

The National Security Archive

The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

08/31/98

Phone: 202/994-7000
Fax: 202/994-7005
nsarchiv@gwu.edu

<http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive>

25 August 1998

Agency Release Panel
c/o Mr. Lee Strickland
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20520

Re: F92-2660

Dear Mr. Strickland,

This letter constitutes an administrative appeal under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552 (a) (6). Through a letter dated 7 July 1998, you provided me with a number of intelligence reports concerning the Berlin situation during 1958-1960, with most of them excised under the (b) (1) and (b) (3) exemptions. For your convenience, I enclose a copy of your decision letter.

I greatly appreciate the CIA's efforts to locate and review these reports and release substantial portions of them. Nevertheless, I ask that CIA initiate a fresh, line-by-line review of these documents to determine whether any information can be released from them without violating statute or executive order requirements. I also ask CIA to determine whether any substantive portions can be segregated from paragraphs that disclose intelligence sources and methods that no longer remain sensitive.

Most of the documents at issue in this appeal had excisions relating to various types of intelligence information: that concerning U.S. allies, such as the France, West Germany, and the U.K., that derived through means that were secret at the time of the Berlin crisis or which otherwise shed light on West Berlin's role as an intelligence base. I believe, however, that CIA should be able to release much of this information because in recent years other federal agencies have routinely declassified it. If the Agency's reviewers take into account declassified intelligence information that other agencies have already released, it should be able to declassify information relating to all three of those categories without violating statute or executive order.

The CIA's reviewers have consistently excised from these documents almost any indication that the U.S. government was interested in the perspectives of its allies in Berlin: France,

the United Kingdom, or West Germany. Likewise, the reviewers have withheld the section concerning "Western Statements" on Berlin from the 8 May 1960 OCI "Handbook on the Berlin Problem." I find it difficult to believe that any French, British, or West German statements that were included in this "secret/noforn" document are still so sensitive that they must continue to be withheld almost forty years later. Other agencies, including the State Department and the National Security Council have already released so much formerly secret reporting on the attitude of Allies during the Berlin crisis that CIA should be able to release additional information on this point. For example, the National Security Council has declassified a series of briefing papers for the President, including the regular "Synopsis of State and Intelligence Material Reported to the President," various dates, that include information derived from intelligence sources on allied attitudes toward the Berlin situation (see enclosure 1). Moreover, the State Department has declassified its own intelligence analyses and reporting on the French, British, West German, and West Berlin government thinking about the Berlin problem (see enclosure 2). It seems to me that if NSC and State can release material of this sort then the CIA should also be in a position to release information on allied attitudes.

At least one deletion, most likely about an allied government, may be found in the chronology (annex 1) to the 23 November 1958 OCI report entitled "The Berlin Situation." Information about an event on 17 November 1958 is deleted. I suspect that this redaction has to do with a famous British Foreign Office memorandum suggesting the possibility of recognizing the former German Democratic Republic. The British, however, made this memorandum available to the State Department and it is summarized and analyzed in the Department's Foreign Relations volume on the Berlin crisis (see enclosure 3) as well as in a briefing for President Eisenhower on the "status of Berlin," 25 November 1958 (see the first item in enclosure 2). Again if the NSC and the State Department could release reporting on the British memorandum, then CIA should be able to declassify information about it in one of its reports. I suspect that among the other excisions in this case there are other instances of withheld information about U.S. allies that came from the State Department or U.S. embassies. Again, information of this sort should be readily declassifiable and not automatically exempt merely because it is about a close ally.

CIA may also have withheld material relating to intelligence activities in Berlin or intelligence sources and methods. Perhaps some of this information is properly classified but in the years since the end of the Cold War, both the State Department and U.S. military agencies have released detailed information on intelligence activities in and around West Berlin. For example, the State Department has declassified a document about the role of the Marienfelde Refugee Reception Center in gathering intelligence information on developments in East Germany and the Soviet Union (see enclosure 4). Moreover, the U.S. Army has declassified one of the annual histories of the Berlin Command which discloses the Command's routine intelligence collection activities and the targets of those activities (see

enclosure 5). The Defense Department has declassified additional information on the electronic eavesdropping activities that the Command conducted against the former GDR (see enclosure 6). The State Department and the Defense Departments have also released information on the intelligence-gathering activities of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) in East Germany (see enclosure 6 and 7). Further, the National Security Council has declassified a memorandum of discussion between President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles discussing Berlin as an intelligence base (see enclosure 8). With such documentation coming into the public domain, any information in these documents discussing Berlin as an intelligence base or otherwise discussing formerly sensitive information derived from refugee interviews, electronic eavesdropping, etc., should be readily declassifiable.

I also want to bring to your attention other previously declassified documents that may include information that has been excised from these reports. Declassified reports of the U.S. Intelligence Board's Watch Committee may include information that the CIA has excised from the USIB reports at issue in this appeal. For example, the reports from 27 February and 13 March 1959 (enclosure 9) include information about East German anti-aircraft weapons and the operational readiness of the CGSF that may be excised from "Special Report No. 1." or "Special Report No. 2." Moreover, the Watch Committee report for 10 April 1959 (see enclosure 10) includes details on concerning restrictions on the movements of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission that may be withheld from "Special Report No. 5."

I also question whether CIA should unilaterally make decisions on the declassification of these special reports on Berlin. For example, given the CIA's apparent decision to excise references to the 17 November 1958 British memo I suspect that other withheld information on allied attitudes that appeared in the USIB reports may also be derived from the U.S. embassy or other State Department reporting. As the State Department has already declassified its already voluminous embassy reporting on the Berlin problem, I urge that CIA coordinate its response to this appeal with State to determine whether it has any objection to release of the withheld material from a foreign policy point of view. Likewise, other information may be based on reporting by Army or Air Force intelligence. Again, the review of this information could best be coordinated with those organizations.

Thank you for considering this appeal.

sincerely,



William Burr

(b)(6)



Washington, D.C. 20505

900216CIA 010

JUL 07 1998

RECEIVED JUL 16 1998

Mr. William Burr
The National Security Archive
The Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Reference: F92-2660 (formerly F90-0858)

Dear Mr. Burr:

This is a final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of 21 May 1990 for "articles on the Berlin crisis published in any CIA weekly or monthly intelligence summaries or reports, between November 10, 1958 and December 31, 1960."

We have located documents responsive to your request which were reviewed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431, and have made the following determinations:

Enclosed, Tab A, are 53 documents, numbered 1 through 53, which can be released to you in sanitized form. The deleted material is being denied on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). An explanation of the FOIA exemptions is enclosed at Tab B.

CIA material responsive to your request that requires coordination with other agencies has not been returned to us as of this date. In order to avoid further delay in processing your request we shall send that material, if it is determined to be releasable, when received by us.

The official responsible for the above determinations is Lee S. Strickland, Information and Privacy Coordinator. You have the right to appeal these determinations. Should you decide to do this, please address your appeal through me to the Agency Release Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter. Please explain the basis of your appeal.

Charges that were incurred during the processing of this request consist of a ten cents per page copying fee beyond the first 100 pages. Since the total page count is 825, the fee amounts to \$72.50. Please send your check or money order in the amount of \$72.50 to me, payable to the Treasurer of the United States, adding our reference number, F92-2660.

45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, November 17, 1958, 7:45 p.m.

1012. Paris for Embassy and USRO. British Embassy has given Department memorandum¹ setting forth Foreign Office views on current Berlin situation and has asked whether Department agrees with analysis. Following is substance of memorandum.

We should proceed on assumption Soviets will sooner or later "hand over to sovereign GDR those functions in Berlin which are still maintained by Soviet organs" as Khrushchev threatened in November 10 speech.

Among Soviet motives are (1) desire create atmosphere of crisis which could produce climate of opinion in West favorable to high-level discussions of future of Germany, in which Soviets would support revised Rapacki Plan as measure to deny nuclear capability to Bundeswehr (Khrushchev considers that Americans are on point of supplying West German forces with nuclear weapons and it may not be too late to prevent this) and (2) desire force Western Powers ultimately to recognize GDR, in order to consolidate satellite empire and imprison Poland within status quo.

We cannot prevent Khrushchev from carrying out his threat; main question is decide how react when he does it.

We must proceed from assumption we would resort to force, with all risks that entails, rather than submit to Berlin's being starved out. But immediate issue is whether submit to dealing with GDR representatives on practical matters relating to transport and communications on same basis we have hitherto dealt with Soviets.

It is clearly in our interest agree in practice we should deal with representatives of GDR rather than refuse do so and thus precipitate new blockade of Berlin which in last resort might have to be broken by force. It would therefore seem worthwhile work out set of rules for our authorities which would enable them when time came to deal with GDR authorities without implying this action constituted recognition of GDR Government and while maintaining theory Soviets remain responsible.

But such modus vivendi would not be allowed operate for very long, if at all. We would soon find ourselves faced with further choice of

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1758. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McKiernan; cleared by Hillenbrand, Fessenden, EE, and BNA; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to London, Berlin, Paris, and Moscow.

¹ A copy of the full text of the British memorandum was transmitted to Bonn in instruction CA-4536, November 20. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/11-2058)

recognizing GDR or exposing Berlin to blockade which would in last resort have to be broken by force. Khrushchev, who has been for long time in position oblige us make this choice, has probably calculated we would prefer recognize GDR. "So far as UK concerned, he would be right." Nobody in West would believe avoiding recognition of GDR is worth a war.

In short, we may have to choose between:

- (a) abandoning Berlin;
- (b) resorting to force;
- (c) staying in Berlin but dealing with and, if necessary, ultimately recognizing GDR.

"Course (a) is out of the question and course (c) is greatly to be preferred to course (b)."

Our decision re dealing with GDR must depend partly on our ability stage a successful airlift and continue it indefinitely, which Foreign Office believes may be impossible. Airlift difficulties are such that it is unlikely blockade could be resisted for longer than about fifteen months. Would seem prudent accept this estimate for political planning purposes.

Foreign Office is instructing British Embassy Bonn (1) push on with negotiations with Federal Republic regarding facilities which would be required from latter in event of airlift (financial aspect of airlift and appropriate Federal Republic contribution will also require consideration and (2) concert with US and French Embassies estimates of requirements of "miniature airlift" which would take care of Allied official and military traffic only.

Full text follows by pouch.

British Embassy Paris has handed same memorandum to French Foreign Office.

Addressees' comments urgently invited.²

Dulles

² In telegram 1065, November 18, 8 p.m., Trimble replied that the British memorandum was "defeatist" and based on the assumption that the West had no effective reaction to Soviet moves in Berlin, an assumption that he did not share as long as the Soviet Union was not prepared to risk war. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/11-1858) On November 19 and 20 the Embassies in London and Paris replied. The former reported that the paper was hastily drawn up and uncharacteristic of Macmillan's thinking, and noted that it agreed with the substance of telegram 1065 from Bonn. (Telegram 2737; *ibid.*, 762.0221/11-1958) The Embassy in Paris reported that the French Foreign Ministry was "very disturbed at weakness shown in British memo", but that Couve considered it an intelligent statement of the case. (Telegram 1862; *ibid.*, 762.00/11-1958)

49. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, November 19, 1958, 5 p.m.

2752. Reference: Embtel 2737.¹ As we were leaving a small dinner at Gray's Inn last night I mentioned quite casually to Selwyn Lloyd that I wondered whether we were not getting off our joint track re Berlin. It was immediately apparent that I had struck a nerve and he asked me if I would upon leaving the party come with him to his house. There we discussed UK memo² which I told him we had seen and which had both er me considerably since it seemed to imply that the preferred British position involved the recognition of the East German Government. He had not seen, he said, the whole message when it was sent and it did not have his specific approval. However, it was quite apparent that it had a lot of his thinking in it. At the end of our discussion during which it was clear to me that he was fearful that his office had loosed off a premature rocket he asked that I not report our talk immediately but that we meet again "with as many people as you want to bring" at noon the following morning. After meeting with Lloyd at Foreign Office this morning, I be- lieve we have obtained some clarification of British views and may eliminate certain misunderstandings occasioned by original FonOff memorandum.

Lloyd said that memorandum should certainly not be regarded as more than stimulus for discussion, since he had checked with none of his colleagues in government. He said that he was anxious we should remain on "same wavelenght" re Berlin problem, but apparently we had received impression that British Government way out ahead re question recognition of GDR. Reading text of Bonn's 1065 to Department,³ he said that he could agree with everything stated in paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7. Paragraph 5 based on misunderstanding of British point, and real point of difference between us that discussed in paragraph 3.³ Lloyd said that no disagreement about our being on "slippery slope" when we begin to make de facto arrangements with GDR, but in British view bottom of slope would be reached by recognition of GDR, and they saw no reason why this should lead to our ejection from Berlin. We sug-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1958. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.

¹ See footnote 2, Document 45.

² See Document 45.

³ Paragraph 5 of telegram 1065 discussed how much the Western powers could deal directly with the East Germans without recognizing them.

gested that slope might not end there, and it would in any event involve major revision of our policy against partition of Germany. We doubted that it would be acceptable to Adenauer.

Lloyd said that everything of course depended upon acceptability to Federal Republic. British first choice was that there be no change in existing arrangement, and if Soviets or GDR interfered with access to Berlin we should respond vigorously in first place. He did not agree with his staff on ineffectiveness of air lift, feeling that if it could be maintained twelve months, that was as good as indefinitely. However, air lift would be a nuisance and would involve large expenses which Germans could afford much better than British. Lloyd felt that it would be absurd of West Germans to refuse to deal with East Germans, if we made it clear that we intended to stay in Berlin. Main point of British suggestion, which had possibly been misunderstood, was that if West Germans were to decide to make arrangements with GDR rather than bear cost of provisioning Berlin, and such arrangements led or amounted to West German recognition of GDR, certainly British for their part would have no objection, no need to be more royal than the King. It all depended on what West Germans willing to do.

We suggested that our presence in Berlin and position vis-à-vis Soviets involved more than merely German considerations (i.e. what West Germans willing to accept). It seemed to us of significance for NATO and whole East-West position over and beyond West Germans and Berliners.

Lloyd summed up by saying that there was not much difference between us. It was clear we could not go against wishes of Federal Republic, provided they realized that we might have to submit to some de facto arrangements. This would create danger of slide toward recognition, and there was something in point that it might confirm partition of Germany, which Lloyd would be against. However, we were not quite in agreement that recognition of GDR would lead to further slide toward our physical removal from Berlin. Agreed that at latter point issue of force would be raised. Lloyd was worried lest British memorandum gave impression that UK "almost welcomed" recognition, and hoped that Germans would not receive wrong impression. Couve de Murville had agreed with him that merely implied recognition of GDR was better than risk of war. Lloyd felt that purpose of memorandum would be served if it led to further study of problem, before Berlin situation became acute.

I informed him that no instructions had been received from Department, but I had wished to obtain his considered views for Department's information.

As our meeting broke up, I asked Lloyd what he thought Adenauer's attitude would be about recognition of GDR if this became

88 Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume VIII

issue. He replied that question will not arise in such clear cut way, but there will be a de facto process which would lead step by step towards recognition.⁴

Whitney

⁴ In telegram 2753 from London, November 17 at 5 p.m., Whitney reported a further discussion of the memorandum between an Embassy officer and a Foreign Office official during which the latter indicated that the British could never go to war over the question of recognition of the German Democratic Republic. The official stressed further that the British were uncertain of the strength of the Federal Republic on the issue and would not incur risks over Berlin if the West Germans were reluctant to make sacrifices on the question. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1958)

50. Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, November 19, 1958, midnight.

360. Paris also pass Topol. Re Deptel 236.¹ Mission interprets UK position as based on assumption "we cannot prevent Khrushchev from carrying out his threat" and proceeding to acceptance inevitable recognition GDR.

We consider British unrealistic in assumption contained "course C" their memo that recognition GDR would permit continued Allied occupation Berlin. Once recognition accorded GDR, four-power status officially ended and continued Allied occupation city stripped of legal basis.

While compromises possible which could prolong Allied "occupation" in one form or another, stated objective of Communists is to get Allies out and continued pressures, harassments and threats would, we believe, force us ultimately either abandon city or resort to force. Meanwhile, with "writing on wall," there little expectation city could survive economically with industry depending on GDR acquiescence for imports-exports and Allied position on wane.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1958. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.

² Printed as telegram 1012 to Bonn, Document 45.

British suggestion of GDR recognition appears ignore fact that all of Berlin is claimed as capital GDR. It also overlooks effect such recognition on East German population and on stability GDR which could embark on harder Stalinist program internally and appreciably step up pressure on FedRep. UK proposal appears ignore fact that Berlin policy is but one segment of our German policy. Ramifications of our recognizing GDR would be manifold. One clear result would be to discredit our firmest German friends who support Western European integration policy and encourage disenchantment US leadership, with probable consequent boosting of stock of German neutralists. British, it seems to us, have failed to recognize that Sovs deal with Berlin as part of world power balance.

For foregoing reasons, mission has viewed askance any steps in direction acceptance GDR control of access routes even allowing GDR "agents" place date stamp on surface travel orders as tripartite policy now envisages should GDR take over controls (Berlin tel 298 to Bonn, rptd Dept 345).² In mission view, basic decision needed on whether:

1. Allies play for time allowing GDR to nibble away until Allied position untenable, thus postponing day of decision re use force or abandoning city. Berlin's economic position likely suffer severely meanwhile.

2. We take forthright stand now by refusing accept GDR controls in any form and making clear our determination remain Berlin.

On basic assumption of British that we cannot prevent Khrushchev from carrying out threat, we leave it to the appropriate world capitals to determine whether this assumption is correct. We hope it is not. We believe that trap Soviets are laying for us could result in such serious consequences that every effort should be made to stop them.

