

29 DEC
1955

Chief of Station, Germany

Chief of Base, Berlin

INFO: EE

Operational/CADORE

CADROWN

- REFS: A. 5502-GWUFG dated 17 July 1951
 B. ECBA-10506 dated 24 December 1951
 C. ECBA-17011 dated 13 September 1951
 D. ECBA-25876 dated 22 September 1955

1. SYNOPSIS: This dispatch outlines briefly the history of CADROWN from the project's inception to its termination. It also attempts to extract from the voluminous detailed information concerning CADROWN some of the chief lessons which have been pointed up by KUBARK's experience with this project.

2. INTRODUCTION: CADROWN was not originally conceived as a separate organization, but as a para-military adjunct to be developed under CADROIT, beginning during the latter half of 1951. KUBARK was charged at that time with urgent para-military missions in East Germany, which reflected the expectation then current that war might not be long in coming. However, the difficulties of acquiring in any substantial measure controlled para-military assets without recourse to the assets of already existing Western-connected psychological warfare organizations were considerable. Attempts to secure such independent assets had left a wide gap between KUBARK's para-military missions and its capabilities. It was therefore decided to convert to para-military purposes certain of the large numbers of East German contacts which CADROIT had built up during the preceding two and one half years. To this end, discussions with Nelson G. HEARD were carried out early in the second half of 1951 concerning the establishment within CADROIT of a para-military section. Not long thereafter, Identity 1 was spotted as a potential chief for the new section.

APPROVED

21 December 1955/era

Distribution:

- 3 - COS w/Attachment A and Annexes I, II, and III UNSEPCOV
 3 - EE w/Attachment A UNSEPCOV

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2007

SECRET COPY

32-128-0-138/initial

3. MISSIONS:

a. Original Conceptions: CADROWN was chartered as a para-military resistance apparatus designed to crystallize the existing East German resistance potential into "specific, trained and organized stay-behind groups, with the ultimate aim of furthering the achievement of KUBARK's transitional and wartime objectives in Germany".¹ To these various ends, the following functions and concomitant organizational elements were to be developed:

(1) Operations, Plans, and Training: A section was to be established which would be responsible for the development of the chains of command through which the various other stay-behind functions and activities were to be directed. This section would direct and coordinate all planning and training activities.

(2) Escape and Evasion: A section was to be created responsible for the establishment and operation of escape and evasion nets capable of moving persons in and out of the Soviet Zone of Germany.

(3) Sabotage and Special Operations: A section was to be created responsible for the "more violent types of activity which require the use of explosives and firearms, such as guerrilla warfare, sabotage and assassinations".¹

(4) Communications: A section was to be created responsible for planning and making the necessary preparations for the conduct, development and maintenance of a stay-behind radio net which would provide communications between the various CADROWN stay-behind elements and allied controlled territory. This section's primary mission was to be the recruitment and training of stay-behind radio operators and the assignment of such operators to the operational units of CADROWN.

b. Supplementary Tasks: As CADROWN's work progressed, two tasks were later undertaken as activities supplementary to the missions described above: (1) eight W/I nets were infiltrated into East Germany and (2) drop zones were spotted in strategic areas and partially manned with potential reception committees.

k. BASIC ORGANIZATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS: During CADROWN's later life, questions were sometimes raised concerning the extent of KUBARK control of the project, KUBARK's substantial dependence upon the chief agent for almost all information concerning the project, acceptance of his statements as presumably true, and similar matters. An examination of certain basic assumptions upon which CADROWN was organized should serve to put these later questions into proper context. Three of these assumptions deserve special comment here:

¹Amendment No. 3 to the CADROWIT project outline, authorizing CADROWN's establishment (Reference A).

a. The fundamental assumption underlying the initial formation of CADBROW's organizational structure and the lines of communication between KUBARK and CADBROW was the firm belief that resistance is essentially a natural and logical expression of nationalism which can best be achieved and exploited if allowed to develop on nationalistic lines. National traditions and feelings were seen as the primary forces which draw people together for resistance activities of the CADBROW type. The following excerpt from the CADROIT project outline amendment authorizing CADBROW's establishment is typical of the considered KUBARK approach to the control problem: "Establishment of a para-military apparatus under a presently existing project such as CADROIT will enable KUBARK to play a leading role in the development and future action of unconventional warfare elements in Germany and will also enable KUBARK to make certain that the interests of CADROIT are protected in such undertakings. While it is felt that resistance groups are essentially nationalistic and will better serve CADROIT interests if allowed to develop along those lines, KUBARK will be in a better position to achieve its own aims if it enters into this field at an early stage and if such resistance elements become dependent on KUBARK as the chief, if not sole, source of funds and operational guidance". In this belief lies the chief explanation not only for the fact that CADBROW co-workers in East Germany performed their services without pay, but also for reliance upon the case officer/principal agent contact as, for all practical purposes, the only channel of communications between KUBARK and CADBROW during most of the project's life.

