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9 September 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 8  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 10-2  
DATE: 10 JUN 1980 REVIEWER: [Redacted]

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
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


# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 September 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC



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\*Berlin: The East German Government decree announced on 8 September requiring West Germans to secure special permits to enter East Berlin is a further step toward incorporation of the Soviet sector of Berlin into East Germany and gives the city sector border the character of an East German frontier. The West Germans now must meet the same requirements for entry into East Berlin as for travel in East Germany. The move, which clearly violates the four-power agreements guaranteeing freedom of movement within the city, appears to have bypassed the procedures normal in the past under which East Berlin municipal authorities re-enacted any legislation applying to the Soviet sector of Berlin.

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Communist China: Peiping has used the occasion of the 100th Sino-US ambassadorial meeting to indicate that it does not expect any material results from further negotiations with the United States. A long editorial in the 8 September issue of People's Daily asserts that Peiping has no "unrealistic illusions" about the talks, but is willing to continue the meetings, which have been going on since 1955. The editorial reiterates Peiping's refusal to renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Strait area.

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Congo: Premier Lumumba's formal request on 8 September for the withdrawal of UN troops increases the threat of fighting between UN forces and Lumumba's supporters in the Congo. *no* [The premier's demand results from his belief that the UN officials were backing his rival Kasavubu.] He probably has been encouraged to adopt a tough attitude by the propaganda support he has received from the USSR following Kasavubu's coup attempt.

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Hammarskjold can be expected to put the whole weight of his office behind his effort to retain the UN troops in the Congo. [In late August, before the Congolese crisis had reached its present impasse, he indicated that Lumumba must be "broken." He planned to insist that the UN forces must remain in the Congo to maintain peace and order because the Congolese National Army was incapable of doing so.]

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In Leopoldville the situation remains fluid between Kasavubu and Lumumba, but the premier won unexpected backing from the Senate--formerly believed to be an opposition stronghold--which cheered his accusations against Belgium and the United Nations.

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**III. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE  
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES**

(Available during the preceding week)

Flag Issue in Panama: Significance in US-Panamanian Relations. SNIE 84-60. 6 September 1960.

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Offshore Islands: Likelihood of Renewed Communist Chinese Military Activity in the Area in the Next Year or so and Consequence of the Loss, Evacuation, or Successful Defense of the Islands. SNIE 43-60. 6 September 1960.

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Chinese Communists Issue Statement on Sino-US  
Ambassadorial Talks

Peiping has used the occasion of the 100th Sino-US ambassadorial meeting, which took place in Warsaw on 6 September, for a long People's Daily editorial blaming US "insincerity" for the fruitlessness of the talks. The editorial says that Peiping harbors no "unrealistic illusions" about the meetings, which have gone on since 1955, indicating that the Chinese do not expect any material results from further negotiations. Peiping argues that "imperialist" states will negotiate seriously and carry out agreements only when compelled to do so by a superior Communist negotiating position.

While Peiping says it will continue the meetings as long as the United States is also willing, it apparently intends to maintain its adamant position on all Sino-US issues. In the editorial the Chinese again assert that they will not renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Strait and reiterate their insistence on an agreement guaranteeing the "equal and reciprocal" exchange of newsmen between the US and China. Peiping has called for such an agreement since the United States said in 1957 that it could not guarantee "reciprocal" admission because of existing laws and regulations. The editorial reasserts the Chinese position that US "nationals" detained in China are rightfully convicted "criminals" and thus not subject to release under the Sino-US agreement of 1955.

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~~SECRET~~Congo Situation

Premier Lumumba's formal request on 8 September for the withdrawal of UN troops stems from his anger over what he sees as UN support for his rival Kasavubu. UN troops, in addition to controlling the radio station and the two Leopoldville airports, are guarding Kasavubu's residence. As a result of the steadily increasing tension, violent incidents may take place between UN forces and supporters of the premier.

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold can be expected to put the whole weight of his office behind his effort to retain the UN troops in the Congo. [In late August, before the Congo crisis had reached its present impasse, he indicated that Lumumba must be "broken." He planned to insist that the UN forces must remain in the Congo to maintain peace and order because the Congolese National Army was incapable of doing so. His aim at that time was to avoid a Security Council resolution calling for withdrawal, arguing that in the absence of such a resolution the UN military presence in the Congo would in effect be endorsed.]

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Radio Moscow followed up its strong support of Lumumba in Kasavubu's attempt to oust the premier with a slashing attack on Hammarskjold and the UN authorities in the Congo. In a widely broadcast commentary on 7 September it charged that they have "grossly contravened" the UN Security Council's resolutions by "openly pursuing an inimical attitude toward the Congo's legal government." Another commentary, based on an Izvestia article, charged that the Western powers, especially the United States, are acting under the "cover" of the United Nations banner and that Hammarskjold has violated his duty by "grossly interfering in the Congo's domestic affairs." Such support presumably encouraged Lumumba in his demands for evacuation of United Nations forces.

In Leopoldville the power struggle between Lumumba and Kasavubu remains unresolved. Lumumba, however, retains the initiative and has reasserted his control over the Congolese legislature. Following the confused session of the lower house on 7 September--

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whose results pro-Lumumba forces are treating as a victory for the premier--Lumumba won unexpected backing from the Senate, which supported the government with a 41-2 vote of confidence. The large number of abstentions and absences in the 78-member house indicates that opponents of Lumumba are unwilling to engage in an open test of strength with the premier.

Sympathy for Kasavubu's moderate position is indicated in the recent activity of army Chief of Staff Mobutu, who apparently is accepted in both the Kasavubu and the Lumumba camps and is highly regarded by Western military observers. Mobutu warned Foreign Minister Bomboko of his impending arrest, thereby enabling Bomboko to escape to the American Embassy and thence to Kasavubu's residence. Mobutu apparently is trying to remove the army from politics and is also concerned over the presence with the army of Soviet mechanics who accompanied the recent shipment of trucks from the USSR.

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense

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The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

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Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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