We venture one suggestion:

Khrushchev statements on Berlin beginning Nov 10 have implied willingness negotiate question and at least some Soviet and Sov Bloc interpretations of that speech seem to have placed Khrushchev declaration within framework all-German settlement. Important factor now would seem to be to insure that possible four-power negotiations not begin under Soviet preconditions. Allies might therefore consider proposing immediate four-power conference with sufficiently vague and limited preconditions to permit Soviet acceptance without loss of face. Idea would be to take advantage of what may be short-lived opportu-

² Telegram 298, November 16, reported that at a meeting on November 14 the three Western Political Advisers had reached agreement on tripartite positions on air access to Berlin and procedures to be followed if the Soviet Union transferred its remaining occupational responsibilities to the East Germans. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-1658)

1

November 25, 1958

Briefing on Status of Berlin Crisis



1. Developments, 18 Nov. - 25 Nov.

a. A British working-level paper was received by State on November 18. It indicated a readiness not only to deal with East German authorities but also eventually to recognize East Germany rather than expose Berlin to a blockade which would in the last resort have to be broken by force. A conversation of Ambassador Whitney with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd indicated that the Foreign Secretary thought that there was no reason why the recognition of the GDR should lead to our ejection from Berlin. He also said that French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville agreed with him that implied recognition of the East German regime was better than the risk of war.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority STATE GUIDELINES
 By DDH/NLE/Date 7/10/97

b. Ambassador Smirnov on November 20 informed Chancellor Adenauer of Soviet plans to abolish the "Occupation Statute" for Berlin. The Chancellor stated emphatically that the action proposed by the Soviets would not contribute to the relaxation of tension but, on the contrary, would heighten it. He felt that the reaction of the Three Western Powers would be negative and that the move would be adversely

box 37
 State Note
 Nov 19

- 2 -

received by the German public and would undoubtedly lead to a further deterioration of German-Soviet relations.

c. The same day the British Ambassador in Bonn gave Foreign Minister von Brentano a copy of the British Memorandum on Berlin. On November 21 Brentano informed Ambassador Bruce that he was "horrified" by the British paper, in particular by its statement of the three alternatives the last of which accepts de facto recognition of the GDR. He declared the drafters were grossly ignorant of the implications and consequences of the paper.

d. Chancellor Adenauer addressed a letter to the Secretary of State, received November 21, pointing to the gravity of the situation, observing that the first Allied concession will not be the last, and suggesting talks between the governments of the UK, France, the Federal Republic, and the US as soon as the details of the Soviet position on Berlin become known.

e. An ad hoc committee has been established including representatives of State, Defense and other interested agencies, plus the British and French, to consider the Berlin problem.

f. On 22 November, in response to the urging of Adenauer, Macmillan sent the following message to Khrushchev:

"I am sending you this personal message to tell you of the anxiety which your recent statements on Berlin have caused me. I must tell you frankly that I find

- 3 -

those statements difficult to reconcile with your many previous expressions of the desire to reduce tension in the world. The British Government have every intention of upholding their rights in Berlin which are soundly based.

"That also I believe to be the position of our Allies as is well known to you. At the moment discussions are taking place in Geneva. I still profoundly hope that fruitful results will come both from the political conference on nuclear tests and from the technical conference on measures against surprise attack. I cannot imagine anything more calculated to increase tension at a moment of opportunity for an improvement in our relations than the kind of action which your statements appear to foreshadow. I hope therefore that you will seriously consider what I say before deciding to proceed to such action."

g. On 22 November (Saturday) the State Department instructed Embassy Bonn to submit to the UK and France there the proposed text of a note to be delivered in Moscow ostensibly on 24 November (Monday). This message, noting the announced intentions of the USSR with regard to Berlin, emphasizes that the proposed Soviet action would be invalid in international law and would be hardly consistent with the Soviet Government's protestations of a desire to relax international tensions. Embassy London has since notified State that the Foreign Office approved the tripartite demarche, subject to possible suggestions from legal advisers. The French, however (Couve de Murville), feel that delivery this soon would be premature; and, since the Soviets have not yet taken action, would give the impression that we are "nervous." Accordingly, the sending of the note has been delayed.



- 4 -

h. An offshoot of the proposed tripartite note to the Soviets is the matter of publication of such a note. The Ambassador in Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson, favors publication because of its effect on the Germans. Whitney and the British Foreign Office feel that a note not published would have a greater deterrent effect.

2. Reactions of the Countries Concerned

a. Germany

Official German as well as press reaction unanimously supports a firm stand on Berlin now. The Foreign Minister summarized his views on German opinion to Ambassador Bruce as follows: There is universal belief that any concessions to the GDR by the Allies (specifically the showing of documents even under protest in order to maintain access to Berlin) will start an avalanche which nothing can stop and which will have catastrophic consequences for Europe and the Free World. Thereby "The West will have lost the first bloodless blow of World War Three." A firm stand now will cause the Soviets to back down. He referred to Berlin Mayor Brandt's recent statements and to Bundestag President Gerstenmaier's mention of the possibility of the Federal Republic breaking off relations with Moscow as evidence of undoubted solid German support for firm Allied reaction.

Other West German sources bear out the same view. On 25 November the State Department reported that Mayor Brandt of

- 5 -

Berlin has made it plain to the deputy commandants of Berlin that the West Berliners expect the allied occupying powers to maintain their right to be in Berlin as conquerors, subject in no sense to control by any German officials or agencies. Alluding to reports that the allies might submit to control by Soviet Zone German officials as agents of the USSR, Brandt asserted that submission to any such controls would destroy the western allied position in Berlin.

The views of the Germans are well summarized by the message from Adenauer to Secretary Dulles which is being appended for your information.

b. UK



As evidenced by the British working-level paper, preliminary British official reactions to the Berlin crisis have not been firm. Embassy London reports, however, a desire for firmness on the part of certain Conservative MP's and a good deal of press comment, both pro and con on the GDR recognition question. The conflict in British statements is over the question of whether recognition would affect the Allied occupation, not as to whether we should abandon our position in Berlin. Prime Minister Macmillan has stated that he expects the Berlin crisis to be settled peacefully.

On Friday (21 Nov.) the Foreign Office seriously questioned

- 6 -

the US policy of non-recognition of East Germany. In this connection the Foreign Office informed Embassy London that its legal experts "unanimously rejected" our position that non-recognition of the East German regime was essential to the Western legal position in Berlin.

There are indications, however, that the working-level attitude in the Foreign Office is not necessarily Mr. Macmillan's attitude. This possibility is suggested by the note which he sent to Khrushchev on 22 November (mentioned above) and by the fact of the British support for the proposed tripartite demarche.

c. France

Earlier in the week Embassy Paris reported that the working-level in the French Foreign Office had recommended to Couve that the Allies adopt a policy of firmness in the face of Soviet threats, even to the extent of refusing to accept GDR personnel at checkpoints. However, a final Foreign Office position has not yet been reached. Laloy commented that the British Memorandum was not helpful in stimulating the Foreign Minister to adopt a strong stand. He noted that Couve already was inclined to feel that the continued insistence on the "non-existence" of the GDR may be unrealistic. Couve informed the British Ambassador that he was reserving the French position and would not give any definite views on the British Memorandum, other than that



- 7 -

he considered it an intelligent statement of the case. Couve is, as has been mentioned, the principal apparent stumbling block in the submission of a tripartite note to the Soviets.

3. Views of Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, in Moscow



The "Afternoon Summary," Department of State, dated 21 Nov., included the following:

"Prompt, Forceful Stand on Berlin Advocated - Thompson in Moscow believes that while the USSR would refrain from any action which it was convinced would cause us to use force, once it had turned its functions in Berlin over to the East German regime it would take great risks rather than back down in the face of our counteraction. In this circumstance he thinks our worst policy would be one in which there is any uncertainty as to what to do. He is inclined to consider the UK memorandum disingenuous, and thinks it likely that the British have in fact decided they would not risk war for Berlin, since they must know that acceptance of their position -- including recognition of the East German regime and its control over our access to Berlin -- would have a most serious effect on the German, and particularly Berlin, population and government. In dealing with the UK memorandum, Thompson suggests we start by trying to get an agreed evaluation of what the Soviet objectives are, and then try to get from the UK a commitment as to how and under what circumstances it would agree to the use of force to maintain our position in Berlin. He recommends we attempt to reach an agreement with the UK and France that we will be prepared to use force to maintain road and air communications with Berlin, and that we so inform the USSR and West Germany promptly but confidentially."

4. Views of General Norstad

On 16 November, General Norstad informed Secretary McElroy and General Twining that unless directed otherwise, he will order

- 8 -

the dispatch of a normal Berlin-Helmstad convoy with authority to "extricate US military personnel and equipment by minimum force necessary if the Soviets again detain and prompt protest does not effect early release" (2-3 hours). This stand was overtaken by the suspension of convoys by the JCS on 18 November and the withholding of approval by them. (Mr. Murphy met with the JCS later in the week.)

On 24 November, Houghton (France) advised the State Department that he and Norstad agree that there is considerable merit in suggestions for Western initiative in proposing a four-power conference on the German question. He reports that Whitney, who was in Paris Saturday, supports Norstad's view that we should take a forthright stand and make clear our determination to remain in Berlin.

(This has been done, it would appear, by both your statement and that of Mr. Nixon on 25 November.)

Houghton finally points out that a conference would assist in preventing our being maneuvered into a position of appearing to oppose Soviet withdrawal from East Berlin.



- 9 -

5. Developments on 26 November

a. Discussions on 26 November seem to center chiefly on the way to approach a possible administrative harassment of the land lines to Berlin on the part of the GDR. At this time the official State Department position is that administrative dealings with the Soviets have never indicated any compromise of rights. Therefore, any dealings with the GDR would also be free of any implication in that regard. Murphy has stated that we do not contemplate an airlift and will "push through" on surface lines if necessary. This is contrary to the recommendations of the Deputy Commanders in Berlin, who prefer to prepare for airlift.



b. Talk of tripartite positions shifted from possible note to Soviets to a possible note to the Federal Republic of Germany. A copy of the draft note to Germany is available. Again, the French are reticent to join. The British are willing to join a tripartite statement but feel that if the French demur, a unilateral U.S. note would be better.

c. Adenauer and De Gaulle are to meet today and Berlin will be an important item on their agenda.

d. An unconfirmed radio report this morning stated that a covered convoy was permitted to pass the guards without interference. This will be checked into further.

- 10 -

6. Summary

In summary, the following points stand out in all the discussions:

a. None of the Western governments nor members thereof advocate pulling out of Berlin.

b. The main issues of discussion are: (1) the degree with which the Western powers can deal with the East German government without undue loss of prestige or undue damage to Adenauer, (2) the procedures to be followed (including the degree of force to be used) in the event of serious harassment by East German police, and (3) timing of Western moves, such as the proposed tripartite demarche to the Soviets or the proposed message to the Federal Republic.

c. Of the nations concerned, West Germany has taken the firmest and most unequivocal position; the British working level appears the most conciliatory. France is uncommitted. Apparently De Gaulle prefers to wait a little longer before moving.



[Handwritten mark]

December 16, 1958

Synopsis of State and Intelligence Material Reported to the President

MIDDLE EAST



UAR-Iraq

Nasser is reported to be expressing stronger concern than heretofore that the Qasim regime will fall under the influence of Communist elements. S

On December 11 a Soviet ship delivered the second consignment of arms to the Iraqis under the deal with the Soviet Union. This included antiaircraft and field artillery pieces and vehicles. S

Meanwhile, there are reports that the four Iraqi division commanders have decided to oust Premier Qasim in the near future. They are convinced that he is incapable of controlling the Communists or preventing further disorders. This feeling may have been spurred by the action of the Communist-led mob in Basra on December 8 which beseiged the army garrison for a day. S

A report today (December 16) indicates that a foreign office official has told Embassy London that the U.K. still hopes and believes that Qasim will prove able to prevent the domination of Iraq by either Communists or the UAR. The British Charge in Iraq believes that Qasim has been playing a cautious, skillful game and some time may elapse before his final course is discernible. TS

Israel-Syria

On December 12 Hammarskjold told our UN mission that he had authorized the Chief of UNTSO to request Israeli and Syrian authorities to introduce observers to inspect the borders. The Syrians had immediately given unqualified approval and the Israelis answered later. Inspections began the morning of December 16. S

As of December 15 the Israelis were complaining about the lack of a U.S. position on the Israeli complaint in the UN.
..... Eban has written that he doubts

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
Agency Case NSCF 90-1146
NLE Case 90-308-1
By *[Signature]* NLE Date 11/16/92

- 2 -

that Israel will in the future see any use in turning to the UN if we do not support them now. Lloyd also has expressed his concern to the Secretary of State that Israel is being maneuvered into a position which might result in its taking aggressive action against Syria. TS

As of this morning it was reported that both sides are maintaining a state of precautionary alert but tension does not seem to have increased. A patrol action occurred on the night of December 13-14. Firing took place on the following evening and Israel accused Egypt of making reconnaissance flights on that day. S

Jordan

On December 15 Prime Minister Rifai prepared a bill which would place full control of the armed forces in the hands of the Defense Minister, a post presently held by himself. This action is aimed at curtailing the power of the potent Bani Sakhir Bedouin faction. Rifai expects that Jordan's legislature will approve the bill this week but his proposal may set off more difficulties. S

BERLIN

A report on December 15 indicated that Adenauer remains concerned over what he considers British softness on Berlin. He indicated to Brandt that Bonn might block approval of London's free trade area proposals if the British fail to support his position on Berlin. S

Spaak told Burgess on December 15 that he had learned the Germans were pressing for a firm, precise communique on Berlin following the quadri-partite meetings in Paris. Spaak expressed a strong conviction that the issuance of such a communique by the four prior to consultation in NATO would have most unfortunate effects, particularly with Italy. The Canadians also expressed the view that the NATO communique should be the first substantive statement on this issue, and the quadri-partite communique should stay within its bounds. However, the communique was actually issued. It reaffirmed our determination to stay in Berlin; it found unacceptable the Soviet unilateral repudiation of obligations; and indicated the foreign ministers found themselves in agreement on basic issues and would consult NATO allies prior to reply. TS

Meanwhile, in a tri-partite meeting in Paris, Secretary Dulles told the British and French that we should revise existing contingency plans for Berlin. The ministers agreed (a) that convoys would turn back rather than accept East German processing at check points; (b) to tell the Germans we did not treat East German officials as agents for the Soviet Union; and (c) in this regard, Selwyn Lloyd gave some difficulty at the discussion noting that our whole position was the East German officials were merely stooges of the Soviets. - TS

DE GAULLE

As was indicated in the President's message from Secretary Dulles this morning, De Gaulle is insisting on tri-partite organism for cooperation in NATO. He expressed support for firm position regarding Berlin and extreme dissatisfaction with our actions in the UN on Guinea and Algeria. TS

HONDURAS

Tension is rising in Honduras between the civilian government and the military forces. Clashes could occur at any time. TS

BRAZIL

Government officials apparently intend to establish new machinery to expand trade with the Soviet Bloc but not to broaden diplomatic relations. TS

NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands will probably be without an effective government for several months as a result of resignation of the Labor Party from the governing coalition. S

SAUDI ARABIA

Dissatisfaction in the Saudi army is growing as a result of curtailment of military perquisites under Faisal's economy program. S

UNCLASSIFIED

January 27, 1959 material
Reported January 27

Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President

USSR - FINLAND

In talks with Finnish President Kekkonen, Khrushchev renewed earlier Soviet offers of trade credits and aid in developing Finnish industries. The two men agreed to negotiate a 1959 trade protocol "very soon" and, in the spring, a new long-term trade agreement. In a highly publicized speech on January 23, Khrushchev warned against forming such governments as the recently fallen Fagerholm coalition, and against allowing elements in the Finnish press -- "well paid by reactionary circles and possibly subsidized by third countries" -- to criticize the USSR and Soviet-Finnish relations.

State Department has gone to some length to note the extent to which Finland has been required to pay in advance for the restoration of Soviet benignity and feels the dangerous precedent may bedevil Finland for a long time.

THAILAND

Marshal Sarit may now be near total incapacitation and is expected to be succeeded by a duumvirate composed of General Thanom and General Prapat.

CEYLON

Colombo, on January 24, signed a contract accepting the USSR's offer to design a steel mill which has been under consideration since early last year.

ITALY

President Gronchi is expected to begin a search for a successor to the Fanfani government on January 28. Possibilities for Premier include left-of-center ex-Premier Segni and two rightists, Interior Minister Tambroni and ex-Foreign Minister Piccioni.

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
Agency Case NSC 590-1141
NLE Case 90-30825
By 270 NLE Date 11/16/92

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

MEXICO-GUATEMALA DISPUTE

Despite Mexican severance of diplomatic relations with Guatemala on January 23 over a shrimp boat dispute, there is no confirmation of Guatemalan charges that Mexican forces are massing on the frontier. Guatemala President Ydigoras seems more interested in making political capital out of the dispute than in settling it rapidly.

CUBA

Castro, during a visit to Cuba, attack the U.S. both publicly and privately, calling for the liberation of Puerto Rico from the U.S. along with the overthrow of Latin American dictators.

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

In commenting on the harmful effects which press speculation could have on our Berlin contingency planning, Embassy London fully agrees that it is most important to avoid giving the USSR the impression or intelligence that under anticipated circumstances the West would immediately resort to an airlift rather than try to force the issue on the ground. It believes that discussion of the problem by the NATO Council involves the danger of having the USSR learn of Western intentions.

At the same time, the Embassy doubts that the British or French Governments are likely to commit themselves now to a course of action some months hence, which might lead to another world war. The Embassy believes the present British reluctance over Berlin contingency planning should not be taken as a sign of weakness, but rather as an indication of Macmillan's concern that we may be heading into a situation where we would be urging the use of force without the support of public opinion.

ISRAEL-SYRIA

Israel has requested an immediate Security Council meeting to consider a list of recent Syrian border incidents culminating in the slaying of an Israeli shepherd. Our mission comments that the Security Council cannot be effective in this matter in view of Israel's unwillingness to cooperate through other UN channels. Our mission believes that unless the Security Council puts the burden on Israel, they will succeed in putting it on us.

UNCLASSIFIED

- 3 -

TEST TALKS

The 42nd meeting of the Geneva test talks was devoted to a discussion of the methods of staffing control posts. The Soviets opposed the concept of an international staff on grounds that it endangered Soviet national security and argued for the Soviet proposal of a national staff with "controllers from the other side."

BAGHDAD PACT

Since the bilateral agreements are not expected to be concluded in this session, our delegation believes it desirable to extend an invitation to hold the seventh session (July 1959) in Washington. Our delegation has been told to "hold the door open."

UK-UAR

Foreign Minister Fawzi has apparently agreed to the establishment of a British mission in Cairo with diplomatic facilities and immunities. In the meantime, Embassy Jidda has been informed that Prince Faisal is prepared to discuss resumption of relations with the UK.

