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10 September 1952

To: Chief, SR/3

From: SR/3 - W2

Subject: Contact with CASSOWARY 2 on 4 September 1952: Political

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

Present at the conference were CASSOWARIES 2, 4 and 15 and []
(known as [] and [])

1. Background: The following are the points outlined by CASSOWARY 2 as the background of his unification talks while he was in Europe.

a. Two days before CASSOWARY 2 arrived in Germany, CHYZ had come to France where he had met with BARAN, Chairman of the Executive Organ of the UNRADA and tried to convince the latter that the UNRADA should send representatives to QKACTIVE. It was understood by people who came in contact with him that CHYZ represented the U. S. Department of State. Many people naturally wondered why the U. S. was sending two emissaries, namely CHYZ and CASSOWARY 2.

b. A letter was received by the Executive Organ (VO) of the UNRADA from Dr. MARGOLIN (CASSOWARY 2 learned of the letter and its contents from two separate sources who are not members of the UNRADA but whom CASSOWARY 2 considers as reliable. He has also stated that he is going to receive a copy of this letter).

c. MARGOLIN allegedly stated the following:

(1) The State Department is not interested in the consolidation of Ukrainian emigre parties, but on the contrary, will recognize the UNRADA providing the RADA excludes MELNYK's OUN and BAHRIANNY's URDP. Everyone questions the wisdom of such a move since the MELNYK and BAHRIANNY groups are the only real political parties in the RADA complex - the others being either very, very small, or verging on the notional. Some people, however, might consider this a bona fide State Department request since, if MELNYK and BAHRIANNY left the RADA it would be composed primarily of individuals who were members of the original RADA of 1917-20.

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(2) The RADA should treat CASSOWARY 1 and CAVATINA 6 "in the same manner that the Russians treat the NTS". In other words, the RADA should consider the revolutionary organizations as ultra-rightists and, therefore, unacceptable to any democratic centers. [It can be imagined how CASSOWARY 2 must have felt knowing that MARGOLIN has contact with the State Department.]

(3) MARGOLIN further stated in his letter that CASSOWARY 2 "does not have contact with the State Department but with some strong intelligence organization".

d. On approximately 20 July at Dusseldorf, there took place a German-Russian congress which, according to CASSOWARY 2, was NTS dominated. This congress was attended by a UNRADA sympathizer, KOSAR-KOSARENKO of New York (by the same token it was inferred by many that he had been sent, or at least sponsored, by some American agency) and by GULAI and ZOLOTORENKO of QKACTIVE.

e. Before departing on his mission CASSOWARY 2 had been led to understand that a CASSOWARY 1 rapprochement with ZChOUN was desirable. Two weeks after arriving in Germany, however, he was told by CIA representatives there that the U. S. took a dim view of CASSOWARY-ZChOUN cooperation. [This in light of the fact that we attempted to have these organizations work out a modus vivendi throughout winter and spring of this year.]

f. Comment: It must be kept in mind that the above four developments took place concurrently with CASSOWARY 2's mission. It then appeared to him that the U. S. told him to unify the Ukrainian emigration and, at the same time, told others to splinter it. He, therefore, concludes that although we talk much about unification we are primarily interested in liquidating any real Ukrainian movement.

2. CASSOWARY 2 Conversations with ZChOUN: CASSOWARY 2's contact with the ZChOUN were on three levels: With individuals from the Provid, with STETSKO and with BANDERA himself. The following are the conditions on which CASSOWARY 1 would cooperate with ZChOUN:

a. Both BANDERA and STETSKO are to leave the ZChOUN Provid for an indefinite period of time. [This probably because both men have been tarred with a "fascist" brush.]

b. The Provid of the ZChOUN must affirm that the Provid of the OUN is in the homeland and not in the emigration. Until recently, BANDERA has titled himself as the leader of the OUN in the emigration, as well as in the homeland. The Provid of the ZChOUN will turn over all external-political activities to CASSOWARY 1.

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(1) The ABN will be liquidated as an "international" organization composed of "bona fide" representatives of the various nationalities. It may be reorganized as an emigre body but will not claim to represent the various national movement within the USSR.

(2) All contact with the Ukrainians will be carried on through CASSOWARY 1. Both of the organizations realize that double lines of communication are a security hazard and, at the same time, both organizations insisted that they had the right and the "mandate" to maintain such lines.

