

Extractions

26 March 1945

TO : JJ/001
FROM : X-2, Bari.-BB/007 *BB-007*
SUBJECT : A BRIEF SURVEY OF X-2 BALKAN OPERATIONS.-
PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS AND FUTURE PLANS.

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S E C R E T

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CONTROL

1.

I. DISPOSITION OF X-2 PERSONNEL IN THE BALKANS.

1. In planning X-2 operations in the Balkans, the fact that the entire area is either Russian-occupied or in the Russian sphere of influence must be taken into consideration. Consequently, the securing of clearances and the provision of proper cover are difficult and delicate matters.

2. With the establishment of diplomatic representation all personnel working openly should be withdrawn as soon as practicable. However, foreseeing a continued shortage of competent personnel, certain concessions seem inevitable. Thus, personnel recalled from the Balkans might be employed in distant and/or neutral countries.

3. Because of poor OSS security, those selected for work under diplomatic cover should be carefully instructed to avoid OSS contacts before and after entry in the field.

4. In the following pages, a summary of intended personnel disposition in the Balkans is offered. Lacking a complete roster of potentially available X-2 employees, only the minimum requirements per country are specified.

S E C R E T

II. X-2 BALKAN FIELD HEADQUARTERS.

5. OSS Bari is now in the process of liquidation. At this writing most of the departments and Desks have already left for other points in Italy (mainly Rosignano and Caserta).

6. Our Desk, however, has made arrangements to continue here temporarily. It is intended to remain in Bari until a major military campaign in Italy and the northwest Balkans justify our moving elsewhere. This projected move will undoubtedly occur simultaneously with the transfer of British Intelligence Organizations further north, possibly Trieste or Venice.

7. Minimum requirements of Balkan Headquarters.

- One (1) Chief
- Three (3) Intelligence Officers (interrogator-analysts)
- One (1) Vetting-Tracing Officer
- One Administrative man
- One File Clerk
- Two Secretaries

Total: Nine (9).

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III. YUGOSLAVIA .

8. The following is the situation, based on recent information believed reliable, with regard to American representation in Yugoslavia:

9. Colonel Thayer until recently head of the OSS Independent American Mission to Marshal Tito will return to Washington, and Major Lindsay will head the OSS unit under the name of "American Mission to Yugoslavia".

10. The American diplomatic representation proper is now being established in Belgrade and according to latest knowledge, the Military Attache, as well as his assistant, are already in that city. The Assistant Military Attache, Lt. Kristovich, formerly a member of the R & A, OSS, spoke to the head of this Desk shortly before reporting in Belgrade. During this conversation, certain functions which X-2 could perform for the Military Attache were discussed.

11. The United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Mr. Patterson, presently at Capri, is to depart shortly. It is planned to arrange an interview with him in order to impress upon him the importance of maintaining a close link with X-2. At this time the subject of cover will be broached to the American Envoy.

12. According to an OSS source, Ambassador Patterson proposes to maintain a staff of about 50, excluding the naval and military attache personnel.

13. As for the OSS proper, field units are still being expedited to Yugoslavia, although on a reduced scale. These field units, as well as the Belgrade City Team itself will progressively be withdrawn, in proportion as German Army retreats from Yugoslavia. Only the R & A Branch is expected to continue with a relatively large staff, establishing its Hq. for Balkan Research and Analysis work at Belgrade.

14. With relation to X-2 in Yugoslavia, our staff there, consisting of two (2) ~~EM~~ are doing the best possible job under the circumstances. Unfortunately our failure to produce at least one officer for a post requiring close liaison with Yugoslav staff officers (ranking as high as generals) has proved a serious handicap.

15. Our representatives report their conviction that a good deal of the material in the possession of their counterpart (Captain R.) is withheld from them. The policy of bilateral exchange apparently is not fully realized. Most Secret information to be passed on to the Yugoslavs, channeled through and transmitted by BB although approved by London is actually not forthcoming.

