

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGQA-56103

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

HP

TO : Chief, SR
FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
SUBJECT: GENERAL - Redsox Cart Aerodynamic
SPECIFIC - Transmittal of KUBARK-Smyopia Meeting Minutes

DATE: 2 FEB 1955

1. Transmitted under separate cover as an attachment to this dispatch are three copies of the minutes of the joint Kubark/Smyopia discussions held on 21 January.
2. It is requested that Headquarters forward a copy of the minutes to London per our agreement with the Smyopia representative. Incidentally we have already received the photos of SKOB mentioned in paragraph 2 of the attachment. It is expected that a photo spread will be shown to AECARTHAGE 19 on 31 January. Headquarters will have the results of the attempt to further identify the AECAVATINA courier in short order since AECARTHAGE 19 will arrive at Headquarters before this dispatch.

APPROVED: []

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31 January 1955
ENCLOSURE: SEP COV a/s above
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CS Classification: 74-124-29/3
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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

74-124-29/3


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JOINT US-UK CONFERENCE

20 January 1955

PARTICIPANTS

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AGENDA

- (1) RIS Penetration of Ukrainian Emigre Groups
- (2) Exchange of Information on Couriers Held by AIS and BIS
- (3) Effect of (1) and (2) on Current and Future Operations
- (4) Activities of Bandera in Munich

1. [] noted the increasing and continuing efforts by the RIS to penetrate Ukrainian emigre activities (a) to penetrate our operations against the USSR, and (b) to further split Ukrainian groups. He characterized the RIS effort as falling into three patterns, namely, recruiting emigres who have been out of the USSR for several years, dispatching agents to the West as "defectors", and, dispatching agents who are allegedly couriers from the underground. Associates of []

2. [] summarized in some detail the background and facts as presently known concerning the alleged couriers from the underground, Taras and Marischka. During the discussion of the case, the British representative noted that the man Skob who figures in Marischka's story could possibly be identical with one Skob who is in British custody, and agreed to furnish biographical data and a photo spread for possible identification by Marischka.

3. Another angle of Marischka's story, concerning Okhrimovich, was discussed and the British representatives passed [] a translation of a report which they had received within the past ten days which may furnish additional information for checking purposes. AIS agreed to provide an evaluation of the report.

4. In a discussion of RIS techniques and weaknesses, [] noted that one of the chief points of weakness lay in the RIS legends re motivation and exfiltration routes, and cited the Taras and Marischka stories as examples. [] raised the question concerning comparison of the Marishka-Taras "legendary" crossing points and exfiltration route with British known and proved information in an attempt to determine why the RIS gave this specific area to Marischka as a notional crossing point. It was agreed that this information would be furnished to the British in the near future. Along with this, AIS will forward to the British interrogation reports concerning the Zenya Khimka story for BIS study and evaluation.

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5. Summarizing the foregoing, listed below are the points of action to be taken by U.S. and British representatives:

By U.S. (a) Furnish interrogation of Marischka for British study, analysis and evaluation
 (b) Study and evaluate the newly-received British report on the Okhrimovich fiasco
 (c) Furnish details of Marischka's "legendary" as well as her actual exfiltration routes and crossing points for comparison with British known information

By U.K. Furnish photo spread and physical description of "their" Skob for possible identification by Marischka

6. Re agenda item #3, [] noted that the Americans have no final plans for Marischka, and [] advised that the British plans are presently "in limbo" but tentatively plan to renew efforts to get someone sent out of the Ukraine this year, these efforts depending to a great extent on the clarification of Skob's status. The British also stated that they have three W/T links, all allegedly "clean", and the U.S. representatives claimed one, controlled.

7. [] summarized information available on an alleged OUN/M courier who, however, was not made available to allied authorities by the emigre organization. He also noted that there is an increase in Soviet efforts to persuade emigres to be repatriated, and reported on rumors re a Moscow "Conference of Returned Emigres". The British said there was some confirmation as far as the Ukrainian angle was concerned but they had no information re various amnesty rumors.

8. The afternoon session was concerned with the activities of Bandera in Munich. [] summarized AIS knowledge of Bandera's two W/T operators in training, his attempts to recruit fifteen more agents (five each from France, Belgium and Germany), and the report that Bandera is expecting two couriers from Poland this winter. [] advised that AIS has no knowledge of who is supporting Bandera in these activities, but stressed the importance of determining the source of funds. Bandera's activities, on the whole, are unsavory and he is thought to be responsible for a number of murders in the Munich area. [] went on to say that there is one way in which Bandera can be "quieted down"; that is through the police, but the U.S. is loath to take this action without the knowledge and concurrence of the British, since the degree of BIS possible involvement and interest in Bandera is not known to the AIS. [] stated that the British also have no operational interest in Bandera and [] expressed his belief that Bandera's source of funds is quite probably from his followers, collected through blackmail, etc. throughout Europe. [] added that the two W/T operators are probably identical with the two who were fully trained by

the British and who returned to Bandera via France. He said that information on the operators, their true name documentation, descriptions, etc. will be forwarded to assist the AIS in identifying them. [] stated that they would welcome any restraining action of Bandera's activities, and [] added that the British are in touch with a person, "Bertram", who can possibly throw additional light on Bandera's activities.

9. [] raised the question of the reported organization of Ukrainian guard companies in the British Zone, the recent drive for members by Bandera representatives, and the reported use of the guard company by Bandera to further his own political ends. [] confirmed the organizing of guard companies but stressed that the companies were organized strictly because of a need for labor, that they have no official backing, and that there is no "Ukrainian" guard company as such. He noted that BIS would take action to halt Bandera's use of the guard companies for increasing his personal prestige.

10. Summarizing, [] stated: (a) Bandera's misuse of the guard companies should be "scotched"; (b) an attempt should be made to determine what Bandeta is really up to and what, if anything, can be done about it; (c) an effort should be made to determine the source of Bandera's support; and, (d) Bandera should be made to realize "the war is over", this latter task to be undertaken by the AIS with concurrence of the BIS.

11. Re the Bandera W/T operators, [] said all possible information on them should be gathered and, even at the risk of their getting back into the U.K., they should be removed from Germany.

12. In a discussion of whether there would be a person of sufficient stature among the Banderovtsi to take over and hold the group together should Bandera be eliminated, it was the consensus that no such person appeared to be capable of this. It was, however, agreed that despite our unanimous desire to "quiet" Bandera, precautions must be taken to see that the Soviets are not allowed to kidnap or kill him, and under no circumstances must Bandera be allowed to become a martyr.