(3) ZChOUN will liquidate its SB (Security Service) as presently organized. The Service will be reorganized as a defense mechanism against Bolshevik penetration exclusively.

c. CASSOWARY 2's Assessment:

(1) CASSOWARY 2 feels quite certain that the opposition within the ZChOUN Provid is strong enough to carry out the above proposals. It is quite possible, however, that BANDERA and STETSKO may rally sufficient support behind them to maintain themselves in power.

(2) According to CASSOWARY 2 the British favor CASSOWARY-BANDERA consolidation. Operationally, this has been deemed desirable for some time since the idea of joint teams, or joint action, has fallen through due to the political differences of the two organizations.

3. Conversations with UNDS: CASSOWARY 2 spoke with Mykola LEVITSKY and three other UNDS members. These ostensibly represent the ideas of the "government-in-exile" of the UNRADA. CASSOWARY 2 discovered that he could not talk business with these men since they would not take a "position"; he discovered that there were four representatives and four positions. In general, the following were the results of the conversation:

a. The "government-in-exile" does not believe that there is any resistance in the Ukraine (CASSOWARY 2 feels that LEVITSKY should wait for five more years, by which time the resistance in the Ukraine will have been liquidated and ZPUHVR will have become a purely emigre organization).

b. If, however, there is resistance in the homeland, which CASSOWARY 2 represents in the emigration, then the two parties are not equal so that there was no sense in them trying to treat each other as equals.

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c. LEVITSKY agrees that consolidation of the Ukrainian emigration is desirable but feels that BAHRIANNY should not be included if such an organization is created.

d. CASSOWARY 2's Assessment:

(1) UNDS wants a reorganization of the UNR in order to oust BAHRIANNY.

(2) LEVITSKY is merely jockeying for an advantageous position and is really not interested in consolidation.

(3) Although he would not say so in that many words, CASSOWARY 2 feels that LEVITSKY is a museum piece and that dealing with him could be compared with the American public dealing with someone of Teddy Roosevelt's vintage.

4. Conversation with BAHRIANNY:

a. BAHRIANNY opposes both LEVITSKY's and wants to be the leader of the entire Ukrainian emigration. He, therefore, wishes to get rid of the UNDS and the LEVITSKY's and to consolidate with CASSOWARY 1 and ZChOUN, proposing that in this consolidation UNR will take over the entire Ukrainian liberation struggle. CASSOWARY 2 countered by maintaining that the UHVR is the leader of the struggle and not an emigre group like the UNR. Therefore, only coordination between UNR and CASSOWARY 1 can be the first step on the road to consolidation.

b. CASSOWARY 2's Assessment:

(1) CASSOWARY 2 is not interested in power politics but only in helping the liberation struggle in the Ukraine.

(2) Operationally, it would be most profitable for CASSOWARY 1 to unite with BAHRIANNY's group since this latter group is large, representative of Eastern Ukraine, and composed of the younger element. Such a union would be operationally advantageous to CASSOWARY 1 but at the same time it would be politically advantageous also since it would highlight the fact that Eastern Ukrainians are as nationally conscious as the Galicians.]

5. HETMANITES

a. The HETMANITES are willing to coordinate their activities with both CASSOWARY 1 and the UNR but without recognizing the government of the UNR since they claim Danylo SKOROPADSKY is the rightful ruler of the Ukraine. Paul SKOROPADSKY, the father of the present HETMAN, DANYLO, overthrew the UNRADA with the help of the Germans in the spring of 1918.]

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b. The ~~HETMANITES~~ believe that the consolidation of the emigration is possible providing that the UNR does not pose as the "government-in-exile" but as the center of all the emigre organizations and groups, including political parties, churches, scientific organizations, etc.

6. ~~BARAN~~, President of the Executive Council (V.O.) of the UNR, and the UNDO Party: BARAN appeared to be for coordination and at a later date, for consolidation on the basis of the resolutions of the Ukrainian Congress Committee. This, however, CASSOWARY 2 attributed to the troubles which BARAN is having with the MELNYK and BAHRIANNY groups whom he (BARAN) would like to "equalize". CASSOWARY 2 bases his opinion on the following:

a. In four UNRADA meetings nothing has been passed.

b. ~~BOYDUNIK~~ (OUN/M) a Vice-President of the RADA, has been sent to Canada (and now the U.S.) and has been gone for over a year but has not, as yet, written a single letter to the UNRADA about what success he has had in North America.

