


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20 September 1960



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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


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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

20 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

South Vietnam: Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam reportedly have been ordered to intensify their terrorist and sabotage activities in connection with the 15th anniversary on 23 September of the anti-French resistance movement in Indochina. The prime target is said to be Saigon, although stepped-up attacks on military posts and patrols in the countryside are also planned.

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Communist groups may attempt to plant explosives in places frequented by Americans, and has advised against any night driving in Saigon from 21 to 24 September.

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LATE ITEMS

*Laos: The Pathet Lao high command has ordered its units to stop fighting in those provinces--including Sam Neua--which are "under the control of the government of Souvanna Phouma." In choosing to consider Sam Neua loyal to Souvanna despite indications that military commanders there are loyal to General Phoumi, the Pathet Lao leadership may have been motivated by concern that additional military pressure at this time might serve to reunify the badly divided Lao army. The order calling for a cease fire left numerous loopholes in case the Pathet Lao should decide to resume the offensive in Sam Neua. The insurgents' propaganda activities in the province will be facilitated by the withdrawal of army troops from outlying posts to form a small defense perimeter around Sam Neua town. Premier Souvanna's cancellation of a planned cabinet meeting in Luang Prabang with the king on 19 September may have been influenced by an announcement over Phoumi's Radio Savannakhet that its "liberating forces" were launching an assault on Vientiane.

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by one of Phoumi's units is imminent.

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Press reports on 19 September pointed toward a possible early announcement of some compromise arrangement; a Kasavubu spokesman publicly acknowledged that peace talks were in progress and indicated that the Ileo government recently named by Kasavubu was

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DAILY BRIEF

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considering a "cabinet post" for Lumumba. Later Lumumba's representative at the UN claimed an agreement had been reached under which Lumumba would remain "chief of the legal government."

The special session of the UN General Assembly on the Congo situation closed early on 20 September when the USSR abandoned its efforts to obtain censure of Hammarskjold's actions in the Congo. This paved the way for the overwhelming endorsement by the assembly of the Asian-African resolution backing the secretary general and opposing military aid to the Congo except through UN channels.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Possible Communist Violence in Saigon

Communist guerrilla units in South Vietnam have reportedly been ordered to intensify terrorism and sabotage in connection with the 15th anniversary on 23 September of the beginning of armed resistance against French colonial rule. [redacted]

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[redacted] the primary focus of such activity will be in Saigon, although the Communists are also expected to step up attacks against military posts and patrols of regular Vietnamese army troops as well as civil guard and self-defense forces in the countryside.

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Special action groups are believed to have been infiltrated into the capital with the aim of committing acts of sabotage against key installations, including Tan Son Nhut airport, gasoline depots, and bridges. [redacted]

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[redacted] believes that attempts may be made to plant explosives in places frequented by Americans and has advised against night driving in Saigon during the period 21-24 September.

The upsurge of Communist guerrilla activity during the past nine months has affected provinces in the Mekong delta area south and west of Saigon and main routes leading from Saigon, but the capital city itself has previously been considered secure. There has been renewed emphasis by the Communist regime in North Vietnam on the "struggle against the US-Diem clique" in the South, and plans to create incidents in Saigon may be partly intended to stir up further discontent among non-Communist opponents of the Diem administration in Saigon. [redacted]

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Press reports on 19 September pointed toward a possible early announcement of some sort of compromise arrangement. A Kasavubu spokesman publicly acknowledged that talks between the contending factions were in progress and indicated that the Ileo government recently named by Kasavubu--but still not formally invested--was considering a "cabinet post" for Lumumba. Later Lumumba's representative at the UN claimed knowledge of an agreement under which Lumumba would remain "chief of the legal government."

Mobutu, meanwhile, was reported on 19 September to have survived a second attempt on his life by Lumumba adherents. The American Embassy in Leopoldville has characterized Mobutu, who appears to lean heavily on Moroccan General Kettani, as an honest and dedicated man who is appalled by the magnitude of the Congo's problems. On 18 September he was still talking naively about a "council of students" to run an interim government pending the "transfer" of power to a Kasavubu-Ileo regime by the end of October.

The special session of the UN General Assembly on the Congo situation ended early on 20 September when the USSR suddenly abandoned its efforts to obtain endorsement of its resolution which would in effect have censured Secretary General Hammarskjold's actions in the Congo and upheld the right of unilateral aid to the Congolese Government. The assembly backed overwhelmingly the Asian-African resolution supporting Hammarskjold and opposing any military aid to the Congo except through UN channels. The Congo situation, however, will almost certainly be discussed further during the 15th General Assembly, which opens this afternoon.

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Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

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