


~~TOP SECRET~~



18 September 1961



Copy No. C 85

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~*General Throughout*Situation in the Congo

[During Hammarskjold's stay in Leopoldville, he told Ambassador Gullion that he believed the Adoula government would be the "greatest winner" from the UN Katanga operation. He asserted that Adoula had been under great pressure from the Gizenga faction to bring Tshombé to heel. The secretary general said he believed that if this could be accomplished, Adoula, whom he characterized as the most purposeful, energetic, and capable African he knew with the possible exception of Nigerian Premier Balewa, would be master of the situation. Otherwise, according to one of Hammarskjold's aides, there was a danger that General Lundula in Stanleyville would take action against Katanga on his own account.]

[The UN officials expressed concern over the appointment of Egide Bocheley-Davidson as the chief Leopoldville representative in Katanga. However, they said he was presently under the control of the UN and they hoped he would remain so. Bocheley-Davidson has thus far been confined to Elisabethville airport by the fighting in Katanga.]

[A more accurate evaluation of the situation may be that provided by Arthur Doucy, a Belgian socialist called by the American Embassy in Brussels "one of the most knowledgeable Westerners" on Congo affairs. Doucy, who is a friend and adviser of Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko and has known Adoula for ten years, told American officials that he fears the UN is unwittingly abetting a Gizenga takeover. He asserted that anti-Communist elements in the government, such as Bomboko and Sureté chief Nendaka, were being isolated through the appointment of Gizengist assistants, and that the dispatch of Bocheley-Davidson to Elisabethville was part of a Gizengist plan to take over Katanga after the UN had neutralized Tshombé and his associates.]

[According to Doucy's informants, the radical neutralists at the Belgrade conference worked to impress Adoula with the necessity of retaining Gizenga's support; as a result, Doucy feels that Adoula, who he says is not a particularly strong personality, would prefer to make concessions to Gizenga rather than put up a determined fight against Gizenga's efforts to gain control. Doucy stated that he fears the Gizenga bloc may take over from Adoula within three or four months.]

(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)~~SECRET~~