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(b)(1) (b)(3) *Congo: (Hammarskjold has sent a letter to Kasavubu implying that he will ask the Security Council to take the UN out of the Congo if Mobutu uses force in an attempt to take Orientale Province--still nominally controlled by Antoine Gizenga's (b)(3) "government." Hammarskjold told US officials, however, that he does not expect civil war in the Stanleyville area, since he believes neither Gizenga nor Mobutu is strong enough to force a military showdown. Hammarskjold plans to be in the Congo on 3 and 4 January.] Khrushchev, after a delay of ten days, responded to Gizenga's appeal for support by reiterating Soviet promises of support and sympathy but avoiding any specific commitment of assistance. (Sudan continues to refuse transit to UAR planes bound for Stanleyville, but President Abboud admits that (b)(3) flights over remote areas of the country could probably be made without Sudanese knowledge. (b)(3) ¢ K (b)(1) 27 Dec 60 DAILY BRIEF ii (b)(3) SECRET

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Hammarskjold's Views on Congo

(UN Secretary General Hammarskjold has sent a letter to President Kasavubu implying that he will ask the Security Council to take the UN out of the Congo if Mobutu uses force in an attempt to take Orientale Province--still nominally controlled by the "government" of Antoine Gizenga. On 25 December Lumumba supporters entered adjacent Kivu Province and arrested the governor and several other provincial officials. Mobutu may be expected to take some kind of retaliatory action.

(Hammarskjold told US officials that he does not expect civil war in the Stanleyville area, since he believes that neither Gizenga nor Mobutu is strong enough to force a military showdown. The US ambassador in Leopoldville, however, believes that barring substantial airborne assistance from the bloc or the UAR, economic collapse will come to Orientale Province in two to four weeks, and that there may then be attacks on Europeans and their shops. He points out that since the Europeans are widely scattered throughout the province, it will be very difficult for the UN force to protect them. The Sudan continues to refuse transit to UAR planes bound for Stanleyville, but President Abboud has admitted that planes could overfly remote areas of the country without Sudanese knowledge.

(Hammarskjold, who plans to visit the Congo on 3 and 4 January, hopes soon to get the Guinean troops out of the country, as he considers them Communists for all practical purposes. He does not think that either the UAR or India will withdraw its forces, and he hopes to be able to keep the Moroccan troops in the Congo. The army personnel who returned to Morocco on 25 December were members of a special training mission and not part of the Moroccan UN force.

Soviet Premier Khrushchev, after a delay of ten days, responded to an appeal for support from Gizenga by reiterating promises of Soviet support and sympathy but avoiding any specific commitments for assistance to the Stanleyville group. Moscow may be awaiting the outcome of the Rabat meeting of African leaders, to begin on 3 January, before taking a definite stand toward Gizenga and his rump government.

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