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add to log file 304

c. Jan. 1954

REVIEW, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANNING FOR HANDLING OF SHUBA 800 TRAFFIC

I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION:

At the present moment the assets of SHUBA 800 which are in place within the Soviet Union are far from negligible. Regular periodic contact is being made both by means of W/T and S/W with six agents located in such strategic locales as the Moscow Oblast, Leningrad, Minsk, and Bryansk. Each agent has established himself within the community, has become registered, has secured living quarters, has made friends, holds reliable documents, and has obtained employment. All of them are generally following their mission operational plan which is to obtain legal status, to keep in regular communication, to obtain operational and document intelligence, and to further the SHUBA 100 mission. The procurement of positive intelligence, the establishment of secure escape and evasion routes, and the wartime partisan potential of these men, are three other aspects of the situation which will become of increasingly strong import, after the initial period of legalization. Only in one instance, SHUBA 811, is there evidence such as to indicate rather conclusively that the agent is controlled. In all other cases, control, while not ruled out, cannot be presumed or proved. In the subsequent study space will be given to the CE analysis of each agent's traffic.

It is felt that in order to secure the optimum results from the agents that periodically an exhaustive analysis of their traffic should be made. The results of this particular study will serve ~~as a~~ foundation upon which

** Note: Two of them have since been captured.

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to base our future mode and direction of approach. Only on an individual basis can the task of review, analysis, and interpretation be best performed, thereby insuring the maximum protection to and full utilization of the agent.

II. SHUBA 800 "A" CYCLE:

A. SHUBA 801:

1. Chronological Account:

SHUBA 801 was dropped in company with SHUBAS 802 and 803 on 29 June 1952. He contacted SHUBA 803 on the DZ but they could not find SHUBA 802. On 24 and 27 May 1952, contacts were vainly attempted. This agent, not heard from since, is presumed lost yet he had a Moscow address and thus we are not destroying his commo plan. It is dormant, however.

B. SHUBA 802

1. Chronological Account:

SHUBA 802 was dropped from an unmarked aircraft on the night of 4 May 1952 near BARANOVICHI, Belorussia, and was first contacted by radio on the night of 29 June 1952. Since that time he has sent us 18 W/T messages and three letters, while we have sent him 26 W/T messages. We are currently awaiting the 4th letter from him which he stated he would mail in October. His target city is Minsk. In the course of his transmissions to us he has stated that he was badly bruised upon landing in the DZ for he became hung-up in a tree. He was unable to make contact with SHUBA 801 or SHUBA 803 but he heard them. He buried his operational gear in the region of the DZ but on 2 July 1952 he said that he had picked everything up ^{which had melted.}
(comment: Agent now using blood system for S/W as are all agents except

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SHUBA 803.) He visited his mother and then his father for two weeks.* He travelled extensively throughout the Soviet Union after visiting SHUBA 309's sister (note: She is last reported in MIN'YAR, the Urals) and giving her a letter from her brother. He later visited Moscow (saw and aviation parade (note: held 27 July 1952) with Tupolev Bombers, Ilyushin and MIG jets), DNEPROPETROVSK (lived with a woman), KHARKOV (worked with a floor waxer for cover), BRYANSK (spent nights in train), PSKOV (where he hid his old documents), ROSLAVL', VITEBSK, SMOLENSK, PETROZAVODSK, VELIKIE LUKI, AND MINSK (several times). For 6000 rubles he purchased through a female domoupravlenie accountant friend of his father a new PP with 1948 goznak, issued 9 July 1952 by the second section militia of Pakov. Finally SHUBA 802 settled in Minsk about 1 January 1953 per his operational plan. He stated that he had become registered. He has used an auto battery as his power supply, transmitting from the woods and from a park in the summer time and from a barn in the winter time. On 8 April 1953 he mailed a letter to Victor BUDE, Belgium, with no S/W text but with a coded message for SHUBA 102. We received a paraphrased portion of the text which stated his inability to listen to the radio during the day. However, strangely, he never has referred to this letter in any W/T broadcast or in any subsequent letter. Thus there remains the possibility that he has written other letters to SHUBA 102 containing no S/W but only a ciphered text in the cover letter. SHUBA 102 knows the S/W indicator, he need only pass on to us those letters which contain that indicator (note: SHUBA 99 unable to break cipher and to know except through missing crypte groups of other letters.)

* Note: This subsequently turned out to be SHUBA 814

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Since 30 May 1953 he has usually made his contacts from BORISOV, 80 Km northeast of Minsk. He communicated his understandable worry about possible reactions and repercussions from the SHUBA 800 flap. Then he had crystal trouble over 8000 (8 mgs). On 24 May 1953, he told us that he had sent a second letter to Alexander TVERBOUS in Luxembourg, Belgium, which we have never received. By June 1953 he had secured a job as a general laborer on Construction Trust #1 even though he didn't have a trudovaya knishka. He gave us his address as being Gramadekii Pereulok 20A, Minsk. He is militarily registered with the Kaganovich RVK (notes: Industrial card file discloses no data on Trust #1. Possibly employer holding his trudoyaya Knishka: unable locate street address Minsk maps. One of the three Minsk raions is Kaganovich.) In reply to our questioning he gave us a little news of the Beriya crisis and stated that he mailed his letters from Borisov openly and without showing his passport. He obviously is able to travel about considerably for his following contact, made on 6 October 1953, was from Zaslavl', about 27 Km northwest of Minsk. During this contact he told of the currency reform rumors which were passed off in the summer of 1953 by the Soviets as an attempted provocation.

2. Present Situation:

SHUBA 802 went on vacation for the month of October but he stated that he would be listening for us on 6 and 20 November. It seems a bit strange that he has gone on vacation, for he has not been working too long and states in his last letter that he was running short of money and needed our help (note: the average length of vacation for the Soviet worker cannot be determined, but periodic vacations are possible on a modest budget). We have no advance knowledge as to his vacation itinerary so we

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are handicapped operationally. It is not beyond ~~the~~ ~~realm~~ ~~of~~ ~~possibility~~ that he will return to visit his family or to see SHUBA 309's sister. This latter is an extreme risk as SHUBA 805 also carried a letter to the sister which can be assumed to have fallen into the hands of the RIS at the same time that the four SHUBA 800 arrests were made. However, there was no way to warn SHUBA 802 of this danger until our contact in November (note: agent advised of his danger on 6 and 20 Nov. blind broadcasts but as of this date nothing has been heard for two months.).

In the last letter SHUBA 802 also stated that he had his eye on a possible recruit for propaganda work and that he might allow him to utilize the rubber matrices. This type of political activity may be premature at this time especially since the agent was of a low calibre and the attendant risks of such action might easily finger him, bringing to no profitable end his past endeavors.

3. Analysis of Traffic:

a. General:

SHUBA 802 was not given a thorough course of training in reporting and message writing techniques and his messages reflect it. He is not a high level agent mentally and in training had the alcohol problem. He also is not a good radio operator. He was only given a brief course of instruction in S/W techniques. He is politically mature and the member of a dedicated organization -- yet no spontaneous cry for joy was received upon any of the three occasions for such sentiment in the last nine months: Stalin's demise, Berlin's riots, and Beriya's fall. His passivity and stolid calm echo falsely.

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b. W/T traffic:

Throughout the period SHUBA 802 has: given us the correct first message procedure, given the correct fixed text indicator for the next three messages, generally used correct W/T procedures, generally sent correct crypto safety-danger signals indicating freedom from control, and answered the cryptographic challenge correctly. He is following his operational plan and his actions agree with his assessment. The challenge (stranni) was never used. On the negative side is the poor reporting, the ambiguous statements, the lack of enthusiasm over Beriya's fall (note: no comment even after we questioned him on 7 and 19 May), the doubted authenticity of some of the document information he sent us, the poor W/T technique employed, and his vacation away from a new job (possibly to the Min'yar region where SHUBA 309's sister, compromised by SHUBA 805, resides) while low on money. No mention of a visit to SHUBA 309's sister was ever made by W/T but only by letter a year later.

c. S/W traffic:

Two of the four letters we know of have been received and both contained the SHUBA 102 safety signal used correctly. The first letter to SHUBA 321 and never mentioned by W/T contained a secret SHUBA 100 ciphered text, which KOSTYA 1 has been unable to break, but no S/W text. In the third letter (Sept. 1953) he tells in rambling style of his travels yet omits the cities of Moscow and Bryansk. He also tells us for the first time that he, too (as SHUBA 805) carried a letter to SHUBA 309's sister and that he visited her (note: Files show that KOSTYA 3 knowledgeable this situation in 1952 prior dispatch. SHUBA 146 actually gave letter. Also, letter #3, which was received addressed to Mr. TVERBOUS as was letter #2, contained the danger signal and omitted the safety signal (note : Mr. TVERBOUS'S

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address also is held by SHUBA 808.

d. Summary:

There are several precise indications that SHUBA 802 is controlled. However, he has given us many signs and signals that he is free from control. His general reportorial techniques and lack of ability make it difficult to assess the content of his traffic on grounds of accuracy, or possibility of control. The general tone of the traffic indicates that if control is present that the RIS is doing a masterful job but that if it isn't then our agent is doing a far from successful reporting endeavor. With this type of low grade information it is doubly difficult to assess his bona fides. However, the letter carried and visit made to SHUBA 309's sister; the omission of S/W safety signals from letter #3 as well as his two month radio silence now, add up to a sizeable brief for a controlled status. The weight of evidence indicates control.