John SD Eisenhower

UNCLASSIFIED

March 18, 1959 material
Reported March 18

6

Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President

USSR - IRAQ

Plans being worked out by Soviet and Iraqi officials to return 500 Kurds to Iraq from the USSR are "well along," according to an Iraqi diplomat in Moscow. At the present time, Moscow and Iraqi Communists appear to be playing down the theme of an independent Kurdish state in favor of joint Kurdish-Arab support for the "progressive" Qasim regime.

SUDAN

A dissident officers group in Sudan, led by Brigadier Shannan, Commanding General, Northern Command, is reported to be attempting to take over control of the government on March 19th.

WEST GERMANY




Chancellor Adenauer has publicly made a sweeping rejection of all plans for limiting or withdrawing armed forces in Central Europe. Despite an appearance of "complete unanimity" in his March 12-13 talks with Macmillan, Adenauer's attack on disengagement is aimed at London; it is also designed to correct any public misinterpretation of Bonn's position. A top foreign policy adviser in Adenauer's party, feeling it necessary to make concessions to public opinion, favors putting forward a disengagement plan designed, however, to be unacceptable to Moscow.

PANAMA

A coup attempt by Vice President Diaz is expected today, March 18th.

JORDAN



~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS	
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)	
Agency Case	NSC F90-1146
NLE Case	90-30849
By	PLS NLE Date 11/6/92

April 7, 1959

Summary of Intelligence Items reported to the President

Top Soviet Foreign Ministry officials showed great relief to Thompson that a Foreign Ministers Conference has been arranged, and adopted an "almost pleading" attitude stressing the importance of a Summit Meeting. Thompson sees this as a result of Khrushchev's pressure on Foreign Ministry officials and their realization of dangers of Khrushchev's Berlin move in November.

East German workers are becoming "testy and assertive," according to a former party leader, refusing to cooperate in forced programs, "voluntary" work and increased production norms.



Intermittent clashes continue between Bedouin tribesmen and Iraqi security forces on Syrian-Iraqi border. Cairo has sent three million rounds of rifle ammunition to the tribes, but is not supporting with regular Army elements.

British Ambassador in Baghdad has advised London that the arrest and questioning of the senior Iraqi official of Mosul Petroleum Company operations may have purpose of providing a basis for sequestering the company.

U. S. inform French of decision in principle to furnish arms to Morocco. Couve de Murville said de Gaulle would react unfavorably and be spurred to take further unilateral action in other fields relating to NATO. The Acting Secretary then sent a personal message to Couve reassuring that we have not acted without consultation, and have simply stated an intention to help Morocco.

Von Brentano, in explaining the negative nature of German position in recent discussions, pointed to the danger of subversion by East Germany and possibilities of a coalition between the West German

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.4(b)


opposition and the Socialists and Communists in East Germany.

Nasser and Hare have been conducting discussions regarding possible aid to Egypt -- Hare citing the difficulties relating to Egyptian cotton, but stressing desire to improve relations with the UAR. Possibility of additional PL 480 wheat also discussed.

In Indonesia Sukarno is preparing to assume a stronger leadership role under the 1945 Constitution, and to "return" to the Constitution. The effect of the move will be to lessen the influence and infiltration of the Communists.

.....there remain only a few thousand Germans in the territory turned over to Poland who have retained German nationality. Perhaps a million have assumed Polish nationality, the rest have left.

.....restrictions continue against the immigration of anyone of other than the white race into Australia. Although restriction has been changed to be based upon "tests," the effect is to exclude other races (there were less than a dozen exceptions in 1945).



[Handwritten signature]

A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

UNCLASSIFIED

DE

April 18 thru 20, 1959 material

Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the PresidentIRAQ

Communist pressures have resulted in a number of personnel changes in important Iraqi government posts, and a major revision of the Iraqi cabinet is reported to be impending.

According to a UK Foreign Office official, the British Ambassador to Iraq -- now on consultation in London -- holds that there is no alternative to continuing the present UK policy in Iraq, avoiding actions embarrassing to relations with Qasim, and trying to find ways to help him. So far no decision has been reached on an arms offer, but the Ambassador favors it and other projects. He feels Qasim has not given in to every Communist demand, and the label "Communist" is being used indiscriminately in regard to Iraq.

SUDAN

Premier Abboud is again reported preparing to retire. Meanwhile, continuing dissension in the Supreme Military Council makes a shake-up of the Sudanese cabinet appear increasingly likely.

YEMEN

Crown Prince Badr and Nasir have agreed that all foreign diplomatic missions in Yemen will be closed and that representation will be conducted through Cairo. The move may be aimed primarily at reducing Communist-bloc influence in Yemen and suggests the heretofore pro-Soviet Badr is falling in line with Nasir's anti-Communist campaign.

BERLIN

In summing up the first week's deliberations our delegation lists the following remaining important issues to be either resolved by the working group or referred to the respective Governments: (1) the extent of the responsibilities of the proposed all-German Committee; (2) the details of Western security proposals; (3) the UN role in Berlin; (4) the possible extension of the basis for the West's Berlin rights; and (5) the tactics to be used at the Foreign Ministers Conference.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12355, SEC. 3.4 (b)**UNCLASSIFIED**

OR 90-308#11

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

Meanwhile, Embassy Paris has been informed by the Foreign Office that Hammarskjold had stated to the French UN Representative he felt it would be desirable if the UN could be associated in some manner with the Foreign Ministers Conference. He therefore suggested he might give a brief welcoming address in Geneva but then leave the conference. According to the Foreign Office the USSR, the UK and France have already agreed to this suggestion.

We informed the British Embassy on Friday it would be necessary for us to undertake further flights into Berlin above 10,000 feet if the press continued to speculate on a split on this subject between the Allies and within the US Government.

Moscow is preparing a bloc foreign ministers' conference in Warsaw, probably in April but certainly before 11 May, according to the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow.

Foreign Minister Gromyko told the West German ambassador recently that the USSR will concentrate on discussing the Berlin issue and a German peace treaty at the forthcoming foreign ministers' conference, but will not evade other questions. Gromyko expressed doubt regarding the prospects for a "successful" foreign ministers' conference. The West German ambassador believes this reflects Khrushchev's desire to go on to a summit meeting. In the ambassador's view, Khrushchev is convinced he can gain Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe without making any concession in return because he does not believe the West is united.

VENEZUELA



We have informed Embassy Caracas that in order to forestall the adoption by Canada of nationalistic oil policies, which might impair our joint defense arrangements, we are seeking authority to notify Ottawa that oil imported by pipeline will be exempted from the restrictions imposed by the mandatory oil import program. The Embassy has replied, expressing serious concern that when this becomes known in Venezuela, there will be an across-the-board denunciation of the exemption as discriminatory. The Embassy urges that our action vis-a-vis Canada be tied in with some more constructive move such as a hemispheric exception.

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET

- 3 -

BOLIVIA

A rightist revolution broke out briefly in La Paz on the morning of 19 April but the government apparently has the situation under control.

TEST TALKS

We have informed our test-suspension delegation that no new proposal on staffing should be advanced at present. We believe the recent Soviet answers to questions on staffing, although representing a move toward integration of foreign specialists into control post staffs, do not constitute a move of sufficient importance to justify our abandoning the principle that no host-country personnel should serve on a technical staff.

INDIA

Despite major economic advances during India's First and Second Five-Year-Plan periods, Nehru's Congress party apparently is losing popular support. In recent municipal elections in the southern state of Madras, one of the Congress party's strongholds, the party lost control of Madras city and of most other large towns.

CEYLON

Embassy Colombo reports that manifestations of anti-Chinese Communist feeling as a result of the Tibetan revolt are continuing, including suggestions during the past week that the Prime Minister raise the Tibet issue in the UN or Afro-Asian Conference forum, and that the World Fellowship of Buddhists summon a conference to discuss the situation.

ICELAND-BRITAIN

The Icelandic parliament and public are more aroused over the recent intervention of a British naval vessel in preventing the arrest of a British trawler than at any time since last September when Iceland extended its fishing limit to 12 miles. With elections scheduled for this summer, all political parties are seeking to appear as champions of Iceland's rights, and the Icelandic foreign minister says the Communists have gained considerable ground as a result of these incidents.

UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET

May 12, 1959

Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the PresidentIRAQ

In a long interview with Nasser on Saturday, Hare raised the question of Syria's need for economic aid and the UAR's failure so far to present its needs specifically. Nasser said there was confusion resulting from the imprecise nature of Syrian agreement with the USSR, which had talked of little except "studies, studies, studies." He had become impatient with these dilatory tactics. Hare emphasized we were not trying to drum up business but wished to make clear that mention of need for aid in Syria by Nasser himself had not progressed to the point of specific suggestions. We would not want to be placed in a position of having it said later that we had failed to respond to a request which in fact had never been made. Nasser said he understood this.

Hare found Nasser's thinking on Qasim very much like ours. Despite somber aspects of the Iraqi situation, Nasser felt there were a few hopeful glimmerings. He made clear he did not wish to obstruct any constructive developments in Iraq. Agreeing in principle with the desirability of closing Arab ranks to the Communist menace, the UAR leader nevertheless saw practical difficulties arising from extraneous circumstances. Nasser said he had no plans whatsoever for renewing full relations with the British. Referring to the UK's decision to supply materiel to Iraq, he said the British had not yet made their views known to him.

✓ TURKEY

Minister of Defense Etem Menderes, whose relations with the prime minister and other Democratic leaders have become seriously strained, claims that if the present repressive tendencies of the Democratic regime continue, military leaders will intervene and a dictatorship will result. Menderes' views are probably colored by his own political ambitions. There is, however, information from other sources regarding the stringent measures the government has taken and is planning to take against the opposition.



MR 88-11 #11

- 2 -

WEST GERMANY

West German and West Berlin political leaders have given up their previous opposition to the acceptance of the East Germans as Soviet "agents" in operating checkpoints on the routes to Berlin. They are more firmly opposed than ever, however, to any change in West Berlin's status or in the four-power responsibility for the entire city.

John S. Eisenhower



UNTOP SECRET UNCLASSIFIED

June 24 thru 26, 1959

Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the PresidentJAPAN - KOREA

MacArthur and Gruenther met on 23 June with high official of the Foreign Ministry of Japan. Gen. Gruenther outlined his opposition to the ICRC lending its good name to any screening and repatriation plan which did not have the full confidence of the world. Kishi later impressed MacArthur as being vague on the entire matter. MacArthur thinks that the whole issue would be best shelved and this could be implemented by an ICRC refusal to participate in the plan or ICRC insistence of carrying out a truly effective supervision of screening.

BERLIN

West German officials have received reports of "voluntary" action to be taken by East German workers to interfere with the West German presidential election in West Berlin on 1 July. A Moscow commentary has called the decision to hold the election a gross and dangerous provocation. Brandt does not expect serious trouble but has agreed that if such trouble comes about the assembly should be convoked elsewhere. He has incidentally indicated some relish for interference which would require such action.

Meanwhile the Italians in the NATO Council have ^{proposed} ~~opposed~~ a special ministerial meeting prior to July 13th. Most delegates have been cool to this idea although Spaak has sent a message indicating his approval. Decision has been postponed to 1 July. The Germans are the first objectors advancing the opinion that such a meeting would indicate rifts in the Allied position, capable of exploitation of the Soviets. London also objects.

USSR-BALKANS

Moscow has sent a formal note to 10 nations calling for an atom- and rocket-free zone in the Adriatic. The notes suggest a "great-powers guarantee" of the security and independence of the countries in the zone. They could have some impact on the Greek attitude on the IRBMs.

UNTOP SECRET UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS	
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)	
Agency Case	NSC F90-1146
NLE Case	90-308-13
By	SPB NLE Date 11/16/92

2

to further forms of diplomatic or other pressure, including the withdrawal of the Ambassadors of the Three Powers from Moscow.

b. The Three Powers will intensify their military preparations. At this point the preparations could include measures which would be readily observable.

11. Use of Military Force

a. The Three Governments will make jointly the appropriate decisions for restoring freedom of passage. The measures required for their implementation should be the object of a study by the tripartite staff in Paris.²

b. Supplementing military decisions, consideration might be given to possible economic measures.

12. Air Access to Berlin

a. As a concomitant to the above courses of action regarding surface access to Berlin, the Three Powers should, from the start, take steps to maintain their unrestricted air access to Berlin, which would be essential to maintaining the status and security of the city.

b. The Three Embassies at Bonn, in consultation with the tripartite staff in Paris or with other military headquarters as appropriate, should review or complete contingency planning to deal with the following aspects of the Berlin air access question:

- (1) Possible Soviet withdrawal from the Berlin Air Safety Center;
 - (2) Possible Soviet or East German threats against the safety of flights in the Berlin corridors and control zones;
 - (3) Measures which might be taken to continue civil air services as long as possible in the event of any change in the present situation;
 - (4) Possible establishment of a "garrison airlift" to transport Allied personnel and material as necessary in the event of an interruption of Allied surface traffic;
 - (5) The possible substitution of military for civil aircraft to maintain air services to Berlin if civil aircraft cease operations;
 - (6) Possible direct interference by the Soviets or East Germans with flights in the Berlin corridors or control zone; and
 - (7) Flights in the Berlin corridors above 10,000 feet. (This issue might be resolved by a simple tripartite agreement to fly at an altitude appropriate to efficient operations of individual aircraft.)
- c. Planning regarding b (4) and b (5) above should be conducted on the understanding that no policy decision has been taken on a "garrison airlift" or on the substitution of military for civil aircraft.

² See Document 227.

13. Planning Responsibilities and Coordination

a. The Tripartite Ambassadorial Group meeting in Washington is responsible for the over-all coordination of Berlin contingency planning and for the drafting of the statement mentioned in paragraph 3 above.

b. The Three Embassies at Bonn are primarily responsible for the development of recommendations regarding identification of Allied movements (paragraph 7 above), instructions regarding detailed procedures at the checkpoints (paragraph 7 above), and air access planning (paragraph 12 above).

c. The Tripartite Staff in Paris, under the supervision of General Norstad, is responsible for coordinating the preparatory military measures and the planning described in paragraph 1 above, for studying measures which might be taken to restore freedom of access (paragraph 11 above), and for assisting the Three Embassies at Bonn in carrying out their responsibilities as described in paragraph 13 b above.

d. The Ambassadors of the Three Powers to the United Nations are charged with making recommendations to their Governments regarding the basis and timing of a possible approach to the United Nations (cf paragraph 10 a above).

e. The Headquarters of the Three Powers in Berlin will give the Three Embassies at Bonn whatever assistance the latter may require in carrying out their responsibilities as described in paragraph 13 b above.

f. The military authorities in each of the Three Countries are responsible for the planning of measures on a purely national basis, as mentioned in paragraph 1 above, in support of tripartite by planned measures.

256. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research No. 7994

Washington, April 7, 1959.
THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT POSITION ON THE BERLIN SITUATION¹
French Government Position
[Here follows a two-paragraph abstract of the paper.]
Throughout the current Berlin crisis the French official position has been firm, but the French have been extremely reluctant to initiate any

¹ Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files, Secret; Noform. Similar reports on the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, Nos. 7995 and 7996, were prepared on April 8. (Ibid.)

negotiating positions which might be taken by the West. This is not to say that the French position is flabby but rather one of "stand-patism" and not showing one's cards. The French approach is undoubtedly based on the French interest in preserving as much as possible of the status quo. The French are most reluctant to assist in steps which might lead to a general European settlement adversely altering the relative power status of France vis-à-vis Germany or weakening the security of Western Europe.

Several factors need to be taken into account in explaining the French position. Unlike the German and the British governments the French government is not faced with a vigorous and effective opposition party in Parliament. This, of course, enables the French government to reveal as little of its position at any particular time as it sees fit with no need to parry the critical curiosity of the opposition party. It also means that the position taken need not represent an internal compromise—there is no need to accommodate the position to opposition demands. The result might well be a more stubborn, rigid attitude. A further factor related to this is the dominating personality of General de Gaulle. For the foreseeable future French policy is likely to be de Gaulle policy no matter what other views may be held at Foreign Office (or other ministerial) working levels. De Gaulle may, as in the past, fail to coordinate his policy in any very thorough manner with his Western allies but nonetheless, the end result is likely to be a position in favor of a firm Western stand, including the will to force access. De Gaulle's policy is less likely than that of any Western power to encompass any disengagement—thinning out of forces—compromise schemes.

Of all the Western allies, France is the least interested in the reunification of West and East Germany. While the other Western allies see the Berlin crisis in terms of achieving general European solutions, the French are happy with the status quo and anxious to avoid the Berlin issue bringing about any weakening of the Western position via disengagement. This undoubtedly helps to account for the rigid and legalistic character of the French approach. Whereas the French believe the other Western allies consider that the status of Berlin is only negotiable in terms of wider issues—Germany, Central Europe, disarmament—the French prefer to stand on legal rights and to confine the issues to the access question. This may be further reflected in a reluctance to engage in a Summit conference.

French Estimate of Soviet Objectives

In considering the Soviet objectives in precipitating the Berlin crisis the French Foreign Office at the outset (Nov. 14) believed that Khrushchev wanted to get US forces out of Europe and to prevent an armed, unified Western Europe. In a subsequent analysis, presented by the

French delegation of the Four Power Working Group in Paris on March 10, the French amplified their views. In an effort to perpetuate the present division of Germany the Soviets, in the French view, wish to constrain the West, by explicit recognition of East Germany, to share the responsibility for maintenance of the division of Europe. To achieve this goal, the Soviets are using Berlin and threat of war over Berlin to wring concessions from the West which France in particular is not willing to make. While France has nothing against the division of Europe in its present form, it cannot countenance this division within the framework of disarmament, disengagement, or weakening of the West's military posture vis-à-vis Soviet military strength.

French Views on Reunification, Disengagement, and Disarmament

De Gaulle has in private conversations clearly stated that he is no friend of German reunification (although offering it lip-service in public pronouncements). The reasons are obvious. France does not want the balance of power in Western Europe altered so as to increase the strength of Germany. Nor does it wish to see Western Germany cut loose from its Western military and economic ties. Quite apart from Germany, per se, reunification on terms acceptable to the Soviets would alter the entire military balance in Europe to the almost certain detriment of the West and this is an added reason for French aversion to reunification.