b. A second basic element in the original establishment of CADBROW was a commitment to the organization of groups of co-workers within East Germany, rather than the acquisition and maintenance of strictly singleton assets. While present records contain little reflection of the group size which the best opinion at the time considered ideal, it is clear that the group concept was implicitly accepted and approved by all concerned with CADBROW at its inception. This procedure, of course, inevitably had important implications for the later status of compartmentation within CADBROW.

c. A third factor affecting CADBROW throughout its later history is found in the original intention to establish CADBROW, not as a separate organization, but as an apparatus within CADROIT. While personnel in CADROIT were not to be informed as a general rule of CADBROW's true purpose and activities, CADBROW was to take advantage of CADROIT's files, East German contacts, and other facilities, as necessary and feasible. CADBROW was to acquire a staff which would screen the CADROIT East German co-workers in order to obtain personnel suitable for CADBROW's purposes. This connection with CADROIT also had implications for the later security of both organizations. As action designed to secure the physical and operational separation of CADBROW from CADROIT received greater and greater emphasis, KUBARK, CADROIT, and CADBROW found themselves repeatedly faced with the problem of throwing off the past. CADBROW's efforts in this respect have been compared to those of a recently divorced man who attempts to maintain that the marriage had never really existed at all.

5. Recruitment of Identity 1 and [] Although Identity 1 was actually employed by HENARD and put upon the GADROIT payroll in approximately August of 1951, information assembled as a result of a request for security clearance showed that he was already connected with SEPPER and indicated that he might have little actual knowledge of clandestine operations. As a result, HENARD was directed to induce Identity 1 to resign. HENARD did so on 1 January 1952, and the two parted on good terms. In the meantime, however, Identity 1 had recruited [] as the executive officer of the new para-military section.² After Identity 1's departure, [] was retained as the head of GADROWN, which position he held until the project's termination.

6. Initial Organizational Work: Identity 1 and [] set to work in September 1951 to acquire and organize (a) a staff for GADROWN within GADROIT, and (b) V-Man assets within East Germany for the primary purpose, during this period, of Escape and Evasion.

a. The staff was built up in three general ways. Some staff members who were already working for GADROIT were transferred to GADROWN, e.g., CAZIP and CANAL. A number were freshly recruited after being spotted by someone in GADROIT/GADROWN. CAIFFET, CAWICK and CAVERBOSE, for example, were recruited in this manner. Third, a certain number of staff members were later acquired by withdrawing from East Germany former GADROWN V-Men whom GADROWN had had an opportunity to appraise, e.g., THIELE (the former MN 544, who had taken considerable part in W/T infiltration) and MEISSNER (the former HVK 222 who had organized four groups of V-Men before being withdrawn). The staff reached a strength of sixteen members exclusive of [] and maintained this size for a considerable period of time before termination of the project began. A chart showing the staff organization is contained in Annex I.

b. The East German V-Men were drawn from four different sources: (1) the GADROIT files on already recruited GADROIT co-workers were screened by the GADROWN staff for persons suitable for transfer to GADROWN, (2) "Organisation Freulich", a group of approximately ten V-Men located generally on the line Berlin-Eschwege which had been already partially organized for Escape and Evasion purposes by a GADROIT co-worker in East Germany, was taken over completely by GADROWN at the outset, (3) new visitors to GADROIT were screened for possible diversion to and recruitment by GADROWN, and (4) potential new V-Men were spotted by already recruited GADROWN V-Men. The first GADROWN progress report (for the period 29 September to 11 October 1951) thus showed a total of eighteen V-Men who had been drawn from "Organisation Freulich" and GADROIT co-workers. The

²According to debriefing of [] in April 1953, [] had stated that he, [] had been originally spotted by Identity 2 for Identity 1. [] had described Identity 2 as an old personal friend and a "high level LITVAL contact man/spotter/recruiter" who had often performed spotting functions for Identity 1 during the latter's earlier service with []. During a meeting between Identity 1 and [], which had been arranged by Identity 2, both recalled that [] had worked for Identity 1 developing stay-behind nets in Poland during the early 1930's. ROBA-17933 gives further details concerning Identity 2, including a different spelling of his last name (Identity 3).

numerical strength of GABROWN reached its high point at the end of 1952, with 569 V-Men organized into 89 groups.³ As this increase took place, a constant process of screening and evaluation took place, with a number of V-Men being dropped almost every month for reasons of unsuitability and a greater number being added. Beginning in January 1953, GABROWN's numerical strength gradually decreased through the cessation of recruiting coupled with normal attrition. This process continued until the termination of the project.

7. "Spitzen Group Leaders": Contact with the GABROWN groups was maintained almost entirely through trips to West Berlin by the group leaders to meet with the appropriate GABROWN German case officers. Contact with the V-Men thus depended upon the possibility of travel between West Berlin and East Germany, which the Soviets might cut off at any time. A considerable amount of traffic between East Germany and West Berlin was required by this group leader contact system. For these reasons, efforts were made to establish a second echelon of "super group leaders" or "Spitzen group leaders" within East Germany, with whom the other group leaders would be in contact and from whom the latter would receive instructions. It was hoped that the implementation of this system would reduce the amount of contact between West Berlin and East Germany which was necessary. To this end, a limited number of group leaders were screened and designated as "Spitzen group leaders" during 1952. It became clear, however, that the implementation of this system would place too much information concerning V-Man assets in the hands of the "Spitzen group leaders", and the system was abolished.