4. Planned Exploitation:

a. General:

We will keep after SHUBA 802 until he sends us the promised document information on PP, VB and TK which we first requested on 23 July 1953. We have twice advised him to stay away from SHUBA 309's sister and to have nothing further to do with her. Indeed, if necessary, he should change his living quarters (query: How is it that this letter was taken without KOSTYA 1 knowing it, and why wasn't immediate notification and council given to SHUBA 802 by KOSTYA 3 as to the possibility of compromise to SHUBA 309's sister due to the arrest and interrogation of SHUBA 805? Records state that SHUBA 146 gave the letter after promising not to -- not until SHUBA 309 was put on the machine in summer did knowledge come out. However, for three months no action was taken by the KOSTYA 3 to warn this agent).

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We should question him as to the addresses of his parents (last reported POGORKI) and have KOSTYA 3 find what address SHUBA 309 gave for his sister (note: SHUBA 309's sister GRACHEVA was last reported living in Min'yar just east of UFA in the Urals, while his first wife, Alexandra (SHURA) was living in Altai (south of Novosibirsk) where she had lived with 309' after their marriage. However, nowhere in his messages does 802 specifically mention having travelled to any of these eastern cities. Their location so far to the east would give a different complexion to his post-dispatch travels and vacation). We should query him as to the name and background of the friend whom he has secured for possible propoganda type work. He will also be questioned thoroughly on his holiday travels, as to places visited, persons seen or contacted, and things of intelligence value noted.

b. Intelligence:

We should embark on a series of questions of intelligence value in line with SHUBA 99 requirements but so worded that we may deduce the agent's bona fides. The requirements and targets of intelligence worthiness in the city of Minsk are myriad: airfields, oil refineries, penicillin plants, chemical plants, railroad marshalling yards, and hydro-electric plants. With his mobility seemingly assured, his area of operational potential increases. This intelligence gathering mission will be tailored to his limited training and abilities and will probably be of such a nature that he can obtain the intelligence reports required merely by walking through Minsk on a Sunday afternoon. We will not attempt the challenge (stranni) for after a year and a half it is highly probable that it has been forgotten. It is also possible that if determined clean he can be given SHUBA 81's mission regarding the railroads, Brest, and recruiting railroad personnel for the transmission through dead drops of documents or intelligence information.

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c. Political Reporting:

Also in an effort to determine bona fides a series of questions can be posed dealing with the inhumane and inefficient treatment obtained under the Soviet regime. This man has definite political feelings and it will not be too difficult to determine whether he in fact is the one speaking. He will be questioned as to his feelings toward individuals, Russian policies, world issues, and generally how he finds life in a communistic state as compared to that of a democracy. This information can be secured under the guise of research for a SHUBA 100 newspaper article (note; experience has shown that there is a marked reluctance upon the part of the RIS to take the responsibility of stating that anything is wrong with the regime, personality wise, or policy wise).

d. Joint Play:

A seemingly controlled agent, SHUBA 811, is also located in the city of Minsk and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that something could be worked out between them at some future date. This possibility of joint efforts or of inter-agent communication through dead ~~steps of personal contact~~ seems unwise however until such time as it may be determined beyond reasonable doubt that SHUBA 802 is controlled. At the same time we have to consider the cache just over the Usha river near Krasnoye which SHUBA 811 made for SHUBA 802, the coincidental factor is that SHUBA 802 now states that he is running short of money, and the highly convenient factor that he made his last contact from Zaslavl' which is only 33 Km from the cache site. It is possible that a very convenient situation is being set up here by the RIS; they are extending the bait and wondering if we will

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pick it up. If SHUBA 802 is controlled we could have him pick it up as part of a large scale notional operation.

5. Agent's Future Plans:

During the winter season he has stated that he will be on the air only once per month so that the traffic will not be moving very fast. This is good from a security viewpoint because of the attendant dangers and hardships found in winter transmissions made at night. In the last analysis, the fact of merely having this agent in place free of surveillance, and at liberty to move at will, means that we can count on an invaluable continuous flow of information on popular trends and opinions. Lastly, he can perform spotting and assessing missions from which we will secure a backlog of cleared persons living and working in different sections of Minsk yet all bound together by common belief.

6. Proposed text for Next Contact:

SHVEDOVA IS COMPROMISED. PROTECT YOURSELF FROM HER AND HER FRIENDS. ANSWER BY NUMBERS

1. DOES SHE KNOW YOUR ADDRESS?
2. WHEN WAS LAST CONTACT WITH HER?
3. WHAT IS HER ADDRESS?
4. DESCRIBE VACATION FULLY.
5. WHAT IS GREATEST EVIL OF COMMUNISM

YOU'VE SEEN.

GREETINGS FROM STAFF AND FRIENDS.

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B. SHUBA 803

1. Chronological Account:

SHUBA 803 entered the Soviet Union in company with SHUBA 801 and 802 on the night of 4 May 1952 in the region of BARANOVICHI. He, too, was a low grade agent and only a fair radio operator but more of an under-world character than SHUBA 802. Thus he had a mission to satisfy his abilities: to attempt to enter the local underworld in Leningrad, to obtain documents, to establish communications in order to transmit document intelligence to us by W/T or S/W, and to recruit a man to carry the procured documents over the border. SHUBA 803 has been in regular contact with us by W/T and S/W since 13 June 1952. We have received 15 W/T and 6 S/W messages, while sending him 22 W/T transmissions. His first five S/W letters were received in Liege, Belgium, through an SHUBA 102 contact -- Mme. Leloup. His sixth letter (containing no S/W text) was sent to Mme. SPELT in Brussels. He landed in the DZ close to SHUBA 801 but they could not find SHUBA 802. Having travelled at night, avoided controls, changed commuter trains frequently, he arrived safely in Leningrad. His documents were found to be unreliable. His ^{sp} spare radio and coins are buried in the woods on the road MALAYA-POLONKA which is 18 Km NE of the DZ (53 09N, 23 43 E). Initially and until November 1952 he had a bad time with communications due to garbling. He stated on 24 July 1952 that he was changing living quarters, taking a room in the suburbs as a student, and working over friends in a neighboring city. He obtained a stolen PF in Odessa for 5000 rubles plus a VB which he fixed up (note: His document information checks out as far as we can tell). Due to the 250th jubilee of Leningrad he reported a big "reconstruction" of houses going on. In December 1952 he had obtained work in a telephone center as a helper and was registered. Repurchased a commercial

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radio receiver and requested the wave lengths for ~~Radio~~ free Russia (note: possible to hear secret SHUBA 100 instruction yet feel that reception too limited. Difficult to check). In March 1953 he received our first letter from him without secret writing but with an open text telling of a trip to Odessa. Again in March the same complaints about poor radio communications. In April he gave us the information taken from a VB he saw and also told us that his money was all gone (note: Whose VB was it? He holds military exemption certificate in place of VB). This data seemingly checks out). In his May letter he tells of his troubles in initially securing legal status, of his acquaintance with an underworld figure and of his trip to Odessa, where he purchased documents (note: exact date of this trip unknown). He has put the registration stamp in his PF himself. He also obtained a certificate of exemption from military service through the same friend (note: Possible new 1950 printing, considerable changes in text of outside cover and third page. It refers to Prikaz #130 of 1951 which disseminated a more recent edition of the Haspisania Bolezni. One glaring inconsistency is the printing of Voyennoye Ministerstvo Soyuza S.S.R. on the outside cover, whereas, according to the inside text, the Prikaz which disseminated the new edition of the Haspisanie Bolezni is still referred to as emanating from "NKD, SSR"). He was able to register in Leningrad only after getting a certificate from his place of work. He has lived in at least two places in Leningrad legally. In his job he goes around to various offices and houses repairing telephones. He also told of the mourning and speeches in the factories after the death of Stalin accompanied with the attendant stressing of the need for party unity. In May he stated that people arriving in Odessa were not checked, and that while in ~~Odessa~~, he and his friend lived with some of the latter's friends. documents can be purchased in

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Odessa through reliable criminals, such as Nikolai NADUEV residing on 26 Srednefontanskaya Ulitsa, apartment #21, Odessa, Ukraine (note: Check of RI files disclosed no identifiable information; green list also negative). In April and May he was again forced to miss radio contacts due to radio trouble.

At this point (the last week in May) we began to receive a series of letters. The first evidenced the strain and emotion of the man reading in the papers of the execution of friends as diversionist saboteurs, the SHUBA 800 agents. He contemplated leaving Leningrad and running away, a normal yet unprofessional reaction under such circumstances. His next letter in July contained the certificate of exemption from military service. In his August letter he forwarded the amnesty spravka plus an impassioned statement on the current unrest which followed the fall from grace of Beriya. (note: How and from whom or under what circumstances did he get this document? The document information contained checked as far as our limited knowledge goes but his political mouthings could be considered as direct quotes from Pravda).

