


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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*Cuba-USSR: [A report from a highly reliable source indicates that on 15 June a MIG jet aircraft was being assembled at the San Antonio de los Banos air base in Cuba. This is the first confirmed report of the presence of such aircraft in Cuba, but there is no indication of the total number delivered to date, nor of whether it is a MIG-15 or MIG-17. The Soviet merchant vessel Leninsky Komsomol, which arrived in Cuba on or about 16 June, may have delivered from 15 to 18 more MIGs.]

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USSR-Indonesia: The Indonesian Embassy in Moscow, according to an intercepted message of 12 June, has informed the Burmese Embassy that the USSR will deliver two TU-16 jet medium bombers to Indonesia in the near future. This would be the first transfer of such aircraft out of the Soviet Union. Indonesia has requested permission for the two bombers, accompanied by two Soviet AN-12 transports, to stop over in Burma between 22 and 25 June en route to Djakarta. The TU-16s are to be flown from the USSR to Rangoon via Peiping by Soviet pilots, and from Rangoon to Djakarta by Indonesian pilots with Soviet copilots. Under the Soviet-Indonesian arms agreement of last January, the USSR is to provide a total of 20 TU-16s during 1961 and 1962, six of which will be equipped with air-to-surface missiles.

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
Bolivia: Ambassador Stevenson, in commenting on his talks with President Paz and Vice President Lechin, reports that the Bolivian position as a whole is "desperately bad," and that the basic problem is the need for assertion of government authority. The army sent word to Stevenson that it was fully behind Paz, and rather than tolerate Lechin, will take over with a military

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Republic of the Congo



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junta if Paz falls. Any such attempt would be likely to meet resistance from armed elements of the police and of the workers' and peasants' militias. [redacted] (Backup, Page 1)

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*Brazil-Cuba: The Quadros administration in Brazil is going ahead with plans to offer its good offices, together with those of Mexico and Ecuador, in an "attempt to bring about a rapprochement between Cuba and the United States," according to a 16 June intercepted Foreign Ministry message to the Brazilian embassies in Mexico City and Quito. The message emphasized that Brazil felt the offer, as proposed by special Cuban emissary Carlos Olivares during private conversations with the Mexican, Brazilian, and Ecuadorean presidents in late May, would have to be "extremely discreet" and should be aimed solely at bringing the United States and Cuba together for bilateral conversations. The message added that Brazil did not oppose the participation of Uruguay and Chile in the "good offices" effort--as proposed by Ecuadorean President Velasco--and said that it would like to see Argentina added. [redacted]

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Congo: Representatives of the Kasavubu and Gizenga regimes reportedly have agreed to a meeting of the Congolese parliament at Lovanium University outside Leopoldville on 27 or 28 June. The UN apparently will set up a neutralized zone with a six-mile radius from which all unauthorized persons would be barred. Leopoldville officials recently indicated to officers of the American Embassy that negotiations with Katanga were also going well, although Foreign Minister Bomboko was adamant that Tshombé would not be released before the reconvening of parliament. [redacted]

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[redacted] (Backup, Page 2) (Map)

Tunisia - Communist China: [Secretary of State for Information Mohamed Masmoudi, who leaves on 20 June for Peiping, will be the first Tunisian official to visit Communist China, and may have been given the mission of negotiating an exchange of diplomatic missions. President Bourguiba indicated as early as July, 1958, that he was contemplating an exchange of diplomatic]

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[representatives. Last fall he said he would thenceforth oppose the moratorium on the Chinese UN representation issue in the UN General Assembly; Tunisia to date has abstained.]

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Page 4)

UAR-Africa: Cairo, which has long provided moderate amounts of financial assistance to African nationalist movements, has recently begun to offer relatively substantial aid programs to certain African countries apparently selected on the basis of their presumed susceptibility to UAR influence. A credit to Mali of \$18,720,000 to buy Egyptian equipment and services for a variety of economic and social development projects was extended during Malian President Keita's visit to Cairo last week. A similar amount was made available to Guinea's Sekou Touré when he was in the UAR in May. Both countries are associated with the UAR in the "Casablanca group" of radical African states. Earlier the UAR granted an \$11,200,000 credit for development projects in the Somali Republic. Cairo has also provided some military aid to both the Somali Republic and Mali.

