TWO LETTERS AND TO HEAR THAT YOU ARE WELL. MOSCOW, AS I HAVE ALREADY TOLD YOU IS A NICE CITY. THERE IS MUCH WORK IN THE INSTITUTE AND MY STUDIES ARE INTERESTING. I OFTEN GO FOR WALKS WITH MY FRIENDS AND ALSO PLAY VOLLEY BALL. WITH THE APPROACHING SPRING THIS REALLY IS NICE TO DO. I CERTAINLY WOULD LIKE TO BE WITH YOU DURING THE SUMMER AND LISTEN TO THE EVENING NOISES AS FOR EXAMPLE WHEN THE BABBLE OF THE BROOKS BLENDS WITH THE CROAKING OF THE FROGS. YOU WROTE TO ME ABOUT YOUR LIFE AND DAILY ACTIVITY AND ABOUT THE PEOPLE IN THE VILLAGE. I OFTEN THINK ABOUT YOU AND ABOUT MY DEAR ONES. I EXPECT THAT SPRING HAS ALREADY ARRIVED THERE AND THAT PEOPLE ARE NOW ENGAGED IN SPRING WORK. HAS THE SNOW MELTED FROM THE MOUNTAINS? GIVE MY BEST REGARDS TO VASIL, MIKHOLA AND MARY. WRITE AGAIN TO ME AS I AM ALWAYS GLAD TO HEAR FROM YOU. SOON I WILL WRITE AGAIN BUT MORE THAN I HAVE WRITTEN THIS TIME. I WILL ALSO LET YOU KNOW IF AND WHEN I WILL COME VISIT YOU. I AM AWAITING NEWS FROM OKSAN MAKOVOI IN ORDER TO LEARN HOW THINGS ARE WITH HER. DO YOU WRITE TO HER AND DO YOU PLAN TO VISIT HER? WRITE TO ME AT MY UNCLE IVAN'S ADDRESS SINCE I EXPECT TO MOVE TO A NEW APARTMENT. BEST GREETING WITH SPRING. YOUR FRIEND. ANN."

2) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- a) There was no S/W message included.
- b) Interpretation of the above open text is as follows: We received his two letters; reference to volley ball and frogs is the case officer indicators to ABCARTHAGE 12 that the letter was sent by us. Without this, he might assume, since

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- he probably does not expect a letter mailed from inside the USSR, that his letters were intercepted and are being answered by the opposition; we request that he write again and that we will write to him again; we are waiting to hear from MAK (re Oksan Makovoi) and want to know whether he has made any contact with him or does he plan to visit him; we request that he continue writing to us at address used previously and that he not use return address on envelope for mailing address to us.
- c) The letter was dropped in Moscow on 15 May 1954.

E) Open Text Letter to AECARTHAGE 12 on 1 June 1954:

1) "MY DEAR: AGAIN I AM WRITING TO YOU FOR I DON'T KNOW WHETHER OR NOT YOU RECEIVED MY EARLIER LETTER. I RECEIVED YOUR TWO LETTERS QUITE SOME TIME AGO AND HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR YOUR ANSWER TO MY FIRST LETTER. I AM FINE AND SOON WILL END MY STUDIES AND WILL LEAVE MOSCOW. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT I WON'T BE ABLE TO VISIT YOU THIS YEAR. I WAS THINKING OF VISITING OKSAMU MAKOVU BUT I DOUBT WHETHER I'LL BE ABLE TO DO THIS AND THEREFORE I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MEET YOU AT HER PLACE AS I HAD EXPECTED. I THINK IT BEST THAT YOU GO TO UNCLE IVAN'S THIS SUMMER ALONG WITH YOUR FAMILY FOR I SHALL BE THERE AND WE CAN SEE EACH OTHER AND TALK THINGS OVER. WRITE SOON AND LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU THINK OF THIS IDEA AND WHETHER YOU WILL BE ABLE TO COME TO UNCLE IVAN'S. ALSO WRITE AND LET ME KNOW WHEN YOU WILL ARRIVE. I SHALL WAIT FOR YOU THERE. WHAT IS NEW WITH YOU? HOW ARE YOU? I WANT SO MUCH TO SEE MY DEAR ONES THAT THAT IS ABOUT ALL I THINK OF. I AM WAITING TO HEAR FROM YOU MY DEAR AND AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU. MY SINCEREST GREETINGS, YOUR ANNA."

2) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- a) This letter was written shortly after we received the news of AEGASSOWARY 5's capture. It was assumed here that AECARTHAGE 5 might also have suffered the same fate at the same time and therefore the above letter was written to inform AECARTHAGE 12 not to expect aid this year and that it will be impossible to connect him with AECARTHAGE 5 as he had requested.
- b) There was no S/W text in the above letter. The interpretation of the open text is as follows: We got his last two letters and have answered them earlier; he should not expect a supply drop or the arrival of agent personnel; Oksam Makovu is reference to Mak and indicates that it is impossible to arrange meeting between them; Uncle Ivan is his letter drop in Canada; reference to his coming to Uncle Ivan's is a request that he exfiltrate with several of his colleagues and to let us know if he will attempt this and when.
- c) This letter was dropped in Moscow on 9 June 1954.

- 4 -

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F) S/W Letter from AECARTHAGE 12 on 7 June 1954:

1) "DEAR SECRETARY: ALTHOUGH IT WAS DIFFICULT, WE PASSED THE WINTER SUCCESSFULLY. DURING THE WINTER I SENT YOU TWO LETTERS IN WHICH I EXPLAINED TO YOU THAT DURING AN OBLAVA I LOST MY W/T SET. THE POINTS (DEAD DROPS) I SENT YOU LAST FALL ARE ACTIVE AND WE ARE CONTROLLING THEM. I AM WAITING FOR YOUR ADVICE OR HELP. MAYBE YOU WILL CONTACT ME WITH MAK OR HRUZIN. WRITE TO ME AT THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS: OBL. STANISLAVIV; RAYON KOSIV; SELO SOKOLIVKA, BILOSMCHAK VASILINA. SLAVA UKRAINA. 4 V 1954. IVAN."

2) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- a) The S/W text was written on 4 May; the letter was postmarked 9 May. The return address was as follows: Obl. Stanislaviv; rayon Kolomiya; selo Turki; Petro Ivashkiv.
- b) When writing the above letter, AECARTHAGE 12 had not yet received our two letters.

G) S/W Letter from AECARTHAGE 12 on 2 July 1954:

1) "IN THE NEWSPAPER SUB CARPATHIAN PRAVDA DATED 19 MAY 1954 THERE WAS AN ARTICLE STATING THAT THE BOLSHEVIKS CAPTURED PARACHUTIST OKHROMOVICH, VASIL WHO HAD IN HIS POSSESSION A RADIO TRANSMITTER. IS THIS NOT HRUZIN? IT SEEMS TO ME THAT HRUZIN WAS KNOWN BY THAT NAME. IF THIS IS HRUZIN, AND IF YOU HAVE THE POSSIBILITY TO DO SO, INFORM ME IMMEDIATELY WHETHER HE KNOWS THE POINTS I SENT YOU. I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE FATE OF MAK AND OREST. HAVE YOU ANY NEWS FROM THEM? SLAVA UKRAINA. IVAN. 25/V/1954."

2) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- a) The above letter was written on 25 May, 1954 and was postmarked 30 May. The return address was similar to the one used in his first letter to us.
- b) In the open text of the above letter AECARTHAGE 12 mentions having received our first letter to him but makes no reference to it in the S/W text.
- c) AECARTHAGE 12 was not told, while in W/T contact with us, that AECARTHAGE 13 had been killed. AECASSOWARY 5 was not given the points sent us by AECARTHAGE 12.

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H) S/W Letter from ABCARTHAGE 12 on 16 July 1954:

1) "I WAS VERY HAPPY TO HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER WHICH I MORE OR LESS UNDERSTOOD. I AM ANTICIPATING HELP FROM YOU SOON. I AM STILL LOCATED IN THE SAME AREA. THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM IS THAT WE DO NOT HAVE A BETTER MEANS OF CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER (S/W LETTER COMMUNICATION). SHALL I EXPECT W/T APPARATUS FROM YOU. I ALSO NEED MONEY AND MEDICINE. WRITE TO ME IN AN S/W SYSTEM THAT I KNOW. GIVE ME AN ADDRESS THAT IS NEARER. 31/V/1954. GLORY TO THE UKRAINE. IVAN."

2) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- a) Our first letter was received by him.
- b) ABCARTHAGE 12 evidently remembers how and is equipped to develop an S/W from us. S/W will be used in the next message from us to him.
- c) Our letter (the first one) took approximately 15 days to reach him.