At this point, he again berated us for poor communications procedure, the setting up of BB dates and then not keeping them (note: Our reason for setting up these dates was so that in the eventuality another letter was received we would be in a position to take some immediate action). Then on October 4th we received W/T message #14 which stated that he had mailed two letters to us and that he had been listening for us in vain. He established two more BB dates which we utilized by asking specific questions as to where he was living, working, and to what buildings he had access and where they were located. Unfortunately, the answers to these question have not as yet been received due to interference and

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garbling on 24, 30 October and 11 November (note: Our last year's experience at this season was similar -- great difficulty experienced in passing traffic due to atmospheric (?) interference).

2. Present Situation:

We know that SHUBA 803 is living in the Petrograd city raion in Leningrad and working in the Frunze Telephone Uzel (note: no information on this in Industrial Card File, yet we found it in the city directory). We can expect him to continue to try to make contact and send us answers to the outstanding questions. He is being advised to use his S/W crypto system for all future letters. This is being done in an attempt to tighten security both as regards the INS and SHUBA 100.

3. Analysis of Traffic:

a. General:

SHUBA 803 was not given a through course of training in reporting and message writing techniques. He was only given a brief course of instruction in S/W techniques. He was assessed and graded as a relatively low level type and given to complaining. All of these factors must be considered in the analysis of his traffic in an effort to determine bona fides and to properly evaluate the intelligence product.

b. W/T Traffic:

SHUBA 803 sent us the correct fixed text indicator on his first three messages, generally used correct communications procedure and used the correct cryptographic signal. His "fist" compares favorably with the characteristics of his recording made during training. He replied correctly to our cryptographic challenge. He has replied generally to the most important questions asked, yet has ventured no details. On the negative side, our evaluation is handicapped by the fact that his messages form no

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pattern except one of erratic impreciseness. ~~His~~ message format, content, and length often varies from the accepted standard. His critical attitude toward the SHUBA 99 radio men and his frequent inability to make contact are both accepted RIS techniques, but in this case cannot be definitely proved to be such. SHUBA 803 never was a top notch radio man and the seasonal atmospheric conditions often preclude successful contact being made. No mention was made in any of the W/T messages of Stalin's death, the East Berlin uprisings, or the Beriya fall from power. He was never sent the case officer challenge and it seems that if used now it would be of no avail for he can be presumed to have forgotten it.

c. S/W Traffic:

All letters contained the SHUBA 102 safety signal and all the letters contained the SHUBA 99 safety signal with the exception of the second letter which contained two of three "d's" on the envelope with stems down, indicating danger or control. (note : SOME CONFUSION EXISTS AS TO WHETHER THIS SIGNAL APPLIES TO EITHER S/W OR OPEN TEXT OR BOTH). Handwriting comparisons seem to check out well. However, many of the precepts of S/W were violated in that the S/W text was written between the lines of the cover text, S/W was written on both sides of the paper, S/W was written on the blank back of the cover letter. Add to this the fact that five letters were written to the same addressee, which is a definite security hazard. We are not in receipt of the SHUBA 102 cipher but SHUBA 102 has told us that all of his devices have indicated freedom from control. The lack of passion with which he tells of the demise of Stalin and the fall of Beriya plus the lack of attention given to the Berlin uprisings all seem unusual in the face of the fact that SHUBA 100 members are known for their political fervor and hatred for the regime and its leader. The letter received on 27 November 1953 by Mme SPBLT contained SHUBA 99 and SHUBA 100 safety signals but no S/W indicator or S/W or

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coded message. The handwriting is disguised yet from the formation of "yis" it is determined to be 803's hand (note: SHUBA 808 also has this Mme. SPELT address). As with SHUBA 802 there are ~~indications~~ **KAPOK** indications pointing to control as well as those which seem to indicate full freedom. We must at this juncture attempt a new method for determining bona fides. The evidence just about balances in this case. I am unconvinced either way.

4. Planned Exploitation:

a. General:

When the full picture of his present situation has been reported we will begin to send him a series of intelligence questions in an attempt to test and establish his bona fides, and, incidentally, to fill some of our intelligence requirements. The assets of an agent in place in this large port city of Leningrad cannot be overestimated. Also a continuous stream of coordinated reports on the sentiments and opinions of the Soviet citizenry is much in demand.

b. Intelligence Reporting:

There will be countless questions which can be worked up by SHUBA 900 division dealing with technical, industrial, naval (submarine), and military installations, the security forces guarding them, and the restrictions and regulations encountered by Soviet citizens in their life from day to day. Of especial interest are the forbidden zones north of Leningrad: where they are, how many there are, what special documents are needed for access to them, what special papers are carried by persons working there. There is also the cache located outside of Leningrad which SHUBA 810 set up for 803's benefit and utilization. Upon the ~~ascertainment~~ **KAPOK** ascertainment of 810's bona fides, we may be able to find it and use it. However, we must have the location of this cache clarified by SHUBA 810 who has sent a garbled distance and an ambiguous direction. This cache can be utilized to good

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advantage by both SHUBA 803 and/or any of the other agents for any number of purposes.

We can also question him on his method of mailing letters and the controls encountered in Leningrad for entry into post offices. This data can then be compared with that received from the other SHUBA agents but especially from SHUBAS 809 and 808 who are in Moscow, 802 in Borisov and 810 in Orsha.

c. Political Reporting:

Answers to questions of political potential in an effort to test his bona fides will give to us and to SHUBA 100 political information helpful in fulfilling our requirements. Questions to embarrass his handlers into admitting the shortcomings, injustices, and evils of the Communist ideology and its leaders, can be posed. This line of approach will diversify the agents task and keep him interested politically.

d. Mission Fulfillment:

We should eventually play him fully in line with his mission, his own exfiltration or the actual recruitment of an underworld character from whom he can acquire the document information he desires, and which we need in order to have him established as a real support point. As of this date, his sole contact of this nature seems to be in Odessa, thus he seemingly has not fulfilled his mission of securing an underworld type in Leningrad who is an expert on documents and who can be used as a constant source for new documents or for possible exfiltration. The exfiltration of such a recruited individual or even of 803 himself would open vast new vistas of operational potential if successful (note: Study of the Karelo-Finnish and Iranian borders are now being made). What ~~is~~ the constant advances in maritime

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"snell" boat, aerial pickup, and submarine techniques, such an operation is ever more possible of success. The use of a pontoon equipped "Beaver" plane also is being considered. The unsuccessful contacts in October and November have delayed our play of this agent for we failed in our attempt to secure the much needed background material. It is felt that by sending him on short trips to SORTOVALA, VYBORG, PETROZAVODSK, and MOSEL'SKAYA to secure OB. MATERIAL, we can indirectly secure intelligence on controls and prepare him for exfiltration (note: The Murmansk or Ashkhabad areas in spite of their recent utilization seem to be the most likely locale for the jump of 803. Prior to any exfiltration radios and equipment will be cached for use by 809 and 808).

If money becomes a problem in the fulfillment of this mission, it is always possible to consider the utilization of a legally penetrated agent for the purpose of making a ruble cache near Leningrad. This same channel could be exploited to "pick-up" documents obtained by 803, but only if we feel reasonably sure that he is uncontrolled and that the risk involved is calculated. We will also ask him to set up an internal address to which we can send money, pads, or instructions. However, the agent has no system for processing our S/W messages and as this S/W system should be high grade, a great problem is raised (note: --- has several highly classified systems we may use).

5. Proposed Texts:

DIFFICULT MAKE CONTACTS THIS TIME OF YEAR. REPEAT BROADCASTS OF 24 AND 30 OCTOBER. ANSWER BY NUMBERS

1. HOW CLEAR DO YOU HEAR RADIO FREE RUSSIA?
2. ADVISE ON YOUR EFFORTS TO FIND SUITABLE TYPE FOR EXFILTRATION WHO KNOWS UGOLOVNIY MIR.
3. WHAT PROCEDURE DID YOU USE TO MAIL LETTERS?
4. HOW DID YOU OBTAIN (AMNESTY, SVIDETELSTVO)?

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- Ed*
5. WHAT CONTROLS DO YOU ENCOUNTER INSIDE LENINGRAD?
 6. HOW DO PEOPLE FEEL ABOUT AGRICULTURAL REFORMS, NEW BUDGET, HYDROGEN BOMBS, MALENKOV?

APPRECIATE GOOD EFFORTS. GOD BE WITH YOU.

