

ROUGH DRAFT

*Int - for  
London conference  
in near future*

Summary of Decisions Reached During London Meeting, 23-26 April 1951

1. On the evidence so far available both Services agree on the existence and nature of the internal Resistance Movement in the Ukraine and its potential value for clandestine operations.

2. SIS stated that so far as the Ukraine was concerned their concern was with intelligence tasks for which BANDERA's organization is acceptable for them. They recognize that some measure of unofficial support is implicit in this arrangement, but this does not extend to the support of a political programme.

3. It has not been practicable to resolve these basic politico-organizational aspects of the problem. Concrete agreement has been reached on the following operational arrangements:

- a) Coordination of clandestine operations for Spring/Summer 1951, including exchange of information on DZ's in West Ukraine.
- b) Identical messages stressing Anglo-American cooperation to be sent to the Ukraine through both parties. It is hoped by this means to neutralize the effects of the clash in the emigration as far as possible and to work towards a single channel of communications.

SIS Position April 1951:

1. It is not in fact entirely clear from the "mandate" in the view of the homeland who composes the legitimate ZPUHVR and who the

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SOURCE: METHUSEXEMPTION 382B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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legitimate ZchOUN. What is clear from U.S. interpretation placed in the "mandate" by the ZPUHVR as at present constituted (LEBED, HRYNIOCH, etc.)

2. A further effect of the "mandate" would be to place the majority of the manpower reserves which we believe to be under OUN/B's control at the disposal of ZPUHVR. This control of personnel has been as we understand the situation, one of BANDERA's bargaining counters in his negotiations with ZPUHVR.

3. If the operations which OUN/B is conducting into the Ukraine were spurious or of no importance, our two Services could afford to view the absorption of BANDERA, STETSKO and their supporters into the ZPUHVR, as at present constituted with equanimity. We have reason to believe, however, that BANDERA is better organized operationally than the ZPUHVR, if not at this very juncture, then at least potentially. Even though, therefore, we accepted the "mandate" in toto and without further examination, it would be unwise not to take BANDERA's anticipated personal objections to its implications extremely seriously.

There are, however, indications that the "mandate" does not tell the complete story. The OUN/B according to our information has grounds for believing that the resistance organization inside the Ukraine would support a less drastic and on the face of more equitable solution.

4. OUN/B would not gainsay that OUN/UHVR in the Ukraine was vehemently in favor of unification among the Ukrainian emigres.

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5. OUN/B however maintain further that the homeland stipulated only as follows: that all business concerning OUN at home, contacting procedure, organizational information, personal data, etc., should be kept in utmost secrecy and divulged only "among the highest ranks and the most reliable personnel." There was no statement to the effect that such reliable personnel were confined to ZPUHVR.

6. We think it unlikely in this case that BANDERA is lying or that his organization has forged or doctored reports from the homeland to suit his particular convenience -- though we would not in general put this sort of thing past Ukrainian organizations. For immediate practical purposes it is sufficient that BANDERA believes himself to have a case at least as valid as that of ZPUHVR.

At present information about the Ukraine is unfortunately too slight for us to be able to express a final opinion on the writers of the various documents which were brought out last October by two groups of couriers. For what it is worth we feel that the general political line of the UHVR mandate with its, at first glance, perhaps a trifle surprising, left-wing slant, is in our favor and suggests that it is the product of a genuine resistance movement. The extent of this movement and the degree of popular support which it enjoys remains to be seen. In all events, we consider that the claims made for it by Ukrainian emigres, especially as regards numbers and degree of organization, should be treated with very considerable scepticism.

After Above conference and SIS stand the 1951 operations were

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conducted separately. Although CIA attempted to have close coordination of intended dispatches a representative BIS appeared <sup>at</sup> General Lewis's office ~~11~~ 11 May 1951 with general statement that British regarded closer coordination as "not practical (FRAN 3176 - IN 40406). Re MUNI 3545 -(IN 40578) "BROADWAY states will dispatch 13 May irrespective what we do."

(KARL 2046 - IN 40585) states "KUBARK will dispatch 13 May if British do."

LOND 9125 (IN 40631) - BROADWAY states its flight scheduled 13 May cancelled.

KARL 2048 (IN 40632) - If BROADWAY not KUBARK will not dispatch 13 May either.

MUNI 3557 (IN 40964) - BROADWAY mission successfully carried out 14 May. No details.

Note: Failure as far as attempted coordinated operations are concerned.

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A second Conference 19 December 1951:

[ ] and BROADWAY field case officer as proposed US-BROADWAY 1952 joint operations. Decisions reached:

- a) Spring 1952 teams sent by either U.S. or BROADWAY will include both CASSOWARY and CAVATINA personnel.
- b) Those in the team who are members of the group sponsored by the dispatching country will have full control of W/T contacts until partisan headquarters has been reached.
- c) First team will be sent in by BROADWAY since they still in contact with the field.
- d) Entire plan of joint operations is subject to review in event U.S. May 1951 team should come on the air prior to first 1952 dispatch.