I) S/W Letter from ABCARTHAGE 12 on 30 July 1954:

1) "BEGINNING. FRIEND SECRETARY, BOTH I AND THE PROVIDNIK ARE VERY SURPRISED AT YOUR SECOND LETTER. IF YOU ARE ALARMED ABOUT ME PERSONALLY AND ARE PERMITTING ME TO RETURN, THEN I THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR SUCH CONCERN, BUT A RAID ACROSS UNKNOWN TERRAIN AND THREE BORDERS UNDER TODAY'S CONDITIONS IS VERY DIFFICULT. FURTHER, I CAME HERE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STRUGGLE, THEREFORE PRIOR TO THE RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER I NEVER EVEN THOUGHT OF RETURNING. NEITHER I NOR THE PROVIDNIK, TO NOW, HAVE EVER CONSIDERED WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE TO CROSS THE BORDER. THEREFORE AT THE PRESENT TIME WE ARE NOT PREPARED FOR THIS. WRITE TO ME AT THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS: OBL. STANISLAVIV; RAYON IARLONIV; SELO STOPCHATIV; PETRO MIKHALLOVICH BODNARUK. END. GLORY TO THE UKRAINE. IVAN. 6 JULY."

2) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- a) The above letter was written on 6 July, postmarked 11 July, and is in answer to our second letter. The return address was the same as used in his second letter.

- 6 -

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- b) This is the first letter from AEGARTHAGE 12 indicating possibility of control as explained as follows:
- 1) This is the first message in which AEGARTHAGE 12 began and ended his message with the words "beginning" and "end". (According to his instructor, he was told to do this in all messages.) Perhaps it was an oversight on his part in not including these words in earlier messages and it could be considered an oversight if omitted in only one message. But he omitted these indicators in five messages which might be concluded to mean that the Soviets, if they in fact have him under control, knowing the system used in S/W writing which included the use of the words "beginning" and "end", insisted that they be included in his letters to us.
 - ii) The above message was the most legible S/W message yet received from AEGARTHAGE 12. In fact, this message was so perfectly written that it appears as though it was written with the best equipment and under ideal conditions whereas the preceding letters all have that "field" look.
 - iii) AEGARTHAGE 12 gave a new return address; in the addressee's name there is a patronymic which was not used in the old return address. The question is, why did he change addresses after having received only two letters there?
 - iv) It seems doubtful that AEGARTHAGE 12 would have written, on his own, such a sarcastic letter to the Secretary although he is capable, under certain conditions, to show complete disregard to his superior's position. (The case officer once heard an intoxicated AEGARTHAGE 12 "guss out" AEGASSOWARY 1.) However, it is doubtful that AEGARTHAGE 12 would have gotten that indignant over a suggestion that he exfiltrate. The show of it here might be for the purpose of making his rejection of exfiltration appear real. It is questionable that he would disobey an order from the Secretary, but then he might be taking orders from his Chief there.
 - v) For the first time AEGARTHAGE 12 uses the word "providnik." Prior to this his reference to a superior there has been okrushnik. A W/T case officer challenge to him was the word "Providnik". Any mention of this word by the base was to be considered a challenge. If the agent was free from control, he was to answer with anything not pertinent to this reference, and if controlled, he was to make reference, including the use of the word, to the "providnik".

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It is possible that AECARTHAGE 12 is controlled and by the use of the word "providnik" is trying to let us know of this control or is suggesting that we challenge him via S/W with this word since it is a W/T challenge. He probably assumes we could use the W/T challenge since we made use of the W/T control indicator "shaba" in the first letter to him.

- vi) For the first time AECARTHAGE 12 did not fill both sides of the page in writing the cover of open text of his letter. He was instructed to always fill both sides of a page.
- vii) There seems to be an unusually long interval between when he got our second letter and when he answered it, and he apologizes for this delay in the open text of his letter. (Our letter was mailed on 9 June; his on 11 July. He should have gotten ours about the middle of June.)
- viii) For the first time AECARTHAGE 12 (but perhaps in line with giving us the control sign) speaks in terms of someone else and himself as in reference to the exfiltration, i.e., "neither I nor the providnik, etc...".
- ix) It appears as though the next move has been left for AECASSOWARY 2 for AECARTHAGE 12 asked for no further instructions; he merely stated his position.