7. CASSOWARY 2 had no discussions with the MELNYK group.

8. Some two weeks before he was scheduled to return to the U. S. CASSOWARY 2 found out that the U. S. was thinking of sending DUSHNYK, DOBRIANSKY, and VITVITSKY to Europe in order to effect a consolidation of the Ukrainian emigration. Naturally, no one would commit himself after this, realizing that these gentlemen were being sent by the U.S. and believing, therefore, that they would have "the last word". In light of this CASSOWARY 2 could not continue his conversations.

9. CASSOWARY 2's Conclusions:

a. Unity in the Ukrainian emigration is possible but power politics such as evidenced by LEVITSKY and BAHRIANNY would have to be eliminated.

b. CASSOWARY 1 cannot speak of any consolidation if such forces as ~~CHYZ~~, ~~MARGOLIN~~, ~~GULAI~~, etc., are operating simultaneously.

c. Vacillations in U. S. policy as evidenced by the various simultaneous approaches make it impossible for CASSOWARY 2 to act as an intermediary in any consolidation talks.

d. If the U. S. really wants consolidation then the best plan would be for the CASSOWARIES to unite with ZChOUN and later with BAHRIANNY, since these groups are the strongest and are composed of the younger elements. In passing, CASSOWARY 2 pointed out the dangers of uniting with BAHRIANNY, which are:

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- (1) His people are from the Soviet Ukraine and have, therefore, been brought up under Communism.
- (2) The Soviets are aware that this group is important to the Americans and others and would, therefore, consider it a primary target in their penetration efforts.
- (3) At least three of the individuals in the URDP are probably Soviet agents. They are (fnu) ~~MARTINS~~, Col. (fnu) ~~KOVAL~~, and Col. Kyrylo ~~DATSKO~~, all ex-teachers of the NKVD.

e. It is difficult to talk politics and build policy with starving people. CASSOWARY 2 maintains that thousands of Ukrainian DP's in the Schleisheim camp (Munich) live under deplorable conditions and, therefore, are easy marks for Soviet intelligence. As evidence of this he points out that he bought the information about ~~MARGOLIN~~'s letter for some 10 marks and that for an additional 50 marks he is going to get a copy of it.

10. CASSOWARY 2's Recommendation for Specific Action:

a. It is necessary to set up a plan of action and to grant assurance that certain sections of this plan will actually be realized. In short, generally speaking, this plan should have as its goal:

- (1) The preparation of the Ukrainian emigration for the coming fight with Bolshevism.
- (2) Salvaging the people from apathy and passiveness.

b. The U. S. should stop making politics with such people as ~~X~~YABLON and others of his type. The Ukrainians do not understand the basis of American attitudes. For an example, STETSKO is accused of all sorts of terrorism, killing Jews, etc., and because of this, was not allowed into the U. S.; STETSKO, however, is not guilty of any such activity. On the other hand, ~~X~~ZOLOTARENKO, a member of the Sturm Abteilung, undoubtedly had something to do with the liquidation of Jews but is, however, held up by the Americans as one of the Ukrainians in QKACTIVE. This kind of injustice is not very well understood nor appreciated.

c. Give CASSOWARY 1 "room to breath" since they feel "closed in".

d. If the U. S. is really interested in the unification of the Ukrainian emigration all that is necessary is to create military units such as the formerly proposed Guard Companies and this will automatically lead to consolidation since the emigration will see that the U. S. means business.

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11. SONR

a. CASSOWARY 1 participation in this effort is possible but only on the following conditions:

(1) SONR must recognize status quo:

a. This section of the globe's surface with which we are on the verge of battle is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; it is not "Russia".

b. The USSR is made up of 16 republics, among them the Ukrainian SSR. The Ukrainian SSR is recognized de facto and de jure as is evidenced by its membership in the U. N.

c. All the nations of the USSR have the right to achieve independence on the basis of self-determination.

d. In any common effort (SONR) the principle of the equality of peoples must predominate.

e. Self-determination should be applied to the Russian people also.

b. CASSOWARY 2 feels that the entire SONR action is a lost cause. If for a moment he thought that it has a 10% chance of success, he would join. He feels that the only solid basis on which any such joint effort can be built is as follows:

(1) Russians will not be held responsible for Communism.

(2) The nationalities should be given assurance of real self-determination.

(3) The frame of reference for any united effort should be status quo, not the situation 35 years ago.

12. Toward the end of the conference, [] instructed CASSOWARY 2 to meet with ~~DUSHNYK~~, ~~DOBRIANSKY~~ and ~~VITVITSKY~~ to see if any agreement could be reached. CASSOWARY 2 agreed to meet with these men but refused to take the initiative in any further consolidation talks.

BMH:ghh

cc: SR/PPP

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