British stand based on CAVATINA-CASSOWARY 1 conversations 17, 23, 25, January 1952:

- a) CAVATINA 6 is prepared to accept one or two CASSOWARY 1 representatives for inclusion next team to be sent into the Ukraine.
- b) A single channel for W/T is to be maintained and control of such commo to be matter of Anglo-American decision. (It should be noted that the above British proposals are identical with CAVATINA proposals).

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CASSOWARY 2's trip to Europe re coordinated operations in <sup>to</sup> Ukrainian *SSR*.  
dispatches:

MUNI 0050 (IN 36560) Caplin reported September 1952 new delegation will be selected by STETSKO for purpose discussion with ZPUHVR. Will base discussions on following:

- a) All ZP members formerly members of ZchOUN must return to ZchOUN.
- b) A ZchOUN conference must be held soonest to choose new head provid who will then appoint new members PROVID.
- c) ZP must admit ZchOUN into its fold

MUNI 0095 (IN 37333) SAMOSTIINIK September 1952 has printed allegedly recent document from homeland confirming BANDERA's claim to be head of entire OUN Provid. Same issue announces BANDERA's resignation as head of Provid in both emigration and homeland. His future activity confined to ordinary membership ZchOUN Provid. Claims motive to remove barriers ZP-ZchOUN rapprochement and suggests SP members of OUN Provid also resign.

MUNI 0434 (IN 44248) In 17 October meeting between CAVATINA 2, STYKALO, CASSOWARY 8, 9, CAVATINA 2 presented paper acknowledging homeland fountainhead and final authority of revolutionary movement; however, insists all members of CAWNPORE 2 living abroad under jurisdiction CAVATINA 6.

Demands CASSOWARY 2 resign and be replaced temporarily by individual selected by Provid CAVATINA 6 until homeland expresses its desire.

Insists all matters connected contact with homeland exclusive CAVATINA 6 function.

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November, Message From HRUZIN:

"Problems current important for you have been resolved in every respect positively and the appropriate decisions in particular confirmation of ZP mandate, I will send."

Message received April 1953 -- continuation HRUZIN'S '52 msgs:

"I am able give you news of how I succeeded in fulfilling the expectations and hopes of settling the matters which I took upon myself. Basically and in matters of principle, I found among leading echelons of our national liberation movement proper understanding and moreover even unanimity of views in regard to the so-called conflict, there is no one who in concept, in program, or legally-formally would recognize the legitimacy of the stand of SHCHIPAVKA and the Zch. With the exception of the organizational leaders of the LVOV area where MIRON and his Zch couriers have made their base. At the present time the leaders in the homeland are disturbed by the stubborn schismatic politics of the Zch abroad and their efforts to introduce it into the homeland."

Continuation (April 1953) --

"Famous for his shady deals abroad, ~~MIRON~~, having arrived here and having based himself in LVOV area, and, using the name of his chief as symbol of the struggle, was able here also to carry on his dirty business and to disorient the ranks of the underground. With his associate SB member, ~~CHERNEL~~, he decided to remove ~~KOVAL~~ and to take his position, convinced that all this was being done not without

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the knowledge of SHCHIPAVKA and his friends.

"At first, despite difficulties (enemy activities, illness of KOVAL, etc.) we attempted to meet in a friendly manner in order to solve pressing matters. But upon receiving information regarding MIRON's intentions, we abandoned this move on grounds of security. We are convinced more and more our suspicions were correct. We have isolated the representatives of SHCHIPAVKA, confining their activities to the LVOV area, an area which withdrew from the jurisdiction of KOVAL and is now carrying on its work independently. This is sad to write, but it is a fact.

"Recorded in an official publication celebrating the 107th Anniversary of the UPA was KOVAL's order decorating a number of soldiers and commanders as well as members of the organization. Among those were CASSOWARY 2, CASSOWARY 3, CASSOWARY 13, CASSOWARY 4, AND CASSOWARY 6. KOVAL and I congratulate those decorated and send our regards to them."

Comments by CASSOWARIES:

CASS 6: CASS 6 (18 April 1953) revealed without stating source of information he personally knew one member CAVATINA group which he assumes was dispatched West from MIRON's headquarters. CASS 6 further states that in preparation CAVATINA conference London next month CAVATINA 1 circulating confidential report 35 pages violently attacking CAWNPORES 1 and 2, CASSOWARY 1 and U.S. CASS 1 considering campaign against CAVATINA 1 on basis wild statements and attacks on homeland.

CASS 3: (18 April 1953) homeland political situation rosy for CASS 1.

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CAVATINA group under MIRON no problem. MIRON will either be forced curtail activity, owing to CAWNPORE 1 policy or be liquidated by CAWNPORE 1. MIRON's success temporary to date because he operating in own home territory.