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UAR-USSR: The three-week-old propaganda dispute between Cairo and Moscow is tapering off. On 14 June, according to an intercepted message from Cairo to Damascus, Nasir notified Sarraj, "The attack on the Soviet propaganda machine is to stop since their broadcasts have not attacked us for three days."

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Only a few scattered items critical of the USSR have appeared in the Arab press or radio since 14 June. Moscow appears equally ready to end the propaganda exchange. A 17 June Pravda article entitled "Who benefits from this?" blamed UAR press media for creating the dispute, but stressed the USSR's desire for maintaining good relations between the two countries. At the same time, the article made it clear that the USSR would continue to defend Arab Communists and to protest the actions of those countries which "persecute" them.

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Dominican Republic: Anti-Trujillo elements evidently now believe their cause is almost hopeless and are considering extreme measures in an effort to provoke US armed intervention. The US Consulate in Ciudad Trujillo reported on 17 June that it believes it has, at least temporarily, dissuaded two prominent dissidents from such a plan to sabotage local American investments and create the appearance that American citizens are in danger.

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The consul noted on 18 June that since the departure of the special OAS subcommittee on 15 June the government has made no further moves to give the impression of democratic intentions. No additional Trujillo associates have been downgraded or sent out of the country, and the Military Intelligence Service is again in evidence, although its behavior has been more correct than usual.

[Redacted]

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~~SECRET~~The Bolivian Situation

President Paz told Ambassador Stevenson that since the 1952 revolution the governing Nationalist Revolutionary Movement had tried to push social development and welfare faster than the country's economic development would permit. With the help of foreign advisers, as well as the United Nations, the government of Bolivia is now completing a long-term plan to increase annual per capita income to \$180 within six or seven years; Paz states that present per capita income is \$90 annually, but other recent estimates have been lower.

Paz said that his arrests of Communist labor leaders had created a strong reaction and that the Communists proved to have wider connections than the government had supposed. He said the situation was further confused by divisions within the government and that Lechin refused overt support. Lechin later told Ambassador Stevenson that his equivocal position is helpful to the government and claimed everyone knew he was supporting the government since he was part of it. He impressed Ambassador Stevenson as thoroughly untrustworthy and opportunistic.

Lechin, who heads the national labor federation, might be willing to oppose the Communist arrests if he thought he would strengthen his position with labor. Thus far he has refrained from overt opposition, however, and he evidently did not support the demonstrations on 15 June calling for release of the Communist labor leaders. A reliable observer estimates that the demonstrations involved only 450 students, some 500 workers who took part only briefly, and street gangs who did the most damage. The demonstration was led by youths who frequent Communist party headquarters.

The Bolivian Army numbers about 11,000 and the air force 950. The national police number about 5,000. The American Embassy in La Paz noted in March 1960 that the police and the army together are outnumbered and out-gunned by the civilian militia. Membership in the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, which polled 70 percent of the vote in 1960, implies an obligation to drill with local militia units. (b)(3)

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Situation in the Congo

Cyrille Adoula, the moderate interior minister in Premier Ileo's cabinet, seems the likeliest candidate for the prime ministership when parliament reconvenes. Adoula has wide support, particularly among Gizenga's more moderate lieutenants, and the American Embassy believes the Stanleyville leader would accept a vice premiership under Adoula. Ileo appears to have little support from any faction and in fact has been removed from the team which is negotiating with Gizenga's representative.

The embassy believes that Gizenga's position has weakened in the last two months. It feels that coming to a parliamentary session is the lesser of two evils for him, since in the long run his position in Stanleyville would not be tenable without massive outside aid. [redacted] The only aid efforts now pending--the medical supplies being brought in by an IL-18 from Ghana and a \$2,000,000 barter arrangement with Yugoslavia--will not be adequate to meet his needs. [redacted]

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In Katanga, American and UN officials believe that the recent expulsion of Belgian extremist advisers to the Elisabethville regime improves the chances for Katanga's reintegration with the rest of the country. Agreement reportedly has been reached between Katanga and the UN for the replacement of senior Belgian officers in Elisabethville's forces with UN officers. [Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak stated recently that he hoped that 50 Congolese officers would be sufficiently trained by 1 July to enable Belgium to begin withdrawing its lower ranking gendarmerie officers. Spaak reiterated his view that the implementation of the UN resolution could be made easier if tripartite groups made up of Belgian and Congolese officials could work out arrangements on the spot in the Congo. However, Sahbani, Hammarskjold's representative in Brussels, told US officials that he did not think he could persuade the secretary general to "buy the idea," at least until after the departure of some 23 Belgians already nominated by Spaak for withdrawal and of at least some Belgian mercenaries.]

