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63

20 April 1961

CONTINUED CONTROL

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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The Situation in the Congo

The UN Command appears increasingly disposed to take a tough stand in its relations with the Leopoldville and Katanga governments. Hammarskjold's unpopular Congo representative, Rajeshwar Dayal, reportedly plans to leave for Leopoldville on 28 April. In Katanga, where the UN continues to airlift reinforcements from Tanganyika in the face of Tshombé's threats, the situation remains tense. UN officials in Leopoldville have stepped up efforts to return UN forces to the port of Matadi even at the risk of jeopardizing the recent improvement in their relations with the Kasavubu government. Pointe Noire, which Hammarskjold has mentioned as an alternative port to Matadi, handles on an annual basis only one third the tonnage of Matadi, and all goods brought in there would have to be brought across the Congo River at Brazzaville.

Only in Orientale is the UN Command inactive. The status of the proclaimed truce between Mobutu's Congo Army and the rebel forces remains unclear; although a Stanleyville broadcast has denied the existence of any truce, it is possible that some agreement has been reached among commanders in the field.

[redacted] the Ministry of African Affairs in Brussels had assured Belgian officers that service with Tshombé's forces would be considered equivalent to service in Belgian forces with respect to retirement. [redacted] on instructions from Brussels [redacted] warned Belgian officers against participating in any action against the UN Command.

Prospects for a meeting of Congo political leaders at Kamina, Katanga--scheduled for 20 April for the purpose of implementing decisions reached at Tananarive--appear dubious. [redacted] Tshombé's attendance is in question, [redacted]

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York again denouncing the Tananarive conference last March as "not representative of the country" and as a maneuver "designed to counteract the work of the General Assembly."

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