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17 May 1951

To: Chief, FDS  
Chief, EE-4

From: FDS/West [ ]

Subject: Present ZPUHR Position Towards the U. S. Government

Reference: The Problem of British Activities Among Ukrainians and Other National Minority Groups (16 May 1951)

1. Upon returning from Europe the undersigned gave CASSOWARY 15 approximately the same briefing that had been given Dr. HRINIOCH in Munich after the London conference. This briefing basically contained only three major points:

- a. The British are dispatching BANDERA couriers in the month of May by air;
- b. A letter from the British and Americans will be carried by the leaders of both teams;
- c. It is expected that our team has a better than fifty percent chance of arriving at CAWNPORE headquarters prior to the BANDERA team.

CASSOWARY 15 transferred this briefing to Mykola LEBED on 14 May 1951. LEBED was also told that an agreement must be reached soonest on the availability of former UPA men in the U. S. for partisan training. To this end, a conference either in Washington or in New York between the undersigned and LEBED was strongly urged for the week of 14-18 May.

2. Mykola LEBED's reply was transmitted to the undersigned by CASSOWARY 15 on 17 May 1951. First of all LEBED ruled out the possibility of a meeting on partisan training during the week 14-18 May. His statements

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below on general problems connected with the ZPUHVR and the American government indicate why he deems a conference on the partisan training program out of place at the present time.

3. LEBED was aware that conversations took place in Germany on 28 April, 1 May and 3 May between [ ] Dr. HRINIOCH, CASSOWARY 4 and the undersigned on the problems of the overall relationship. LEBED emphasized first of all that he has received no mail from his colleagues in Germany since that time and hence is not aware of Dr. HRINIOCH's views. LEBED's own position was given by CASSOWARY 15 as follows:

"I came to America to disseminate information on the Ukrainian liberation movement and to explain the problem of the minority nationalities in the Soviet Union to the American government. Since the world is split into two hostile camps, I assumed that all peoples fighting the Bolsheviks on the behalf of freedom and democracy would gain the sympathetic understanding of the American government. It was of course clear to me that the objectives of the national minorities and the American government were not completely synonymous. However, I thought that mutual opposition to Soviet imperialism provided a powerful enough compact of agreement to permit mutual understanding. Naturally the ZPUHVR first of all had to prove the existence of the underground in our country, the extent of its fight and the degree to which the population supported it. After three deliveries of original material, both printed and typewritten, from the Ukraine, plus the arrival of couriers who were debriefed by intelligence officers of the American government in 1948, 1949 and 1950, the ZPUHVR frankly expected changes in the American attitude towards the Ukraine. The fifteen pounds of documents brought out by BOGDAN in October 1950 provide basic information in answer to all the fundamental questions that the American government could have regarding the ideology, political program and activities of the Ukrainian underground. Following BOGDAN's arrival, several worthwhile and realistic proposals were made by representatives of the American government and it looked for awhile as if real progress towards mutual understanding were in the making. However, suddenly this progress came to a halt and commitments made by the American government were withdrawn in a manner suggesting that somewhere within the American government opposition to Ukrainian irredentism was still so strong that the collaboration and genuine efforts of the ZPUHVR to put the Ukrainian case before the Americans over a three year period had had no real or salutary effect. The

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result has been a political deadlock. The request that I take the lie-detector test, coming at the time and in the manner that it did, only served to confirm the existence of this deadlock.

"Under these circumstances I no longer wish to take the responsibility for cooperation with the American intelligence service. I have done what I could to highlight the problem of the Ukrainian liberation movement, but the American government has not met the ZPUHVR half way in our efforts to work out a political understanding on the national minorities question. We have never demanded immediate official, overt recognition of the ZPUHVR or of the Ukrainian liberation movement. We would have been satisfied if we had observed that the American government had grasped the elementary fact that the Soviet Union is comprised fifty percent of non-Russian national minorities.