CASS 2: (18 April 1953) According SIRY's circles, MIRON fell in Czechoslovakia late 1952 while attempting exfiltrate. SIRY sent new couriers September 1952.

CASS 3: (24 April 1953) ~~SHCHIPAVKA~~ wrote detailed letter against CASS 1 and CAWNPORE 1. He also called conference end of May and plans send couriers to CAWNPORE. An appreciable number CAVATINA 6 members are displeased with CAVATINA 1's activity. In view of this necessary that Provid CAVATINA 7 send CAVATINA 1 via CASS 1 an official declaration that CAVATINA 1 is neither formally or factually the leader of the organization. The Provid should also inform CAVATINA 1 at the same time to discontinue his schimatic work at CAWNPORE and abroad. Also send for CAVATINA 1's information that MIRON's activities are traitorous.

CASS 3: (24 April 1953) ~~CHERNEL~~ is pseudonym of SB member. Summer 1952 CAVATINA 2 gave CASS 1 rumor KOVAL dead. Why? Because MIRON gave SB orders liquidate him. CAVATINA 5 also told CASS 1 Winter of 1952-1953 in Ukraine difficult resulting death many partisans. Why? Also in line with SB plan liquidate KOVAL. Conclusions: In three dispatches Summer 1952 CAVATINA 1 sent over 20 people to CAWNPORE with plan to liquidate provid. If successful, MIRON's assignment to elevate CAVATINA 1 to top in CAWNPORE headquarters.

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CASS 6: (24 April 1953) His theory CHERNEL SB executioner who wither infiltrated with MIRON or picked up there for job execution KOVAL. CASS 6 will investigate here.

CAPELIN (13 May): Capelin reports ~~KASHUBA~~ stated three Zch couriers arrived from homeland in late April with encoded letters for ~~STETSKO~~ and BANDERA. The letters allegedly were pouched in August 1952 and contents are as yet unknown. Couriers alleged to state orally that despite difficulties in keeping contact the homeland OUN still functioning, that MATVIEKO is safe and wrote some of the letters they carried, that OKHRIMOVICH is in contact with homeland leaders.

Field (13 May): Check here as yet produced no confirmation from any source. It is view here KUSHUBA's talk part Zch strategy in current fight with opposition and ZP and may in fact reflect information received via BROADWAY link.

CASS 3 (13 May): CASS 3 believes arrival of couriers premature, while CASS 6 opined that source of rumor is KASHUBA; it is definitely a plant.

Field (13 May): Pre-conference fight within Zch mounting in intensity in Germany. Opposition held two meetings in Munich in early May soundly hitting present Zch leaders for calling conference in London not Germany, for departing from homeland positions, for not reaching agreement with ZP, and for distasteful tactics of ~~STETSKO~~, MUKHA, and BANDERA. Opposition demands greater voice and more delegates at London meeting. Typewritten broadside violently attacking MUKHA and

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STETSKO being circulated. Issue #10, ZP newspaper announces Poltava's death, and attacks BANDERA by quoting from latter's recent letter and then publishing parts POLTAVA's reply to BANDERA dated August 1950, wherein POLTAVA's reply to BANDERA dated 1950, wherein POLTAVA accuses Zch of departing from homeland positions.

CASS 2 (15 May 1953): CASS 2 agrees rumor undoubtedly a plant. In recent conversations with MATLA, CASS 2 learned that the former had received official letter from TIUSHKA informing of death of MATVIEYKO. Zch circles in New York hint that MATVIEYKO was one of BANDERIVTSI killed near KARLSBAD last Fall.

MATLA further revealed that during 1952 while he was still Zch referent for cadres PIDHAINY informed him that four separate W/T messages from MATVIEYKO indicated that the underground headquarters had refused to receive him or his companions in person but had accepted Zch pouch. CASS 2 feels and MATLA confirmed that even if MATVIEYKO had sent messages in Zch code unintelligible to JAVELIN, PIDHAINY because of his good relations with JAVELIN would have informed them. Therefore, JAVELIN aware its W/T team cordoned off from headquarters and probably aware team conducting diversionary activities. 1952 rumors of disintegrating JAVELIN-Zch relations tend to confirm this.

MATLA also states that despite PIDHAINY's good relations with JAVELIN, he unhappy in his job and disturbed in conscience that he is supporting BANDERA's machinations vis-a-vis the homeland. Further, PIDHAINY's assistant name not mentioned but probably REPECKY, also aware and disturbed BANDERA's diversionary activities in homeland. PIDHAINY's assistant is source rumor that BANDERA plans dispatch

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couriers overland from British Zone immediately after 23 May London conference.

CASS 2 believes ~~PIDHAINY~~ and ~~LENKAVSKY~~ are ripe for defection, which would have strong impact Zch cadres, causing them repudiate BANDERA and STETSKO. Event defection, CASS 2 suggests both be employed newspaper, PIDHAINY only while his emigration status is clarified. CASS 2 says PIDHAINY refused entry U.S. because his UKE Division and BANDERA connections.

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