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The DCI Strategic Warning Committee's

## **Atrocities Watchlist**

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FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

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The DCI Strategic Warning Committee's Atrocities Watchlista				
Sudan. Arab militia along with government forces are being accused of ethnic cleaning and perha	ns.			
genocide: humanitarian disaster looms as the rainy season begins.				

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Special Warning Notice		(b)(3
Sudan		(b)(3
Both sides in Darfur almost certainly are still committing atrocities. Government actions over the past sixteen months reflect characteristics associated with past genocides. A major humanitarian crisis in which nearly 1.2 million civilians have been displaced and some 10 to 30 thousand civilians have died is expected to grow worse during the ongoing rainy season. The security situation also may deteriorate further despite the cease-fire between Khartoum and the two major rebel factions and the arrival of 120 international observers.		
• Since early 2003 military operations by government forces and militia, including a systematic scorched-earth campaign, have resulted in damage or destruction of an estimated 600 or more villages.		
• Hundreds of thousands more could die if fighting flares and massive aid is not forthcoming. with the loss of the last growing season major humanitarian assistance will be needed for the next 18 months.		(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3
Many atrocities can be attributed to the Jenjaweed, a militia numbering between 11,000 to 15,000 fighters from regional Arabs tribes. Khartoum has been using the Jenjaweed to destroy the rebels' support base within Darfur's ethnic African villages.	(b)(1) (b)(3)	
the government provided arms to the Jenjaweed and continues to support their attacks on villages, including air strikes.		(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3
Neither side has the capability to militarily defeat the other, yet the government seems determine to try to eliminate the insurgency, and the rebels show no inclination to lay down their arms.		(b)(1) (b)(3)
• militia members may be joining Sudanese army units to hide their identity from international observers.		(b)(1) (b)(3)
• The rebels continue to engage government forces and last month appear to have shot down a government helicopter. The government is accusing the rebels of taking advantage of the ceasefire by seizing territory.		(b)(3 <sub>)</sub>
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