The French are very leery of disengagement and under the firm hand of General de Gaulle, whose thinking on this problem is premised on military rather than political considerations, there is likely to be great reticence on the part of the French government to agree to any of the disengagement plans currently under discussion (e.g., Rapacki plan, Kennan plan, Gaiskell plan).² Any partial disarmament as a possible concomitant of a Berlin settlement is equally unappealing to the French. Both disengagement and partial disarmament in the French view are likely to lead to a situation in which France is impotent and isolated in the face of a Soviet military threat. General de Gaulle has stated categorically (in his March 25 conference)³ that disengagement has no value for the French and that disarmament would only make sense in terms of a zone extending to the Urals. The French are against disarmament being one of the themes for discussion at a Ministerial or Summit conference with the Russians, since they consider that the West has no agreed posi-

² Regarding the Rapacki Plan, see footnote 2, Document 43. The Kennan plan is presumably a reference to George F. Kennan's "Disengagement Revisited" in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1959, vol. 37, pp. 187-210. The Gaiskell plan probably refers to Hugh Gaiskell's "Such a Policy Might Pay" in *Western World*, Spring 1958, pp. 36-44.

³ For a transcript of de Gaulle's press conference on March 25, see de Gaulle, *State-ments*, pp. 41-51.

tion on disarmament and discussion of this subject would give the Soviets a chance to maneuver Communist China into the discussions.

Jules Moch has been quoted as saying that from the French point of view any two of the three proposals—reunification, an armed Germany, a neutral Germany—are acceptable but not all three together. It is no doubt with this in mind—even if only subconsciously—that the French are suspicious of reunification and German neutralism. They realize that a reunified and neutral Germany would hardly be left unarmed.

Berlin—Access and Rights

France, like the other Western allies, wants to maintain access to Berlin and the freedom of West Berlin. This has to do with prestige and with the fear that loss of Berlin (or weakening of the Allied position in Berlin) would inevitably result in the gradual breakup of NATO. In the French view, the Soviets are using Berlin as a gambit to maintain "a state of constant tension tending to weaken German resolve and bring about a desire for neutralism in Germany." For this reason, regardless of other considerations, Berlin must be held. There must be no drift towards neutralism. The French consider that there are groups in West Germany of all political colorings that are inclined towards neutralism. Failure of the West to take a firm stand in Berlin might well enable these groups to impel West Germany into the neutralistic camp.

It is hardly surprising that the French have a rigid position—a legalistic approach toward the Berlin crisis. They want to maintain the European status quo including that of Berlin—not at the price of Berlin. They accordingly take a "tough" line, and de Gaulle is known to advocate maintaining access by every means possible not excluding force. He tempers this by saying that the West should not be provocative or use force first. The French Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, has also stated categorically that the West cannot brook interference with air or land communications with Berlin. He considers it essential that the Western Allies retain the rights which they acquired by the German surrender, including freedom of communication with Berlin.

Berlin and the UN

As was to be expected, the French do not want to take the Berlin problem to the UN because they fear that UN debate could tie the hands of the West. They have reluctantly agreed to exploratory discussions with the UK and US Ambassadors at the UN but obviously intend to remain adamant regarding Western introduction of the issue into the UN for UN consideration. The most they would be willing to do is to go to the Security Council under Article 51 of the Charter to inform the Council of Allied measures taken in response to interference with access to Berlin. The French are especially concerned lest the approach to the UN might occur following a probe by the West but prior to the use of

force by the West with a resultant blockade situation in which the initiative passed from the Western Allies to the UN.

Foreign Office Views on Berlin

Although there is no French opposition attitude on Berlin there has been some indication that there have been some divergent views within the Foreign Office upon various aspects of handling the crisis. For some weeks following the Khrushchev speech of Nov. 10, the Foreign Office took no official position on the crisis in spite of the fact that the working level in the Foreign Office had consistently advocated a firm policy. The French Foreign Minister indicated at an early stage that he was inclined to feel that continued Western insistence on the "non-existence" of the East German government might be unrealistic. In early December Couve was reported as tentatively proposing negotiations on the whole German question as a means of appearing to give a positive reply to the Soviet Note of Nov. 27. In January Couve stated that although France in its reply to the Nov. 27 note was resolved to reject anything prejudicial to France's incontestable rights in Berlin, France is prepared, if there is any prospect of arriving at an accord, to discuss the entire German problem including reunification and a peace treaty. The Foreign Office has also had some internal divergence of opinion regarding Soviet motives. One leading official (formerly French Ambassador to Moscow) believes the Russians may be willing to lose East Germany (in the sense of troop withdrawal) to obtain a neutralized, united Germany. The working level of the Foreign Office rejects this view.

Regardless, however, of these apparent divergent opinions, the Foreign Office is certain to follow the line met [set?] by de Gaulle, and part of the "rigidity" of the French position may stem from the fact that the Foreign Office must wait to receive its cue before disclosing its position. Because de Gaulle (as is recognized by the Foreign Office) is unpredictable, it is necessary to adopt an extremely circumscribed approach on any theme on which de Gaulle's views are not yet known.

[1 paragraph (20 lines of source text) not declassified]

Berlin and NATO

Since the accession of de Gaulle to power, it has been apparent that the French are determined to acquire a role in NATO equal to that of the UK and superior to that of Germany. The Berlin crisis may prove to be of great assistance to them in this endeavor because of the close working arrangements, both military and political, among the Three Powers, which the new situation has necessitated. It seems likely that the French will exploit the situation to the full. (French anger towards the US in connection with the Algerian-Moroccan problems may also provide a manipulatable lever in achieving French NATO aims. The French Foreign Minister has very recently stated that US unilateral action in decid-

ing in principle to supply Morocco with arms would encourage de Gaulle in taking unilateral French actions vis-à-vis NATO to achieve French goals. The US and other NATO countries, faced with the Berlin crisis, will be obliged to discourage any actions which would impair the cohesiveness of NATO as a military force.)

One rather strange suggestion, somewhat unemphatically made by the French on one or two occasions, is that a tenuous relationship for a reunified Germany with NATO (parallel perhaps to the Russo-Finnish relationship) might somehow be developed as a part of the solution of Berlin. This idea, still very nebulous, seems likely to remain so in view of the improbability of Russian acceptance of any kind of military affiliation of a united Germany with the West.

Conclusions

There are undoubtedly large segments of the French population, particularly the Communists, which are opposed to the firm policy of the French government on Berlin. However, in view of the existing political situation in France, it seems unlikely that dissident groups have had, or are likely to have, any significant influence upon decisions taken by the de Gaulle government. While fear of war as a consequence of the Berlin situation certainly exists in France as in the rest of West Europe, the absence of an effective opposition to exploit this aspect has meant that the government has not had to cater to the public's fear.

In sum, the French throughout this Berlin crisis, both because of the present political situation within France and the foreign policy aims of the French government, have taken a very firm stand. They will bend every effort to maintaining the status quo in Berlin with freedom of access for the Western Allies. They will balk at any step which may be taken to solve the Berlin crisis if it seems likely to have an adverse effect upon France's military security. For various reasons—e.g., the existence of a strong government, lack of opposition, France's geographic position on the continent, concern regarding Germany's future vis-à-vis France—France has responded to the Berlin crisis in a manner that seems to take into account to a far lesser degree the actual dangers and implications of war than has been the case in the UK or even West Germany. While General de Gaulle's actions and pronouncements are often unexpected as to timing and content, there seems no reason to think that France's policy on Berlin will become any less firm. The French are unlikely to cause the US any major difficulties in any aspect other than procedural matters, provided that the US position itself remains firm. France's own firm policy, as de Gaulle himself has said, is predicated on American power and leadership.

In a conversation with the Acting Secretary of State on March 31,⁴ the French Foreign Minister outlined several of the principal elements of the French position on Berlin. In particular he stressed the need for maintenance of rights, a tough policy rather than flexibility, a desire to avoid implicating the UN, and general mistrust of British policy.

⁴ See Document 246.

257. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, April 9, 1959, 7 p.m.

2034. As Four Power Working Group prepares resume preparation of Western negotiating position for Foreign Ministers' Conference, believe it should be useful sum up various aspects of Soviet position as they are likely to unfold at Geneva. Developments for possible later Summit meeting are largely excluded since too much will depend on interim events.

Kremlin objectives now seem clear. Primary one is to achieve result which will in fact amount to Western acceptance of East European status quo epitomized by some sort of recognition of GDR. This is, of course, to be accomplished with as much loss as possible of Western prestige and political stature so as to produce maximum disorganization of NATO, West European unity efforts, defense measures, and West German domestic stability. However, latter gains would at present time serve essentially as icing for Soviet cake, main ingredient of which is to be legitimization of "irrevocable" incorporation of Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany into "socialist camp". This does not mean that achievement of latter aim by Moscow would herald end of Communist-led political warfare against West in Europe (or elsewhere), but it would create new phase and changed conditions of struggle, perhaps related to Khrushchev's concept of economic competition of two worlds which has prerequisite in his eyes of full consolidation of Eastern empire (Soviet hegemony).

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762 00/4-959. Secret. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

555
#7996
4/9/59
C.I
/R



Intelligence Report

No. 7996

April 9, 1959

THE UK GOVERNMENT POSITION
ON THE BERLIN SITUATION*

MAY 1 1959

LR FILE COPY
PLEASE RETURN

Abstract

The British are determined to exploit every opportunity to press for a summit conference on the Berlin crisis, since they believe that a satisfactory solution can be reached only at that level. They have no illusions that such a meeting will reduce all, or even most, of the East-West tensions, but the imperatives of UK public opinion require that the West make every effort to approach the forthcoming conference pragmatically and not appear intransigent. More openly than other Western European powers, the UK considers reunification no longer a practical possibility and the Berlin issue to be separable from an all-Germany solution as well as from the broader problem of European security. As for the immediate problem, the British see the possibility of exchanging de facto recognition of East Germany in return for a reaffirmation of Western rights in Berlin. As a first step towards a broader detente, they see the possibility of establishing a controlled and inspected "limited forces" zone in Central Europe. The other major Western European powers, whom the British consider "too doctrinaire," consider the UK "soft" on these tactical proposals. The UK is, however, firm in its strategic commitments. It has reiterated its opposition to the abandonment of West Berlin, its opposition to a neutral Germany or the pulling apart of forces in Germany, and its opposition to the unbalancing of East-West forces. Fully cognizant that their maneuverability is limited, furthermore, the British are not likely to engage in any further initiatives that will weaken the Western position in general or their "interdependent" relationship with the US in particular.

AS

3AS

Excisions
P1-7 (241-247)

REVIEWED BY: [Signature]
DATE: 2/14/60
CLASSIFIED BY: [Signature]
DECLASSIFY ON: [Signature]
DOWNGRADE TO: () S OF () G, DATE: [Signature]

* Related Intelligence Reports No. 7994 and No. 7995, dated April 8, 1959, discuss the positions of France and of the Federal Republic of Germany.

THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT, AND NOT A STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICY

- 2 -

Introduction

The UK position in the Berlin crisis must be considered in the context of that country's long-standing desire for a detente with the USSR and a demonstration of Western political initiative in resolving the dangers of a divided Germany. "Summitry" and "flexibility," furthermore, derive fundamentally from the profound fear felt by the British public of a nuclear war. These factors have only intensified the traditionally pragmatic approach that has long characterized the UK's diplomatic relations. Although stimulated by the campaign fever of the forthcoming General Election, British eagerness to go to the summit does not stem basically from electoral pressures but will continue to be an essential element in UK foreign relations. A 5

Essentials of the British Position

Status quo. The UK found the status quo -- i.e., a divided Germany and a Berlin enclave within the GDR -- a workable, albeit vulnerable, arrangement, and would be satisfied if this situation could be continued. [It also appealed to an underlying prejudice in Britain that a strong Germany has historically proved to be the trouble maker of Europe. While the division of Berlin was an awkward arrangement, it was also a useful "showcase" and intelligence outpost in a Soviet satellite. 25

It is unlikely, however, that the British ever believed that this situation could continue indefinitely, or that they now believe the pre-November 10 status quo can be restored. The British recognize that the long and the short term goals of the USSR are to weaken the Western alliance by every conceivable tactic, and that their Berlin gambit has struck at one of the West's weakest positions. Convinced, however, that the Soviets intend to exploit the vulnerability in this salient, and estimating that this is a potentially explosive issue, the UK is inclined to accommodate itself to the political "facts of life" in Central Europe. The leadership of both parties has drawn encouragement from Soviet statements that Moscow is ready to negotiate, and they believe that every effort must be made to wring concessions that will save West Berlin and Western face.

In a broader sense, the UK sees in the present crisis an opportunity to alter the status quo in Europe by enabling the West to formulate a more positive foreign policy than they believe has been advanced since 1955. [In the absence of Secretary Dulles both the British Government and British public see the Berlin problem as an opportunity to fill a vacuum in Western leadership and thereby to enhance their sense of self-esteem.] They have no illusions about the difficulties of bridging the gap between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, but they are ready to engage in protracted discussions and negotiations toward this end. If there is no detente, and lack of success is the result of Soviet rather than Western intransigence, they see the effort itself as a victory for Western initiative. A 5

SECRET/NOFORN

881137 - 242

- 3 -

Berlin. The British see the German issue as two separable problems: 1) the immediate status of West Berlin and the imminent threat of transfer of access controls to the GDR, and 2) the broader German question, including questions of reunification, security zones, etc. The British consider the Berlin problem negotiable, on an interim basis at least, but they recognize that the West may have to pay a price of de facto recognition that may compromise an overall German settlement. They are less optimistic as to the negotiability of the broader German question. They have little expectation that the Western formula of "reunification by free elections" will be acceptable to the Soviets in the foreseeable future, and will resist the inclusion of this formula in any Western proposals except as a long-range objective.

More specifically in regard to Berlin, British thinking has not changed since November when the crisis crystallized. The abandonment of West Berlin to East Germany is in the foreseeable future out of the question. They are still certain that the USSR will eventually transfer access controls to the GDR unless East-West negotiations are under way. Once control is transferred, and assuming the West's inability to supply Berlin by airlift for more than a year, the British see the West confronted with the alternatives of dealing with GDR authorities or using force to break a blockade. As between these, the British Foreign Office has said that "it would seem clearly to be in our interest to choose the first...." They recognized that this might put the West on a "slippery slope" leading to the alternatives of full and formal recognition of the GDR or a blockade that would have to be broken by force, but again the Foreign Office considers the recognition of the GDR the lesser evil. Lloyd has attempted to dispel the illusion that the British "welcome" recognition of the GDR, and he has reiterated the unwillingness of the UK to go against the wishes of the Federal Republic. He has indicated, however, that the Federal Republic must recognize that the West might be obliged to submit to de facto recognition, and doubts furthermore that de facto recognition will necessarily lead to the removal of the West from West Berlin. A3 AS

In return for de facto recognition, the British believe that they can exact from the Soviets a reaffirmation of Western rights in Berlin. They welcomed Soviet statements that the "free city" proposals are amenable and that an interim solution in Berlin is feasible. Essentially, de facto recognition would be tied into the "agent" theory in that the GDR would function, not as a government in its own right, but as the designated authority of the USSR. The USSR in return would assure that its obligations to keep open the Berlin corridor would continue. A3 AS

Should it not be possible to effect such an agreement with the Soviets, the British would have the West "get off the hook" by recourse to the UN. They believe that world opinion can be mobilized in support of the West if the matter goes to the Security Council, and that an interim solution might be effected by providing a UN presence in Berlin.

SECRET/NOFORN

881137-243

- 4 -

Such a presence, however, could not conceivably displace Western forces in the city. There is virtual unanimity in the UK on the retention of Western forces in Berlin as a symbol of Western strength vis-a-vis the Soviets, as well to uphold the morale of West Berliners, Western Europeans, and all countries identified with the Western Alliance.

Contingency Planning. The British position on this matter rests on the conviction that nothing should be done by the West that would appear to be provocative, or that might spark off military hostilities without satisfying public opinion within the NATO countries that the Soviets made the first use of force. In principle the British have agreed to military preparedness measures, possibly including a NATO general alert, but they have reserved their right of final review before any contingency plan is implemented. Should surface traffic be interrupted, the British still seem reluctant to test Soviet intentions by ground action where it is difficult to determine clearly who has been the aggressor. At the outside, they hope that any ground test would be limited to an "access probe" rather than a "military action."

More to their liking, if the West must make an effort to run a blockade, would be a garrison airlift which would be more difficult to obstruct without overt use of force on the part of the Soviets or the East Germans. This latter situation, the British feel, would more likely elicit NATO and popular support for a Western response that might involve the risk of general war.

Notwithstanding the appearance of "softness" in this British position, it is likely, as Embassy London has observed, that "when the chips are down," both the British public and British government would show determination and firmness. The key to the British position is the need on the part of the leadership not to get too far away from public opinion and to find itself in a position where the US government is urging the use of force while the British public is either split or negative on this issue. British public opinion, however, may be expected to harden if the Soviets take a "tough" line in forthcoming negotiations.]

Reunification of Germany. The British still maintain their "declared policy" that Germany is to be reunified by free elections. There is, however, probably no British leader who considers such a solution feasible in the foreseeable future. Macmillan, and the Labor opposition, welcomed Secretary Dulles' observation that free elections need not necessarily initiate the reunification process. [Quite aside from their own doubts about the desirability of a united Germany,] the British are convinced that the Soviet Union will maintain the division of Europe and that East Germany is increasingly becoming an integral part of the Soviet bloc. They do not even believe that a confederation or economic union between the East and West zones is possible until there can be Four Power agreement on an all-German settlement. So long as the present deadlock continues, the British believe that relations between the

SECRET/NOFORN

881 137 - 244

two zones can be improved largely through technical and professional contacts. They even doubt that this relatively modest contribution to "reunification" is likely to make much progress until more liberal conditions are achieved in East Germany, or the standard of living in East Germany improves to such an extent that the Ulbricht regime would not be likely to suffer in prestige from greater contact with the Federal Republic.

In the British view, therefore, Western proposals for reunification are to be advanced as maximum objectives, and largely for their propaganda effect. They fully recognize that there must be fall-back positions, and that these come close to involving the West in de facto and ultimately de jure recognition of "two Germanies."

