26 October 1946

TO:

AB-43. Eunich

FROM: A

AB-51, Amzen

SUBJECT: C Stefan BANDERA

REF:

R-6064; LTS 746

1) As you know, the purpose of Colonel ANTONIUK's recent visit to USFET was to sid the U.S. authorities in the detection of BANDERA's whereabouts. Source Josephine reports that ANTONIUK is now devoting all his energies to the accomplishment of this one aim and, needless to emphasize, BANDERA's delivery into the Soviet hands would be the crowning success in ANTONIUK's career as an intelligence officer. We should, therefore, not underrate the determination of the Soviets to bring this to pass. The attached report was passed by ANTONIUK to G-2, USFET. It is of considerable interest inasmuch as it lists one STETESKO, Yaroslav, (also spelled STECIKO, STECIKO and STECZO) who is about to be arrested in Munich and brought to MISC, Oberursel, for interrogation. The following comment upon likely implications of STETSKO's arrest, offered by our USFET representative, can be accepted as inspired by official USFET sources.

2) "If STETSKO reveals BANDERA's hideouts, G-2 officially will probably try to pick him up and deliver him to the Soviets. I think, however, that they would wink at BANDERA's being tipped cff. Some people here are worked about the possibility that STETSKO may be a soviet penetration agent who will report to the RIS all information given to MISC, so they are bound to go ahead on whatever information he gives. If BANDERA is found the Political Advisor, Mr. Muccio would undoubtedly concur in his delivery to the Soviets.'

doubt would result to American interests in any form of collaboration with UHVR, should BANDERA be turned over to the Soviets by the U.S. authorities and, on the other hand, considering the equally serious effects on Soviet-American relations likely to ensue from open U.S. connivance in the unhampered continuance of his anti-Soviet activities on German soil, we should take special pains at steering a judicious

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BECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3BZB NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2004 2006 middle-course. The following course suggests ifself as best suited to avoid either pitfall.

4) You should contact the Lynx group and, referring back to you last meeting when you hade at abortive attempt at drawing them cut regarding BAMDERA's present whereabouts, point cut that the secrecy surrounding his movements would in the long view create more harm than good. You would point cut that rather than asking a direct question and courting another rebuff, you preferred to place yourself squarely on record as greatly concerned as regards BAMDERA's security but equally unable to materially contribute to its preservation, because you had not been taken into the complete confidence of the UHVR. You did not share the view that irreparable damage would be caused by BAMDERA's extradition, although it would doubtlessly constitute a heavy blow to the prestige for the Ukranian movement. Your main concern was, however, to establish a perfect understanding with the UHVR that BANDERA, once captured, would inevitably be handed over to the Soviets by the U.S. authorities. It would then be too late to intervene and pleasing protests would be absolutely to no avail. The UHVR would only have to blame itself in that case. Any demands made on you for a specific undertaking to guarantee BANDERA's security, vis a vis the U.S. authorities, should be declined, even if UHVR sees fit to let you in on the secret of his whereabouts.

5) In case STETSKE should come forward with information containing a lead to BANDERA's siding place, we shall try to inform you on time. If we have reason to believe that coverage of that lead is likely to result in BANDERA's capture, we shall have to lay out our course of action in the light of our conflicting interests in the natter. Tipping off BANDERA, if this should be decided upon, would have to be done with utmost discretion obviating the remotest possibility that his escape is traced back to a U.S. agency. In anticipation of such contingency, you should now cast about for secure reams of passing such information, taking into account, of course, that should any intimation of our commivence in BADDERA's escape reach the ears of the UHVR, we could expect with certainty that the Soviets would learn about it sconer or later. This dilemma could best be avoided, we believe, if the tip-off be launched into UHVR channels through an elaborate chain of notional and/or actual cutouts.

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