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III SHUBA "B" CYCLE

A. SHUBA 811

1. Chronological Account:

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SHUBA 811, a cycle "B" agent, was dropped with 810 in the vicinity of SMORGON', Belorussia, on the night of 29 April 1953. His mission was to attempt legalization near Minsk, establish and maintain radio contact, and carry out the general SHUBA mission. He was to concentrate on the railroads near Brest especially the transloading station of Zhabinka, as well as reconnoitering the woods of Gomel Oblast for a black base. The two men 811 and 810 were to split up the second day. To date we have received eight W/T contacts and transmitted nine W/T broadcasts to him. Our first W/T contact was made with him on 23 May 1953 at which time he stated that he had landed all right and had buried his bundles. He cached both of his re-supply (for 802 and for the ---) packages in two caches near Krasnoye. However, in this first message as in all subsequent ones, his use of the confirmation digit indicates control. His seeming answer on 19 August of 80 groups to our case officer challenge of 12 June also showed control (note: One message of 120 groups sent us on 10 July was not received and possible there was a correct reply to the challenge here). He told us that he was anxious and went into the woods after hearing the reports "about the fellows". While in Minsk he lived at #33 Vokzal'naya Ulitsa, apt. #1 with a war invalid (note: This location is between the main Minsk railway station at the large freight yards and tracks leading to Poland -- ideal location for an agent with his type of mission -- perhaps too ideal). We tried to calm his fears of being compromised by the flap and then asked specific questions as to the invalid Vladimir GOROVTSSEV, manager of the Toptrust (fuel trust) garage, and about his documents (note: ~~found~~ found for Toptrust in Industrial

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~~agent with documents~~
Card File). We also told him of the Berlin riots in order to influence his

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handlers if, in fact, he was controlled and questioned him about Vladimir. He replied that he had met Vladimir, or Volodya, as ~~KARON~~ calls him, in a snack bar, and that the veteran drinks heavily, has a shrew for a wife, and passes 811 off as an old combat buddy (note: Registry and green list produced no identifiable traces on Vladimir GOROVTSSEV). SHUBA 811 states that he transmits to us from the woods and listens with a battery. In September he told us that he was registered as an arrival from Leningrad. He was then looking for a place to work and a new place to live, for seemingly the shrew is too much for him.

2. Present Situation:

After a month's silence in September, we attempted to reestablish contact by a BB on the 13th of October. On the 15th 811 sent us inconsequential intelligence on Volodya's PP and military release document: inconsequential in that he did not give us enough material for verification (note: This agent is being well handled if controlled, for his case officers are answering our questions yet giving us either information we already have or other data which we cannot verify). In his message on 8 November 1953 he stated that he was registered with the eighth section of the militia, that his VB was registered with the Kaganovich RVK, that his documents (issued by SHUBA 99) were proved reliable when checked at the time of registration and when he obtained work as a carpenter in a prefabrication factory on Puteiskaya St., Minsk (note: He, as 802, is registered with the Kaganovich RVK, one of three raions in Minsk. It is most unique -- noteworthy -- that he alone of our agents has stated that his SHUBA 99 documents have been proved reliable. A check of the Industrial Card File gave no information on the construction parts (prefabrication) plant on ~~Puteiskaya~~ Ulitsa which is located in the southwest part of the city west of the railroad line to Brest. It

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should also be recalled that 811 had had previous experience as a carpenter in Europe and North Africa). He stated that Volodya's ~~KAPOK~~ svidetelstvo was printed in 1943 and issued in 1945 (note: In previous message he stated that the issue date was 1943. Other document data given at this time on the listings of illnesses, checked exactly with a 1943 copy available and presumed still valid). He is listening for us on 13 and 27 November and has promised to send us a post card and if it goes through successfully he will forward us a letter (note: This will be our first post card but odds are that it will never be received -- what would the RIS gain from such a maneuver?)

3. Analysis of Traffic:

a. General

SHUBA 811 proved himself in training to be highly intelligent and informed young man. He was brave and rigidly upright in all his activities. He was well-trained in radio, S/W procedure, message writing and reporting techniques.

b. W/T Traffic:

As of this date, we find certain irrefutable evidence that the agent is controlled. As mentioned earlier he did not answer our case officer challenge correctly although there may possibly have been some confusion in his mind because of the missed July 10 broadcast. However, when we sent him our acknowledgment of control signal, he did not venture to reply that he was uncontrolled. Although having labored as a construction worker in Casablanca, he was a high level agent, and thus his use of improper communications procedure and indefinite and ambiguous message writing techniques combine to give added evidence of control. His description of the caches and of his relationship with Volodya are both examples of this. Also, he has meticulously answered each and every question we have posed to him, the

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exception rather than the rule in agent traffic. ~~TOP SECRET~~ bit of evidence of control is the fact that he is the only agent who has mentioned to us the fact that his operational documents were reliable and that he was able to register on the basis of them. The fact that he has promised to send us a post card is of great interest for it will be the first such card received from an agent. However, he failed to state to which address he was sending the card. This is an omission which violates standard operational procedure. He has consistently sent us the cryptographic digit which indicates control. He has never sent us his transmission location which is a violation of standard operational procedure. His first message began on page three with group 79 and there was never any explanation as to the cause. Although the outstanding commo man in the group, he has on both 10 July and 15 October so poorly worked his circuit as to merit a EUCA dispatch to that effect. His messages on 30 November are full of the mouthings of all current party organs, as well as a possible provocation attempt. On the positive side, we have the fact that in several messages, including the last one, he has stated his future plans which is according to communications operating procedure. His fist compares favorably with recordings made during training. Finally, he has avoided no question but has given us answers (vague and without basis for verification to be sure) to each and every query made.

b. S/W Analysis: None

c. Summary:

The evidence of control is considerable and outweighs that indicating freedom from control. However, it is felt that the results of the case officer challenge should not be relied on to too great an extent. The courage manifested by this agent in withholding his crypto signal from the RIS is great, and we must govern ourselves in a manner which will keep him alive and only incidentally in an effort to secure an intelligence product.

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4. Planned Exploitation:

a. General:

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As it can well be assumed that this agent is controlled, the method in which we handle his play becomes fraught with import and must utilize the greatest skill which we possess. We have just about exhausted the normal methods of establishing bona fides, yet so that there will be no room for possible doubt of confusion, I would repeat the case officer challenge once more. Then we should attempt to pose intelligence type questions on the Minsk area.

b. Intelligence: As we know that 811 is a high grade agent type, all of his answers will be highly significant. These questions and answers of an intelligence pattern will serve the purpose of extending the play, of slowing it down until a final determination of status is made at which time a long range notional type operation can be considered. This play must be handled delicately because if once the RIS determines that it is only a notional operation, it can be presumed that they will end it at once. We must consider this case in the long term view, in terms of years. Notional operations of a haphazard nature cannot be prolonged for that period of time, especially if played in line with the original mission. The longer we can delay the day of reckoning the better. Some device or technique must be utilized from time to time to keep up the interest of the RIS in handling this man or else they may give up just through boredom. By questioning him in detail on his landing and travels we may indirectly secure some comment on 810 which could aid us in determining the latter's status.

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We can begin by asking him:

1. Describe the entire normal procedure for legal establishment of residence in Minsk.
2. What is the radius from Minsk which one can travel without travel documents?
3. Are Minsk rayon, city or oblast boundaries important as regards documents?
4. What variations exist in travel control procedures for various classes of workers in Minsk?
5. What travel restrictions have been eased, withdrawn, or imposed since 1951? We then can enter into a different type of question, such as:

1. Describe the buildings and the guards in front of them on a certain block in Minsk where a new antibiotic plant is operating.
2. Describe the shifts and hours worked in certain priority buildings in Minsk.
3. Describe the new oil refinery near Minsk Airfield South.
4. What type of freight cars and locomotives are stored in the railroad yards east of the Minsk Airfield South?
5. What is the exact address of Toprest garage?
6. What is produced in the "stroidetal zavod" where you work?

In this regard, results could be well most effective because the RIS does not know exactly how much we know about any of these installations. Thus we have the initiative for they know if they give us erroneous data, we will deduct that the agent is controlled, so to be certain they will usually give us extra information.

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Then we can go into the operational questions dealing his mission. However, I feel that possibly 802 should also be given the railroad mission in case he is clean. However, this type of railroad mission will wet the palates of the RIS and insure that they will keep the play going. We will pose questions such as:

Begin to think about your operational work.

What are the possibilities of trip to Brest?

Have you met any railroad men, that you can use?

Where do railroad men meet, eat and drink in Minsk?

c. Political Reporting:

We have the negativist propaganda field. We can ask direct questions of a political nature, the answers to which must show the Soviet Union in a poor light. One question of this type per broadcast would go a long way toward throwing the handlers off balance because they are allergic to speaking or even thinking evil of their government or party masters. These questions can deal with persons or policies known to be evil. Cover can be that the information is to be used in SHURA 100 newspaper (note: a query on the greatest evil of Communism seen has been posed to 802 and 811 who are both in Minsk. Answers should be highly significant).

We also have the positivist propaganda field by which we fill the Soviet handlers with wester ideology and propaganda -- the uprisings in Germany, defection of soldiers, immigration of people, food packages, etc. This takes great skill, must be delicately handled. There is natural and legitimately normal purpose for, in essence, these agents are political activists on a PP mission. The end products will be similar, the seeds of discontent and justice are sown in both cases.