Limitation of Forces and Disengagement. The British have been waging a strenuous campaign to clarify widespread misunderstanding as to the differences between disengagement and limitation of forces, and their view of which concept best suits the present crisis. This confusion of terms reached a climax with the release of the Anglo-Soviet communique of March 3rd which discussed "the possibilities of increasing security by some method of limitation of forces and weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in an agreed area of Europe, coupled with an appropriate system of inspection." Much to the displeasure of Macmillan this statement was characterized in many Western capitals as a disengagement proposal. The British maintain that disengagement specifically means the separation of the main land forces of the East and West by the establishment of an area which is demilitarized, occupied by indigenous forces alone, or denuclearized. They agree with critics of "full" disengagement that the creation of such a neutral belt invites rather than avoids substantial risks of war. Limitation of forces, as they have advanced the concept, means either fixing the total of forces and armaments without regard to nationality, or their reduction to agreed ceilings without regard to nationality on some basis of parity. It would not involve the withdrawal of any particular forces (including foreign forces), nor the exclusion of particular (i.e. nuclear) weapons. They insist that the idea is not new, that it was part of the Western proposal at Geneva in October 1955, and reiterated by Selwyn Lloyd during the foreign affairs debate in Parliament on December 4, 1958. Even Hugh Gaitskell, commonly associated with a neutral belt proposal, considers that a limitation of forces plan is the best that can be considered at the present time.

The UK sees such a proposal as having several principal advantages: (1) it would bring about a lowering of tensions between the two German territories that might gradually lead toward reunification; and (2) it might prove a useful experiment in international control which if successful could be extended to other fields. The British also feel that such an agreement would not necessarily confirm the division of Germany as some critics fear, since the areas could be described without reference to the line dividing East and West Germany.

SECRET/NOFORN

881-137-245

It may be expected that the British will continue to advance limitation of forces as part of a plan which the Soviets may be prevailed upon to accept along with an interim Berlin settlement -- if they do not offer it first. It has been reported that they would define the so-called security zone to include Berlin and the surrounding territory. Such a proposal, it is believed, would protect the freedom and contribute to the economic viability of West Berlin. From the British view this would be worth the price of de facto recognition of East Germany. The British meanwhile are seeking to avoid the impression that they will press this proposal "at all costs," but the concept has so captured the imagination of the British press and public that it will be difficult to abandon.

Special Pressures

In addition to the presence of a continuing and articulate Labor opposition that has long advocated negotiations with the USSR, the fact that a General Election must be held this year creates special pressures in Britain that are not found in West Germany, France, or the US. It is often said in British politics that foreign policy issues rarely play a vital role in elections, but the coincidence of the Berlin crisis and the election campaign may modify this judgment. The two parties are now so evenly balanced that every factor, foreign and domestic, will affect the scales, and it is certain that the Conservatives are counting heavily on foreign policy accomplishments to help provide their margin of victory.

Most notable among the public's "expectations," and suggestive of the specific pressures Macmillan is under, is the conviction that a summit meeting is certain to be held sometime this summer. Every shade of press opinion is in agreement that Macmillan has convinced the other Western leaders that Khrushchev is the only man who can speak for the Soviet bloc and that this present crisis can be resolved only at a summit meeting. Should events suggest that such a meeting was not to be held owing to Western rather than Soviet intransigence, Macmillan will suffer political embarrassment and chances of a Conservative Party re-election will be somewhat diminished. The Labor Party will exploit every manifestation of German, French, and particularly US reluctance to go to the summit, while indications that such reluctance is deflating the image of Macmillan will engender strong anti-US resentment among the Conservatives as well.

Conclusion

In summary, the UK is eager to avoid any action by the West that would appear intransigent or provocative, and is losing interest in identifying a detente in Europe with reunification by free elections. Whereas "summitry" and "disengagement" were previously relatively academic issues, the UK now sees the potentially explosive Berlin issue as enhancing the possibility of negotiating with the Soviets. De facto recognition of

SECRET/NOFORN

881137-24

East Germany, albeit dangerous, seems to the UK to be dictated by the realities of the situation. The British would trade it, however, for the reaffirmation of the Allies' position in West Berlin, as well as a sign of progress toward a "security zone" in Central Europe.

A35

While the British appear to be soft on tactics, their position is essentially hardened by the fact that they cannot solve the Berlin issue bilaterally and that their area of maneuver is very narrow. Macmillan's latest trip to the Western capitals demonstrated the diverse approaches to a Berlin solution, as well as the prevalent suspicion of the British role in this issue. He has been obliged to defend his present views in Bonn, Paris, and Washington and to remind his allies that if the UK was "soft" in 1938 it was not soft in 1939-41. Macmillan recognizes that there can be no solution that does not take full cognizance of West German and US views, if only because the latter are the principal elements in the military defense of Western Europe. He and Selwyn Lloyd have reiterated their opposition to the abandonment of West Berlin, the establishment of a neutral Germany and the pulling apart of forces within Central Europe, as well as their opposition to the unbalancing of East-West forces. The Labor Party, sometimes shrill in its demands for greater independence from US leadership, would itself be obliged toward a much more moderate position if it came to power. For all of the pressures, therefore, for flexibility, realism, and detente, the British may be expected to back away from any independent proposals or actions that will weaken the Western position in general, or their "interdependent" relationship with the US in particular.

SECRET/NOFORN

State-FD, Wash., D.C.

881137-24

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

L 57-2
SECRET/NOFORN

LR

Copy No. 10



Intelligence Report

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 8085
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
LIBRARY DIVISION

REVIEWED BY
 RELEASE
 EXTEND
 WITH
 FOR

2/14/59
August 20, 1959

SEP 18 1959

Exclusions
AP 1-7 (278-284)
OP 10 (287)

LR FILE COPY
BASIC ATTITUDES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ON THE BERLIN AND GERMAN QUESTIONS

Since the beginning of the Berlin crisis in November, 1958, the positions of the major Western European powers -- the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany -- have remained essentially unchanged. The positions of these governments toward the Berlin crisis and the questions of German reunification and European security are reflected in their attitudes toward the forthcoming exchange of visits between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev and the prospects of later summit meetings.

Despite its continued advocacy of the maintenance of Western strength in Europe and the Western position in Berlin, the United Kingdom is convinced that a detente with the Soviet Union must be achieved. It doubts that a general German settlement favorable to the West can be reached in the foreseeable future, and seeks a modus vivendi which will avoid the risk of hostilities and preserve Western presence in Berlin for an interim period without jeopardy to Allied rights thereafter. To this end the United Kingdom is willing to consider concessions leading toward de facto recognition of the East German regime and limitations on Western troops in Berlin. The United Kingdom views the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference as a success leading to continued negotiations, and as a long-time proponent of summit talks it welcomes the Khrushchev-Eisenhower visits.

France views the Berlin crisis as an attempt by the Soviet Union to weaken German solidarity with the West which must be resisted firmly at all points. It believes that the status of Berlin can be negotiated only as part

THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND NOT A STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICY

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

- 2 -

of an unlikely, wider settlement of the problems of German reunification and disarmament. It supports close Franco-German cooperation as a means of bolstering French security and of augmenting current French efforts to gain equal status with the US and UK in determining Western policy. Because of these fears and nationalistic sentiments, the regime of General de Gaulle has grave reservations about joint United States-Soviet talks at this time.

A 3
A 5

The Federal Republic of Germany is primarily concerned with maintaining full Western support, political and military, for its security and its search for reunification. It sees the Berlin crisis as a Soviet attempt to split West Germany from its allies and to perpetuate Communist control of East Germany. The Federal Republic has therefore attempted to restrain its allies, particularly the US and the UK from wavering in their non-recognition policy towards the German Democratic Republic and from making security concessions without getting equal political concessions from the Soviets. It has welcomed the Eisenhower-Khrushchev visits, but seeks reassurance that United States commitments in Europe will not be changed.

A 3, 5

The sharpest difference between the three powers is that which divides the UK from the other two. France and West Germany insist on maintaining firm resistance against Soviet pressure until such time as a general European settlement may be possible. The United Kingdom also seeks a general settlement but believes a start must be made now. It considers a limited Berlin agreement important enough to warrant some Western concessions. The French and West German positions, while tactically similar, differ in that West Germany is preoccupied with the close relationship of security and reunification while France is concerned with controlling German power as well as with preserving Western security in the face of Soviet pressure and adding to her own prestige.

A 3

The Western European powers are unlikely to change their positions significantly during the forthcoming series of top-level negotiations. All three remain uncertain, although in varying degrees, as to whether the Khrushchev-Eisenhower visits mean a real, if limited, thaw in the cold war or whether they may signal United States concessions to Soviet pressure. If the latter, only the United Kingdom might interpret concessions as anything but a do-or-die for the West, while the French and the Germans

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

- 3 -

would be driven to urgent examination of alternatives, including the formation of a continental bloc*, in order to protect themselves against anticipated Soviet moves.

I. THE BRITISH POSITION

The adjournment of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers and the accompanying announcement of forthcoming talks between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev found UK views on the problem of Berlin and of German unification largely unchanged. [The major characteristics of the UK position on these two issues may be summarized as follows:

1. The British are reluctant to risk war over Berlin. They do not believe the Western position in Berlin can be maintained intact, without any concessions to the USSR, unless the West is prepared to show it will risk war.
2. The British feel that the Berlin issue has to be separated from the broader problems of German reunification and European security and negotiated since no solution of reunification or security problems is likely now.
3. They believe that it may be necessary to consider de facto recognition of the East German regime and limits on Western forces in Berlin in exchange for Soviet agreement to an interim solution that permits the continuation of Western presence in Berlin for a certain period without jeopardy to Allied rights thereafter.
4. Although the British still declare that it is their policy that Germany should be reunified by free elections, they doubt that this solution is feasible in the foreseeable future; they believe, rather, that Western proposals for reunification should be advanced as maximum objectives. There is some UK willingness to consider the Soviet proposal for permitting the Germans to negotiate with each other on reunification.
5. They maintain that the questions of Berlin and reunification must be kept the subjects of continuing negotiation, with meetings at the highest levels as often as necessary.

Adherence to this stand has provoked accusations of "softness" from some of the United Kingdom's allies. The UK continues to be firm, however, in its strategic commitments. It remains opposed to the abandonment of West Berlin, to the establishment of a neutral Germany, and to the disengagement of forces in Central Europe (although it has indicated willingness to consider so-called "limitation of forces" in an agreed area in Central Europe). Moreover, the UK remains convinced that the fundamental threat to it comes from the Soviet Union while its security

* See IR No. 8070 entitled "A Critical Appraisal of Western Unity" for an analysis of this topic.

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

- 4 -

derives from its partnership with the United States. Therefore, the United Kingdom is determined to remain a loyal and active member of NATO and a firm partner of the US. The British realize that their security is based on a nuclear deterrent composed of SAC, augmented by their own strategic bomber force, and the system of US bases in Britain and around the world, but they do not believe that certain concessions on the German issues would necessarily alter the nuclear stalemate.

The post-Geneva thinking of the UK on Berlin and reunification must be considered in the context of that country's awareness of its helplessness in nuclear war, its traditionally pragmatic approach to foreign relations in general and unrepresentative governments in particular, and its long-standing desire for a detente with the USSR. The British, no longer sure that "there will always be a Britain" after a nuclear attack, believe it is essential for the Soviet Union and the West to seek a modus vivendi by negotiating. They do not expect negotiations to yield immediate and far-reaching results, but they do believe fervently that it is of supreme importance for the West and the USSR to achieve some agreement, however limited. They feel that continuous diplomatic activity can deflect Soviet threats and improve chances of working out a reasonable adjustment between the USSR and the West. The pressures for negotiation are intensified by the prospect of an early election, but they do not derive solely from political considerations.

Moreover, the British believe that because only Khrushchev can speak for the Soviet Union, there is no alternative to periodic summit conferences. Prime Minister Macmillan has said that a summit meeting should not be thought of "as a single peak, but as one of a continuous chain."

The British by no means viewed the Geneva Conference as a failure because it did not reach agreement; on the contrary, they considered the very fact of its having been held an accomplishment because the participants were no longer—in Macmillan's phrase—"in an atmosphere of ultimatum" but rather "in an atmosphere of negotiation." When the Conference adjourned, and the Eisenhower-Khrushchev visits were announced, government, opposition and press all expressed relaxation. Announcement of the visits has reduced pressures for an early summit meeting since the British now regard such a meeting as inevitable.

The British feel that the announcement of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev visits represents a justification of the approach to the easing of East-West tensions that they have followed since their Prime Minister Eden invited the Soviet leaders to visit the UK in 1956. Many credit Macmillan with breaking the ice for the Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks and an expected summit conference by having gone to Moscow last February.

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

- 5 -

II. THE FRENCH POSITION

Throughout the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers the French have taken a firmer and more uncompromising stand on all issues discussed there with the Soviets than either the UK or even the Federal Republic. They have avoided any attempts at "meeting the Russians halfway" or making special efforts to reach compromises with the Soviets on specific issues a la Lloyd.

French official reaction to the proposed Khrushchev visit to the US has been cool. No statements were made at the top level. De Gaulle, as part of his effort to display French independence of the US and the UK, rejected the idea of a Western summit preparatory to Khrushchev's visit to the US, lest this appear as a mandate to the US to act as the spokesman in dealing with Khrushchev.

During the entire period of the present Berlin crisis the French have been extremely reluctant to initiate any negotiating positions. [This is not to say that the French position is flabby but rather one of "stand-pattism" and not showing one's cards.] The French want to maintain the European status quo including that of Berlin -- not at the price of Berlin. Both De Gaulle and Couve de Murville consider it essential that the Western Allies retain the rights which they acquired by the German surrender in 1945, including freedom of communication with Berlin.

[The French are extremely reluctant to assist in steps which might lead to a general European settlement weakening the security of Western Europe or adversely altering the relative power status of France vis-a-vis Germany. Of all the Western Allies, therefore, France is the least interested in the reunification of Germany.]

Whereas the French believe that the other Western Allies consider that the status of Berlin is only negotiable in terms of wider issues -- Germany, Central Europe, disarmament -- the French would prefer to stand on legal rights and to confine the issue to the access question. This may be further reflected in a reluctance to engage in a Summit conference. While France has nothing against the division of Europe in its present form, it cannot countenance this division within the framework of disarmament, disengagement, or weakening of the West's military posture.

France does not wish to see Western Germany cut loose from its Western military and economic ties. The present Franco-German rapprochement is, from the French point of view, designed to preclude this. [Quite apart from Germany, per se, reunification on terms acceptable to the Soviets would alter the entire military balance in Europe to the almost certain detriment of France and this is an added reason for French aversion to reunification.]

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

- 6 -

In the French view, the Soviets are using Berlin as a gambit to maintain "a state of constant tension tending to weaken German resolve and bring about a desire for neutralism in Germany." For this reason, regardless of other considerations, Berlin must be held.

As was to be expected, the French do not want to take the Berlin problem to the UN because of their great distrust of the UN, based on their own experiences with it in connection with Suez and Algeria, and because they fear that UN debate could tie the hands of the West. The French are especially concerned lest the approach to the UN might occur following a probe by the West but prior to the use of force by the West with a resultant blockade situation in which the initiative passed from the Western Allies to the UN.

For various reasons -- e.g., the existence of a strong government, lack of opposition, France's geographic position on the continent, concern regarding Germany's future vis-a-vis France -- France has responded to the Berlin crisis in a manner that seems to take into account to a far lesser degree the actual dangers and implications of war than has been the case in the UK or even West Germany. While General de Gaulle's actions and pronouncements are often unexpected as to timing and content, there seems no reason to think that France's policy on Berlin will become any less firm in the near future.

However, France's firm policy up to now has, according to General de Gaulle, been predicated on American power and leadership. It is apparent that the developments in the Berlin crisis during the past eight months have led the French to distrust the British completely and to have grave doubts as to the firmness of the US. This, combined with the resurgence of French nationalism since De Gaulle's takeover in May 1958, has caused the French to try to force the US to consider a complete revamping of the NATO Alliance so that, in French eyes, the Alliance would be a really effective instrument of Western military policy and the French voice in this policy would be equal to that of the UK and the US.

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

- 7 -

III. THE WEST GERMAN POSITION

The West German Government remains firmly opposed to any agreement on Berlin that might adversely affect West German security. It rejects both Soviet proposals for a "free city" and a German peace treaty, and the proposal that reunification should be left to the Germans themselves through the creation of an all-German commission. When Khrushchev made his initial demands in November 1958, the West Germans were concerned primarily with their long range problems of reunification and security. [The Western responses to the Soviet threat in Berlin, especially that of the UK, persuaded Bonn that the chance of reunification was remote and that the Soviets might succeed in undermining West German internal and military security. This new preoccupation led the West Germans to regard the Geneva Conference simply as a holding operation. They believed that the Western negotiating position contained an increasing tendency toward accommodation of the USSR, and they grew more fearful that a settlement inimical to their long range security interests might be accepted in return for a temporary respite of Soviet pressure on Berlin.] At Geneva the West German actions left the impression of inflexibility and a negative attitude towards any effort to reach agreement. [Chancellor Adenauer openly expressed his concern about UK and US motives, especially after Macmillan's visit to Moscow and the death of Secretary Dulles. However, German concern dates from an earlier period in 1955-6 when revision of allied military strategy, as symbolized by the British White Paper and the so-called Radford Plan created doubts about the intention and ability of the Alliance to defend the continent.] Internal political difficulties in Germany since November, notably the challenge of Ludwig Erhard to Adenauer's dominating role, have increased German rigidity. Although the official response to the Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting was favorable, the Federal Government is eager to be reassured that both US assessment of Soviet intentions and the US commitment to European defense are unaltered.

A. The Basic West German Position

The policy of the Government of the Federal Republic is dominated by the long range goals of reunification by peaceful and democratic means and the attachment of a reunified Germany to an integrated Europe. The Federal Republic relies for military security and for diplomatic support on its NATO allies, particularly the US. It maintains that the former occupying powers — the US, UK, France and USSR — are jointly responsible for the solution of all-German questions including the status of Berlin. It can accept the division of Germany as a temporary expedient, but feels that it cannot be indefinitely maintained and that unless some progress toward reunification is achieved the East German population will become permanently separated from the West. Pending reunification, the Federal Republic claims to be the only legitimate spokesman for the German people; accordingly the Government refuses to recognize the "German Democratic Republic" or to concede anything to Soviet pressure unless concessions are clearly linked to a guaranteed program for reunification.

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

- 8 -

Within this framework the Federal Government has expressed itself on the following specific questions.

1. Berlin

A Berlin settlement can be reached only in the context of reunification and a broad European security arrangement. The Western Powers should neither accept East German controls over access to the city nor grant de facto recognition to the East German regime in any other manner as the price of insuring access. The maintenance of an allied garrison in West Berlin is indispensable to its safety: a UN garrison would be an unacceptable substitute since it could not automatically commit the allied powers in the event of aggression. The Federal Government is ready to accept for as long as may be necessary the present status of Berlin since it is based on allied responsibility for the security of the city.