16. Despite these obstacles the quality of material being received from X-2 Belgrade continues to improve.

17. Bari X-2 and X-B, as well as SILO collaboration on Yugoslav matters is satisfactory.

18. Minimum requirements for Yugoslavia:

Two (2) Intelligence officers
One (1) Secretary

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IV. A L B A N I A

A. OBSTACLES.

19. Entry into and intelligence work in Albania is no simple matter. An all-too eloquent proof of this fact is the experience of a special SILO mission to Tirana. The group, headed by Captain JEFFREY, arrived in Albania on 6 January 1945, and returned to Bari 22 January 1945. We quote several revealing passages from SILO's "Report on Visit to Albania" (26 Jan 1945):

20. "They (the present military authorities) are most suspicious of the Allies, of their actions and intentions, both present and future".

21. Describing the treatment received by the SILO mission, the report stresses that:

"They were not only passively unhelpful, but actively obstructionist".

22. Finally, summarizing the experience of the Mission:

"This Mission returned to Italy after sixteen (16) days of fruitless endeavor to penetrate FNC suspicion and prejudice, and without being granted access to or information about suspects held by the FNC".

23. In addition, it should be observed that two other missions have been waiting unsuccessfully for permission to enter Albania. One of these is the British 5 S.C.I. The other is the OSS SI TIRANA CITY TEAM, which has been awaiting clearance from the Albanians since the autumn of 1944.

B. IMMEDIATE PLANS.

24. In spite of the foregoing, X-2 Bari's prospects of obtaining clearance are good thanks to our friendly relations with Colonel HOXHA, Chief of the Albanian Mission in Bari. HOXHA realizes that our work in that country is of immediate military interest and can be beneficial to whatever democratic regime is in power. Final decision as to clearance is expected momentarily from the Albanian Government. Once this is received, we propose to send in 2 or 3 X-2 men for a period of 3 or 4 weeks. Following this, a permanent X-2 representative would be established in Tirana under diplomatic cover, as soon as feasible.

25. Should permission be denied, we shall abandon further efforts until diplomatic cover is available.

26. Minimum Requirements for Albania:

- a) One (1) Intelligence Officer
- b) One (1) Secretary

V. HUNGARY.

27. The OSS Budapest City Unit (with staff of approximately 50) has been waiting since September 1944 for permission to enter Hungary. An X-2 man was assigned to this team.

28. Since the prospects for an OSS mission appear questionable, it seems advisable to arrange for ACC or diplomatic cover instead. Due to the fact that the ACC has already been established in Hungary, diplomatic cover strikes us as most feasible.

29. The individual selected for X-2 work in Hungary is Stephen Streeter, who is thoroughly familiar with the Hungarian intelligence set-up. It is therefore recommended that immediate steps be taken up to

- a) Expedite his commission
- b) Forward permission from London to indoctrinate him in Most Secret.

30. Minimum requirements:

Two (2) Intelligence officers
One (1) Secretary

SECRET

VI. RUMANIA.

31. The reorganization of the X-2 office, by now completely compromised, is an urgent task: The chief and office manager are to be replaced; the native personnel gradually eliminated; employees borrowed from other branches, if potentially useful, to be vetted and briefed; all compromised agents liquidated and American personnel to be properly indoctrinated.

32. The present personnel, with the necessary changes, will continue until such time as new employees can be introduced under ACC or diplomatic cover.

33. When this occurs, all known OSS X-2 personnel will be returned to the Balkan Hq. for reassignment. This "liquidation" should be accomplished with sotto voce publicity through Bucharest governmental "grapevine".

34. Minimum requirements:

Two (2) Intelligence officers
Two (2) Secretaries

S E C R E T

7.

C O N T R I L

VII. BULGARIA.

35. OSS has not been successful in establishing a mission in Bulgaria. To our knowledge, our only representation is an R & A man operating there under ACC cover.