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d. Notional Operation:

The field has come up with two suggestions:

the establishment of a notional SHUBA 100 net in the USSR both to divert RIS efforts and to establish a channel through which snow can be shovelled at the RIS. I don't favor this at the present time because it is out of line with his mission which the RIS must know. Of more immediate interest and merit is the need for servicing the dead drops (#1 was for the ---- and #2 for 802). (note: Do we have any other doubled agent who could be brought to service them and thus let the RIS see that we do not know that 811 is controlled? What is the status of the ---- for this gimmik? This raises many difficult problems of integration, however, and will give us little positive gain except time.) Another solution to this cache problem is to have 811 move them, report anew on them, and then tell him that the people who were to service them have not been heard from for a long while (801 possibly) and thus he, 811, can use the money himself to further his own work. Then we can send him off according to his operational plan to explore the Gomel Oblast as if we are to send a spring mission on a black base concept. This will entail his briefing us on details of DZ's, controls, documents, etc., before the new men can go and on basis results of his answers, can possibly also determine bona fides.

e. Summary:

The pressing need is to keep the pattern of this traffic similar to all our others, to show the same concerned approach, and to keep the contacts on a regular basis. We will continue the drawn out questions and answers, then turn into the broad recruitment mission coupled with propaganda activity: the cache gimmick and the Gomel Oblast reception will follow in that order to complete a pattern.

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At long last possibly we can work something between 802 and 811, utilizing notional or actual nets, ~~leaflets~~, caches, SHUBA 100 leaflets and all the other possible plans for resident support agents. As W/T traffic affords security risks and has limitations as to time and quantity of reporting it might be well to insist that this man write often by S/W -- this would mean that we could check the format of S/W letters written by a known doubled agent. It would not be altogether illogical for us suddenly to determine (as the basis of a current intelligence report) that RIS DF-ing devices in Minsk posed too great a hazard and risk to the agent. Thus he would be told to write letters only in S/W cipher to certain new and secure addresses. He could continue to listen to us, however.

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f. PROPOSED TEXT. (to be sent after we receive broadcast form him)

BROADCAST RECEIVED. THANKS FOR INFORMATION

WHERE ARE THE GOODS FROM YOUR FACTORY SHIPPED?

ARE MINEK RAYON, CITY, OR OBLAST BOUNDARIES IMPORTANT AS

REGARDS DOCUMENTS?

WHAT CONSUMER GOODS ARE IN SHORTEST SUPPLY AND WHICH FLOURISH
ON BLACK MARKET?

THINK ABOUT RELOCATING YOUR CACHES, VICINITY BYKHOV, AND
BEGINNING YOUR PRIMARY MISSION. REGARDS FROM STAFF AND FRIENDS FOR CHRISTMAS
SEASON.

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SHUBA 809

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1. Chronological Account

SHUBA 808 in company with SHUBA 809 was dropped into the Caucasus on the night of 23 April 1953 with his target city being Moscow. His mission consisted of legalization, establishment and maintenance of W/T contact, and the carrying out of the general SHUBA mission. First report about him was received from SHUBA 809 on 6 September 1953. At that time he was supposedly looking for living quarters in the RUZA, MOZHAISK, AND NAKHABINO regions to the west of Moscow. On 7 October we received our first and to date only letter from him through the Berlin Intercept channel from "Sojuzhineksport", Moscow to Kecks and Co. written 14 Sept. 1953. He told us that on his parachute landing he had strained his leg. The weather was rainy (note: this agrees with the final debriefing report of the indigenous crew of the mission craft.) and that SHUBA 80 did the caching. No further details of the D.Z. or their manner of travel was sent. Later they both went by railroad to Stalingrad, Kuibyshev, Novosibirsk, Berdsk (where they worked for two months on the construction of an electro station) (note: there are many hydroelectric stations in this region along the Ob River and this piece of intelligence information is of little value unless the name of the station is given and some indication as to whether the construction is new or merely repairs to existing plants), and finally to Moscow, on July 18, 1953. From amnestied prisoners in Berdsk they each purchased an amnesty spravka for 2000 rubles and on the basis of the spravkas they were issued a PP and VB. They stated that the spravkas which they were issued for the operation were no good. (note: This fact was known to us, they had no basis for authenticity.) (note: Although they travelled 2000 km before they secured these new documents they didn't mention whether the VB and PP they gave them were inspected and found reliable. However, due to the fact that they secured new documents at the first opportunity, it would seem that all their issued documents were found wanting.)

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In Moscow both attempted to find living quarters but it was impossible. They began to search in the suburbs where 809 finally found a room on or about the first of August. Later in August they both made a trip to the D.Z. cache area where they secured their radio but couldn't find the W/T pads, the packages given them by SHUBA containing the silk screen process matrices, or the 30m000 rubles. (note: our reconstruction of this situation is that the original cache of the gear of both including radios was made by 809. Letters, money, crystals, pads, plans, and packages were carried for the DZ on their person in a specially constructed duckcloth belt. However, due to the bulky size of the belt they possibly halted their travels and removed 15,000 rubles a piece as well as W/T pad and SHUBA 100 packages which were buried in a second cache. Upon their return to cache locations they were only able to find the former cache with the radios; they were unable to find the second one with the W/T pads, the money, and the propaganda material. This appears to be a highly practical and rational split of their belongings in order to assure optimum results). In the confusion before they arrived at Moscow for the first time they mixed up their S/W pads, or so they thought. In reality they did not do so, each continued to hold his assigned encipher and decipher pads. After his return trip south SHUBA 808 was able to secure living quarters in KLIN. on 15 October 1953 we transmitted two Messages to him which he probably attempted unsuccessfully to answer on 25 October but no traffic could be passed. However, on 14 November 1953 his first successful W/T contact was made. At this time he stated that he had tried in vain to make contact with us on October 25th but he didn't hear us (note: Base heard Field on primary and secondary frequencies and field signal was good, yet field not able to hear base at all so not contact established. He gave us document information on the PP and the VB which had been issued to them on the basis of the spravkas in ~~break~~. Regarding the mailing of letters in Moscow, he told us that he had

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mailed his letter on Smolenskaya through a woman who by her looks was a janitress. He told us that it was not possible to get into the ~~Post Office~~ personally. The Post Office is inside the building and a pass is necessary. He verified the known fact that 809 had sent one letter also by this method in July. (note: It seems that all of the firm addresses which 808 was given are now located in a new office building on Smolenskaya Ploshad at the intersection of the Arbat and Sadovaya Circle. This skyscraper is called the "Vysotdom" and contains various Soviet institutions. Besides 850 rooms for offices, the building will have a conference hall, a restaurant a bank, post and telegraph offices, telephone exchange, etc. Air conditioning, artificial daylight, escalators and high-speed elevators are of course provided for" states SOVIET UNION in the edition of July 1951. Thus post office #200, which is the post office inside the Vysotdom, must cancel all letters originating in the offices located in the building. Result, all the Berlin intercept firm letters must be mailed from inside the Vysotdom from post office #200.)

2. Present Situation

808 is living in Klin and has both of his S/W encipher and decipher pads. We are awaiting answers to the following questions which will give fuller details as to his present situation: what is the name and the location of place you are working? How did you obtain living quarters? Under what conditions are you listening and transmitting, and what is the source of your power? We have given him certain instructions which we feel will help his present situation: do not maintain contact with Paul without permission (note: SHUBA 102 felt that this edict was out of place because it restricted the movement of the agent on the inside at a time when his own judgment was the best guide. Another reason might be that if they are both to return in the autumn to the second cache site that perforce they will have to get into communication and possibly in short notice and without our permission.) He is using one of his encipher S/W pads for ~~W/D~~ and the other for letters. We have also given him a warning about taking such risks in mailing letters in Post Office #200. (note: When the original gimmik was thought through it was believed

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that the letters could be mailed in any of several letterboxes located around the square. We have initiated a series of questions on the Vysotdom and the Smolensk Ploshard which are being asked a source. We hope to be able to devise some other plan for the mailing of these firm letters, but until such time, 809 is forced to rely on his radio and the use of his normal mail channels. We have told him to begin thinking about his operational plan and to investigate the town of Klin. As we have two outstanding December Blind Broadcast dates and as there are still five important outstanding unanswered questions, we determined to send him no message on 28 November but instead only sent a "QRU". (note: the town of Klin has long been a mecca for embassy people for there is a Tchaikovski museum there for which passes were readily granted. It is also the reported site of important Soviet Air Force installations, a pilot and paratrooper training base and location for medium bombers and jet fighters. (note: As 808 and all the cycle B agents were briefed on reporting and observation of airfields, the intelligence which we secure from this agent may be enlightening.

3. Analysis of Traffic

a. General

SHUBA 808 was assessed as being idealistic, warmhearted, energetic and quick to learn and having the operational potential to be a fine reporter and spotter. However, the limited quantity of traffic, merely one S/W letter and one W/W message, does not serve as a sufficient basis for detailed analysis of traffic. It is hoped that the receipt of more traffic in the near future will enable us to reach a more realistic and factually sound basis for the determination of his status. However, this may not be possible until his last assigned blind broadcast date has passed, namely 28 December. He has never been challenged.

b. W/T Analysis

The 25 October 1953 attempted contact was not a total loss

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it was found that the agent was using commo procedure for his first message which was indicative of freedom from control. His signal was loud and clear but he didn't hear us at all. This can easily be explained by the fact that he was understandably nervous in making his first contact and in the excitement he may have set up his antenna incorrectly. Also it is possible that his RR 6 was found to be out of order and that now he is using his RR5.

