

## S E C R E T

## ARGENTINA - POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICES

1. Organization

The following organizations comprise the Argentine police and security services:

a. Secretariat of State Information (SIDE). A staff of about 250 (mainly military). SIDE has overall coordinating responsibility for the Argentine intelligence community but lacks enforcement powers. An anti-Communist section investigates Communist and Sino-Soviet Bloc activities within Argentina, coordinates the anti-Communist activities of other Government agencies, and prepares intelligence studies on Communism. SIDE also has a psychological action department which prepares and distributes anti-Communist propaganda, departments concerned with other subversive movements, and a limited foreign intelligence capability represented by several staff officers stationed abroad.

b. Federal Police. A force of about 20,000 with nationwide responsibility for the maintenance of public order. An internal security component, the Coordination Department, is concerned with the investigation and control of Communist activities, labor agitation, and espionage and subversion by foreign powers.

c. Provincial Police. Maintained by each province for routine law enforcement.

d. National Gendarmerie. A force of about 11,000 responsible for policing the land frontiers and for quelling internal disturbances.

e. Armed Forces. The Army (72,000), Navy (29,000 plus 8,000 Marines), Air Force (16,000), and Coast Guard (9,000) may be used to suppress disturbances which the police and gendarmerie cannot handle. The Army, Navy and Air Force each maintains a separate intelligence service.

2. General Capability

The Argentine police and security services have shown a strong capability, by Latin American standards, to detect and neutralize subversion and insurgency. The promulgation in January 1963 of the first of four proposed new security laws has strengthened the authorities' hand by providing more severe sanctions for subversive and extremist activity. Providing they act in concert, the Argentine police and security services can cope successfully with any internal security threat short of a general popular uprising.

3. Limitations and Weaknesses

No serious deficiencies are apparent in the training, equipment, administration, discipline, or morale of the Argentine services.

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4. Riot Control Capability

The Federal Police, the primary force for suppression of civil violence, have proved to be well-trained, well-equipped, and effective. As noted previously, the National Gendarmerie and, if necessary, the Armed Forces are available for this purpose.

5. CI/CE Capability

SIDE, the Coordination Department of the Federal Police, and the military intelligence services have relatively well-developed CI/CE capabilities. These services are known to have low-level penetrations of the Argentine Communist Party, physical surveillance teams, technical penetrations of Soviet-bloc installations. The Federal Police, with the cooperation of SIDE, the National Gendarmeries, and the Coast Guard, have energetically exploited these capabilities by rounding up Communists, seizing propaganda materials, and closing Communist and Communist-front printing facilities and meeting sites. Enforcement will become more effective with the enactment of stiffer laws against subversion.

6. Technical Capability

SIDE and the Coordination Department of the Federal Police, and to a lesser extent the military intelligence services, have and exploit technical capabilities which include microphone plants, telephone tapping, mail intercepts, and photographic surveillance.

7. Liaison with Other Central and South American Countries

SIDE is believed to be the only Argentine service that maintains liaison on security matters with other Latin countries. SIDE has representatives in at least the following countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, and Uruguay.

9. Communist Penetration of Services

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No Communist penetrations of the Argentine police and security services are known to have been discovered, although these services are an obvious Communist target and some degree of penetration must be presumed. An investigation is

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currently in course of a leak within the Federal Police involving the Czech Mission in Buenos Aires.

10. Coastal Patrol Capability

The Coast Guard, an all-volunteer force of some 9,000, is well-trained, fairly well-equipped, and effective within the obvious limitations imposed by Argentina's extensive coastline.



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ARGENTINA

I. The Communist Party of Argentina (PCA)

A. Manpower and Organization.

The Communist Party of Argentina (PCA) has 40,000 to 50,000 members and some 100,000 sympathizers. Its main strength lies in the Federal Capital and in the urban centers of the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Mendoza, and Cordoba.

Another important group, the orthodox Trotskyist Workers Party (POT) and other Trotskyist splinter groups number about 10,000 members. The POT reportedly has won from the PCA some of its members who subscribe to a more active and aggressive revolutionary role than that which is currently espoused by the PCA, and continually chides the PCA for its lack of direct action. Ties with the Trotskyist movements of other Latin American countries are maintained by the POT in part through the Latin American Bureau of the Fourth International.

