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DIRECTORATE OF
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*PRCS -
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Central Intelligence Bulletin

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
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
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3 Nov 67 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

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*South Vietnam: The third Communist assault within four days against allied positions at Loc Ninh in northern Binh Long Province was repelled with heavy enemy losses.

The two-pronged attack, conducted on 2 November, was broken off with the help of heavy allied artillery and mortar fire. The Communists suffered a reported 238 killed in the assault, raising their losses over the past five days in this area to nearly 850. Friendly casualties during the same period total 25 killed, including eight Americans, and 118 (32 US) wounded.

Although the repeated enemy attacks around Loc Ninh suggest a determined effort to overrun the allied positions, enemy positioning in Binh Long and immediately adjacent areas suggests that the enemy strategy may be to draw in and tie down allied forces in another sparsely populated border stronghold. Elements of three divisions are in the area, and they may be willing to take substantial casualties in large-scale combat if they can attract allied forces away from the populated coastal regions and thus relieve the pressure there.

Recent enemy actions in the delta and along the central coast suggest that the Communists are using tactics designed to reduce the effectiveness of friendly reaction forces and create a maximum psychological impact upon the population. The latest example of these tactics occurred on 2 November in the southern coastal area of Quang Nam Province when the enemy conducted a series of simultaneous, widespread attacks and harassments on US troops and Vietnamese villages. Allied losses in these actions were ten US Marines and nine Vietnamese civilians killed compared with only four enemy known killed.

The North Vietnamese 2nd Division is apparently withdrawing from contact and moving into the highlands of south-central Quang Nam Province. In the past two months, the subordinate regiments of the 2nd Division

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are believed to have been the most active enemy units in South Vietnam. The approximately 2,000 killed the enemy is believed to have sustained in clashes with allied forces may have forced it to withdraw into the highlands to regroup and possibly receive reinforcements. Last week the 3rd Regiment of the division appeared to have been caught in a vulnerable position on the Quang Nam coastal plain. [redacted] this unit apparently has extricated itself and joined the rest of the division. [redacted]

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
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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

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*Congo (Kinshasa): There is no firm information on the invasion of Katanga by white mercenaries and their African hangers-on.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the invaders entered the country from Angola via Dilolo, seized a train and set out in the direction of Lubumbashi. By late yesterday, they had seized the rail stations at Kayembe and Tshianda, approximately 70 miles west of the town of Kolwezi.

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Meanwhile, Katangan governor Paluku ordered a stretch of tracks west of Kolwezi torn up to impede the invaders long enough for Congolese troops to ambush them before they can reach the town.

There is little chance that either civil authorities or Congolese troops will be able to mount an effective defense. The army may take reprisals against whites in the area.

However, unlike last July when it broadcast inflammatory accounts of a "foreign invasion" and exhorted the populace to defend itself, Radio Kinshasa seems to be fairly restrained. Moreover, Paluku appears to be more reasonable than his predecessor and may be successful in keeping the army under control. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (Map)

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Israel-Syria-Jordan: Continued Arab terrorism increases the likelihood of strong Israeli action against Syria and Jordan.

A clash between Arab terrorists and Israeli border police on 30 October was the eleventh incident of the month along the border with Jordan. In at least two of these incidents, Jordanian military units apparently used machine-gun fire to cover the retreat of infiltrators to the East Bank. Such acts, although probably not condoned by Amman, could provide the Israelis with a pretext for striking at Jordan.

While the Israelis would probably strike at what they believe to be terrorist centers in Jordan and Syria, they might also strike at military bases near Damascus. An Israeli raid against Jordan probably would increase the pressure on King Husayn to abandon his moderate stance and acquiesce in extremist policies toward Israel. A tougher tone in his dealings with the US might also result.

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
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Peru: A growing financial crisis may add to President Belaunde's political problems.

Widespread lack of confidence in the government's ability to resolve economic problems has caused a run on central bank foreign exchange reserves and further devaluation of the currency may be necessary. Such a move would be politically unpopular and increase the likelihood of renewed labor protests over the rising cost of living--some ten percent between 1 September and 15 October.

One such protest has already been scheduled. The nation-wide government employees' union has declared it will go on an indefinite national strike on 4 November if the government does not grant its demand for salary increases. If the strike comes off, it probably will be supported by leftist-led unions dissatisfied with the amount of the recent pay increases.

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Cambodia - Communist China: Prince Sihanouk has responded favorably to Peking's latest effort to ease its relations with Cambodia.

Sihanouk announced on 1 November that he had received a message from Premier Chou En-lai calling for the "reestablishment of sincere friendship" between the two countries. According to Sihanouk, Chou acknowledged Sihanouk's leadership of the Cambodian people and reaffirmed China's adherence to the "Bandung principle" of nonintervention in Cambodia's internal affairs. Sihanouk has charged repeatedly over the past several months that China's propaganda activities in Cambodia amounted to a repudiation of such "principles."

Chou's letter may have been sent in an effort to head off any move by Sihanouk to carry out his recent threat to cut off Chinese aid. It appears to be a more artful version of one he sent in mid-September which caused Sihanouk to reverse a decision to withdraw Cambodian diplomatic personnel from Peking. Although that letter played effectively on Sihanouk's personal regard for Chou, its wording did not allay Sihanouk's suspicions.

The Prince now states that he is willing to terminate anti-Peking propaganda and compose his differences with China. He also implied, however, that a reconciliation will depend on a cessation of Communist activity in Cambodia. The continuing dissemination of Communist propaganda in the countryside and a reported renewal of small-scale Communist dissident activity may prove to be a persistent irritant.

At any rate, Sihanouk's response to Chou's gesture underlines his desire to maintain at least a facade of cordial relations with China, particularly at a time when international attention is focused on Mrs. Kennedy's visit.

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NOTES

USSR: The Soviets have resumed passing satellite weather data to the US. Weather information from Cosmos 184, launched on 24 October, was received yesterday after a month and a half lapse in transmissions. The pictures were not transmitted within six hours of the time they were taken, as the US-Soviet weather exchange agreement specifies, and some were of low quality.

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Turkey: Violence may occur during today's scheduled public funeral for three leaders in the former Menderes regime who were executed and buried in a prison cemetery after the 1960 revolution. [redacted]

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[redacted] Emotions could run high during the funeral. Although any incident could snowball rapidly, available security forces should be able to maintain control. [redacted]

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