In his 14 November 1953 transmissions there are many features pro and con. Negatively, he stayed on the air for 38 minutes when the accepted maximum desired by commo is 20 minutes. Both his Passport number and place of issue were not clear. Also, his V.B. could either read ZH or EO, but if it were EO it would agree with that of 809. Again, it is possible that his VB was issued either by the Berdsk G.VK. or R.V.K. Important background questions on his work and living quarters were not answered, and other answers were not given per our instructions "by the numbers". Contrary to accepted communications procedure, no transmission location was given on this first W/T broadcast. There was also a garble of eight groups in answer to the most important question of what comes after #19 on page 4 in the V.B. It is also most interesting to speculate on how the amnesty spravkas were altered (note: a document falsification kit was taken in on the mission but it was packed inside the radio package. It seems highly unlikely that photographs and personal data could have been altered without the assistance of this specialists kit.) Both men were together in July when 809 mailed his first letter which we never receive, went down to the Maikop region together, and listened to our BB of 7 September 1953 together. Therefore it seems a most logical proposition that if either 809 or 808 is controlled then the other is also controlled.

Also worthy of comment ~~but not~~ indicative of one status or the other are the facts that blind broadcasts a month and a half in advance were set up, the message began on page four line three of the S/W cipher pad (note: the S/W pad

was used according to our instructions in message #2. It is felt that the missing pad groups were used for the attempted ~~SECRET~~ October contact and according to cryptographic training when the message was finished the cipher pads were destroyed. Thus a reencipherment was necessary.), that his normal letter addresses are A. TVERBOUS (note: address also held by 802) and Mme SPELT (note: address also held by 803).

The positive aspects of the W/T analysis are that the cryptographic signal indicated freedom from control, first message W/T procedure was correct as regards the utilization of call signs, correct first message cryptographic procedure was used, correct frequency shift procedure was employed at group #80, his document information basically corresponds to that given us by 809, his method of mailing a letter in Smolenskaya region although risky was also effectively utilized by 809, the information on controls to be found in the Vysokom agrees with that which 809 furnished. (note: again we must state that this very similarity of information between 809 and 808 is double edged, and merely gives us added basis on which to state that if one is controlled the possibility is great that the other is also controlled.)

c. S/W Analysis

Information on the sprained leg, the raining weather, the caching by 809, the trip to Novosibirsk, the employment in Berdsk, the purchase of I.T.L. spravkas, the issuance of V.B.'s and P.P.'s, the search for rooms in Moscow and the suburbs, the return trip to the cache site, the mixing of the pads, and the 7 September 1953 meeting with 809 which was all contained in letter #1 has also been received in similar fashion from 809. Headquarters is now running tests to determine if the handwriting checks with samples taken at the SHUBA school.

This letter took 22 days to arrive in Frankfurt whereas the letters received from 809 took only nine and thirteen days.. (note: there was a delay in the courier channel from Berlin which has ~~SECRET~~ ironed out).

As the Berlin intercept firm ~~SECRET~~ letter gimmick was put into effect at the very end of training no ~~SECRET~~ safety/danger signals were assigned. As the

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s/w text was to be always enciphered it would be difficult to establish these new signals and so in order to avoid confusion, they were purposefully omitted.

Therefore, no indicators of any sort were present in this first firm letter from 808 and thus we have no indication as to his status. However, it should be stated that the four portions of the letter which he had to fill in were correctly filled in.

d. Conclusion:

It is still thought too early in terms of amount of traffic to make any definitive decision as to status but based on the limited amount of traffic we have thoughts which prevail: a. As 808 goes so goes 809 b. if one considers that nervousness with a first contact caused improper antenna location and unbreakable cryptographic groups, then the bulk of the weight of his traffic indicates freedom from control.

4. Planned exploitation

As 809 can be considered as a case to be handled hand in glove with 808, I am postponing possible plans for exploitation until after the chronological account of 808 has been presented.

c. SHUBA 808

a. Chronological Account

808 also was dropped into the Caucasus on the night of 23 April 1953 and our first contact with him was through a Berlin Intercept firm letter mailed from EXPORTLES in Moscow to RITTEL in Berlin and received on 6 November 1953. To date we have received two s/w letters, and two w/t message, while we have sent him 8 blind broadcasts. However, his first s/w letter has not as yet been received (note: mailed in July from EXPORTLES to Merckel in Berlin). He told us that they returned to the D.Z. area on August 16 and found everything except the 30,000 rubles, the packages with the SHUBA equipment, and the w/t pads. The area was overgrown with foliage in the summer but they hoped to return in the autumn.

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He stated that after landing he went to Novosibirsk (note: this is an area which he possibly knew from having trained nearby as a soldier) taking along the s/w pads, letters, crystals and signal plans. In Novosibirsk they were able to purchase cartificates from amnestied prisoners. Arriving in Berdsk they worked construction and received PP and VB. Finally, they arrived in MOSCOW in July. They found that they couldn't register in Moscow or Nakhabino but he was able to find a room in Vereya where he arranged for registration. He stated that to register permanently it was necessary to be working or to have relatives. At this time 809 was reported to be searching for living quarters in Ruza or Mozhai and that the two of them were in contact through a dead drop and possibly the use of their s/w pads for messages. Initially there was some justifiable speculation as to whether his radio equipment was intact and so we proceeded to send him A-2 emission broadcasts which he could pick up if he was using a commercial receiver. However, it has been found that his radio equipment is all in order... On 21 September 1953 he stated that he was registered and working as a carpenter, presumably in Vereya. In his first w/t message on 14 October 1953 he stated that his w/t signal plans and his URC-4 were recovered but that the propoganda material of the SHUBA 100 was still buried. No trip had been made to the DZ in the autumn because they wished to become secure in their work and living quarters, logical reasoning. In this message also it was stated that our semin communication channel using the Moscow firm letters and the Berlin intercept procedure had received an unexpected jolt. All of the firm letters are postmarked with #200 and from this message we learned that the reason for this was because all of the firms were located in the new "skyscraper" on Smolenskaya Ploshad as was post office #200. The real problem was involved in the fact that a pass was necessary for entrance. To get around the 808 stated that he had asked women who were entering to mail the letters. He took the calculated risk and two of the three letters so mailed passed through. As all were enciphered

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and bore no other incriminating evidence the risk after passage as regards tracing is negligible. However, we became understandably ~~anxious~~ **KAPUK** about the security aspects involved and wired him to use his discretion. Of course the basic assumption under which this channel was set up was that the letters could be put in any letter-box on the Smolenskaya Pleshad, seemingly that assumption is invalid.

808 stated that he has listened to us both in the woods and in his room, and that the local power is 200. He is employed as a carpenter in the REMSTROIKONTORA KRASNAYA#4, presumably in Vereya. (note: check of industrial register files gives no listing either in Moscow or Vereya for this plant. 808 worked after the war on construction work so that his present employment is most logical). He stated that he has travelled to Moscow 7 times, and that it takes 3 hours by bus or truck and that there were no controls. In his last communication on 3 November 1953 he stated that after the drop they went three km and that the unrecovered things are buried approximately at TRENOVI. (note: this is a portion of a reconstructed garble. The village of TRENOVI was able to be found north of Maikop). He reported that when he was in Maikop he had seen a lathe manufacturing factory, a lumber, and furniture factory but did not see any new oil refinery construction of the type we requested information on. He also gave full information on the documents (PP and VB) which he had been issued in Berdsk on the basis of the manesty document. His last word was that he would refrain from letters (note: this refers to the Berlin intercept letters, but as he also has forgotten the addresses given by the "professor", SHUBA 137, in Belgium and Norway we can expect no further mail from him until we straighten out this situation or give him new addresses. We have sent a series of interrogatories to the field for answer regarding the Vysotdom and Smolenskaya Pleshad, and it is hoped that on the basis of the answers that some advice can be given. We also hope that certain other addresses can be established in sectors not as overworked as Liege). We are now listening for 808 on his back-up or secondary ~~agency~~ **KAPUK** (note: on the basis of an investigation made by the communication's security people, especially ***** , it was felt that

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that the RIS could quite probably predict and reconstruct the signal plan of 808 on the basis of the four signal plans which they can be assumed to have found with SHUBAS 805, 804, 807, and 806. In some smaller degree the same applies to 808 and 810 but not to a degree sufficient to warrant changing plans. The selection of times, call signs, and frequencies is supposedly on a random basis but even so each factor is limited and thus the possibility of reconstruction and prediction is presented.

b. Present situation

808 is registered, living and working veraya. He has documents and is able to travel with mobility at least as far as Moscow. He has only his s/w pads for communication (note: each page contains 36 groups and there are 10 pages to a pad. Each agent had two encipher and two decipher pads for s/w) He is unable to write due to poor memory and Vysotdom pass system. He is now working the reserve or back-up w/t plan for security reasons. Last contact with him was made on 3 November 1953 and since that time we have sent him two w/t broadcasts asking further document questions and further questions on the Vysotdom. Lastly we have asked him to set up an internal mailing address under suitable cover and under someone else's name so that we can send him w/t pads and s/w messages. (note: one of the technical aspects of this operation is the fact that we will be sending through Moscow Embassy facilities and using an s/w system. At the present time 808 has not system for developing secret writing. It has been found that --- in --- can provide a highly secure "scorch system" for us which can be easily communicated to the agent, thus eliminating our problem). We are currently monitoring both his primary and his secondary plans both at Limber and Meca.

c. Analysis of Traffic.