Transfers of GABROIT co-workers began in October 1951 and continued until the end of May 1952. With one exception, all of these individuals had been transferred prior to 1 June 1952. With this one exception (transferred on 7 July 1952), no further GABROIT co-workers were transferred to GABROWN. A study of the GABROWN V-Man assets as of November 1952 shows the extent to which the latter came originally from GABROIT. Of the 543 V-Men listed as assets for that month, 100 could be considered as definitely recruited. This figure included "spitzen V-Men", group leaders, and W/T trainees. Of these 100, 39 had been recruited from GABROIT sources. Of these 39, 32 were group leaders and seven were W/T trainees (total of W/T trainees for the month: 16). There were 84 GABROWN groups listed for the month in question, each group averaging approximately five men including the group leader. The 32 groups led by former GABROIT co-workers thus represented approximately 38% of the GABROWN groups, or approximately 160 V-Men. An additional 25 former GABROIT co-workers had not yet been fully recruited by GABROWN, but were in the process of being transferred to GABROWN during November 1952. The total of these persons, the 32 groups led by former GABROIT co-workers, and the seven W/T trainees who came from GABROIT, represented approximately 35% of GABROWN's assets.

The "Spitzen group leaders" were withdrawn from East Germany early in 1953 to West Berlin.⁴

8. W/T Training: Shortly after its inception, GADROWH began screening its V-Men assets for potential W/T operators. A W/T instructor was recruited (JB 61); a training school was established in West Berlin; the first training was begun in January 1952. Particular efforts were made to recruit persons who had received war-time training with the German Army. At the same time that new recruits were found for W/T training, a normal amount of attrition of GADROWH W/T trainees took place (due to discovery of unsuitability for the work, flight to the West, loss of interest, or some similar reason). Priority was given to W/T work, however, to the end that each group might eventually have W/T communications capabilities. The number of persons living in East Germany who actually received training each month (not including the large number of persons who were being evaluated and handled as probably suitable for future W/T training) rose rather steadily to nineteen in June 1953. Training continued until 22-23 September 1953, at which time the East German press and radio published the current address of the W/T school during an attack upon GADROWH. Training at this address ceased immediately. It was never resumed in any form.

9. Escape and Evasion: Escape and Evasion was seen at GADROWH's inception and for some time afterward as the predominant substantive mission of the organization. To this end, V-Men were sought who possessed as much stayability as possible, the means of hiding a fleeing pilot or other evader, and other qualifications valuable in Escape and Evasion work. Here GADROWH groups and V-Men were designated for Escape and Evasion work than any other function. By May 1953, for example, 56 groups containing 383 persons were assigned to Escape and Evasion. A considerable number of these V-Men were middle-aged or older; a substantial number were partially disabled; a smaller number consisted of women. Most of the groups had been briefed in at least general terms concerning their mission ("Weiterleitung von Fluchtlingen"). Escape routes generally covering most parts of East Germany had been developed in connection with the groups concerned, although more emphasis had been laid upon the areas between Berlin and the West German border than on the areas between Berlin and the Oder-Neisse line. Annex II contains a sketch of these routes as of March 1953.

10. W/T Set Infiltration: In recognition of the importance of establishing suitable W/T communications assets as soon as possible, eight RS-6 W/T sets were infiltrated into East Germany from West Berlin between approximately July 1952 and December 1952. It was planned to cache each set near the location of the particular W/T trainee for whose wartime use the set was intended (the trainee would not be aware of the set's location pending further instructions). In accordance with this plan, the sets were moved by stages from their temporary

⁴Following are the last known locations of the "Spitzen group leaders" who were withdrawn from East Germany:

HVM 548	West Berlin	V 301	Grossau
HVM 110	West Berlin	HM 544	Hamburg
HVM 191	West Berlin	HVM 26	Bad Schwanau
HVM 296	West Berlin	HVM 250	Returned to East Germany contrary to GADROWH instructions; arrested 14/25 April 1953.

caches near West Berlin toward their final cache locations, which are given in Annex III. Most had been cached near the appropriate W/T trainees by July 1953. Information available indicates that all except two sets were later recovered by the SSD. One of these two, set No. 2, was transferred to JB-1, who had no connection with GADROWN, by means of a dead drop. JB-1 later reported recovering the set. He reached the set before later fleeing to West Berlin. The second of the two, set No. 4, was reported undisturbed by the SFS as of June 1954. However, NVN 89, who knew the set's location, was reported under surveillance as of that date.

