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[Redacted]

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(S) SUBJ: ARMY VIEWS ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ON ARMED FORCES RELATIONS WITH THE INCOMING CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT

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[Redacted]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

301408Z CIA 761219WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ --WNINTEL-

DIST: 30 NOVEMBER 1983

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: ARMY VIEWS ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ON ARMED FORCES RELATIONS WITH THE INCOMING CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT

3.5(c)

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

SUMMARY. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARMY PRESENTED TO PRESIDENT-ELECT RUAL ((ALFONSIN)) AN ARMY-PREPARED PROPOSAL FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES ((FFAA)) WHEN THE TWO MEN MET ON 10 NOVEMBER 1983. ARMY OFFICERS PREPARED THE PROPOSAL BECAUSE THEY OBJECT TO A REORGANIZATION PLAN PREPARED BY AN ADVISOR OF ALFONSIN. ARMED FORCES OFFICERS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SELECTION OF RUAL ((BORRAS)) IS PARTICULARLY FAVORABLE FOR THE FFAA. OFFICERS, INCLUDING THOSE FAVORING THE RETURN TO A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, SEE THE DISAPPEARED ISSUE AS POTENTIALLY TROUBLESOME FOR ALFONSIN. MANY OFFICERS HAVE BEGUN TO TALK ABOUT A SENSE OF UNCERTAINTY WHICH HAS COME ABOUT BECAUSE OF THE SILENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT-ELECT ON THE SUBJECTS OF RETIREMENTS IN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE REORGANIZATION OF THE FFAA.

TEXT: 1. WHEN HE MET WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT RUAL ALFONSIN)) ON 10 NOVEMBER 1983, MAJOR GENERAL (MG) MARIO ((PIOTTI)), SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARMY, LEFT WITH ALFONSIN AN ARMY-PREPARED PLAN FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES ((FFAA)). UNDER THIS ARMY PROPOSAL, AUTHORITY AND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND WOULD FLOW FROM THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE THROUGH A CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF TO THE CHIEFS OF STAFF -- ALL THREE ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS -- OF EACH SERVICE.

3.3(b)

3.3(b)(1)

[REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] ALFONSIN MIGHT ACCEPT THIS REORGANIZATION PROPOSAL, WHICH IS BASED ON A FRENCH CONCEPT. [REDACTED] OFFICERS OF ALL THREE SERVICES GENERALLY FIND THE PROPOSAL ACCEPTABLE, EVEN THOUGH AIR FORCE OFFICERS HAVE EXPRESSED SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT IT.)

2. ARMY OFFICERS PREPARED THEIR REORGANIZATION PROPOSAL AS A COUNTER TO A PLAN SUBMITTED BY RETIRED ARMY COLONEL GUSTAVO ((CACERES)), AN ADVISOR TO ALFONSIN. THEY DID NOT LIKE CACERS' PLAN WHICH, BASED ON THE U.S. MODEL, CALLED FOR SERVICE SECRETARIES SELECTED FROM RETIRED OFFICERS TO SERVE IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND BETWEEN THE DEFENSE MINISTER AND THE SERVICE CHIEFS OF STAFF. THE ARMY OFFICERS OBJECT TO THE CACERES PLAN BECAUSE IT INVOLVED RECALLING RETIRED OFFICERS TO ACTIVE DUTY TO SERVE AS THE SERVICE SECRETARIES: THEY BELIEVE THAT RETIRED OFFICERS WOULD BE OUT OF TOUCH WITH THE ARMED FORCES AND WOULD NOT BE ABREAST OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE FFAA. [REDACTED] COMMENT: CURIOUSLY, HOWEVER, THE ARMY REORGANIZATION PROPOSAL WOULD PERMIT THE GOVERNMENT TO RECALL A RETIRED OFFICER TO ACTIVE DUTY TO SERVE AS CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF.)

3.3(b)(1)

3. AS OF EARLY IN THE FOURTH WEEK OF NOVEMBER, OFFICERS FROM THE ARMY AND FROM THE OTHER SERVICES INDICATED THAT THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SELECTION OF RUAL ((BORRAS)) AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE-DESIGNATE IS PARTICULARLY FAVORABLE FOR THE FFAA. THEY BASE THIS ATTITUDE LARGELY ON THE FACT THAT BORRAS IS AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY TO THEM. THEY SAY, ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT JUAN CARLOS ((PUGLIESE)), AN EARLY CANDIDATE FOR THE DEFENSE PORTFOLIO WHO INSTEAD WILL LEAD THE MAJORITY BLOC OF THE RADICAL CIVIC UNION (UCR) IN THE R OF DEPUTIES, IS WELL KNOWN TO, AND RESPECTED BY, ARMED FORCES OFFICERS AND, THEY CLAIM, WOULD HAVE ALLOWED THEM TO CARRY OUT THEIR DUTIES WITH LITTLE INTERFERENCE. THE OFFICERS DO NOT EXPECT BORRAS TO PERMIT THEM THIS FREEDOM OF ACTION IN REGARD TO INTERNAL SERVICE AFFAIRS.

4. IN ADDITION TO THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ABOUT THE SELECTION OF THE DEFENSE MINISTER-DESIGNATE, FFAA OFFICERS CONTINUE TO SHOW PREOCCUPATION WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT DEAL WITH PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE DISAPPEARANCES OF INDIVIDUALS DURING THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S. ALTHOUGH THIS PREOCCUPATION EXISTS ESPECIALLY AMONG OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, IT EXTENDS GENERALLY THROUGHOUT THE FFAA. EVEN OFFICERS WHO SUPPORT THE RETURN TO A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT ALFONSIN MUST DEAL CAUTIOUSLY AND SLOWLY WITH THE DISAPPEARANCES ISSUE; THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT, IF ALFONSIN MOVES PRECIPITATELY, HE COULD CAUSE COMPLICATIONS FOR HIS GOVERNMENT. THESE OFFICERS HOLD, TOO, THAT CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ISSUE ALSO COULD PROVE TROUBLESOME FOR THE GOVERNMENT. ADDITIONALLY, A NUMBER OF FFAA OFFICERS ARE DISTURBED BY RECENT ACTIONS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED JUDGES, AND BY THE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THESE ACTIONS, IN REGARD TO ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED OFFICERS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY -- ACTIVITY WHICH, IN SOME CASES, APPEARS RELATED TO THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN.

5. MANY FFAA OFFICERS HAVE BEGUN TO TALK ABOUT A SENSE OF INSECURITY WHICH, THEY CLAIM, HAS ARISEN BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF INFORMATION CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHOM THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL RETIRE, A DECISION THAT WILL HAVE RAMIFICATIONS THROUGHOUT THE OFFICER CORPS OF THE THREE SERVICES. THESE OFFICERS ALSO HOLD THAT THE REFUSAL OF THE GOVERNMENT-ELECT TO ANNOUNCE ITS PLANS FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE FFAA HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SENSE OF UNCERTAINTY. BECAUSE OF THIS UNCERTAINTY, THE OFFICERS SAY, THE INITIATIVE FOR ARMED FORCES MATTERS INVOLVED THE GOVERNMENT-ELECT HAS PASSED TO THE CIVILIAN.

3.3(b)(1)

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