1. w/t Analysis

Generally the correct commo procedure has been utilized. The

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crypte signal indicates lack of control. On 14 October 1953 the safety signal was given in reply to the case officer challenge. The radio ~~signal~~ ^{copy} compares favorably with our records made during training. All encipherments have been according to taught procedures and instructions. The use of the nominative case for all place names is in accordance with case officer instructions. All questions which are easily answerable by w/t message have been answered and all document information checks as far as information goes both as to letters, numbers and numerals. The fact that he has spent 9000 rubles and has 14,000 rubles left seems logical. All data given agrees with that which 808 also gave.

On the negative side we find that no transmission sites have been given no statement as to intended future plans which is a violation of communications procedure. It was unfortunate that there should be an unreconstructable garble at the time when the cache was being described (note: we should ask for a repeat of this cache) but we feel that the village named is TERNOVI located north of Malop. However we were unable to find the village of Itemskii which should be near Berdsk. (note: 808 called it Chemskaa, so that we have another ambiguity).

2. s/w Analysis

A test by headquarter's experts on 3 December 1953 indicated that the handwriting on the letters received agreed with samples taken during training (note: it must be stated that the letters were the firm letters and thus contained only numbers for comparison yet the results should be reliable. The fact that the first letter was lost is worthy of comment. This letter was either never cleared by the postal authorities, never mailed by the woman, missed in the Berlin intercept, or actually picked up and striped by the RIS. (note: Merchantil the addressee has now moved from Berlin to the western zone of Germany but his exact whereabouts are unknown).

On the positive side, all crypto ~~signals~~ ^{copies} indicate freedom from control, procedure for crypto work is normal, place names were in the nominative case all questions posed were answered, and ~~SECRET~~ to the last group was filled in with the digit of the last letter of the message according to his custom while at the school,

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Standard first message procedure was used. While 808 forgot to sign a signature to the first letter we received he filled on ~~various~~ ~~persons~~ correctly in his last letter.

On the negative side are the missing 175 groups of the first unreceived message. As there were no safety/danger signals given for use with the Berlin firm letters, we have no basis for further comments. (the letters took respectively 9 and 13 days in transit.)

3 comments

The overwhelming preponderance of the evidence seems to indicate that this man is still clean. Only upon the receipt of more traffic can this position be fully established yet the best educated guess which can be made at this time is that he is successfully established according to his mission plan.

Planned exploitation:

We hope that both of these men will be able to establish their letter channels once again, especially so if they are unable to find their other cache. Their trip to the cache area should be most important and we have already posed questions on the Armavir airfield. If they are able to find their w/t pads all will be well for no immediate resupply will be necessary. Otherwise, we will have to think of the possibility of resupply for the two w pads will last him only for two years at best (note: this is on the basis of one 200 group message per month for two years). Thus the establishment of long term communication via w/t and the reworking of their s/w channel are top priority for without communications the agents soon lose their value to us. The return trip to Armavir and the possible establishment of a channel for internal mail are the top priorities at the moment.

Then 808 will be asked to give detailed OB and airfield intelligence on the city and airfield in Klin. He is well located in this regard, much more so than 809. Each man will be thoroughly debriefed on document and registration, living and working, controls, and mailing procedures.

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Both men will be asked for a more thorough explanation regarding the
amnestied prisoners in NOVOSIBIRSK, as to the personalities involved,
documents, camps, and crimes. They will be asked specific intelligence
questions on the new hydroelectric construction taking place on the Ob'
river in Berdsk.

Generally, however, these men are ideally situated and we must
watch our progress with them. Both are within easy access to many high
priority targets in the Moscow oblast area. Even as agents in place they
will have access to trends of popular feeling and be able to provide us
with a continuous report of trends, grievances, provocations, repercussions,
and sentiments. This method of reporting has definite value to us as a
method of measuring the real feelings of the Russian people and as a
guide for our psychological attacks on the Communist regime. It is
impossible for embassy officials under stringent surveillance to obtain
such off-hand and smouldering feelings.

As their mobility seems to be guaranteed they will be able to
easily, simply by walking and by casual observation, secure information
on priority targets in Ramenshoye and Noginsh as well as other targets of
military and nuclear energy potential

A third factor is that since they are well established and working,
they will become subject to periodic vacations and can take at least a
72 hour trip. We can give them a detailed itinerary and points on which
to check by merely train window observation.

Both of these agents are high grade and should be able to perform
for us as we deem best. It is up to us now to so phrase our demands that
the product obtained will be high grade. Both are following the SHURA mission
and will be invaluable assets in case of war. Both can be counted upon
to do political activist work if we deem it expedient or to assess and
evaluate possible agent types.

SHUBA 810

1. Chronological account

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SHUBA 810 was infiltrated into the USSR on the evening of 29 April 1953 ^{Bryansk} by clandestine aircraft in company with SHUBA 811. As these men were to stay together for a day or two before splitting up, and as the preponderance of the evidence indicates that SHUBA 811 is controlled, it should be borne in mind while reading this account that possibly also 810 was picked up at the same time. To date we have received one s/w letter and three w/t messages and have sent him four w/t messages. His first contact was by a letter mailed 26 August 1953 from Orsha which stated that he was living in Bryansk, his target city... Then there is a slight ambiguity as to whether he actually worked in Astrakhan or merely according to his documents. He also stated that he had had difficulty making contact and in fact had vainly tried twice. A month later we received a message giving the location of his Leningrad area cache for SHUBA 803. A month later and his message stated that he had received little of our messages to him but he told us that he had buried his own equipment in two caches located at Beliys Berega and the Suzemskiy Raion. (note: the security hazards in returning to the D.Z. area for his equipment cannot be overemphasized due to the capture of 811. It also should be noted that the subject's mother lives close to Suzemskii Raion and as had a deep affect attachment for his mother it should be considered that he violated instructions and visited her without prior headquarters consent. He stated that he was registered in Bryansk and employed on the laying of a gas conduit. In his last contact of 5 December he stated that our messages had been well received. He stated that ~~he~~ had made the Leningrad cache in September (after his first letter to us and in spite of the fact that

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this cache was to be his first action after the drop) and clarified its location satisfactorily. He is registered with his own documents (note: we assume here that he means with new documents which he has acquired) as living at Verkhni Pereulok #13 and that his landlord M.A. Stepin helped with the arrangements. (note: no record was found of Stepin in headquarters, green sheet check is pending and there are no phone books available). His employer is the Bryansk Stroitrest, Stroimontazhnoe Upravlenie (SMU) on Kalinin Street #76 (note: check with the industrial desk was fruitless yet this does not mean that such a location does not in fact exist. There seems to be no collection of such offices or departments. Headquarters is usually unproductive on such matters and so as not to finger the man at all no check was requested from them. It is an overt check.

2. Present situation

a. SHUBA 810 is presently settled, registered, has documents, and a job in Bryansk.

3. Analysis of Traffic.

a. W/T traffic

In all three messages his crypto digit has indicated freedom from control. He has utilized correct communications and cryptographic procedure. In his first message per his briefing he reported on the location of the cache for 803. His fist with its sending characteristics compares favorably with a recording made during training. In all broadcasts he has given his transmission location and in all except that describing the cache he has given an indication as to his future plans according to instructions. His location and description of the cache is according to the school solution.

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On the negative side we have: on the first message the message number followed the transmission location, and the message started on page

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#6 of the w/t/ pad without explanation. He also didn't use his lowest numbered pad for encrypting. Garbles of the important cache ~~KABOW~~ and complaints of our commo and crypto abilities sound strangely familiar as with 803. His traffic content for the most part has been definite yet there are vast gaps and uncertainty in his story which need explanation and which he has refused to do. Also on his 1 November 1953 he made the unexplainable communication error of using the time and frequency assigned for 1 November and used the call signs on both primary and secondary frequencies for the 20th of November. (note: when this happened on primary the base operator refused to accept the traffic and changed to secondary frequency where the same mistake was made. The operator at the base felt that it was better to receive the message even though the wrong call signs were used than to lose the possible valuable traffic.) Finally, we must repeat that the cache was not made until mid-september when it should have been the first order of business and the agent returned to the D.Z. area for his bundles which he then buried in the vicinity of Bryansk.

b. S/W traffic

Only one letter has been received from 810 and that on 8 September 1953. The handwriting found in this letter corresponds favorable with samples made during training. (note: headquarters technical analysis made on 4 December 1953). This is the first and only s/w letter which we have received which also contained an enciphered text and thus the basis of comparison for the handwriting is not too firm, yet firm enough for our purposes.