36. As soon as competent personnel is available, we shall endeavor to arrange cover with ACC. Failing this, diplomatic or commercial cover will be sought.

37. Minimum requirements:

One (1) Officer
One (1) Secretary

VIII. REMARKS ON COVER.

38. This Desk should appreciate it if Washington might explore the possibilities of cover to be used by Balkan X-2, along commercial and cultural lines. (X-2, Bari has definite proof that Military Liaison (UNRRA) cover in Albania, to give only one example, has already been blown!).

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IX. FILES AND RECORDS

39. The following notes will refer to the status of files and records in the Balkan area. Efforts are being made to collate field station material with that of this base Hq. for eventual shipment to Washington.

- a. HUNGARY - In order to bring the files up to date, all X-2 field stations were requested to submit material on Hungarian agents. Up to the present, only Switzerland, Spain and Turkey have reacted but the result has been most encouraging. The notes thus far received contain information on new personalities and new data on known personalities, which will enable us to draw conclusions about them and trace the interrelations more precisely. Once the material from all stations is collated, we shall be able to prepare an up-to-date primer on Hungary.

A by-product of this will be a revision of the work recently issued by the Desk entitled "The Interrelation of Japanese and Hungarian Intelligence" based on material available at the Bari Station.

- b. RUMANIA - The files in Bucharest are extensive, although not properly systematized. The rearrangement of these files will be one of the items on the agenda for the reorganization of that office. A study of the cards will be undertaken, with the ultimate view of bringing them up to date and incorporating them into the dossiers at Balkan Hq.
- c. BULGARIA- In the absence of X-2 representation in that country, very little new Bulgarian data is being added to our files.
- d. YUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA - Although we possess extensive files on these countries, these are neither complete nor up-to-date. In numerous instances, we are dependent for X-2 material upon SILO and 5 S.C.I., which are the most complete on the Balkans. It should be noted however, that even SILO is three (3) months behind schedule in carding, due to lack of personnel.

X. FIELD SECURITY - TRACING - VETTING - REPATRIATION

40. The need for further X-2 personnel increases with the establishment of American military and governmental agencies (ACC, OWI, etc) in the Balkan area. All these offices must rely upon X-2 for conducting certain investigations, mainly in the form of tracing and vetting. In every one of the Balkan countries individuals are today, with and without legal basis, claiming US citizenship, protection and assistance in repatriation. A thorough interrogation and investigation of such persons is essential since some of them have collaborated directly or indirectly with the enemy. Three (3) recent examples will illustrate the nature of such investigations:

1. Michael HOLLINGER, of Yugoslav-German parents, left the US at the age of 16, in 1936, served in the Royal Yugoslav Army and during the German occupation in three branches of the German Police and Intelligence (Hipo, Orpo, Sipo). Deserting to the Partisans, he was finally evacuated by an OSS unit from Slovenia. Arriving in Bari in March 1945, he was referred to X-2 Branch and is presently under investigation by both SILO and this Desk.
2. Morris SHENDEROFF, born 32 years ago in Cleveland, Ohio, of Russian-Jewish parents, left America in 1928, living since then in Russia where he became a Major in the Red Army. Stowing away on an American plane at Keckskemet, Hungary, he came to Bari on 22 March 1945. He is under X-2 investigation.
3. Bodo DREYLING, detained in Split, Yugoslavia, where he posed as an American citizen to avoid execution at the hands of the Partisans. Interrogation revealed that he was actually a 2nd Lt. in the Luftwaffe.

41. The number of escapees, deserters, and refugees from across the Adriatic is considerable. A certain number of these are conveyed here by US Air Force pilots as well as OSS field men, sometimes without proper authorization, simply because they take pity upon the apparent pathetic plight of the escaping individuals. In further instances, American personnel sympathetic to particular Balkan opposition groups, have upon their own initiative attempted to facilitate the escape of members of such organizations.