11. Sabotage: Although little concrete briefing of V-Men concerning the GADROWN sabotage mission was ever actually carried out except in selected special cases, V-Men and groups were screened with this purpose in mind. As a result, ten groups of approximately 68 members were designated as sabotage groups specifically designed for wartime sabotage use. (HQB-362h, dated 3 April 1953, gives details concerning these groups). It may be noted, however, that most GADROWN groups contained some sabotage potential, whether or not each had been specifically designated as a sabotage group. A sabotage school, similar in operation to the W/T school, was planned; a preliminary course of instructions was prepared; and an instructor for the school was secured by withdrawing a qualified former V-Man from East Germany (the former MI 544). However, the wave of arrests which was the cause of GADROWN's later termination overtook these efforts, and the sabotage school was never actually established. So far as GADROWN was concerned, sabotage remained largely a matter of screening of personnel and staff planning.

12. Drop Zones: Drop zone work included the spotting of fields suitable for use as drop zones, the assembly of detailed information concerning them (photographs from various angles, detail sketches, etc.), and the naming of them by members of particular groups. This work was begun in October 1952 and continued steadily thereafter. In all, seventeen drop zones in various parts of East Germany had been selected, "documented", and named with reception committees before the termination of GADROWN was begun. The information concerning these drop zones is contained in the GADROWN files which are in KUBARK possession.

13. Retardation vs. Long Range Stay-Behind Activities: As noted in subparagraph 1a above, GADROWN's original mission included both retardation of a Soviet military advance to the West -- short range activities which would become overt soon after they were begun -- and long range deep cover stay-behind operations. An attempt was made at the outset to balance the two in order to prevent undue emphasis on the retardation mission from hindering and compromising assets designed for the more important long range mission. As the work proceeded, however, the conviction grew that the slight degree to which any organization such as GADROWN could hinder a Westward advance by the Soviet armies could only be secured at the cost of assuming a prohibitively large risk of impairing and compromising assets secured for GADROWN's long range, deep cover, stay-behind missions. The latter missions were therefore given clear priority over retardation, and guerrilla warfare was completely excluded from GADROWN's responsibilities (see EOQW-3150, dated 27 February 1953, for a more detailed discussion of the retardation/long range activities antithesis).

14. Location and Cover of GADROWN Headquarters: The various locations and covers of the GADROWN headquarters show an interesting pattern of development, moving from a completely centralized headquarters within GADROIT through a number of intermediate stages to final abandonment of any specific organizational headquarters or cover. GADROWN's original cover within GADROIT was not designed to conceal the fact that GADROWN existed; it was designed to conceal the nature and real mission of the new GADROIT element. GADROWN thus appeared as a new GADROIT section, entitled the "Ideological Warfare" section, which took its place among the many other GADROIT sections and sub-sections. The heads of most other sections within GADROIT knew that this was a cover; they generally supposed that the function of the new section had to do with military intelligence. GADROWN retained this cover until July 1952, during which time [] was nominally subordinate to Nelson G. KERNARD, although in direct contact with the KUBARK case officer for GADROWN. Not long after the kidnapping of Identity 4, it was decided to separate GADROWN from GADROIT physically and operationally as far as possible. GADROWN therefore disappeared from GADROIT overnight in July 1952, and appeared under a new cover at a different location in Berlin as the Identity 5. This cover provided central office and safekeeping facilities for the GADROWN staff and by December 1952 [] was receiving GADROWN funds directly from the KUBARK case officer, and not through KERNARD. It may be noted, however, that a number of GADROWN staff members continued to be carried upon GADROIT records for taxation and insurance purposes through October 1952. The Identity 5 cover was retained until June 1953. At that time the headquarters was moved to a large apartment occupied by GAVISE, and no specific new organizational cover was assumed to replace the old cover. Over a period of time the various GADROWN staff members arranged to secure cover jobs for themselves with a number of small West Berlin firms. The last stage in decentralization of the West Berlin staff was reached in September 1953, when the concept of a physically existent headquarters was given up entirely. All GADROWN files and activities were removed from GAVISE's apartment by that time and the case officers and other GADROWN staff members proceeded to operate out of their own apartments. While this arrangement presented problems concerning security of files, it did add considerably to the compartmentation of the staff and made much more difficult the identification of staff members solely through compromise of a cover unit of which they were members.

15. Arrests and Reorganization Early in 1953: There was little evidence of arrests of V-Men or other indications of possible future trouble within GADROWN until the end of 1952. Four arrests of V-Men in December 1952 and January 1953, however, coupled with the possibility that the arrested persons might provide leads to other V-Men, led to increasing KUBARK scrutiny of GADROWN operational security. As a result, a reorganization of GADROWN, designed to secure greater compartmentation, was carried out in February and March 1953. Eight key V-Men were removed to West Germany as part of this reorganization (see paragraph 7 above). GADROWN operations, which had been held to a minimum during the review and reorganization of the project, were then resumed.

