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23 April 57

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

SUBJECT: Ukrainian Position Paper

1. The attached CIA position paper for the Ukrainian discussions with the British in London on 23-25 April 1951 has been worked out by OSO and OPC, and the political questions involved have been coordinated by OPC with the Department of State.

2. Summary of CIA position:

The British SS and CIA agree that closely coordinated operations in collaboration with the headquarters of the Ukrainian underground movement are essential. They are not in agreement on which Ukrainian emigre group will best serve as the channel for recruitment of agent and courier teams. It is recognized that operational cooperation with any emigre group has political implications. Because there is a basic rivalry between the best recruitment pools, namely the CIA-sponsored ZP UHVR and the SS-sponsored OUN/Bandera, CIA takes the position that operations should be coordinated through the ZP UHVR, the group most acceptable politically to the United States. Under no circumstances will CIA agree to U. S. support of any Ukrainian group with which the present OUN/B leadership, and particularly Stefan Bandera, is associated in a position of prestige or authority.

3. The attachment is submitted for your approval.

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Assistant Director

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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SS-CIA  
AERODYNAMIC

CIA Position Paper for Ukrainian Discussion

with SS in London, 23-25 April 1951

I. Area of Agreement:

1. Both SS and CIA agree that a Ukrainian underground (UHVR, OUN on Ukrainian Soil and UPA) exists and constitutes an extremely worthwhile target.

2. Both SS and CIA agree that the July 1950 instructions from the Provid of OUN on Ukrainian Soil are authentic. The Americans, however, have not had an opportunity to read the copy of these instructions given by OUN/B to SS. Similarly, SS has seen only a translation of the copy received by CIA from ZP UHVR. Nevertheless, there appears to be some disagreement between the two services on the question of how binding these instructions to ZP UHVR and OUN/B are intended to be and how various instructions are to be interpreted.

3. Pertinent passages of the mandate instructions are as follows:

"The OUN Provid in the homeland believes that the following should belong to the exclusive sphere of activity of ZP UHVR: (a) representation of the liberation-revolutionary struggle of the Ukrainian people in the homeland and its ramifications and of sympathetic elements in the emigration to the foreign and Ukrainian political world; (b) diplomatic and other external political actions in line with the liberation-revolutionary struggle in the homeland and with Ukrainian liberation policy in general; (c) actions relating to political consolidation, on the basis of the liberation-revolutionary struggle in the homeland, on the internal Ukrainian level; (d) the basic part of the propaganda about the struggle for liberation in the Ukraine; (e) the organization of activities to assist the struggle in the homeland.

"To the exclusive sphere of activity of ZCh OUN should belong: (a) building up the Organization abroad; (b) increasing ideological-educational and political training among the Ukrainian emigration; (c) mass political and organizational work among the Ukrainian emigration; (d) increased work on the ideological and programmatic content of the Ukrainian nationalist revolutionary movement; (e) propaganda about the struggle in the homeland; (f) complete and close cooperation with ZP UHVR in its activities and the greatest possible support of these (ZP UHVR) activities."

4. It is not known whether the British realize that the Provid of OUN in the homeland issued its instructions after a study of written pouches from both emigre factions (which were forwarded to the Ukraine in September 1949 and again in 1950).

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II. The CIA Position towards ZP UHVR:

1. It is clear, based both on the homeland's request for radio teams and other support during 1951 and from the mandate, that the headquarters in the homeland is counting on the channel of communications and support between the Ukraine and Western Governments provided by ZP UHVR.

2. ZP UHVR has been made solely responsible for coordination of activities in support of the homeland resistance.

3. ZP UHVR has authority to ask all interested emigre groups to channel their assistance to the homeland throughout.

4. ZP UHVR is politically and operationally the most desirable instrument for contact with the homeland.

III. The SS Position towards ZP UHVR:

1. The SS implies that other organizations also have the authority to deal with Western Governments on behalf of the homeland on a de facto basis, since the mandate does not prohibit this.

2. The British will naturally state that OUN/B is at least as sound a channel as ZP UHVR.

IV. The CIA Position towards OUN/B:

1. The political leadership of this group as presently constituted is not acceptable to the United States Government.

2. The OUN/B has not been authorized by the OUN Provid in the Ukraine or by UHVR to act as a channel for Western Governments desiring contact with the headquarters in the Ukraine.