"Under the present situation, however, I have freed myself of all illusions concerning the possibility of achieving an understanding on the vital national minorities point. Every day one hears official American voices proclaiming territorial inviolability of the Russian empire. I do not want the ZPUHVR to continue to lend its support and assistance to the United States government when it is clearly visible that collaboration without understanding will in the long run work to the detriment of the moral position of the Ukrainian liberation movement.

"In the material that we have turned over to the American government during the last three years, our methods of propaganda against the Soviets are quite clear. These methods have been quite successful and are, as far as we know, the most advanced weapons of psychological warfare against the Soviet system that any nation has forged. I will protest vehemently if I see any indication that the United States is using this material with the word 'Ukraine' deleted and the word 'Russia' substituted for Great Russian propaganda. It was not our intention that this material be used as Great Russian anti-Soviet propaganda.

"All discussions that I have had with Americans confirm the fact that my understanding of the overall problem as stated above is essentially correct. As Foreign Minister of the UHVR, I am referring my interpretation of the problem to the homeland via this spring's couriers. It is then up to the homeland to decide what course of action will be followed. I do not rule out the possibility that the homeland will accept a purely business-like arrangement: you give us this, we give you that. In this eventuality, however, it will no longer be necessary for the ZPUHVR to hand over the publications and reports received from the underground which deal with internal underground matters and the underground's own interpretation of problems within the USSR. The United States government has already received enough material from us on these subjects to evaluate the situation and do something about it. If the United States government is unwilling to revise or modify its position after receiving these materials, there can be no sense to further deliveries in the future. A powerful intelligence service should be able to procure other interpretations

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and accounts of happenings within the USSR and sufficient information on the Ukrainian underground from other sources.

"To my mind the lie-detector incident is typical of the whole distrustful American attitude towards the Ukrainian underground. Therefore, I took the lie-detector proposal not only as a personal insult but as a blot on the honor of the entire movement. I have nothing to hide and I am not afraid to take the lie-detector test. In fact, I will take it if an American intelligence service official of my level takes it at the same time and answers the same questions I do, including his true name. It has been my understanding that the only accusation against me was that I might be a Soviet agent.

"I have recently spoken with many refugees who talked freely about [redacted] and [redacted] to whom they claim to have been introduced. I have never been introduced officially to anyone in CIA under their right names and yet I am bold enough to think that the ZPUNVR has contributed more to the American government than the refugees with whom I spoke. I would appreciate an introduction without the trappings of anonymity." This is the end of LEBED's statement as relayed by CASSOWARY 15.

4. LEBED is aware that Peter YAROWI, alias YABLON, is an informant of the FBI who has made certain violent accusations against him which have excited the Immigration and Naturalization Service into considering deporting LEBED. YABLON has characterized LEBED to the FBI as a terrorist and a "bandit" and has stressed LEBED's implication in the assassination of Bronislav PIERACKI, Polish Minister of Interior, in 1938. LEBED is anxious to straighten this problem out without our assistance. He intends to go directly to Immigration people and make a clean breast of his biography which is already adequately known to us.

5. As an example of what was reported in paragraph 7 k. of the reference, LEBED calls to our attention the fact that one of the eleven men investigated by [redacted] for inclusion in the partisan training program is now scheduled to leave for Korea within a week. As a former UPA non-commissioned officer, this man is anxious to participate in any fighting

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which has directly to do with the Ukraine, but he is not anxious to go to Korea. Over six former UPA partisans have already been killed in Korea according to the ZPUHVR. This is an example of what the undersigned meant when he wrote "As it is, the draft is dispersing a good deal of personnel of the required type, so that unless some action is taken soon it will be highly debatable whether or not the best physical specimens (for partisan training) can be assembled for such a project." The pertinent address and name are as follows:

X  
Pvt. 1st Class Harry KOSTIUK  
ASN US 55071601  
9227 TSU-TC  
Ft. Eustis, Va.

The camp in California where he is supposed to report to on 21 May for shipment overseas is: Camp Stoneman, Pers. Center, Pittsburg, California.

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