2. Reunification

German reunification should take place by phases, if necessary over a period of years, and in connection with the development of a European security system. Contributions to this program by either East or West Germany should be made only under Four Power auspices and with Four Power consent. Provision for free elections to determine the character of a united German government is indispensable, but such elections may be postponed to the last phase of the reunification process. To negotiate with the "German Democratic Republic" as an equal would destroy any genuine hope for an acceptable solution of reunification and would raise the Soviet price for an all-German peace treaty, particularly in the security area.

3. Security and Disengagement

The Federal Republic is dependent on its Western allies for its security. Both the Government and people have indicated that security must have priority, at least for the present, over reunification. Unless the Federal Republic is protected and integrated into the Western system, West Germany may lose its chance for reunification or even its national existence. West German security demands not only Western support, but optimum development of the armed forces of the Federal Republic, implying progressive relaxation of WEU restrictions on types of West German military equipment. The Federal Government is unwilling to accept any disengagement proposal based on reduction or "freezing" of forces of armaments in a zone encompassing Germany, particularly if limitations were applied specifically to West German forces, unless such a proposal required commensurate political concessions by the USSR.

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

- 9 -

4. Peace Treaty

The final peace settlement must be negotiated with a united Germany and its terms must leave her free to determine her own foreign policy. The military status of a united Germany should depend on the establishment of a European security framework, preferably based on a general disarmament agreement. The territorial limits of a united Germany should be delineated according to its 1937 frontiers: the Oder-Neisse line is not acceptable as part of a definitive treaty of peace (but this point may be moderated by stating the Oder-Neisse line will not be altered by German force).

B. West German View of Soviet Objectives

The Federal Government believes that Soviet objectives in the current crisis extend far beyond Berlin. They believe that these objectives are a series of interrelated elements:

1. Isolation or neutralization of the Federal Republic, to be achieved by forcing its withdrawal from NATO, limiting the West German military effort, and demanding the removal of US forces from Germany.
2. Elimination of West Berlin as a Western outpost, to be achieved by forcing abandonment of the city by Allied garrisons or re-establishing effective Soviet participation in West Berlin's administration.
3. Consolidation of the Soviet and Communist hold on East Germany, to be achieved by obtaining de facto and eventually de jure recognition of the East German regime and demonstrating that West Berlin is at the mercy of the East Germans.

The West Germans believe that an interrelated series determined the timing of the Soviet diplomatic offensive: growing military power particularly in missile capability; increased confidence which it gave to Soviet leaders; desire to prevent the development of the military power of German armed forces backed by the US strategic deterrent; concern over potential West German influence on Soviet Satellites, especially Poland; Khrushchev's desire for increased domestic prestige; and the dynamism of the Communist philosophy of international politics. The Federal Government is deeply impressed by Khrushchev's display of confidence and is inclined to believe that since Western objectives may be extremely difficult to accomplish it is necessary to buy time.

C. West German Attitude Toward Allies

The Federal Republic recognizes that it is not sovereign in matters affecting Germany as a whole or the status of Berlin. The Government is aware that the national interests of West Germany's allies may oppose the accomplishment of German reunification despite the pledge to support it. Traditional fears and resentment of German power

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

- 10 -

persist in some quarters and have been increased in consequence of the rapid economic recovery of the Federal Republic and its highly favorable trade position. The role of the Federal Republic in NATO defense planning has become increasingly important and it claims equality in the making of Western policy, at least in the security field.

1. The United States

The Federal Government has pinned its hopes on the US because the US is the strongest of its allies and US interests conflict least with those of West Germany. The West Germans are extremely sensitive to the possibility of losing US protection and will strongly resist plans or proposals to reduce US military commitments in continental Europe.

2. The UK and France

The West Germans are fully aware that in the current crisis they are vulnerable to British and French pressure. Without allied support the Federal Government risks the loss of Berlin and a severe setback in its long-range aims for reunification and for expanded power and prestige within the Western community. It therefore seeks to delay or modify the effect of tendencies toward compromise with the USSR on the basic questions of an all-German settlement or a change in the status of Berlin.

The Federal Government makes a clear distinction between the UK and France. It has been particularly chary of British policy in Central Europe and British efforts to promote detente between the West and the USSR. Chancellor Adenauer has become suspicious that Prime Minister Macmillan may convince the US that it is time to agree to a general European settlement with the USSR. Adenauer fears such an arrangement would be made at the expense of German security interests and would preclude reunification.

Because of his concern for possible US-UK moves and because rapprochement with France is a cornerstone of his policy, Chancellor Adenauer has leaned heavily on General de Gaulle for political and diplomatic support in the Berlin crisis. In return, Adenauer has supported De Gaulle's efforts to build up French prestige and power through the EEC and weapons development.

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

- 11 -

D. Future Development of the West German Position

Within the Government there are two approaches to the problem of the future development of German policy. Some leaders feel that the Federal Republic must concede some degree of de facto recognition to the East German regime in order to preserve the safety of West Berlin and to preclude arrangements toward some form of disengagement that might jeopardize development of West German security resources. Another group is convinced that steps toward recognition and concessions on security would equally menace the continuation of basic West German foreign policies. This group sees no chance of solving the current crisis without a broad East-West detente and a general disarmament agreement. A minority view holds that Germany's military status must be fixed by Four Power agreement before any effective progress can be expected either on Berlin's status or reunification. This group is closer to the opinion of the opposition Social Democrats.

The key aspect of current West German policy, however, is summed up in Adenauer's formula of "no concessions without counter-concessions". Against the background of his strong convictions and personality, this implies a substantial degree of rigidity, but this is modified by willingness to negotiate bona fide solutions of key problems involving Germany in the broadest terms.

SECRET/NOFORN

State - FD, Wash, D.C.

LIST - 3

HW
62
55
60
61

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN



BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence Report

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
LIBRARY DIVISION
August 26, 1959
DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

SEP 18 1959

LR FILE COPY
PLEASE RETURN

REVIEWED BY: *W. Miller*
DATE: *2/14/60*
E R
A3A5

GERMANY AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

() CLASSIFY AS _____
() DOWNGRADE TO () S or () C, OADR

1-4 (287-292)

Because of Germany's exposed position, the Government of the Federal Republic places the greatest importance on united political and military support from its NATO allies. It is therefore profoundly disturbed by divisive tendencies among them, especially in a period of increased Soviet pressure on Germany. In the assessment of the Adenauer Government, the degree to which it can rely on the US as Germany's principal ally may now be impaired by the growing emphasis of the US, since 1956, on long-range weapons and apparent American reluctance to increase defense spending, coupled with German fears that the US, as indicated in the Berlin crisis, may now be less willing to take military action to meet its commitments. In Western Europe, the Federal Republic has been dismayed by UK pressure for a detente with the USSR, and by French willingness to weaken NATO in support of its nationalist policies, though France's firmness on the Berlin issue and its challenge to US-UK leadership have augmented West Germany's efforts toward Franco-German rapprochement. The German Government believes that an increasingly confident USSR is seeking to isolate, and eventually absorb, West Germany, and that Western disunity and conciliation will only abet Soviet objectives. In this framework, the Adenauer Government is eager to repair the Western Alliance, particularly the breach between the US and France. If this fails, and a US-UK combination appears to be moving toward an understanding with Khrushchev, Adenauer will be forced to shift his main reliance to France and De Gaulle.

Introduction

The Federal Republic is more exposed to foreign pressure and more dependent upon outside political and military support than any other Western European country. Without support, West Germany's existence is in jeopardy.

THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND NOT A STATEMENT OF POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

281137 (289)

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

- 2 -

because of its geographic position and Soviet designs. Moreover, its intermediate and long term objectives, respectively European political and economic integration and reunification of Germany, would be unobtainable.

Under the leadership of Chancellor Adenauer, the West German Government has sought to broaden the base of its external support in the form of US guarantees and military presence, Franco-German rapprochement, and membership in NATO and other multilateral European organizations such as the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and the Common Market. However, in German eyes, developments since 1955 culminating in recent manifestations of growing Soviet power and confidence combined with indications of US and UK uncertainty and willingness to compromise on such issues as Berlin, are cause for reviving dormant German fears that some of the vital external underpinnings for Germany may be shifting. Because of the vulnerability of the Federal Republic, this raises more acutely than heretofore, the need for German reappraisal of alternative courses of action. The seriousness with which the German Government currently weighs even day to day variations in American, British or French actions reveals that it believes decisions vital to its interests are in the offing. [For the first time, since the critical period of 1954 when WDC collapsed, the German Government sees that there is a real possibility of withdrawal of US forces from Europe and a rearrangements of the alignments and power factors on the continent.]

I. GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE ALLIANCE

When the Federal Republic entered NATO on May 5, 1955, its longstanding moral and political affinity for the West was formalized and a device was provided for it to participate directly in Western military security. While the opposition Social Democrats charged that the national goal of German reunification would be precluded by this decision, since the USSR would never agree to a unified Germany retaining its NATO membership, the Christian Democratic-conservative coalition was able to carry the German public with it. The principal affirmative arguments were the German need for security and for Western support in the face of Soviet pressure. Simultaneously, the principal Western Powers assisted the German entry into NATO and WEU by relinquishing their occupation status in the Federal Republic, by pledging to work for German reunification through retention of their responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole, and by guaranteeing West German security through the presence of their forces, under the NATO label, in the Federal Republic. Thus German objectives were adequately met by the specified policies of the Western Alliance.

II. GERMAN GOVERNMENT ASSESSMENT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A. In the West

In the period since 1955, the Adenauer Government and the conglomerate Christian Democratic party have become increasingly concerned with the

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

- 3 -

shifting policies of Germany's Western Allies and the growing might of the USSR. The following are widely held views in the German Government:

The US, regarded as Germany's strongest and staunchest partner, has begun to revise its national strategy beginning with the so-called Radford Plan in 1956. The loss of absolute American military superiority over the USSR, the changing military technology with increased reliance on long range weapons systems and nuclear energy, and the ostensible decline of American willingness to make sacrifices from current consumption to meet increasingly expensive military requirements have been interpreted by the German leaders as signs of a lag in American determination to rise to the challenge of the Soviet Union. The application of American power in specific crises, such as Lebanon and Quemoy, have helped restore German faith in the US but American flirtation with UK willingness to make concessions in the Berlin crisis has driven home to many Germans in all parties the dread that perhaps the US can no longer be counted upon in absolute terms and that it is urgent to weigh alternative policies should US weakness become more pronounced through steady erosion of its position in Europe.

While the Suez fiasco in 1956 and the prolonged Algerian conflict demonstrated to Germans that their principal European Allies were inclined to put national interests above all others, the actions of the UK and France during the Berlin crisis have been interpreted by Germans as proof that these Powers may even go to the extreme of sacrificing the unity of the Alliance and individual members of the Alliance to gain their goals.

The Macmillan trip to Moscow and the readiness of the UK to come to terms with the USSR over Berlin by recognizing the division of Germany as permanent and by making military concessions on "liquidation of forces" in Central Europe have aroused the normally suspicious Adenauer so that he was reluctant to agree to any Western proposals at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers even for tactical purposes.

The French withdrawal of its fleet from NATO, the De Gaulle decision to refuse stockpiling of nuclear warheads in France for American NATO squadrons, and the De Gaulle statement supporting the Oder-Neisse line as the frontier between Germany and Poland have shown the Germans that France is willing to press hard on her Allies to achieve her goals.

However, timely French support of the Federal Government's hard position on Berlin and French efforts to curtail the dominance and the tendencies of the US-UK leadership in the West have resulted not only in German acceptance of but even plaudits for French actions. The result is unprecedented Franco-German cooperation and a discernible trend toward even closer association.]

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

- 4 -

D E L A S E D

B. In the East

As to its Eastern problems, the German Government has not altered its longstanding estimate of the nature of the Soviet threat and Soviet designs in Germany. The Germans, of every political leaning, including the Communists, are convinced that the Soviet aim is to isolate, neutralize and absorb the Federal Republic and Berlin. The Germans believe that the Soviets over-emphasize the potential military and political threat of Germany to the USSR, but they consider Soviet fears of a resurgent Germany and Soviet desires to obtain German resources basic elements in Soviet policy. The Soviet development of the East German area, both as a base of operations against West Germany and as a valuable addition to the strength of the Soviet bloc, is considered a corollary of the general policy.

Recent Soviet moves, particularly the Berlin crisis and Khrushchev's personal diplomacy, are seen by the German Government as evidence of Soviet confidence in the growing strength of the USSR and the bloc. The Federal Government believes the USSR's objectives in the Berlin crisis began with Berlin but go far beyond it. This assessment has been confirmed, to the Germans, by Khrushchev's Summit Conference efforts. The Germans consider that efforts to split the Western Alliance militarily, to gain large potential economic increments to Soviet power and to restrict the military build-up of West Germany with nuclear weapons are linked to important internal objections in obtaining Berlin, strengthening East Germany and stabilizing the satellite bloc. The Germans believe that any Russian gains will be exploited as rapidly as possible, commensurate with Soviet estimates of Western reactions. The Soviet appetite is insatiable. But they will avoid war to gain their ends since hostilities would threaten internal Soviet and bloc security.

C. Moderating Factors

There have been a number of moderating factors in the German Government's assessment which have helped to affect its gloomy estimate of the declining strength, unity and purpose of the Western Alliance and the nature and strength of the Soviet challenge. L 25

Externally, the rapid progress and consolidation in France under De Gaulle and the gradual steady growth of functional integration in Western Europe, with German participation, have encouraged the German Government.

Internally, the Federal Republic is enjoying unprecedented prosperity with full employment, bountiful exports and increased standards of living. Moreover, the internal political situation is not threatening to the Government. This Spring's power struggle in the Christian Democratic Union between Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard weakened the party but it is at least counter-balanced by the widespread dissension and elbowing for position in the opposition Social Democratic Party. It is unlikely that the current Adenauer leadership will be displaced in the next two years by political action and, at this distance, the Government had a fine opportunity of winning a fourth 4-year term in 1961.

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

5

CONFIDENTIAL

III. ALTERNATIVE GERMAN POLICIES

Given the exposed position and national objectives of the Federal Republic, there are three possible courses of action open to any German Government: Alignment with the West, neutrality, and alignment with the USSR.

Only the Communists favor pro-Soviet orientation. They prefer to approach it via neutrality both to obtain broader popular support, since most Germans are anti-Soviet, anti-Communist and anti-Slav, and to harness the dissident Social Democrats and other German elements whose views encompass fear of nuclear weapons, permanent loss of German national identity and reunification, and abandonment of the East German people to the Soviet bloc. The sentiment for neutrality and accommodation with the USSR has tended to increase since 1957 and Sputnik and since hopes for reunification have receded in the Berlin crisis. However, proponents of these policies are still a minority in the leading political parties and in the Government and the danger they portend is not immediate although the potential is present.

As to alignment with the West, there is no doubt that this represents the preference of the people and the policy of the Government of the Federal Republic. However, the form and content of pro-Western alignment is now subject to the external changes which are unfolding in terms of growing Soviet power, De Gaulle's objectives for France, and the threatened decline of US-UK power and influence on the continent. The Adenauer Government is concerned that it may be forced to choose between NATO as it now exists and a Continental Bloc based on the EEC members and led by France. This will pose a dilemma of great moment both for Germany and for the future of the Western Alliance. Therefore, Adenauer's efforts will continue to be directed toward persuading the US to come to an understanding with De Gaulle and to avoid a showdown. He has clearly demonstrated this effort in word and deed in conversations with Mr. McCloy and General Norstad urging American reappraisal of De Gaulle and in German support for French policy in Algeria. However, if the US rebuffs De Gaulle, increases its support for the UK and appears to be moving toward an understanding with Khrushchev, Adenauer will be forced to opt for De Gaulle in order to preserve the existence of the Federal Republic. Whether this painful decision will be required depends, in German eyes, upon factors which are outside her direct influence. Therefore Adenauer has placed the greatest importance on his chance to consult with President Eisenhower on August 27.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

State - F.D., Washington, D.C.

Page 2 of telegram to GENEVA TOSEC~~SECRET~~
Classification

Intelligence exploitation of refugees is also conducted at Marienfelde. The U.S. agencies have first access to the refugees who have come directly from the GDR. The USIB estimates that 75% of our intelligence on Soviet and GDR military forces stationed in the GDR is derived from refugees. Substantial intelligence on Poland and Czechoslovakia is also derived from this source.

From the Soviet point of view the ^{presumed} objectionable features of Marienfelde probably can be stated as follows: 1) it exists primarily to handle the refugee outflow from the GDR, which is innately disadvantageous from the Soviet viewpoint; 2) it provides a convenient and early opportunity for the Western powers to screen refugees for hostile agents; and 3) it affords opportunities for intelligence exploitation of the refugees. Overshadowing these concrete disadvantages, the Soviets undoubtedly view the size and nature of the Marienfelde operations as a disturbing psychological factor, i.e., as something highlighting West Berlin's convenience as a haven for disaffected East Germans and as a free world enclave within the Soviet Bloc.

The Soviets would regard a diminution of Western activities concerning refugees in Berlin as a net advantage because this would serve to deemphasize West Berlin's militant anti-GDR and anti-Soviet posture.

Giving the UN a Role in Marienfelde

The four-power working group report suggested the possibility of "a UN role" in Marienfelde as a possible element in a limited interim solution of the Berlin crisis. This report did not indicate what kind of a role the UN could play in Marienfelde. The implication, however, is that the introduction of the UN into this process would alleviate some Soviet objections to West Berlin's position as a gateway for refugees

~~SECRET~~
Classification

901048

156A

5

~~SECRET~~
BERLIN



1 JULY 1958

30 JUNE 1959

Beattie
CLASSIFIED BY: _____
HQ USAREUR & 7TH ARMY
ODCSINT, ATTN: AEAGB-CIS
UNIT 28351
APO AE 09014 03 AUG 1993

52

COMMAND

Historical Report

gds

REPORTS CONTROL SYMPO
AEA ~~SECRET~~

LC 91-5027

~~GC 21-217~~

~~SECRET~~
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY¹

1. ~~SECRET~~ COLLECTION OF MILITARY INFORMATION:

a. Collection within the Command:

(1) During the past year the collection effort of BC was expanded to include the following activities:

(a) Soviet and East German interference with convoys and individual vehicles.

