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10 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/3

FROM: SR/3-W2

Subject: Contact Report
Meeting with CASSOWARY 2

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3028
VAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. The undersigned conferred with CASSOWARY 2 during the late afternoon and early evening hours of 8 August 1953.

2. The following two items of general interest were brought up by CASSOWARY 2:

a) Rep. Thomas SHEEHAN of Illinois allegedly has drawn up a letter calling for an investigation of AMCOMLIB. The extent to which the letter is being circulated is unknown; however, the Ukrainian language daily "Svoboda" is supposed to have received a copy. One of the reasons given for urging an investigation is the fact that individuals who have been refused visas to the United States for security reasons are now working for the AMCOMLIB in Europe.

This information is rumored to have been supplied by DOBRIANSKY's circle in Washington. SHEEHAN is the congressman responsible for having had the DOBRIANSKY-Admiral STEVENS correspondence read into the Congressional record. If he is actually calling for an investigation, it is undoubtedly a result of DOBRIANSKY's efforts.

b) There are rumors from Europe that the OUN/Melnyk group is dissatisfied with the UNR negotiations with AMCOMLIB's KTSAB and is threatening to withdraw from the UNR.

3. The undersigned then discussed matters pertaining to CASSOWARY 2's trip to Germany. Our plan for concurrent release of homeland directives to BANDERA and the British was outlined. CASSOWARY 2 agreed to the specific material for release, but felt that we should not inform the British until after his conference with BANDERA to prevent the possibility of BANDERA's receiving an advance warning.

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2.

CASSOWARY 2 was advised to discuss the matter of final release with CSOB representatives after he had evaluated the situation in Germany. CASSOWARY 2, before arranging a meeting with BANDERA, plans to sound out individuals like FIDHAINY, KORDIUK, and LENKAVSKY.

According to the latest reports, the number of hard-core BANDERA supporters has decreased to a mere handful, as the majority have either joined the "new opposition" or are on the verge of doing so. Therefore, should BANDERA decide to oppose or challenge the homeland mandate, he will receive little support from the other high-level politicians whose stand has an important influence on the general ZCh membership.

4. CASSOWARY 2 has agreed that the problem would be fairly simple were BANDERA to accept the homeland instructions. In this event, BANDERA would have to write a message for transmission over the British link ordering MYRON to resubordinate himself to homeland headquarters. This would place the homeland end of the British link in the hands of the same people now controlling the homeland end of the KUBARK link. CASSOWARY 2 feels that MYRON would be given a court martial and, in view of the seriousness of his schismatic activities would very probably be executed. The W/T link with the British would be taken over by homeland headquarters for use as they see fit.

5. The undersigned then stated that, should BANDERA refuse to follow the homeland instructions, the British would feel themselves obliged to give him some support in order to protect their own interests. They would undoubtedly stress the value of an existing intelligence net in a strategic area of the Western Ukraine and deny the existence of any diversionary activity on the part of their team. The undersigned pointed out that, had we received valuable intelligence reports from the homeland headquarters, we would be in a much stronger position to counter any British arguments for the continuance of their present operations. The British would be hard pressed to justify the support of a schismatic group when there exists a bona fide link with the top leaders of the entire resistance movement, producing intelligence of vital interest to the West.

CASSOWARY 2 agreed that upon his arrival in Germany he would discuss with CASSOWARY 3 the whole matter of procuring intelligence in the immediate future from the underground leaders. The undersigned also pointed out that the confirmation of the ZP mandate will draw the attention of high-ranking officials in our organization who will then raise questions embarrassing for the undersigned to answer, viz. what has this underground organization produced over the four-year period that they have been receiving our support? Exactly who are the leaders in the underground?

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There is no doubt in the undersigned's mind that CASSOWARY 2, who was already aware of our position towards intelligence production, understood the significance of this argument.

6. CASSOWARY 2 was informed that sometime this Fall control of W/T traffic with the homeland will be transferred to Washington headquarters and he was requested to arrange with CASSOWARY 3 to assume the latter's role in handling future W/T traffic

7. CASSOWARY 2 was also requested to discuss with CASSOWARY 3 recruitment for 1954 operations, since a dispatch this Fall would leave us with no trainees on hand.

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