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TO : Chief of Base, Pullach

Info: COS, ULS

FROM : Chief, EE

SUBJECT { GENERAL : Operational
        { SPECIFIC : Ludwig ALBERT Case

REFERENCE: EGID 1643, 26 June 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: Recontact G-2, USAREUR, as suggested below.

1. As advised in reference, we got in touch with ⊏ ⊐ and discussed Subject case with him at some length. The advise was excellent as ⊏ ⊐ is probably the best informed individual on the aspects of the case which interest us. Please convey to G-2 our appreciation for the suggestion that we talk to ⊏ ⊐ and the clearance to do so on this subject.

2. In general, the points made by ⊏ ⊐ are as follows: A long time CIC contact (perhaps since 1948) and yet a considerable handling problem and distinctly never considered entirely trustworthy by CIC, Heinrich SCHMITZ was only one of the principal agents of Operation CAMPUS. The contact and even the close relationship between SCHMITZ and ALBERT was known to CIC from an unspecified, but early date. Until the middle of 1953 when CAMPUS was rather precipitously closed out, however, ZIPPER had never been targetted by CAMPUS, and ALBERT/SCHMITZ had not provided information on UPSWING. Shortly after CAMPUS folded, SCHMITZ wrote a letter of complaint to the U.S. Ambassador in Bonn, and CIC, calling in ⊏ ⊐ as case officer again, hastily reestablished contact in September 1953, intending to satisfy SCHMITZ's demands in the interests of CAMPUS security, and drop him as soon as possible. Clearly this objective was not accomplished, as SCHMITZ and SCHNEIZER were both being run up to the time of ALBERT's arrest, though most of the handling was done by another CIC case officer, and ⊏ ⊐ was definitely out of the case as of about March 1955.

3. It was only upon being recontacted in September 1953 and being required to state and produce his assets that SCHMITZ came up with ALBERT as a disgruntled UPSWING member desirous of passing on information about UPSWING deficiencies to responsible authorities. Though SCHMITZ was of course paid by CIC, who was also aware that SCHMITZ admitted working for ALBERT and being paid by him, CIC never paid ALBERT.

_____   _____   _____
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No written reports were received by CIC from ALBERT. The reports received were allegedly SCHMITZ's written accounts of material supplied verbally by ALBERT.

4. Sharing entirely our views on the extreme importance of clarifying and coordinating this case, [   ] regrets that the details of ALBERT/SCHMITZ reporting which he can recall at this point in time and space are at best quite fragmentary. Yet it is exactly these details which may contain the clues which will allow us to get on with investigations possibly leading to serious security weak points within UPSWING. [   ] is of the opinion that the original SCHMITZ reports in German must still be retained at 66th CIC headquarters in Stuttgart, and suggests that these might well be at once the most important items to see, because of their detail and the clues which might be provided by their form, and the easiest for CIC to provide us, as there should be no sterilization problem. Will you please get in touch with G-2 again, making all of the above points, and requesting direct access to the SCHMITZ reports as a first step in our further investigation, or to other material which would provide the same data.

5. You will note from the Herbert WEIMANN file that ALBERT was reporting to UPSWING on SCHMITZ's part in Operation CAMPUS since at least mid 1952 (under-signed believes the time was actually early 1952). There seems to be no currently available indication that ALBERT was in contact with SCHMITZ prior to that date. There are, however, various indications that ALBERT, rather than CIC or UPSWING, actually controlled SCHMITZ. The big question, of course, is who had the most effective working control of ALBERT. Having talked to [   ] we believe CIC would make no pretensions in this direction, and the evidence indicates UPSWING would have little basis for claiming principal control of ALBERT. Either ALBERT was for sometime relatively successfully playing all parties off against each other, or the basic control lay in the hands of his eastern employer. In our opinion, analysis of this key case gives the best promise of results in the direction of detection of major areas in which UPSWING may be penetrated. Proper analysis of this case depends upon bringing together for study at some point the details of the ALBERT-SCHMITZ relationship, the SCHMITZ interrogation by the Germans, and the ALBERT archives. We are unlikely to get our hands on the latter two until we have analyzed the first and are in a position to talk about it to UPSWING. This is the basis for our current requests to G-2, USAREUR. Please emphasize to G-2 as often as necessary that this is no simple historical research project, but a vital matter of security.

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CEP:bjw(19 July 1957)

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