(b) Increase of Border Guards on the West Berlin Border.

(c) Current events in East Germany.

(d) Close observation of the Berlin-Helmstedt railroad line.

(2) Overt collection of information by G2, BC is accomplished through the following agencies:

(a) Individual members of BC in the performance of their duties and in their off-duty periods.

(b) Battle Group Reconnaissance Platoons.

(c) Military Police during normal patrols through the US Sector and along the US Border.

(d) Military Police Liaison Officers through a monthly street-to-street reconnaissance of the US Sector Border.

(e) Autobahn travelers to and from Berlin through the Soviet Zone of Germany.

¹G2 Ann Hist Report, dtd 31 Aug 59 (S)

~~SECRET~~

(f) Train Commanders and Military Police Railway Guards.

(g) Helicopters assigned to G2 Division which patrol borders of the Western Sectors of Berlin and observe some 5 Miles into East Berlin and the East Zone of Germany. (This operation is an efficient means of intelligence patrolling.)

(h) Department of the Air Force aircraft which have been utilized by G2, BC for specific missions within the 20-mile Control Zone of the Berlin Air Safety Center.

b. Specific requests for information are placed with IO/USCOB in order to obtain locally-produced information from Intelligence Lodger Units which receive logistical support from BC but are not under operational control of G2, BC.

c. Specific requests for information were forwarded to USAREUR whenever information needed was not available locally or was beyond the capability of local collection agencies.

2. (S) Production, Maintenance and Dissemination of Intelligence:

a. G2 collected, evaluated and interpreted information for the command on a continuing basis.

b. Intelligence information was maintained by G2 in a current and usable form for the CG and the BC General Staff. Publications included Periodic Intelligence Reports, Intelligence Summaries and Spot Reports. In addition, Order of Battle maps were posted with the latest information available on the Berlin

~~SECRET~~

Area, East Germany and the Satellites. Order of Battle books were maintained on the GSFG, EGA, and East Security Forces.

c. Communist Forces in East Germany (Berlin and Vicinity):

(a) As of 30 Jun 59, four Soviet Divisions (Tank, Arty, AAA and Inf) plus one (1) EGA Infantry Division were stationed within a twenty (20) mile radius of Berlin. These, plus supporting units, separate guards units and the East German Garrisoned Security Forces (BSP, SAP, DAP) make a formidable grouping of forces in the Berlin Area. (see Annex A).

d. Developments Affecting the Command:

(1) Reports emanating from the Soviet Zone of Germany were similar to those received during the previous year. They include reports of political purges, student clashes, friction between church and state, complaints about high work norms, shortages of consumer goods and a growing concern over the defector

problem. All this dissatisfaction was displayed in spite of the fact that the Communist regime has made an all-out effort to increase the standard of living and provide an increase in consumer goods.

(2) Among last year's changes in the East German penal code was a law which made watching western TV a crime punishable by imprisonment. There was also a stiffening in the attitude toward defectors to the West. As a rule, their property was confiscated and those who wished to return to their homes in the East

~~SECRET~~

faced charges of desertion.

(3) With the threat of Khrushchev's 27 May 59 deadline hanging over the heads of the Allies in Berlin, the situation was tense during the latter part of 58 and the first six months of 59.

(a) May Day passed without incident. East Berlin and West Berlin held their Labor Day demonstrations as usual. The East claimed 100,000 participants. Official estimates of the crowd at the West Berlin demonstration varied from 300,000 to 750,000. The parade in the East was marked by the conspicuous absence of Soviet Forces, which in the past have been prominently featured in these events. (See Annex B for detailed report.)

(b) Despite all the laws, restrictions and other efforts aimed at stemming it, the refugee flow from East Germany continued at a steady if somewhat diminished rate. An appreciable increase in medical and scientific professional personnel left East Germany during the year.

(c) Throughout the year, East German functionaries (with or without higher-lever or Soviet sanction) have continued harassment of vehicles and trains in transit to and from Berlin. However, no serious incident occurred during this period. The harassment of Allied trains has not created a serious disruption in traffic. At the same time, many private vehicles have been stopped by East German Police on the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn with demands that the occupants submit their documents to East German authorities for permission to continue. US travellers

~~SECRET~~

have complied with USAREUR policy and have refused to submit their documents to any person not wearing a Soviet uniform. This policy has achieved favorable results since East German Police have permitted travellers to proceed with very little delay once it was made clear that they would submit their documents only to Soviet officials.

(d) Summary:

The events of the past year (particularly the fact that there were no major incidents) serve to point out the "Wait and See" attitude adopted by East Germany in the face of the inflexible stand of the Allies in Berlin. It may be inferred that they will push forward at the first sign of Allied weakness.

3. (C) Military Security:

a. General:

(1) Security of military information continued to be of vital importance to all members of the command. Increased emphasis was placed on the proper safeguarding of classified information at all times to prevent compromise and loss.

(a) Periods of instruction for key personnel of the command and all persons designated as "sensitive" were conducted by instructors made available by Region VIII, 66th CIC Group. These classes were designed to alert personnel to the grave dangers to which they are exposed in Berlin and to give them the necessary background for instructing their subordinates in security matters. Attendance was required for all Commanders and

~~SECRET~~

6

— American Forces in Berlin —

1945-1994

Cold War Outpost

by
Robert P. Grathwol
Donita M. Moorhus

Department of Defense
Legacy Resource Management Program
Cold War Project
Washington, D.C.
1994

Persistent Uncertainties

1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

Tension diminished for most West Berliners after the quadripartite agreements, and recognition of the eastern German Democratic Republic followed. In September 1973, both German states joined the United Nations. In 1974, the United States prepared to open an embassy in East Berlin. Still, tension did not disappear.


Differences in interpreting the four-power accords provoked open clashes of interest. Throughout 1973 and the first half of 1974, the Soviet Union objected to plans by the Federal Republic to establish in Berlin an office of the German (Federal) Environment Agency. When the West German government finally opened the office in the summer of 1974, East German and Soviet officials began a series of harassing actions affecting land transportation to and from Berlin. After several days of harassment, the U.S. Department of State announced a postponement of recognition of the German Democratic Republic until the diplomatic atmosphere improved. The harassment stopped, and in September 1974, the United States opened its embassy in East Berlin.

The temporary disruption of overland access to and from Berlin showed that the cordial cooperation following the accords implemented in 1972 could be disrupted at any moment. Tension never reached the levels of the early 1960s, but neither did relations proceed as smoothly as in the months immediately following the quadripartite agreement.

Threats to the allied or American position came indirectly as well as directly. In the mid-1970s, authorities uncovered over 1,000 agents operating covertly against American interests in West Germany. The incidence of terrorism also increased in West Germany. In 1977, a terrorist group, the Red Army Faction, carried out a series of bombings, abductions, and assassinations, including the execution of two West German business leaders and a public prosecutor.

Counterterrorism and espionage played a part in the U.S. military mission in Berlin. By the 1970s, the Berlin Command operated sophisticated electronic listening stations on the Teufelsberg and at Marienfelde to monitor message traffic in East

Germany. Electronic eavesdropping was only a part of the command's intelligence gathering.



The U.S. Air Force, 6912th Security Squadron, based at Tempelhof, manned the facility at Marienfelde.

1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

The four occupying powers had engaged in military intelligence gathering since they arrived in Berlin. In 1947, they had agreed to accredit liaison missions to operate in one another's zones of occupation and to observe military activities. The Soviet Union operated military liaison missions in all three western zones, with one team near Frankfurt in the American zone. The American counterpart, the U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief, Soviet Western Group of Forces (USMLM), operated from a 4.5-acre estate near Potsdam in the Soviet zone. The grounds included a substantial villa and four additional buildings.

The U.S. Military Liaison Mission had 14 positions, filled on a rotating basis. Members of the team lived in West Berlin but traveled throughout East Germany from their base in Potsdam. Their mission was to assert the American right to free movement in the zone and to gather intelligence information. The Soviet Union barred access to certain areas, often the ones the Americans most wanted to see. Members of the mission knew that their assignment involved great danger. They expected harassment from Soviet guards. Through the years, team members reported incidents in which they encountered harassment, beatings, and hostile fire. In 1984, a member of the French liaison mission died when an East German Army truck rammed his vehicle head-on.



The headquarters of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission was in Potsdam, just outside Berlin.

"A colleague of mine had gone on and seen a military train loaded with missile equipment, had followed in his car and attempted to photograph the missile equipment. Another shot at his car, hit it, knocked out his windows, his tires, and he left immobile and then was arrested by East German and then Soviet authorities... This happened with a fair amount of frequency... it is not unusual for this type of thing to happen."

Lynn Hansen, U.S. Air Force off Berlin, 1960-1963, 1971-1972

7

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

~~SECRET~~
OPERATIONAL AC PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
IMMEDIATE (INFO Except prior to Category B encryption.
ADDEES PRIORITY) Physically remove all internal refs
by DTG prior to declassification
No unclass ref if DTG is quoted

FROM: CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY

TO: USAMBASSADOR BONN GERMANY

INFO: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE, DA WASH DC

NR: SX 1487 021542Z FEB 60

AMEMB FOR AMB DOWLING, DA FOR ACS I SGD EDDLEMAN.

References: A. State Dept msg sgd Herter to Bonn (1636).

B. AmEmb msg to State Dept NAIC 170.

C. My SX 1477

1. I consider that continuation of USMLM is a vital necessity. East Germany is the only area in the world where Western military observers can see Soviet military forces in training on a daily basis.

2. The GSFG is the primary, immediate threat to my command as well as to other NATO ground forces. USMLM in coordination with other 2 military missions, collects 60% of all timely, useable military information on GSFG which is available to me. Through this effort I receive timely information on the combat readiness, armament and equipment of GSFG and GDR military forces. This will be reduced by new restrictions, but they apply mainly to areas occupied by East German military forces.

3. Operations of USMLM are coordinated with and complement comint, elint, aerial photography, and clandestine collection.

4. I believe protest to CINC GSFG would produce only a delay and no modification of restrictions. Therefore, I propose to transmit the following message to CINC GSFG in coordination with British and French military commanders:

"I note that certain changes have been made in the form and wording of the passes issued to the USMLM. I wish to make clear that acceptance and use of the passes in this

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

DATE 10 Oct 82

DA IN 280722

(2 FEB 60)

CO FORM 35-3 REPLACES OCS FORM 37-3 1 AUG 57, WHICH MAY BE USED.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

2-184

9177 BERLIN/2000 (2 FEB 60)

X USMLM
X HUBBARD

91



MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

NR: SX 1487

PAGE 2

altered form by members of my military liaison mission does not constitute any change in my government's position respecting the so-called German Democratic Republic. I continue to look to you for fulfillment of the provisions of the Huebner-Malinin agreement of April 5, 1957."

5. An early reply from you would be deeply appreciated.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

NOTE: 1636 1s DA IN 280685 (2 FEB 60) STATE (ARMY DCSOP)
OTHER REFS NOT IDENTIFIED

ACTION: ACS I

INFO: OCS, DCSOP, OSD, JCS, AF, NAVY, CMC, ACS I
(STATE, CIA), CA, OSA, CI

DA IN 280722

(2 FEB 60)

eam/3

SCO FORM 35-3
8 JUN 58

REPLACES OCS FORM 3753, 1 AUG 51, WHICH MAY BE USED.



REPRODUCTION
PROHIBITED

AGV
EUR:GER:AGVigderman: REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

This document consists of 3 pages. Number 1 of 4 copies, Series A

(Drafting Office and Officer)

(33) M-686

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

162.0221/2-960

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 9, 1960

SUBJECT: Soviet Alteration of Passes for US Military Liaison Mission

PARTICIPANTS: The Viscount Hood, British Minister
Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler, EUR
Mr. Alfred G. Vigderman, GER

AK

FEB 15 1960

COPIES TO:

British Emb.

EUR - 2(1cc) 2A -
GER - 4(2ccs) 3A, 4A-2-3
WE - 4
BNA - 5
RA - 6
M - 5-2-8-7
18

American Embassy, Paris (2) 10-11
American Embassy, Bonn - 12
American Embassy, London - 13
American Embassy, Moscow - 16
United States Mission, Berlin - 15

July - 16-18

This Document must be Returned to the Rm/R Central Files

162.0221/2-960

Lord Hood called at his request to convey the British view on how to deal with the issuance by the Soviets of new passes for the Liaison Missions which contain references to the "German Democratic Republic". He said that London quite appreciated the significance of the political point which the US was making - that an acceptance of the passes in the new form might influence the Soviets to believe that we might be ready to accept the same treatment on the routes of access to Berlin. On the other hand, the British were not sure that this was in fact a political test case. The British considered the problem more as a matter of administrative "tidying-up".

As far as the language of the passes is concerned, the Soviets have already put us on notice that the expression "the Soviet Zone of Germany" was, so far as the Soviets were concerned, inadmissible.

The British were greatly concerned that the action proposed by the United States was likely to lead to the loss of the Liaison Missions. London set great store by the intelligence value of the Missions, as providing the most reliable and fruitful of military intelligence on activities in the East Zone. This was a bad moment to deprive ourselves of eyes and ears. Moreover, apart from the intelligence value of the Missions, the existence of the Missions was important in the context of surprise attack. So long as Missions of both sides were present in all of Germany we could be sure that nothing really nefarious was going on. The existence of the Missions also had the virtue of keeping temperatures down on both sides.

Consequently,

Copy No(s) 16/17/18

SECRET

Destroyed in RM/R

Name

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NAD 940556

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

- 2 -

Consequently, the British were very anxious to keep them going. If they were to be withdrawn there would be no opportunity to reinstate them. The British, therefore, concluded that the loss of the Missions was a more serious danger to face than any political dangers which might arise from the acceptance of the new passes. The British, therefore, wished us to reconsider our position and proposed that the matter be handled by making an oral demarche at the military level asking the Soviets the purpose of the changes in the passes. If the response was unsatisfactory, we should then follow up, again in military channels, with a letter to the Soviets, saying that our use of the passes in no way changed our position so far as the East Zone was concerned.

Mr. Kohler said that we were waiting for the French to tell us their position and in the meantime we would consider the British communication. He warned, however, that we were likely to be coming back strongly against the course of action proposed by the British. He pointed out that we had heard the same arguments on the value of the intelligence produced by the Missions from our own people, but commented that this was a highly localized judgment of the operation made by the people conducting the operation. Mr. Kohler considered that the danger of a wrong political judgment concerning the passes overrode the danger of the loss of the Missions. He pointed out that the Order of Battle intelligence gained, comes to us under the supervision of the Soviets who can frustrate our intelligence collection at any time. Moreover, the intelligence was not as useful as it used to be and that whatever value it had in the past, its future value was dubious. Mr. Kohler said that we now had copies of the old and new forms of the passes. Our examination of the passes confirmed our suspicion that the Soviets had deliberately chosen language which left it to be understood that the permission for the Missions to travel in East Germany emanated not from the Soviets but from the GDR. He envisaged the time when the Soviets would be able to say, in a dispute over the acceptance of East German controls over the routes of access that the Allies really could not complain since they had been accepting without question the authority of the GDR in connection with travel of the Missions. Mr. Kohler summed up by saying we regard the political price as wholly unacceptable and that use of the new passes would decrease the chances of any meeting of minds at the Summit.

Lord Hood suggested that we might tell the Russians that they have taken an action contrary to the spirit of Camp David. We might say that at a high level. Mr. Kohler responded that we might consider taking action in more than one step if it was clear that we were not accepting these new passes. Obviously the Soviets were sitting around waiting to see how we would react. We should not give them much encouragement. He pointed out that what the Soviets had done was contrary to the recent Warsaw Pact statement that all states should refrain from unilateral acts. Taking a strong line with the Soviets would be very helpful in connection with the Summit Conference.

Lord Hood then came back to the question whether representations might be made in Moscow. Mr. Kohler said we could consider that but we are under the pressure

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

-3-

the pressure of time. There is, moreover, the continuing danger of a leak since many people were bound to know that something was going on, because they would notice that Mission travel had been eliminated during this period while this issue is being settled. Lord Hood suggested that London would want to consider the whole question at a high level, particularly the relationship of the current issue to the forthcoming Summit negotiation. Mr. Kohler said that we were also considering the matter at a high level and repeated that the worst posture in which we could go to the Summit would be created by the acceptance of these passes.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NAD 949556

Document

8

June 25, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
June 25, 1959 - following NSC

Others present: Secretaries Herter, McElroy, Gates, Admiral Burke, General White, General Lemnitzer, General Pate, Mr. Allen Dulles, [Mr. Critchfield], Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster



The President said he feels some concern over our activities in West Berlin, specifically those in the fields of intelligence and propaganda. This is something that the Soviets are most sensitive to. The question in his mind is what are we getting out of it, and does the return justify the cost. Also, he wondered whether we are too elaborate in our whole set-up in the area. [Mr. Allen Dulles indicated the total number of people directly involved is less than 1000, of whom about 1/2 are involved in monitoring operations of a passive nature. He said we find Berlin a very important center from which to operate in East Germany, largely because the East Germans as individuals are not sympathetic to Communism. He said that what we are doing in West Berlin is not a fraction of what the Soviets are doing in East Berlin. They have an immense program.]

[He added that he has been in touch with our Commander in the area. He did believe that it would be possible to cut down total strengths to some degree. A considerable effort is the interviewing of refugees. On this, he is making great effort to coordinate more closely.]

The President told the Chiefs that there was in his opinion a great opportunity for the services having technical and expert personnel in the area [to make increasing use of CIA activities, since CIA is]

DECLASSIFIED	
MR Appeal NLE 90-309	
By EP	NARS, Date 6/7/96

- 2 -


[Now coming of age in terms of its competence.] What he had in mind was to streamline our whole intelligence organization, cutting out duplication. Admiral Burke said this is being done to a great extent. The President then said that the JCS should require the experts to come before them and state their case as to what they are doing and what can be done to streamline. [He asked Mr. Dulles just how CIA is coordinating with the other agencies.] Mr. Dulles cited some examples of very close cooperation, through committees in some of the centers overseas, and through the USIB here in Washington. The President asked if after coordination the agencies in the overseas centers sent a single report back to Washington or whether they sent back separate reports. Mr. Dulles acknowledged that this was a very key point and said he would have it studied, since he thought there might be something that could be done in the way of improvement in this area.

The President said that all the processes of collection, evaluation in the field, transmission, and evaluation back here should be reviewed by the JCS to see what could be done to reduce duplication between the services. He would value their judgment in this regard.