16. Coincident with the general arrest action in East Germany following the uprisings of 17 June 1953, however, a wave of arrests took place within CADROWN which, beginning with the ~~first~~ arrests in July, eventually included approximately thirty-five before it ended. This arrest wave struck particularly hard at a number of V-Men who had played key roles in W/T set infiltration. These arrests led to an extended investigation of CADROWN which began in August 1953 and ended in December 1953. During this investigation, all CADROWN case officers and other key members of the staff were interviewed at length by KUBARK case officers concerning CADROWN operations in general and matters bearing upon the arrests in particular. These interviews revealed that the chief of the contact section, CAWSE, was for a number of reasons unsuited for his position (prevarication, intriguing within the staff, etc.). As a result, he was removed from CADROWN and terminated. No real evidence was found, however, which would indicate that he had given information to the SIS. ~~C~~ and all key members of the CADROWN staff were LCPLUTTERED concerning possible RIS, SIS, ZIPPER, or other non-CADROWN intelligence contacts (August 1953). No indications of such connections appeared. While the tempo of CADROWN operations was reduced to the lowest possible pitch (September 1953), the main emphasis of the investigation was shifted to a detailed BOB/GART examination of the CADROWN groups and singleton V-Leute, in order to determine the status of their compartmentation. To this end, all German language files were either taken over completely or scrutinized by BOB/GART. While many of the causative factors were never factually determined, the study of the arrests during the various investigations established a reasonable pattern which the roll-up had followed (see paragraph 20 below for further information regarding possible causes of arrests). The BOB/GART investigation resulted in a finding in December 1953 that compartmentation within the East German V-Leute as a whole was not adequate. Of the then 199 V-Leute, 19 singleton V-Leute were considered retainable and 24 were considered doubtful, while 22 of the V-Leute organized in groups were considered retainable and 66 were considered doubtful. This analysis thus indicated that 41 V-Men could be continued, and 98 were could be continued if additional checking and scrutiny did not indicate further compromise or contamination. The GART investigation was conducted using a strict standard of security, and the recommendation that all of the V-Men be dropped except those considered apparently sound or doubtful was grounded in the belief that continuing, concentrated counteraction by the security authorities in the BOB, based upon information which it was presumed these authorities had or would eventually develop, would in all probability lead to the identification and detection of all of the V-Men except those considered sound or doubtful.⁵

⁵A mass arrest wave among the remaining CADROWN V-Men did not occur. CADROWN arrests for the periods concerned were reported (and confirmed by newspaper reports) as follows:

July 53 - 8	Nov 53 - 3	March 54 - 1	June 54 - 0
Aug 53 - 9	Dec 53 - 1	April 54 - 0	July 54 - 0
Sept 53 - 2	Jan 54 - 5	May 54 - 0	Aug 54 - 0
Oct 53 - 6	Feb 54 - 0		

The final German Mission position was that (a) it would be impossible to maintain a standby para-military apparatus of any size even in Germany for more than a limited period of time, (b) East German para-military planning should be revised in the direction of establishing a strictly limited number of singleton or doubleton operations in each of several areas in East Germany, (c) it would be impractical to attempt to establish a para-military apparatus of greater size and scope unless hostilities appear imminent or other as yet unforeseeable changes take place in East Germany (see SFRAN-3728, dated 16 February 1954, for details). It was decided that GADROWN should be phased out (see paragraph 18 below).

17. Rear Base Proposal and [] Abortive Resignation: The question of establishing a rear base for GADROWN in some suitable location in West Germany had first been broached to [] in March of 1952. Under this proposal, all of the German language files except those necessary to day to day operations would be moved to the rear base, where they would be used and maintained by a rear base staff. [] would be located at the rear base, which would be responsible for the overall planning and supervision of GADROWN. A contact section, made up of the German case officers and the chief of the contact section to whom they would report, would remain in Berlin. This section would prepare written reports on all meetings with V-Man and other operational activities for transmission to the rear base. Communications would be maintained between the two elements of GADROWN through KUBARK channels.

18. Although the rear base was never actually established, its proposal had considerable influence upon the actions of [] and certain of the GADROWN staff members. The idea had grown out of the feeling prevalent at the time that West Berlin was exposed not only to enemy penetration but to rapid military occupation on extremely short notice. Memories of the Berlin blockade were still fresh. In addition, the then current Korean incident seemed to offer a hint of what might be in store for Germany. For these and other reasons, [] became firmly convinced of the necessity of establishing the rear base. In August of 1952 the plan seemed close to implementation. Subsequent events, however, retarded action upon the proposal. Repeated delay led to a feeling of frustration upon []'s part. In addition, he came under increasingly wearing pressure from certain members of the GADROWN staff who had earlier been alerted upon ODYBRE advice to be prepared to move to the rear base upon fairly short notice and who had, accordingly, made certain financial and other commitments in anticipation of the move. Therefore, when [] found it impossible over a period of many months, for one stated reason or another, to secure any definite information from KUBARK concerning when the rear base would be established, he submitted his resignation to [] on 6 February 1953. [] listed delayed decisions on increase of staff, establishment of the savings school, and chronically delayed security clearances as other reasons for his resignation. The delay in establishment of the rear base, however, was the main theme running through the letter of resignation). Before leaving SGB, [] succeeded in persuading [] to withdraw his resignation. It was pointed out at the time, however, that continued delay in establishing the rear