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[Spaak does not share Hammarskjold's recently expressed view that UN forces in the Congo probably could be reduced from 20,000 to 5,000 by the end of the year. Spaak believes the situation]

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[will remain so unstable for at least a year that any substantial UN withdrawal would be dangerous. Hammarskjold, in stating his views to British officials in early June, had also said he hoped to reduce the annual cost of UN operations in the Congo from \$120,000,000 to \$20,000,000. British officials are in favor of the goal but believe Hammarskjold's timetable is over-optimistic.]

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Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko told an American official on 18 June that Leopoldville authorities had positive proof that Indian Chargé Rahman had been involved in subversive activities against the Congolese Government. [Usually reliable sources have reported that Rahman, apparently without sanction from New Delhi, has been advising Lumumbist elements in Leopoldville and has acted as a channel for funds from Gizenga to his supporters in the capital. According to an untested source, he also was implicated in a plot involving a youth group and army elements. The leader of the youth group was arrested last week and may have furnished the basis for Bomboko's charges.] Bomboko plans to send a letter to Nehru, asking that Rahman be removed quietly in the interest of Congolese-Indian relations. Should the charges be widely publicized, the recent improvement in New Delhi's attitude toward the Congolese Government would probably be nullified.

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Tunisian Secretary of State to Visit Peiping

Masmoudi's visit, originally scheduled for late February, was planned at a time when President Bourguiba, having been excluded by King Mohamed V from the Casablanca conference of chiefs of state, was groping to resist both international isolation and the label of having "sold out to the West." At that time Bourguiba was persuaded by Iraq to send his foreign secretary to the Arab foreign ministers' meeting in Baghdad.

The Peiping visit was indefinitely postponed when Masmoudi, who earlier had established a degree of rapport with De Gaulle, was commissioned to prepare the way for the De Gaulle - Bourguiba meeting on 27 February. Now that Bourguiba has completed his visits to Canada, the US, and Britain, the Masmoudi trip has been rescheduled, possibly in an attempt to allay criticism that little more than lip service is given the official policy of non-alignment. An exchange of missions with Peiping would facilitate Chinese liaison with the Algerian rebels.

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Masmoudi reportedly will be accompanied by the Tunisian ambassador to Moscow and Prague, the director of youth and sports, and the director of the Neo-Destour party's Arabic-language daily newspaper and the official news agency. Although this is the first official Tunisian visit to Peiping, Tunisian labor, youth and women's groups have exchanged relatively frequent visits with similar groups in Communist China ever since Tunisia acquired independence in 1956.

Even though Bourguiba had long ago indicated he would in due course exchange diplomatic missions with the Sino-Soviet bloc, Soviet, Polish, and Czech missions were not established in Tunis until 1960, and an ambassador--Bourguiba's able protégé, Ahmed Mestiri, the former secretary of state for finance and commerce--was dispatched to Moscow and Prague. Tunisian relations with the Soviet Union have apparently been disappointing to Bourguiba and lesser Tunisian officials. An

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offer of technical assistance in the construction of three small dams in northern Tunisia seems not to have gone beyond the discussion stage. On the other hand, a first contract under a Polish \$8,000,000 credit arrangement was concluded earlier this month for the construction of a metal-products factory at Sousse and the employment of 34 Polish technicians. Other Czech and Bulgarian technicians are employed under contract by Tunisian governmental departments, and relatively active cultural affairs programs have received a mixed reception in Tunisia.

Although Tunisia's commerce with the bloc has increased substantially in the past several years, such trade amounts to less than 3 percent of its total foreign trade, which is still predominantly with Europe, particularly France.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**THE PRESIDENT**

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

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The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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