V. The British Position towards OUN/B:

1. The importance of Stefan BANDERA has been underestimated by the Americans:

- a. As a rallying symbol in the Ukraine.
- b. As leader of a large emigre group.
- c. As a leader favored by the homeland headquarters.

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## VI. The Joint SS-CIA Position Should Be:

1. It is essential to give coordinated support to the resistance in the Ukraine.

2. ZP UHVR to be the instrument for such support.

3. ZP UHVR will, in addition to utilizing its own personnel, recruit additional personnel from other Ukrainian emigre groups for training and dispatch to the Ukraine. The ZP UHVR will also forward to the homeland communications from other groups.

4. It is recognized that ZCh OUN is the counterpart to the OUN in the Ukraine. However, the present top leadership of the OUN/B is unacceptable both from the political and the operational standpoints.

5. The ZP UHVR will be encouraged to co-opt additional representatives from as many of the other emigre groups as possible.

6. The Ukrainian operational unit under ZP UHVR will be expanded along the following tentative lines:

a. Dr. Ivan Hryniokh, Vice President of the UHVR, will serve as coordinator of operations in support of the homeland.

b. Under Hryniokh will be two operational deputies from ZP UHVR, one of which will work with SS, the other with CIA.

c. All personnel recruited for dispatch to the Ukraine through this channel will be cleared by Hryniokh.

7. On the London-Washington level, SS and CIA will:

a. Coordinate political support and guidance to the emigration and the homeland.

b. Coordinate operations, where necessary, to avoid conflicts.

c. Exchange political, operational and intelligence data resulting from these operations.

## VII. Alternate Positions:

1. If the SS insists upon the inclusion of OUN/B leaders in the ZP UHVR or in a reconstituted ZCh OUN Provid, the CIA position will be:

a. Bandera himself is completely unacceptable.

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b. Stetsko is unacceptable so long as he is politically and personally associated with Bandera.

c. The conditions which apply to Stetsko also apply to other ZCh OUN leaders.

2. If CIA and the SS are unable to agree upon a formula for coordinated operations along the lines outlined above, the CIA position will be:

a. Each side will continue its separate line of action with limited operational coordination at the Washington-London level.

b. CIA will take independent action to neutralize the present leadership of the OUN/B.

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UKRAINIAN RESISTANCE

S.I.S. Comments on C.I.A. Intelligence Appreciation

1. Reference your Intelligence Appreciation No. 2279 of 29th January, 1951, in which we have been most interested. We now submit certain detailed comments on your appreciation and on the text of the "UHVR Mandate" itself. Our own information is by no means complete; it is hoped, however, that these comments will contribute towards the efforts of our combined services to dig a little below the surface of the bias which inevitably slants all emigre out-put.
  
2. We are not yet in a position unfortunately to sort out finally the history of the various "provids" and meetings which the writers of the "Mandate" have used to lend legitimacy to their justification of ZPUHVR. From the point of view of our future policy however these quasi-judicial arguments are secondary. The effect of the "mandate" as here interpreted is clear enough. It seeks to achieve the unification of the main bodies of the Ukrainian emigres by bringing the OUN/B or ZCh OUN under the umbrella of ZP UHVR as at present constituted. This fusion is to be effected in such a way that, not only would BANDERA's organisation become subject in practice to the control of a majority of ZP UHVR members, but also BANDERA and his immediate supporters would be prevented from conducting operations into the UKRAINE independently; in practice this would probably mean that BANDERA would also cease to have any hand in operations even in a subordinate role, (page 10 of the "mandate" speaks of "the organisation of activities to assist the struggle in the homeland" as belonging to "the exclusive sphere of activity of the ZP UHVR", and your own recommendations on page 6 to the effect that the committee composed of four ZP UHVR members and three OUN/B members with

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BANDERA as chairman would be concerned with the political activities of the ZCh OUN in the emigration but "would not be involved in the clandestine aspects of communications and support for the resistance" would seem to support this thesis).