base would probably result in resubmission of [] resignation (EGBA-3610). In answer to [] repeated and insistent queries concerning when the rear base was to be established, [] persuaded him to remain with GARDNER by assuring him that the rear base would be established without fail by 15 July 1953. The wave of arrests which began at the end of July 1953, however, eventually resulted in the suspension of all plans to establish the rear base until the completion of a full-scale examination of GARDNER V-Man assets. KNECHTLI stated that he could no longer believe that it was actually the KUBARK intention to establish a rear base; always there was some purported reason for delay. [] thus resubmitted his resignation, setting 3 October 1953 as the date of his departure from Berlin.⁶ During a meeting between [] and [] on that day, however, the latter was assured that KUBARK was firm in its intention to establish the rear base. The actual move would be made, however, only after ODYSSEY was satisfied that the bulk of GARDNER remained uncontaminated. The speed with which this could be established would depend to a large extent upon [] cooperation. Approximately two months was estimated as the time which would be necessary to reach a conclusion about GARDNER's future. [] stated that these remarks altered the situation completely. He was now fully satisfied about the ODYSSEY intentions. Naturally, he would not make an issue over sixty days more or less in Berlin, and withdrew his resignation. The determination that GARDNER was to be terminated, of course, finally ended all plans for the creation of a rear base.

19. Termination: The phase-out of GARDNER began in March 1954. Some months were required to carry out termination contacts with most V-Men, since many were not scheduled to come to West Berlin for their next contact for some months in advance. All GARDNER contact with V-Men had ceased by 31 August, however, and the termination of GARDNER had been substantially completed without serious incident by that date. The main features of the termination were briefly as follows:

a. Termination contacts were carried out with as many V-Men as possible. Most V-Men reportedly were given a final briefing, either personally or through their group leaders. V-Men whom it had been impossible to contact securely before the end of August were listed as dropped.

[] gave three reasons for resubmission of his resignation at this time: (1) chronic delay in establishment of the rear base, (2) ODYSSEY attempts to take control of the project out of German hands and (3) his desire to rejoin his wife in West Germany. Examination of all the facts available, however, shows that the first reason was the chief one.

b. As many V-Men who appeared to have future non-CADROWN potential as possible were assigned recognition signals.⁷

c. The original CADROWN files on CADROWN groups and V-Men, dating from the inception of the project and organized for convenient use, were secured and retained by BOB. These files include, among other things, the following types of information:

- (1) Personality information
- (2) Method of recruitment
- (3) Contact reports written by the CADROWN German Case Officer concerned for all V-Man meetings actually carried out.
- (4) Sketches of the V-Man's neighborhood, when necessary to find his address.
- (5) Certain diagrams of known relationships between the V-Man and other V-Men.
- (6) Any special instructions given by [] or other staff members concerning the handling of the V-Man.
- (7) An assessment, where appropriate, of the V-Man's willingness to work with a non-CADROWN organization.
- (8) A description of recognition signals assigned upon termination, or the reasons why such signals were not assigned.

d. Five staff members were separated from CADROWN in April 1954, four in June, one in July and five (including []) in August.

e. After termination under project CADROWN, [] was placed upon a consultant status for anticipated KUNOOK activities.

Thirty-three V-Men were assigned recognition signals during their termination contacts. Contact was maintained until a later date with those V-Men indicated in BOB/GANT screenings to be apparently uncontaminated or worth further scrutiny than with those indicated to be contaminated, in order to permit BOB assessment of their KUVINE potential. This meant that a larger percentage of apparently uncontaminated V-Men were terminated shortly after the removal of the East of Dr. Otto John. The result of this fact coupled with the termination of the V-Man in question was that many of the V-Men indicated to be apparently uncontaminated refused to take part in any future work. Comparatively few recognition signals were specifically arranged with the V-Men in this group, therefore. However, the recognition signals and/or cover names and other indicators of good faith which had earlier been assigned to most CADROWN V-Men as part of CADROWN's regular work are available in the German CADROWN files for possible war time approaches.

f. The termination of CAVERDICT, the last of the staff members, took place in December 1954. His termination was somewhat delayed by abortive negotiations looking forward to the possibility that he might be transferred to BOB/CART.

20. Conclusions of BOB/CART Investigation Re Causes of Arrests: As noted in paragraph 15 above, many of the causative factors involved in the arrests among certain of the CADBORN Y-Leads in the period July-November 1953 were never factually determined. After considering from a theoretical standpoint the possible methods by which knowledge of CADBORN might have come into SIS hands, the BOB/CART report contained in Reference B concludes at subparagraph 2f of Section II, "Conclusions. It is frankly not possible or wise to attempt at present to formulate any specific reason for the series of CADBORN losses, or to say that a given man was arrested for a given cause, except where we have specific information to that effect. In spite of this recognized deficiency, we feel that the courses of action delineated above probably cover the methods by which knowledge of CADBORN came into the hands of the SSD. In the future, constant attention to these possibilities and the exploitation of all leads may in time lead to a definite pattern by which the original access to the organization may be pinpointed, and the subsequent stages detailed with accuracy. In the meantime, however, all conclusions are tentative, and based upon speculation engendered by such detail as is presently in our hands concerning previous losses." It may also be noted that one of the courses of action considered by BOB/CART to have been one of the ways in which the SIS could have acquired the information leading to the arrests was, "the possibility that the SSD came into possession of information on CADBORN purely through chance, at some control point, during the infiltration of JBRADLE equipment, or some other fortuitous circumstance..." (subparagraph 2e, Section II, final BOB/CART report).