J) S/W Letter to AECARTHAGE 12 on 17 August 1954:

1) "FRIEND IVAN. WE WERE SURPRISED AT YOUR STAND REGARDING OUR REQUEST THAT YOU EXFILTRATE. WE APPRECIATE YOUR DESIRE TO CONTINUE TO REMAIN ACTIVE IN THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE AND ARE AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES AND DANGERS INVOLVED IN CROSSING THE BORDERS WESTWARD. HOWEVER, UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, IT BEING IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO GIVE YOU ANY AID, WE CONSIDER IT BEST THAT YOU EXFILTRATE FOR THE GOOD OF THE CAUSE. THEREFORE ADVISE US OF YOUR STAND AND WHAT YOU PLAN TO DO. HAVE YOU HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT PROVIDNIK ZENKO AND HIS FRIEND LEMKO WHO WERE TO HAVE EXFILTRATED. GREETINGS."

2) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- a) The above letter was mailed to the new address given by AECARTHAGE 12, and was dropped in Moscow on 28 August 1954. An S/W system known to AECARTHAGE 12 was used for the first time. In the event he cannot develop this letter, a somewhat similar message was included in open text of the letter.
- b) Reference to "providnik Zenko" and friend "Lemko" in the letter are control challenges.

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K) S/W Letter from ABCARTHAGE 12 on 11 October 1954:

1) "BEGINNING: FRIEND SECRETARY. THE PROVIDNIK INSTRUCTED ME TO INFORM YOU THAT HE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND YOUR PROPOSED ACTION (REQUEST FROM ABCASSOWARY 2 THAT ABCARTHAGE 12 EXFILTRATE) REGARDING OUR SITUATION. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT YOUR SUPPORT PLAYS A BIG ROLE IN PRESERVING THE CADRES WHICH HAVE REMAINED BEHIND IN OUR AREA. LETTER CONTACT WITH YOU IS AN UNCERTAIN MODE OF COMMUNICATING WITH YOU AND IT IS INCONVENIENT. I RECEIVED ONLY TWO LETTERS FROM YOU TO DATE. PERHAPS YOU WILL ARRANGE ANOTHER MODE OF CONTACT. IN ANY CASE, I AM SENDING YOU A DZ FOR DROPS, I.E., MAP KOLONIYA (GSGA 4416) HILL MUNCZELIK (839728). PASS WORDS ARE THE SAME AS I GAVE YOU LAST YEAR. LET ME KNOW IF I SHOULD WAIT AT THE POINT. END. GLORY TO THE UKRAINE. IVAN. 29 AUGUST."

2) CASE OFFICER COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- a) The above letter was postmarked 4 September 1954, and the return address was the same used in his third letter to us. This letter was not in answer to our last (3rd) letter sent him in which we repeated our request that he exfiltrate and included control challenges. Our 3rd letter was dropped in Moscow on 28 August; his was written on 29 August.
- b) It is possible, in view of the long interval between letters from him and the fact that he might be controlled, that he did receive our last letter containing our challenges and request that he exfiltrate, but to insist on a drop of personnel, he backdated his letter to show that he could not possibly have gotten it prior to writing his. If controlled, it would be a simple matter to put a 4 September cancellation date on a letter mailed in October or late September.
- c) It is assumed that his reference to "another mode of contact" means putting him in touch with ABCARTHAGE 5 or any other W/T operator there.
- d) In bringing up the matter of DZ's, the tone of this message is very casual--he is not demanding that a drop be made but is merely suggesting that perhaps ABCASSOWARY has this in mind, and if so, well, here is a point that could be used.
- e) The words "beginning" and "end" are used for the second time in his S/W text.
- f) We have not yet answered this letter. We will probably wait for an answer to our 3rd letter with the challenges first.

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L) OTHER COMMENTS:

- 1) Beginning with the 11 July letter from AEGARTHAGE 12, wherein we first suspected the possibility of control, the amount of postage stamps contained on the letters changed, i.e. in the five previous letters, each letter contained 120 kopeeks worth of stamps; the 11 July letter had on 100 kopeeks worth of stamps and the 4 September letter had 110 kopeeks worth. Perhaps those who mailed the last two letters knew the amount required; those who mailed the first five did not and therefore put on more than enough to insure the letters being sent without question.
- 2) Without an answer to our last letter containing the challenges, it is difficult to say whether or not AEGARTHAGE 12 is controlled. The case officer would venture to say that to the receipt of the first five letters from him he was not. However, as explained following the receipt of the last two letters, the element of control could be considered (since 11 July) but cannot be proved conclusively. Certainly there is a difference in tone, contents, etc. between messages received from AEGARTHAGE 5 who undoubtedly is controlled and messages from AEGARTHAGE 12. It is suggested, therefore, that a definite conclusion regarding his control be deferred until we get an answer to our challenges which, due to the rapidly closing "season", should come soon.

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