3. It is not in fact entirely clear from the "mandate" who - in the view of the field - composes the legitimate ZP UHVR and who the legitimate ZCh OUN. What is clear from your comments in the interpretation placed on the "Mandate" by the ZP UHVR as at present constituted "(LEBED, HMYNIOCH) etc.
4. A further effect of the "mandate" would be to place the majority of manpower reserves which we believe to be under OUN/B's control at the disposal of ZP UHVR. This control of personnel has been as we understand the situation, one of BANDERA's bargaining counters in his negotiations with ZP UHVR.
5. If the operations which OUN/B is conducting into the UKRAINE were spurious or of no importance, our two Services could afford to view the absorption of BANDERA, ~~STETSKO~~ and their supporters into the ZP UHVR, as at present constituted with equanimity. We have reason to believe however that BANDERA is better organised operationally than the ZP UHVR if not at this very juncture, then at least potentially. Even though, therefore, we accepted the "mandate" in toto and without further examination, it would be unwise not to take BANDERA's anticipated personal objections to its implications extremely seriously. There are, however, indications that the "mandate" however genuine does not tell the complete story. The OUN/B according to our information, has grounds for believing that the resistance organisation inside the UKRAINE would support a less drastic and on the face of it more equitable solution.
6. OUN/B would not gainsay that OUN/UHVR in the UKRAINE was vehemently in favour of unification among the Ukrainian emigres. They have however certain "documentary evidence" to show, not only that ZCh OUN as the strongest Ukrainian organisation abroad, is deemed competent to train party cadres,

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build a "morally and politically healthy" organisation etc., but also that selected and secure personnel from ZCh OUN may concern themselves with operational issues, contact with the field etc. OUN/B admit that they are urged by the resistance at home to come together with the "opposition parties" to settle all their differences in the light of what they call the third NVZ OUN Congress. They would claim however that the field imposed no advance conditions (such as that ZP UHVR should have four members on an eventual committee, as against three of the OUN/B plus BANDERA); rather, that their colleagues at home desired them to find a basis of mutual agreement which was unspecified, and that in the last resort should negotiations break down, representatives of the different parties should be sent home so that OUN could participate in the solution of their problems. This in itself if true, would imply that from an operational stand point OUN/B would have to be considered parallel with ZP UHVR. OUN/B however maintain further that the field stipulated only as follows: that all business concerning OUN at home, contacting procedure, organisational information, personal data etc., should be kept in utmost secrecy and divulged only "among the highest ranks and the most reliable personnel". There was no statement to the effect that such reliable personnel were confined to ZP UHVR.

7. We think it unlikely in this case that BANDERA is lying or that his organisation has forged or doctored reports from the field to suit his particular convenience - though we would not in general put this sort of thing past Ukrainian organisations. For immediate practical purposes it is sufficient that BANDERA believes himself to have a case at least as valid as that of ZP UHVR. For this reason, if for no other, we consider that he would be disposed to put firm conditions in his negotiations with ZP UHVR and we do not think that attempts at persuasion by us as suggested on page 6 of your Appreciation, in which you

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state that "If the British Service is in touch with BANDERA, its recommendation to BANDERA to accept the solution (that is, the ZP UHVR solution) would probably do the trick", even if such attempts were really desirable, would cause him to change his mind. That BANDERA is anxious to solve the problem of unity with ZP UHVR is evidenced by the fact that it is OUN/B which is sponsoring the forth-coming meeting in Munich (April 10th). We should perhaps add that this meeting was not instigated by us. With ZP UHVR maintaining their present attitude, it can scarcely fail to be abortive.

8. There is a further consideration. This is that whatever the field may have said on the one hand to ZP UHVR and on the other to OUN/B, our concern, in this particular case, should be not slavishly to follow whatever exhortations we believe them to have made, but to seek an objective solution to the problem of unity for immediate practical purposes in the Ukrainian emigration. Given the points which we have set out above, it will be clear that this unity can scarcely be achieved without due regard for OUN/B conditions however arrived at. From our knowledge of the various Ukrainian organisations we would say that these conditions are likely to resolve themselves into the following:

- (a) that on any combined committee OUN/B, owing to its effective power in the emigration, should have at least equal representation with ZP UHVR, and
- (b) that OUN/B operations both current and projected should not be adversely affected by any union with ZP UHVR.

This means in practice that if any Ukrainian co-ordinating body were set up for operations, BANDERA's "controllers" would demand representation.

9. It seems to us possible that BANDERA's conditions might in the first place go even further than this, since he and certain of his supporters might be disposed to question the legitimacy of the present ZP UHVR, just as the "Mandate" throws doubt on certain of the credentials of OUN/B. We believe, /however ✓

however, that this juridical point could be ironed out and that OUN/B's final conditions would resolve themselves, as stated above.