21. Possible Compromise Through Loss of CADBORN Film. Since the completion of the BOB investigation of CADBORN and the termination of the project, information has come to light indicating the tenuous possibility that the SIS might have secured the original knowledge of CADBORN upon which its action was based through acquisition of information contained in microfilm copies of KUBARK files on the project. The CADBORN case officer, [redacted] had made microfilm copies of his own files on CADBORN as well as certain non-CADBORN files during the latter part of 1952 and the early part of 1953. One roll of the non-CADBORN film, which was unclassified although highly sensitive, was later inadvertently delivered to a separate German project (CAEROIT) as part of a normal delivery of supposedly unexposed film. This non-CADBORN film was returned to KUBARK upon discovery that it had been exposed. Subsequent checks have thus far failed to locate the whereabouts of the CADBORN film. Details concerning this incident are contained in Reference D, which makes certain recommendations for determining precisely what CADBORN films were photographed and for locating the film. It is hoped that implementation of these recommendations will eliminate the possibility that the arrests were caused by loss of the CADBORN film.

22. Conclusions Drawn From KUBARK's Experience with CADROWN: CADROWN represented a substantial para-military effort in East Germany between August 1951 and March 1953. In assessing its contribution to the achievement of KUBARK's transitional and wartime goals, it should be remembered that the project was designed for a hot war situation which might well have developed in the then very near future; it was not specifically organized for a long interim period of years before war appeared. War did not appear, and the organization eventually suffered losses during the lengthened interim pre-war period. We believe it fair to say, however, that if the eventuality for which CADROWN was designed and organized -- an all-out shooting war -- had actually developed in Germany as it had, for example, in Korea, CADROWN would have proved an asset valuable to the achievement of KUBARK's wartime aims. In this sense, it is believed that the establishment of a para-military organization in East Germany in the latter half of 1951 was a sound investment at the time. KUBARK's experience with CADROWN, however, has pointed up a number of lessons which may be useful for the future. Some of these are obvious from the preceding discussion; others, however, deserve some special comment here.

a. CADROWN was continued as long as it was upon the at least implied assumption that it is technically possible to maintain for an indefinite period of time in East Germany, in the face of intense and competent GALT and security counteraction, a large group of individuals interconnected to a large extent for the purpose of conducting para-military Escape and Evasion, and related activities. The CADROWN experience indicates that this assumption is not tenable, that continuance of such an organization indefinitely would incur the risk that hostile counteraction will result in a continuing attrition of the assets to such an extent that the organization would not be a viable instrument at the time of actual hostilities.

b. The extent to which the CADROWN organization was expanded and the extent to which insecure interrelations were allowed to exist for the purposes of Escape and Evasion, W/T training and infiltration, and related activities, is traceable in large part to two reasons: these were (1) the sense of urgency which existed at the time of the project's inception and for some time thereafter, and (2) a lack of preciseness as to what missions should actually be assigned to CADROWN and which missions should not be so assigned.

(1) Sense of Urgency: It is assumed that the reasons underlying the drive for rapid acquisition of paramilitary assets are familiar to all concerned with paramilitary affairs at the time of CADROWN's organization and need little comment here. It is worth noting, however, that [] has stated many times that he was under considerable pressure during the first year of CADROWN's life to increase the numbers of the organization, and that during the latter part of that year, he was acting under firm instructions to increase the size of CADROWN to 1,000 V-Men as soon as possible (thus roughly doubling the size of the organization).

(2) Lack of Precision Re Missions: The CADROW project outline amendment authorizing CADROW (Reference A) indicated which missions CADROW was authorized to carry out. Although the Escape and Evasion mission was assigned to [] from the start, and although terms such as "unconventional warfare" and the like had been used in early discussions with [] concerning what CADROW's mission was to be, it was not clearly decided until much later which of the other missions in the project outline should be assigned to CADROW and which would not be so assigned. This lack of clarity in definition of missions is reflected, for example, in SFRAH-0146, dated 9 January 1953, which, in reporting upon an earlier review of CADROW, points out the need as of that time for "guidance on strategic functions, i.e., establishment of E and E and W/T nets, beginning carefully targeted sabotage missions". This guidance was to include a "statement as to what could be told East Zone CADROW members in regard to their future mission". BOB was to "work out in conjunction with principal agent detailed plan for implementation of guidance". The result of this lack of sufficient precision concerning these matters up to then, i.e., during the formative first year of CADROW's organization, had left [] to too great an extent to play it by ear concerning the manner in which compartmentation and other vital aspects of security should be balanced off against efficiency in accomplishing CADROW's missions. [] stated a number of times, with some justification, we believe, that he was never informed of the "true purposes" of the apparatus during its formative period, and that he has always experienced constant difficulty in securing clear decisions from KUBARK in this and other regards. In many specific cases where he could not secure decisions over a period of time (or could secure only "Gunsentscheidungen"), he became accustomed to make provisional decisions himself, which, never being reversed by KUBARK, became part of the CADROW framework. It is unrealistic to expect, however, that a tool well suited to the purposes for which it is intended, will be produced by a tool-maker who is unaware of these purposes. In this respect, CADROW's experience supports the conclusion that sound operational principles require that the acquisition of agent personnel for para-military purposes be undertaken only when the objectives for which these agents will be used have been clearly established.