The Socialist Vanguard, an extreme leftwing group led by David Tieffenberg which broke from the Argentine Socialists (itself a splinter group of the old Argentine Socialist Party) in May 1961, appears at times to be farther to the left than the PCA. This group joined the Communists in enthusiastic support of Peronist candidates in the March 1962 elections. It can be counted on to hew closely to the Communist line even though it disavows any allegiance to Moscow. Its strength is estimated at less than 50,000 votes under its own party banner.

B. Condition of the PCA

Although well organized, the PCA is not considered a strong party by international Communist circles. Other Latin American Communist parties believe that the PCA involves itself too much with theoretical leadership and too little with grass-roots action and some pressure has been exerted by them to have the PCA become more directly involved in Argentine labor, student, and political activities. Reporting, however, is inadequate to support reliable judgments on the extent of the party's indirect influence among existing opposition forces. In the circumstances which have existed since the fall of the Frondizi government, this is obviously of critical importance.

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Once quite powerful the PCA has declined in strength and is now only nominally legal. It is increasingly harassed by the military-supported Guido government, and is prohibited from carrying out propaganda and other normal overt political activities. Arrests of party officials continue, although these have been confined largely to medium and low-level members. High-level leaders continue to travel throughout Argentina and to other countries with relative freedom. The party's financial campaigns have not done well and on many occasions funds were not available for propaganda during crucial periods. Many party members never were and still are not active. For prestige purposes the PCA is concerned with the loss in membership and is currently conducting an enlistment campaign. There appears to be little evidence of dissension in the PCA despite the fact that many of the top leaders are over sixty years of age and a national party congress has not been held since 1946. The party has virtually unanimously supported the CPSU in the current Sino-Soviet controversy.

### C. Para-Military and Intelligence Activities

The PCA is reported to have initiated a guerrilla training program. Although specific details regarding numbers being trained, equipment, and group locations are not available, there has been sufficient reporting to establish that a guerrilla training program by the PCA is under way. Recent raids by Argentine security officials have brought to light maps, weapons, and other items indicating that the PCA does have some type of guerrilla program. The party is known to have trained and equipped some "shock groups" for sabotage and riots, but so far there has been little evidence of their employment.

## II. Political Assets

Incapable of seizing control of Argentina independently, the PCA continues to work toward a united democratic front with other political parties, especially the Peronist, to take advantage of their greater strength and appeal. The Peronists, especially those active in labor, although not willing to accept leadership from the Communists, are not withdrawing their support from CP-endorsed plans and programs which they believe will be beneficial to the Peronist movement. An agreement in principle allegedly reached among the Tieffenberg faction of the Argentine Socialists, the Peronist leftwing faction, and the PCA, demonstrates that the party has gained some ground in this effort at rapprochement with other opposition forces.

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The party bases its hopes on the cumulative disruptive effect of continued disturbances, particularly within military and labor groups. The PCA apparently has taken few initiatives in this regard, realizing that it stands to gain more from the polarizing effect of the military, political, and labor groups' continued revolts, counter-revolts, labor strikes, and political bickerings that show no sign of letup. By standing back and remaining a strong, though small, united force, the party hopes that it will be the only organization which can furnish leadership for Argentine labor and left political groups if a crisis is precipitated.

The party holds a strong although not dominant position in the powerful General Confederation of Labor. It continues to exert considerable influence among students, particularly within the universities. Communist front organizations continue to function on a moderate scale and with limited scope, and although not numerically strong, do maintain the potential to combine with other leftist groups, to draw in individuals and students in favor of mass movements, and to form a national front for specific causes. These fronts include the Argentine Peace Council, the Communist Youth Federation, the Union of Argentine Women and the Argentine League for the Rights of Man.

Notwithstanding suppressive measures the PCA continues to publish various newspapers and periodicals such as the official weekly party newspaper Nuestra Palabra, Nueva Era, the voice of the Central Committee; and Revista Internacional, edited in Prague, another Spanish language edition of Problems of Peace and Socialism, the theoretical periodical of the international Communist movement.

The pro-Castro organizations such as the National Movement for Solidarity and Aid to the Cuban Revolution, the Brigade of Volunteers and Friends of the Cuban Revolution, and the various committees in support of Cuba, remain sporadically active, but with the rupture of diplomatic relations with Cuba on 8 February 1962 and the advent of the Guido government, visible evidence of pro-Castro activities has decreased appreciably.

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