10. Apart from the need described above to find a solution which would be acceptable to BANDERA there is the objective consideration - already touched upon - that the operational potential of the BANDERA-ites may in fact be greater than that of ZP UHVR. If this were agreed between us it would in any case be in our interests irrespective of the "justice" of any claims made by either side to give BANDERA the impression of warm Anglo-American support. This is a matter which could be discussed.

11. Since under no circumstances would the OUN/B be likely to cease operating into the UKRAINE, co-ordination of ZP UHVR and ZCh OUN operations for the purpose of avoiding clashes in the field, crossed lines and directives etc., becomes an urgent problem which requires solution before the Spring. Irrespective therefore of the degree of political unity which the Ukrainians abroad with greater or lesser prods from ourselves, succeed in achieving, our two Services must get together to ensure that any ZP UHVR operations known to the one side and OUN/B operations known to the other, should not clash. The framework to be aimed at might well be one in which a new "provid" abroad, acceptable to both sides and looking to both our Services for guidance concerned itself with problems of politics and propaganda, co-ordination of field directives etc., whilst watertight operational sections having a general allegiance to the "provid", but a specific responsibility to their American and British controllers respectively, continued as heretofore. The real directing body in all this, both politically and, in a limited sense, operationally, would be the small team of American and British officers responsible for liaison:

- (a) with the reconstituted provid, and
- (b) with respective operational sections.

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12. Our present information about the Ukraine is unfortunately too slight for us to be able to express a final opinion on the writers of the various documents which were brought out last October by the two groups of couriers. It would clearly be wise to make an allowance for Soviet penetration. The stakes, however, are so high that a substantial degree of risk in our forthcoming operations must be accepted. For what it is worth we feel that the general political line of the UHVR mandate with its, at first glance perhaps a trifle surprising, left-wing slant, is in our favour and suggests that it is the product of a genuine resistance movement. The extent of this movement and the degree of popular support which it enjoys, remains to be seen. In all events, we consider that the claims made for it by Ukrainian emigres, especially as regards numbers and degree of organisation, should be treated with very considerable scepticism.



DETAILED S.I.S. COMMENTS ON THE INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION  
OF THE UKRAINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

I. UHVR - Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Your Page 1)

(i) Our information on the organisation and function of the UHVR differs from yours at a few points:

(a) History: The UHVR was established in 1944 to administer territory controlled by the UPA as an underground government. It continued in this capacity during the years 1944-47, when districts were at times under effective control of the partisans. Since the cessation of large-scale military activities, however, the function of the UHVR would seem rather to have become that of the administrative branch of the Resistance Movement, training and recruiting members and organising communications in the now largely passive and civil network of the Movement.

(b) Relations between OUN and UHVR: The "Mandate" claims that the UHVR was created on a broader national basis than that of any one political movement, but there is considerable evidence that it is to a very large extent directed by the OUN. On Page 6 of the Mandate, it is stated that the UHVR "was created under the actual initiative of OUN and through the latter's efforts", and further that the "UHVR is the supreme supervisor and representative of the present-day liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people only insofar as it is supported by OUN. Without the support of OUN, as the only political organisation in the liberation movement, UHVR would not be able to realise its objectives and carry out its duties". On Page 9 of the Mandate it is admitted that the ideal structure of UHVR, a coalition of political parties,

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cannot be realised under present circumstances, nor the position of OUN members in UHVR determined. In Para. 3 of Section 4, the contingency that OUN might lose all control of the UHVR, which it had founded, is envisaged and the author adds that "no political organisation can consent to such a turn of events".

(ii) In view of statements such as these and other reports on the Resistance Movement, it is felt that the OUN and the UHVR are in fact more closely integrated than the "Mandate" would lead us to believe. UHVR/OUN is perhaps best considered as a joint organisation, with a single directing body, probably under the leadership of KOVAL, of which the one branch engages on tasks of propaganda and political training, while the other is concerned with the administration and direction of resistance units.

(iii) With reference to the independent political platform of the UHVR (Page 1), we have not seen the documents mentioned at Section 3, Page 7. Is there any possibility of obtaining these?

(iv) The leading personalities of the UHVR at its inauguration in 1944 were: Pastor HRYNIOCH, Maxim LEBED (acting Chief of the OUN) and ~~CHUPRINKA~~ CHUPRINKA (CIC of the UPA and a member of the Provid of the OUN), and with the departure of the two former for GERMANY, CHUPRINKA became the effective head in the UKRAINE of both the OUN and the UHVR.