[The President asked if we had any new projects under way in the intelligence field for West Berlin. Mr. Dulles said that we do not -- we have had under consideration a project suggested by the UK, but this has now been "put on ice." The President said that sometimes just from habit and routine we have the idea that operations have a considerable value when in fact situations have changed, and the value has decreased. [This is what he wanted tested regarding West Berlin.]


Mr. McElroy said he would see reason for agreeing to curtail our activities on a basis of reciprocity with the Soviets. The President commented that subversive activities are inherently something that can't be checked as to performance of any agreement reached. He thought that unilateral statements were about all that could be accomplished.

Mr. Herter noted that the Soviets have never mentioned the matter of refugees during the discussions. They have talked only



- 3 -

about radio and subversive operations. RIAS in fact is carrying out very little broadcasting that could be called propaganda -- two very short programs only, the elimination of which would be inconsequential. Mr. McElroy said that the RIAS has a very great morale value, and should be kept up, perhaps even broadcasting to West Germany.


A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA



~~SECRET~~



2389

~~TOP SECRET~~
(Security Classification)

2389

FOR DC USE ONLY

9

NO.: CA- 7359 February 27, 1959

COPY NO. ---1---

SUBJECT: Report of the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board.

DECLASSIFIED TO:

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

AND 90115-1
by #1111/11/12, NARA, Date 9/23/99

AMMAN, ANKARA, BAGHDAD, BANGKOK, BEIRUT, BELGRADE, BENGHAZI, BERLIN, BOGOTA, BONN, BUCHAREST, BUENOS AIRES, CAIRO, CARACAS, DAMASCUS, DJAKARTA, HABANA, HONG KONG, JIDDA, KARACHI, LONDON, MADRID, MEXICO CITY, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, OSLO, OTTAWA, PANAMA, PRAGUE, PRETORIA, RABAT, RIO DE JANEIRO, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SINGAPORE, TAIPEI, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, TOKYO, TUNIS, USRO PARIS, VIENNA, WARSAW.

Following is the Report of Indications of Soviet Communist intentions for the period February 19-25, 1959, prepared by the Watch Committee. Access to it should be limited to those persons requiring the information in the performance of their duties.

CONCLUSIONS ON INDICATIONS OF HOSTILITIES

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.
- C. Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet hostile action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particularly in Iran and Iraq. The situation in the area remains precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.

IRAN Current tensions between Iran and the USSR can be expected to continue and, with the signing of the Iranian-US bilateral, to increase to a point short of direct military action.

(CONCLUSIONS ARE TOP SECRET AND NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS EXCEPT BRITISH AND CANADIANS)

~~TOP SECRET~~
(Security Classification)

DRAFTED BY: IRC:ICD:BFDorr:cen 2-27-59

APPROVED BY: [Signature]
IRC:ICD:IMGoodman

CLEARANCES: Operational - No clearance necessary

SRA S/S CR

FEB 27 1959 P.M.

TOP SECRET FILE

-134

~~TOP SECRET~~
(Security Classification)

LIST OF INDICATIONS CONSIDERED BY THE WATCH
COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT INDICATIONS BEARING ON HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE CONTINENTAL US OR ITS POSSESSIONS:

Speeches and orders of the day celebrating Soviet Army and Navy Day, 23 February, emphasized Soviet military strength and capabilities somewhat more strongly than last year, though not more so than the recent twenty-first Party Congress. Soviet foreign policy and the role of military strength in backing it up received extensive treatment in the usual context of charges of Western aggressive aims and protestations of Soviet peaceful intent; Army General Popov, for instance, characterized the Soviet armed forces as "one of the means of bridling imperialist aggressors, a most important guarantee for the preservation of peace." (CONFIDENTIAL)

POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT INDICATIONS BEARING ON HOSTILITIES AGAINST US FORCES ABROAD, US ALLIES, OR AREAS PERIPHERAL TO THE SINO-SOVIET ORBIT:

EUROPE

1. A negative Soviet reply to the Western notes of 16 February proposing a four-power foreign ministers' conference on the German question was foreshadowed in Khrushchev's speech of 24 February. In effect, he turned down the proposals on all three counts: agenda (which he maintained could not include German reunification but should deal primarily with a German peace treaty and a solution of the Berlin problem); level of negotiations (which he held would be "more expedient" at heads-of-government level); and participants (which he strongly implied must also include Poland and Czechoslovakia). The primary Soviet objective at this time may still be to force more specific counter-proposals and concessions from the West rather than to reject totally talks on other than Soviet terms. Khrushchev, however, also reiterated the threat of conclusion of a separate peace treaty with the GDR alone, which he maintained would automatically bring to an end the occupation status of Berlin. While reference to conclusion of a peace treaty as a prior step to the transfer of controls to the East Germans could be interpreted as providing a basis for a Soviet postponement of the transfer, repeated Soviet assertions of intent on this question and other evidence indicate that the USSR will conclude a separate treaty and a unilateral transfer of Berlin controls, probably by the end of May, unless agreement on negotiations is reached with the West. (CONFIDENTIAL)

There have meanwhile been continuing indications of Soviet and East German preparations, some directly and some possibly related to a Soviet withdrawal from Berlin, including: a report that the main Soviet Army hospital in East Berlin is now in process of being vacated; a reported

speech

~~TOP SECRET~~
(Security Classification)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

speech by the Soviet commander in East Germany stating that the major significance of the Soviet Party Congress for Soviet troops in East Germany is that there is now a serious danger of war; and the possible acquisition by the East German Air Force of about 30 all-weather jet fighters, reported based at Jocksdorf Airfield, 75 miles southeast of Berlin. (SECRET)

FAR EAST

2. Chinese Communist air activity in east and southeast China continues at reduced levels, primarily because of bad weather. No significant operations or movements by Communist naval forces have been noted. (SECRET)

3. On 22 February, South Vietnamese marines from a detachment based on Pattle Island in the Crescent group of the Paracels seized three Chinese Communist motorized junks, 70 men and radio equipment at nearby Duncan Island. The Chinese Communist flag had been raised over Duncan Island and this action may represent the initial phase in an announced Chinese Communist operation whereby some 200 ships and over 1,000 fishermen were to be sent to "develop fishing grounds" in the Paracel and Spratly Island groups. At present, the chief claimants to sovereignty over the Paracels are Nationalist China, Communist China, and South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese reaction to the current Chinese Communist encroachment probably will prompt Communist propaganda blasts and possibly retaliation against Vietnamese fishing boats. (CONFIDENTIAL) (NOFORN)

POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT INDICATIONS OF OTHER DEVELOPMENTS SUSCEPTIBLE OF DIRECT COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION BY HOSTILE ACTION:

MIDDLE EAST

1. The USSR has continued its strong propaganda attacks against the Iranian Government and the Shah in particular, in an apparent effort to undermine the Shah in order to dissuade Iran from signing a bilateral agreement with the US or to lay the groundwork for any subsequent course of action. Khrushchev, in his speech of 24 February, while adopting a somewhat more moderate tone, continued the line that what the Shah has to fear is the Iranian people and that the bilateral is intended to protect him from them. Iranian officials have indicated their concern over the possible effects this Soviet propaganda campaign will have on the Iranian population, but present evidence does not indicate that the Shah has been intimidated by this Soviet pressure. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Nasser's conciliatory statements toward the USSR during his speech on 22 February undoubtedly were intended to give an outward appearance of harmony and possibly to forestall further deterioration of relations between the two countries. Differences between the UAR and the USSR will persist, however, as long as Nasser continues his anti-Communist campaign in the

Middle

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION

1290
~~TOP SECRET~~
 (Security Classification)

FOR DC USE ONLY

NO.: CA - 7831, March 13, 1959

COPY NO. .../....

SUBJECT: Report of the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board.

TO: AHMAN, ANKARA, BAGHDAD, BANGKOK, BEIRUT, BELGRADE, BENGHAZI, BERLIN, BOGOTA, BONN, BUCHAREST, BUENOS AIRES, CAIRO, CARACAS, DAMASCUS, DJAKARTA, HABANA, HONG KONG, JIDDA, KARACHI, LONDON, MADRID, MEXICO CITY, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, OSLO, OTTAWA, PANAMA, PRAGUE, PRETORIA, RABAT, RIO DE JANEIRO, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SINGAPORE, TAIPEI, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, TOKYO, TUNIS, USRO PARIS, VIENNA, WARSAW.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

By ham/blm, NARA, Date 9/23/90

Following is the Report of Indications of Soviet Communist intentions for the period March 5-11, 1959, prepared by the Watch Committee. Access to it should be limited to those persons requiring the information in the performance of their duties.

CONCLUSIONS ON INDICATIONS OF HOSTILITIES

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.

NOTE: Khrushchev continues to reiterate his intention to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany and to turn over Berlin access controls to the East Germans. Although the Soviets are making preparations necessary to the turnover, which could be done with little or no warning, available evidence does not indicate that they intend to do so in the immediate future. The eventual possibility of armed conflict between Western forces and Soviet/East German forces is inherent in the Berlin problem because of miscalculations which could arise.

- C. Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action which would jeopardize US interests exist in _____

~~TOP SECRET~~
 (Security Classification)

DRAFTED BY: IRC:ICD:BFDorr:cen 3-13-59

APPROVED BY:

S/S CHRC:ICD:LMGoodman *huy*

CLEARANCES:

Operational - No clearance necessary

MAR 13 1959 P.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~
(Security Classification)

Khrushchev on several occasions reiterated the Soviet intention to conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR if the West refuses to sign an all-German treaty (although this point was not mentioned in the final Soviet-GDR communique on his visit), and gave no indication that the USSR has abandoned its project of eventually turning over Berlin access controls to East Germany. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Preparations by the East Germans related to their anticipated takeover of Berlin access controls continue, as well as preparations by the Soviets to withdraw from Berlin, although there is generally little apparent sense of immediacy in these measures. Small groups of Soviet personnel have reportedly departed from Karlshorst and some functions are being discontinued, but no tactical military unit has yet begun withdrawal. The reliable sighting of five AA guns and other equipment at Soviet occupied Brandenburg/Industriehafen airfield in the central air corridor to Berlin may indicate occupancy by an element of the new East German AAA division which is believed in process of formation; this would be the first movement of East German AAA weapons into one of the air corridors. Training of East German Kampfgruppen (workers' paramilitary groups of the SED used for internal security) in heavy weapons was reportedly to start this week with the objective of establishing "heavy weapons battalions" in the Berlin area before the end of March. Unconfirmed reports state that both Soviet and East German military leaves are to be cancelled the first of May, possibly for joint exercises. Training of these forces thus far this year appears generally normal. (SECRET) (NOFORN EXCEPT BRITISH AND CANADIANS)

FAR EAST

2. No significant Chinese Communist military activity has occurred in the Taiwan Strait area. (CONFIDENTIAL)

POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT INDICATIONS OF OTHER DEVELOPMENTS SUSCEPTIBLE OF DIRECT COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION BY HOSTILE ACTION:

MIDDLE EAST

1. The recent revolt of Iraqi Army units in the Mosul area, led by Colonel Shawwaf, appears to have been put down, although purging of dissident elements is reportedly continuing. The revolt apparently was a localized affair which received some UAR encouragement. Iraqi-UAR relations have considerably worsened as the result of: Iraqi statements that the UAR is responsible for the revolt; the Iraqi Government's action in declaring ten key UAR Embassy members in Baghdad personae non gratae; the organized anti-UAR and anti-Nasser demonstrations in Baghdad; and Nasser's speech on 11 March in which he, for the first time, directly attacked Qasim as working with the Communists against Arab nationalism. Aside from this further cleavage in Iraq-UAR relations, the principle effect of the failure of the Iraqi revolt has been to facilitate the

drift]

~~TOP SECRET~~
(Security Classification)



~~TOP SECRET~~
(Security Classification)

FOR RM/R USE ONLY

10

COPY NO. 1

NO.: OA-3735 April 10, 1959

SUBJECT: Report of the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board.

TO: AMMAN, ANKARA, BAGHDAD, BANGKOK, BEIRUT, BELGRADE, BENGHAZI, BERLIN, BOGOTA, BONN, BUCHAREST, BUENOS AIRES, CAIRO, CARACAS, DAMASCUS, DJAKARTA, HABANA, HONG KONG, JIDDA, KARACHI, LONDON, MADRID, MEXICO CITY, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, OSLO, OTTAWA, PANAMA, PRAGUE, PRETORIA, RABAT, RIO DE JANEIRO, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SINGAPORE, TAIPEI, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, TOKYO, TUNIS, USRO PARIS, VIENNA, WARSAW.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
DATE 90/11/17 BY 111/17, MAR, Date 9/26/94

Following is the Report of Indications of Soviet Communist intentions for the period April 2-8, 1959, prepared by the Watch Committee. Access to it should be limited to those persons requiring the information in the performance of their duties.

CONCLUSIONS ON INDICATIONS OF HOSTILITIES

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.

BERLIN: No significant changes bearing on the possibility of hostilities.

- C. Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq. The situation in the area remains precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.

IRAQ

~~TOP SECRET~~
(Security Classification)

APPROVED BY: RC:ICD:BFDorr:cen 4-10-59

APPROVED BY: IRC:ICD:LMGoodman

NCES: Operational - No clearance necessary

cat' S/S CR

APR 10 1959 P.M.

160

~~TOP SECRET~~
(Security Classification)

IRAQ: The rapid progress of the Communists toward control of Iraq is continuing. Tension along the Syrian-Iraq border has increased and incidents are likely.

(CONCLUSIONS ARE TOP SECRET AND NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS EXCEPT BRITISH AND CANADIANS)

LIST OF INDICATIONS CONSIDERED BY THE WATCH COMMITTEE
OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT INDICATIONS BEARING ON HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE CONTINENTAL US OR ITS POSSESSIONS:

The recent intensification of restriction on travel by personnel of foreign missions in Moscow has apparently ended, with permission granted to US and other Western personnel during the past week for a number of trips to widely-separated localities in the USSR. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT INDICATIONS BEARING ON HOSTILITIES AGAINST US FORCES ABROAD, US ALLIES, OR AREAS PERIPHERAL TO THE SINO-SOVIET ORBIT:

EUROPE

1. Khrushchev reportedly stated privately in mid-March that nothing would happen regarding Berlin prior to a summit meeting but that the USSR would not yield to any threat of force. In conversations with US officials in Moscow, Gromyko, Zorin and other foreign office representatives have shown obvious relief that a foreign ministers' meeting has been arranged. The US Ambassador believes that this attitude probably results from Khrushchev's pressure on them to arrange a meeting and from their own realization of the dangers arising from Khrushchev's Berlin moves. ~~(SECRET)~~ (NOFORN EXCEPT BRITISH AND CANADIANS)
2. In line with Soviet efforts to charge reluctance on the part of the US to negotiate on the Berlin and German issues, the Soviet Foreign Ministry, in a formal but relatively mild protest on 4 April over the altitude flown by the C-130 in the Berlin corridors, accused the US of attempting to increase tensions prior to a foreign ministers' meeting, if not to "torpedo" East-West conferences altogether. The Soviet harassment and subsequent protest of the corridor flight by a C-97 transport at somewhat higher than 10,000 feet on 3 April further reflect Soviet efforts to prevent any unilateral action by the West to improve its position with respect to Berlin prior to negotiations. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~
3. The Soviets have restricted large sections of East Germany to travel by the US Military Liaison Mission for the period 6 to 12 April. These restrictions (which include a large area in the southeast occupied by elements of three Soviet armies and some East German units, and a smaller section in

the

~~TOP SECRET~~
(Security Classification)

~~TOP SECRET~~
(Security Classification)

the west covering a major Soviet training area) probably are again intended to conceal Soviet and possibly East German field exercises or CPX activity. These unusually large restricted areas so early in the training cycle, together with the apparent Soviet army-level exercise in March, suggest intensified training in an effort to improve the operational readiness of GSFG. It is possible also that the restrictions are intended for psychological effect in connection with the Berlin situation. ~~(SECRET)~~

POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT INDICATIONS OF OTHER DEVELOPMENTS SUSCEPTIBLE OF DIRECT COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION BY HOSTILE ACTION:

MIDDLE EAST

1. The internal situation in Iraq continues to be unstable, but there is no confirmation of UAR press and radio reports of recent serious tribal and other anti-regime disturbances. The regime has continued to make numerous arrests of army officers and others in an apparent attempt to eliminate all possible opposition. The arrest of 48 senior Iraqi staff members of the Iraq Petroleum Company at Kirkuk on 31 March may foreshadow eventual government action to take over that company. The Iraqi Government continues to arm the Communist-dominated Popular Resistance Forces, and the Communists are promoting and exploiting the confusion and tension in the Iraqi internal situation to consolidate their position. ~~(SECRET)~~

The recent dispatch of a Soviet ship carrying several hundred Kurds from the USSR to Iraq through the Suez Canal may indicate Soviet intentions to bolster the Communist position in the Iraqi Kurdish tribes. These Kurds are probably some of those who escaped from Iraq to the USSR in 1947 with Mulla Mustafa Barzani. Some reportedly have received Soviet military training and all have certainly been subjected to Communist indoctrination during their stay there. They will undoubtedly be used to promote Soviet and Iraq-Communist political objectives among the Kurds in Iraq, and possibly also those in Turkey, Iran, and Syria, and could conceivably serve as a trained nucleus for military or paramilitary units in Iraq. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

2. Iraqi-UAR relations continue to deteriorate, and there appears to be some danger of UAR-inspired tribal hit-and-run attacks or of a local air incident. Present evidence, however, does not indicate that the UAR has greatly reinforced its border units or is preparing for extensive military operations in Iraq. ~~(SECRET)~~

3. The UAR press and radio have continued Nasser's campaign against Arab Communists and against the Soviets for supporting Communist activities in the Arab states. The UAR has also reportedly carried out another Communist roundup in Damascus and Cairo. So far, there is no sign that the USSR will cut off or restrict economic and military aid to the UAR, a step which would seriously damage the Soviet position among the uncommitted nations. If the controversy continues to sharpen, however, the Soviets will undoubtedly conclude at some stage that such action is necessary, and UAR officials have shown some concern over the possibility. ~~(SECRET)~~ (NOFORN EXCEPT BRITISH AND CANADIANS)

HERTER, ACTING

~~TOP SECRET~~
(Security Classification)