S/W procedures and crypto signals are indicative of freedom from control. The setup of the letter (very long cover letter in disorganized vein and very short s/w letter) are in the habit of assessment.

On the negative side we have the absence of the safety-signal (note: unless the fact that the date is written in Roman numerals is to be considered as benign in numbers.) Then again the w/w or SHURA 100 cipher indicator

is absent yet there is s/w note: we thus have no way ever knowing from
signas or signals whether s/w text and/or the SHUBA 100 code is being employed/
Headquarters analysis of the SHUBA 100 code is hampered by the fact that no one
in the analysis section is an expert in the Russian language and thus is unable
to pick up the idiosyncrasies of grammer and spelling (which possibly are tell
tale). Without apparant reason the message also started on page two of the s/w
pad which is a violation of commo procedure. On the envelope the number of the
Belgian house was written after the street and not before it, and the English
word for Belgium instead of the French was used. (note: 810 had lived in France
and should have remembered how the French write the Street address and also
how to spell Belgium in French (Belgique). It is also worthy of comment that
there was no provision in his operational plan for a trip to Astrakhan. The
dangers from associations with 811 and the reutn to the D.Z. area cannot
be overemphasized. However, seemingly careful measures and precaustions have
been taken to give us any information on the post drop period or of any
association with 811. (note: perhaps this lack can be justified by the agents
over security consciousness, but it is felt a weak alibi).

c. Summary

At this writing a definitive decision as to the status of 810
is most difficult to make. He was a poorer type agent given to lackadaisical
whims and a "couldn't care less attitude". It must also be remembered that
final briefings were given too late. With tension at top pitch it was
impossible to imagine that last minute details which were never practised
could be mastered professionally. This may excuse much of the disquieting
evidence regarding control yet it cannot excuse much of the disquieting evidence
regarding control yet it cannot excuse other evidence which must carry
great weight and which indicated control exists. We must await mor traffic
but at the present moment I feel that the evidence of control more than

balances that pointing to freedom.

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4. Planned exploitation

a. We will initially check the agent's bona fides by posing the case officer challenge. Then he will be exploited on all document, and residence, travel, and control themes. We still need his estimate of the fate, if known, of 811, yet we cannot come right out and demand it. We will then concern ourselves with the operational aspects of his mission and the reconnaissance of the Bryansk woods. The city of Orsha has a large bomber base south of the city as well as being a main station and freight depot for traffic on the Moscow, Minsk, Brest railroad over which must flow much of the war might and potential of the Russian Red Army when war approaches or is begun. The "Belgres" power plant in near-by Orekovsk is also a prime target for possible abotage.

b. Outside of these possibilities we also have the chance of moving him to a more productive locale in the Ukraine: Odessa or Kiev. However, it is felt that the potimum should be secured from his present status and legalized condition before any such move is made. We cannot afford to have rolling stones for every such move involves relocating and reregistering with all of their attending dangers.

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H. Possibilities for the Future:

We should not go blithly forward without any look into the future and to some of the possible hurdles which we may be forced to surmount. Some of the more possible ones are:

1. Controlled status with a double agent situation.
2. Demand for exfiltration
3. Demand for reupply of money
4. Depletion of S/W and W/T pads
5. Breakdown of W/T equipment
6. Compromise of our S/W addresses
7. RIS handling so that we are forced either to recover a cache with a clean agent or admit to them that we know the cashing agent is controlled and that they are playing him.
8. Demands on agent's part to visit family or friends.
9. Agent demand to enter activist propoganda work (note: On 367 and wife of 367 there is no control which we can muster which will prevent these actions).
10. Refusal of agent to perform a given mission or activity.
11. Sickness or accident to the agent demading hospitalization.
12. Forgetfulness and loss of skills and techniques.
13. Relazing of security principles.

FINAL SUMMARY:

1. In short these agents are tremendous assets to our program. They are sources of intelligence of several possible kinds, they are able to give voice to the sentiments of the people, they can give notice of wartime preparations. In the event of war they can advise us of behind the lines affairs, they can become reception committees for new agents, they can become

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propaganda activists, with their weapons they can carry on partisan activity they can become principal agents for nets dedicated to the subversion of the USSR through insidious activity, and finally they can be infiltrated and utilized by SHUBA 100 for the advantage of all concerned. Each and every one of these features is made more interesting in that the efforts of the RIS are being dirrused in various direction trying to hunt hown the men. In the case of capture or control, the facilities of the RIS are coubly taxed for they must handle the operation delicately and with finesse. The greater the professionalism, the greater the RIS red tape and exertion.

Although seemingly in the overall picture of this operation the "take" has been limited to a few names and addresses of people and work offices, to the mouthing of document numbers and letters, to general statements of "time and tide", to complaints of lost caches and poor contacts, and although great gaps appear in the chronological reporting in that not one agent has told us in deatil of his drop or where he landed, although not one has given the red corpusled details on any aspect of his life except for the listing of dry itineraries, although not one raised a spontaneous cry of emotion at the death of Stalin, the ouster of Beriya, or the Berlin riots, although little of the information which has been given us has been able to be verified, and that which has been is of such a nature that intelligence-wise little has been gained, although caches have been made, they mold, and although addresses and signals have been given they are forgotten and omitted, even so a total of 147 contacts have been made, valuable operational techniques have been developed and skills mastered, and what is of greatest import, these men remain (even though all become controlled eventually) a link directly to the heart of the Communist government. I state that project SHUBA 100/SHUBA 800 has been successful and that it has tremendous potential for the future even greater successes.

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SHUBA 802 a. Working: Construction Trust #1, Minsk (general laborer)
b. Living: Gramadskii Pereulok 20A, Minsk.
c. Registered: Yes, in Minsk.

SHUBA 803: a. Living: Petrograd Gorraion, Leningrad.
b. Working: Franze Telephone Uzel, Leningrad (repairman helper)
Tel # for Chief K2-04-25
Tel # for Engr K2-03-05
c. Registered: Yes, in Leningrad.

SHUBA 810: a. Living: Verkhni Pereulok #13, Bryansk.
K
b. Working: Bryansk Stroitrest, Stroimontazhnoe Upravlenie (SMU)
Kalinin Stl # 76 (laborer laying gas main)
c. Registered: Yes, in Bryansk.

SHUBA 809: a. Living: Somewhere in Vereya
b. Working: Remstroikontora Krasnaya #4, Vereya (carpenter)
c. Registered: Yes, in Vereya.

SHUBA 808 a. Living: #10 Krasnaya St., Klin.
b. Working: Warehouse office of Klintorg on Sovetskaya Square, Klin
c. Registered: Yes, in Klin.

SHUBA 811 a. Living: Vokzal'naya #33, Apt.1, Minsk.
b. Working: Prefabrication Factory on Puteiskoi St., Minsk (carpenter)
c. Registered: Yes, in Minsk.

(802) PP 1948 goznak
(a) I TER 635250, issued 9 July 1952 by Second Section Militia of Pskov.
(b) I ZHR) 636250 valid till 9 July 1957, issued on basis of Gdov ROMVD,
(c) IZZR 23 June 1947. Gdov PP # I ZHR 328536.

VB Registered with Kaganovich RVK?

TK

(803) PP 1948 goznak
II YUE 594525, issued by BYOSK POSELOK OTDELENIIE MILITSII.
DYAT'KOGO RAION, BRYANSK OBLAST, 14 July 1949.

VB (not his) has svidetelstbo so VB not needed.

Gznak ??

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Printed: 1946

A #245893, issued by Smolensk Raiwoenkomat, Leningrad, 27

January 1948.

Handwritten initials

TK

Student's Card.

Svidetelstvo ob Osvobozhdenii ot Voenski Sluzhby: Possible new printing prikaz of 1951 mentioned which disseminated more recent edition of raspisanie bolezny.

Amnesty Spravka format (copied)

(810) "Registered with my own documents" --- ambiguous

(note: all working establishments have been checked but no information has been found in the files).

(809) VB EO # 967976, issued by RVK Berdsk, 11 June 1953.

PP VIII TF # 663271, issued by Itemski Village Section of the Novosibirski Oblast on 4 June 1953. Gznak 1949.

(808) PP VII TO 663282 (663382) by Chemeki (Itemski) Village Militia Section, 5 June 1953

BB ZH 967980, GVK, Berdsk, 11 June 1953.

(811) PP KHUBA 99 documents reliable. Registered with 8th Section of Militia.

VB SHUBA 99 documents reliable. Kaganovich RVK

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Volodya:

PP IV NU 699582

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issued by the Third Detachment Militia in city of Minsk.

VB None.

[Handwritten signature]

Svidetelstvo ob Osvobozhdenii ot Voenski Sluzhby, #239, issued 1943
(stated in Mag #5); printed 1943, issued 1945 (stated in Mag. #6)

[Handwritten signature]
KAPAK

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