II. UPA - Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Your Page 1).

(i) There is some confusion as to the origin of the UPA and the following versions have been put forward from time to time by emigre sources:

- (a) 1941, Taras BOROVETS' underground movement, originally known as the UNS (Ukrainian Self-Defense) but taken over by OUN/LEBED in 1943

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(and amalgamated with other units) under its present name.

- (b) 1942-43, BANDERA's resistance groups (BANDEROVTSI) under the leadership of LEBED, which had a bad reputation for fighting other partisan groups, re-organised by CHUPRINKA under the UHVR in 1944.
- (c) 1942, a number of spontaneous organisations which opposed both the Russians and the Germans and gradually united in one body which, after the German collapse, concentrated its action against the Russians and the Czechs. These governments became alarmed at the so-called BANDEROVTSI and eventually used considerable armed force to suppress them, causing them to withdraw to the North and East. It gained a bad reputation for fighting with other partisans and discipline was finally restored by CHUPRINKA in 1944.

(ii) The truth probably lies somewhere between the latter two, since the BANDEROVTSI have fairly frequently been identified with the UPA and bad relations with other groups, specifically BOROVTETS' and MELNYK's are mentioned in both. We should be most interested to know whether you agree that the "Army" in fact arose in a spontaneous fashion and was only subordinated to the OUN/UHVR at the end of the war.

(iii) The most recent estimate of the present strength of the UPA (end of 1950) gives the number as 2,000 men, located in the Galician UKRAINE only.

III. OUN - Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (Your Page 2).

The following points may be worth mentioning in connection with this section:

- (a) Organisation and Leadership: After the arrest of STETSKO and BANDERA, the OUN remained politically  
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inactive until 1943, although it controlled a considerable number of partisan groups. In 1943 it was rehabilitated as a political organisation and elected a new governing body (Provid) consisting of LEBED, HRYNIOCH and CHUPRINKA. This Provid probably also accepted BANDERA and STETSKO ( who were in prison) as members.


There were a number of Provids of the OUN all claiming control of the movement:

- (i) Pre-1941 consisting of STETSKO, BANDERA and LEBED.
- (ii) 1943, LEBED, HRYNIOCH, CHUPRINKA (STETSKO and BANDERA).
- (iii) Post-1944, BANDERA, STETSKO and CHUPRINKA. (This is based on STETSKO's statement and takes no account of LEBED's claim for inclusion.)
- (iv) Post-1944 inside the UKRAINE, now claiming direction of the party of the OUN - it includes KOVAL and others unspecified.

There is, in addition to the last, a controlling body of the UHVR under the direction of KOVAL.

- (b) The "Mandate": It is interesting to note that the "Mandate" from the UHVR is signed by the Provid of the OUN.
- (c) OUN/UHVR Relations: According to the Mandate (Page 4), the OUN is a "political liberation-revolutionary organisation in the fullest meaning of the words. It was actually the initiator of the Revolutionary struggle and the organiser and supervisor of the struggle". This supports our view of the close integration of the OUN and UHVR

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and of the predominating influence which OUN political views will have on the UHVR.

(d) 3rd Congress of the OUN: We have no detailed information on the 4rd Congress of the OUN (Mandate, Page 1) and have not seen the "Decisions of the Conference" mentioned at the bottom of the page. We should, therefore, be very grateful if you could let us see the Resolutions of the OUN in 1949, listed at Appendix A. No. 25.

(e) Policy: The indications in the "Mandate" are that OUN policy inside the UKRAINE is distinctly inclined to the left, a fact which, if it were possible to substantiate it, would be of great interest in trying to evaluate the political credo likely to appeal to the post-war Ukrainian.

BANDERA has retained much of the ultra-nationalistic flavour of the old movement - possibly more by report than in fact - by he also has been very concerned in extending his influence among East Ukrainian emigres.

(f) Area of Activity: We have no confirmation that the OUN has succeeded in extending its influence to the East, as reported by the couriers. A report dated early 1950 spoke of OUN contacts in the POLTAVA region, but it is more frequently referred to as active in the VOLHYNIA, GALICIA, LVOV, TARNOPOL and ZHITOMIR provinces only, i.e. predominantly in areas previously under Polish sovereignty.