e. A cursory examination of KUBARK's experience with CADROW might appear to indicate that it shows an absolute need for avoiding large scale recruitment of assets for para-military purposes under any conditions. An extension of such absolute thinking would lead to the conclusion that recruitment of strictly singleton agents is the only possible course of action which will prove feasible in the long run. We may note, however, that organizations roughly comparable to CADROW have been organized in the past by KUBARK and have proved to be valuable assets in achieving KUBARK goals. CADROW type organizations

were built in Korea, for example, which more than repaid the effort that went into their creation. The points outlined above point the way to what we consider to be more valid conclusions to be drawn from the CADROWN experience than a belief that large scale para-military organization is never practical: the timing of the creation and expansion of large scale organizations for para-military purposes is vital. Such organizations may profitably be created at certain times and under certain conditions, such as during a hot war (General Bor-Komorowski's secret Polish army during World War II) or during periods of impending hostilities (the Colonial "Minute Men" during an earlier period, and Ho Chi Minh's successful para-military organization in recent times).⁶ Once large scale recruiting has begun, however, para-military organizations are geared rather thoroughly to a developing wartime situation, and are not suited to extended periods of peace or of "not war, not peace" such as that in which we presently find ourselves. Under such conditions, para-military organizations become widely vulnerable to aggressive counter-action by security forces. CADROWN was created out of the sense of urgency stemming directly from the Korean conflict, i.e., during a period of apparent impending hostilities. As the international political framework changed to one of extended "not war, not peace", however, and as the possibilities of expansion of the Korean conflict to other strategic areas diminished, the process of fleshing out CADROWN's organization through recruitment of new members was not accordingly stopped or reversed until rather late. Expansion continued through the end of 1952, long after it had become reasonably clear that the Korean conflict had been localized. The growing divergence of the international political basis for para-military organization and CADROWN recruiting practices thus points up the need for continuing and searching review of para-military organizations, once recruitment has gone beyond the singleton stage, to insure that the international political framework which originally justified such an expanded recruitment policy (impending hostilities or strong tension of a similar nature) has not changed to one of prospective "not war, not peace" or some other form of extended competition short of war. If such reviews indicate that the political basis for the expanded recruiting policy is no longer present, the para-military organization should be either terminated completely or phased down to a skeletal, singleton agent basis.

⁶It may well be that paramilitary organizations are successful, even when activated at times and under conditions which are otherwise favorable, only when they act as a complement to regular military forces operating against a common enemy. Little is said here on this point, however, since regular military forces were never active against CADROWN's East German target area, nor was CADROWN ever put into action to achieve its wartime aims.

d. KUBARK's experience with GADSDON also points up quite concretely the need for maintaining an adequate record of important discussions with agent personnel. While this work may sometimes be seen as secondary to day to day operations, the lack of such a record of a number of important discussions and commitments can and did hamper later efforts to exercise full control over the project. It was not desirable, for example, to rely solely upon [] description of what instructions had earlier been made to him concerning how GADSDON V-Men were to be organized and what efforts should be made to increase or reduce their size: it did not increase either [] confidence in KUBARK or the latter's control of GADSDON when, little record of the matter being available, it was necessary to query him regarding what instructions had been earlier given him concerning where and how the W/T sets would be cached. The point is clear: sufficient KUBARK personnel of suitable types should be committed to a project of GADSDON's size and kind to insure that an adequate record of the project is maintained, if later misunderstanding and confusion are to be avoided. Attempts to economize here, if pushed too far, can cost much more in time and money than is saved.

21. CONCLUSION: As noted in paragraph 20 above, GADSDON did contribute substantially to KUBARK's capability to carry out the latter's wartime missions, despite the developing cross-connections in its organization which led to its later termination. It is to be hoped that the experience gained through the creation, maintenance and termination of this organization will prove helpful in future para-military activities.

22. CGS: Please forward Annexes I, II and III to EE when your use for them is at an end.

[]

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT A TO MIRA-28727

Identity 1: Admiral Konrad PATZIG, former Chief of the German Abwehr

Identity 2: Lt. Colonel (fna) HORATZIG

Identity 3: (fna) HORTAZEK

Identity 4: Dr. Walter LINSE

Identity 5: "Institute of Industrial Hygiene"

Distribution:

3 - COS

1 - RE

SECRET

COPY