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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

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
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
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*Cyprus: Turkey and Greece appear ready to implement measures to end the crisis, but the Cypriot Government has not yet accepted their solution.

Nicosia is balking at the proposed arrangements for pacification of the island after the withdrawal of the bulk of the mainland Greek troops.

[redacted]

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[redacted] If, however, Ankara becomes convinced that the Makarios government is doubledealing or trying to renege on its commitments, a strong reaction can be expected.

Turkey has not relaxed its high level of military preparedness, and could quickly proceed with its invasion plans if it decided that further negotiations with Cyprus were pointless. [redacted]

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
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*Vietnam:

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North Vietnam: A continuing analysis [redacted] indicates that elements of as many as eight regiments of the North Vietnamese 304th and 320th divisions are currently deploying southward from Military Region 3 in the DRV.

The movement to the south of two division-size North Vietnamese forces is unprecedented. However, it will probably take several months for these deployments to be completed.

Since early November, almost all normal internal communications associated with the 304th and 320th divisions have disappeared. In their stead, at least three new communications groups associated with out-of-country activity have been observed. Two of these have been connected with the 304th Division and the third with the 320th Division.

Of the four regiments subordinate to the 304th Division believed to be moving, one has already been located outside the country. On 29 November it was in the Laos panhandle, some ten miles north of Tchepone. Another was located on 22 November in the western DMZ area, while the remaining two regiments are as yet unlocated.

The four regiments of the 320th Division which are currently moving are all unlocated. There are indications [redacted] however, which suggest that they will deploy through the Laos panhandle.

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A ninth North Vietnamese Army unit--the 31st Regiment of the 341 Infantry Division--has been detected in recent weeks moving southward through the Laos panhandle. When last located on 27 November, it was some 23 miles from the South Vietnamese border near the A Shau Valley--its probable destination.


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It is still too early to determine the ultimate destinations of these units. They may, however, be en route to the two northern provinces of South Vietnam-- Quang Tri and Thua Thien. These units--along with the sizable Communist forces already in this area-- could conceivably be used to mount coordinated offensives from the safety of their sanctuaries in the Demilitarized Zone and the A Shau Valley and adjacent Laos panhandle regions. (Map)

South Vietnam: The continuing heavy pace of enemy attacks in northwestern III Corps indicates that the Communists are placing a high military priority on this region.

[REDACTED] last summer that the enemy might be establishing a major new "front" command group in this area, similar to the DMZ Front and the B-3 Front in the central highlands. The northwestern area of III Corps, like the DMZ and the highlands, provides a battleground with favorable terrain features, nearby out-of-country sanctuaries and access to main supply routes from Cambodia and Laos.

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The Communists may hope to establish main force enclaves in these three areas which will help relieve allied pressure on North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units deployed closer to South Vietnam's population centers along the coast and in the Saigon area.

The recent movement of two new enemy regiments into the northwestern III Corps area--the North Vietnamese 88th from the highlands and the Viet Cong 275th from Phuoc Tuy Province--provides further evidence of Communist intent to dominate this region. At the present time elements of three major enemy units are located here, the Viet Cong 5th and 9th divisions and the North Vietnamese 7th Division.

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Meanwhile, Communist forces have intensified their activity in northern Kontum Province.


A delayed report from the Dak Pek Special Forces camp indicates that a patrol from the camp was badly battered in an enemy ambush on 27 November. [redacted] has located the possible 6th Battalion of the North Vietnamese 24th Regiment just north of the ambush site-- the first evidence of an enemy force in the area since last July.

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On 29 November two South Vietnamese battalions engaged an estimated 500-man enemy force, believed to be subordinate to the North Vietnamese 24th Regiment, nine miles northeast of the US stronghold at Dak To. One hundred thirty enemy were reported killed, while friendly casualties were light. [redacted]

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
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Thailand: The Thai army is moving forcefully to extend its control over counterinsurgency operations in northeast Thailand.



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The army was given greater authority in the northeast in October, although its jurisdiction over nonmilitary aspects of the counterinsurgency program is still under discussion in Bangkok. It appears that army leaders are anxious to assert at least nominal authority over development programs, although they will probably leave the day-to-day direction to civilians.



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In any case, the army clearly intends to adopt tough tactics against the insurgents.



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
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Egypt: Nasir's position on future Israeli use of the Suez Canal apparently is not as uncompromising as originally reported.

A fuller translation of Nasir's speech of 23 November shows that he linked eventual Israeli use of the Suez Canal with a settlement of the original Palestine question. Cairo thus appears to be standing on its previous position that Israel would be allowed some use of the canal if a "just" settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem were arranged.

Cairo has been making an effort to stress the moderate aspects of Nasir's remarks. During a press conference in Cairo on 26 November, a government spokesman denied that Nasir was a "war peddler." He asserted that Egypt is making a "serious, honest effort" to reach a political solution, and is giving serious thought to the recent UN Security Council resolution on the Middle East.



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
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
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
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
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India: There has been no let up in the political crisis in West Bengal. The new Congress-backed government suffered a setback on 29 November when parliamentary maneuvering by the ousted United Front coalition blocked a confidence vote. Although New Delhi insists that the state government will stay on, it is not clear how the new leadership hopes to get a legislative mandate. Mob violence has erupted again in Calcutta, but police--if necessary with the help of alerted army units-- should be able to contain it.

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