IV. ZP UHVR - Foreign Representation of the UHVR (Your Page 3).

(i) According to our information Maxim LEBED (at that time a member of OUN Provid and directing body of UHVR) came to GERMANY in 1943. In 1944 further delegates, claiming to represent the UHVR joined him; Pastor ~~HRYNIOCH~~ HRYNIOCH was one of these, but we do not know how many more came with the official

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title of delegate (Mandate, Page 11). From 1946-48 they worked with BANDERA's group, representing Ukrainian Resistance in the West and collecting funds for their campaign. A disagreement then arose between the old and new elements and two foreign representations of the Resistance Movement came into being. There are different versions as to the reason for this split:

(a) That BANDERA "expelled" LEBED and his supporters because they disapproved of the attitude which BANDERA took up with regard to other emigre groups (Page 4 and Page 11 of the Mandate).

(b) That STETSKO and BANDERA walked out on LEBED, on the pretext that he was not truly representative of the Resistance Movement, and have since then spoken of him as the "opposition".

(Note: The Mandate speaks of the need for BANDERA to come to terms with the "opposition" - Page 12).

(c) That there was disagreement because BANDERA refused to accept the assistance of an outside agency in his attempts to maintain contact with the UPA.

(ii) The right to communicate with the inside has since been claimed by both parties, each considering itself as the appointed ZP UHVR. The "Mandate" on Pages 11 and 12 does not specify the exact composition of ZP UHVR and Para. 9 would seem to indicate that there was a ZP UHVR abroad before the arrival of HRYNIOCH. Since each side is convinced of the accuracy of its interpretation of the facts, it is evidently necessary to reconcile two points of view, rather than prove one wrong.

V. ZCh OUN - Foreign Delegation of the OUN (Your Page 3).

(1) We are unable to comment on the ideological passages of the "Mandate", Pages 1 and 2, where ZCh OUN is charged with having violated the decisions of the 3rd Congress and taken up

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an independent political position in exile, regardless of the wishes of the parent organisation. Once again the views expressed by the "Mandate" are unexpectedly far to the left, particularly in the discussion of the status of the Church, a point on which both the ZCh OUN and the UNR and BOROVIETS feel most keenly.

(ii) It has not finally been decided what caused the split between BANDERA and LEBED in 1948 (see Page 6) and it seems likely that personal as well as ideological motives were involved.

(iii) There have been signs that BANDERA is quite anxious to see the breach in the emigration healed as the Resistance Movement itself. On the other hand, he is not prepared to sacrifice what he considers to be his legitimately based authority and status outright to the "opposition". It is worth mentioning that, from the "Mandate", Pages 11 and 12, it becomes evident that all the leading members of both factions are OUN members and therefore may be entitled to be known as ZCh OUN. Similarly members of both factions might have grounds for referring to themselves as ZP UHVR. Injunctions for the future activities of ZP UHVR and ZCh OUN might, therefore, apply to both groups equally. It further seems surprising that the Resistance Movement should wish to impose conditions for the reconciliation of the two groups which, by their exclusive character, tend to militate against that very unity which - since the death of CHUPRINKA - the Movement must be more than ever anxious to see realised.

VI. UNR - Ukrainian National Council.

(i) While we agree with the general conclusions drawn from your survey of the UNR, it is perhaps worth mentioning that the main Eastern Ukrainian political parties - the URDP and SZSU - support the UNR and that these parties include a certain number

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of new emigres.

- (ii) Although the ZCh OUN agreed to the establishment of the UNR in 1948, it never took up the six seats allotted to it on the Council, nor took any part in its activities. It is also reported to have severed all connection with the UNR in the summer of 1950.

VII. UNG - Ukrainian National Guard (Your Page 6).

- (i) We agree with your estimate of this movement, both where its operational and its political possibilities are concerned. Although BOROVETS' claims to possess supporters inside the UKRAINE still lack all confirmation, the possibility that some of his followers might prove willing and valuable for infiltration purposes must not be overlooked.
- (ii) We agree that the approach, reported in your last paragraph, to UHVR is most surprising but feel that it is quite possibly attributable to emigre gossip and exaggeration.

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British Connections with the UNR:

To date we know of no direct contact between English case officers and members although one report states that a Capt. ~~fnu~~ PANCHUK of the UNG has good contact with British army and intelligence circles of the UNR in England. Source CAPELIN cites, however, at least two instances when representatives of the Polish government in London contacted members of the UNR. The only known operation run by the UNR to date which may have had British backing involved the distribution of propaganda leaflets, signed Ukrainian National Guard, along the Dresden-Erfurt highway in the Eastern Zone of Germany on 4 July 1950.

Recent Instances of Polish Contact:

1. In early April 1950 in the quarters of ~~fnu~~ FIKSOLKI at Augsburg, a meeting took place between a Polish intelligence officer (name unknown) representing the London Polish government. The Polish officer agreed to finance anti-Soviet UNG activity in Eastern Germany. Col. ~~fnu~~ SOROVETS @ ~~fnu~~ Tamas BULBA represented the UNG. There was a subsidiary agreement that BULBA would attempt to form an intelligence net out of Red Army personnel in the Eastern Zone. It was also decided that Genadi ~~fnu~~ ROTOROVICH, editor of the Ukrainaki Visti and a man in whom the Poles had confidence, would thenceforth serve as middleman between the Poles in London and the UNG. BULBA allegedly received about 500 pounds sterling from the Poles. Further, he made Bohdan ~~fnu~~ OSADZUK @ Yuri ~~fnu~~ CHORNOMORSKI his resident in Berlin who was to publish the leaflets and forward couriers.

2. Prior to this April 1950 meeting, President Andrei ~~fnu~~ LEVITSKY and Premier Isaak ~~fnu~~ MAKIPA of the UNR had conferred with a Maj. ~~fnu~~ POMIKOVSKI whom represented the London Polish government. The latter proposed collaboration between the UNG and the London Poles.

3. In autumn 1950 while in England BULBA allegedly spoke with the Chief of Staff of the Polish Army in London, Col. ~~fnu~~ KOPANEKI re subsidies for the UNG. He received a promise of financial support and help in obtaining a visa to Canada where BULBA could recruit further financial assistance and a coverstory for his funds from the Canadian Ukrainians.

Evaluation of SS - UNG Connection

1. To approach the UNR's largest recruiting pool, the UNG, the British have used the Poles who traditionally desire to have for bargaining purposes a Ukrainian government sitting in their anteroom.

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2. The first known Polish-UNG operation, the distribution of leaflets in the Soviet Zone of Germany, was bungled in a manner suggesting duplicity or at best incompetence on the part of the UNG resident in Berlin, CHORWOKORSKI.

3. The UHR and UNG are badly in need of prestige following the sudden rise to prominence of the ZPUNVR. The Eastern Zone operation was merely a publicity stunt compared to what they would like to achieve: namely, the creation of a Ukrainian underground in the Eastern Ukraine separate from the UNVR-OUN-UPA complex and recognizing the UHR.

4. Undoubtedly the UHR is anxious to have the British dispatch UNG teams to Eastern Ukraine. The British probably would prefer singletons or at least very small teams with the primary vision of intelligence collection. Nevertheless, to get Ukrainian nationalists to collect intelligence requires some political concessions, if not from the British at least from the Poles.

5. If the UHR attempts from the emigration to start a new underground under present conditions in the Eastern Ukraine one or more of the following things would probably occur:

- a. The teams would be caught soon after arrival, individual members doubled, and redispached to the emigration.
- b. The RIS will leave the team alone but help it to form an RIS-sponsored underground to confound the Western Ukrainian nationalists.
- c. The team will appeal to the existing Western Ukrainian underground for help and will be liquidated as a hazard by the latter.

6. It is fairly clear that the SS is using the London Poles for some of their actual or planned operations into Poland and the Ukraine, however, the Poles do not get along well with OUN/B or ZPUNVR. The UHR is thus the logical partner for the Poles, for the Poles would get nowhere with the existing UNVR-OUN-UPA underground in the Ukraine.

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Summary

The British SS and CIA agree that closely coordinated operations in collaboration with the headquarters of the Ukrainian underground movement are essential. They are not in agreement on which Ukrainian emigre group will best serve as the channel for recruitment of agent and courier teams. It is recognized that operational cooperation with any emigre group has political implications. Because there is a basic rivalry between the best recruitment pools, namely the CIA-sponsored ZP UHVR and the SS-sponsored OUN/Bandera, CIA takes the position that operations should be coordinated through the ZP UHVR, the group most acceptable politically to the United States. Under no circumstances will CIA agree to U.S. support of any Ukrainian group with which the present OUN/B leadership, and particularly Stefan Bandera, is associated in a position of prestige or authority.

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