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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

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19 December 1967

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
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
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*South Vietnam: A captured enemy document indicates that the North Vietnamese may undertake a major military effort this winter in the heavily populated coastal sections of I and II Corps.

The enemy document also suggests that the North Vietnamese may launch diversionary attacks in the Con Thien area; however, the principal thrust will occur farther south in the enemy's Military Region 5 and the Tri-Thien-Hue military region.

A recent build-up of enemy units south of Quang Tri city, the movement of elements of the 304th North Vietnamese Division into the Laos panhandle west of Khe Sanh, and the movement of the 31st North Vietnamese Regiment into the A Shau Valley southeast of Hue, lends some credence to the strategy alluded to in the captured document.

If such is the enemy intention, the design would be to bring the war closer to South Vietnam's population centers and to create yet another battle sector in which to pin down allied forces and disrupt pacification efforts.

Diversionary military activity in the Demilitarized Zone area probably would consist for the most part of rocket and artillery fire against allied strongpoints as the weather improves in January and February.

In the highlands area, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] at least two elements of the North Vietnamese B-3 Front have moved southward to Darlac and Phuoc Long provinces near the Cambodian border.

The units involved have not yet been identified. They could be logistics units sent to help infiltrate men and materials to points farther south, or they could be

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fighting units shifting from the western highlands to northern III Corps. The North Vietnamese 88th Regiment moved to III Corps from the highlands late last summer. [redacted]

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Communist China: [The regime's recent efforts to reopen schools have broken down in many areas.]

[With few exceptions, schools at all levels were closed in June 1966 to release students for full time participation in the Cultural Revolution. In September and October 1967 the regime tried a variety of programs to get students to curb their disorderly "revolutionary" activities and return to school.]

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[few schools actually have resumed classes.]

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[Some major institutions, such as the large elite universities in Peking, show no signs of even attempting to resume classes.]

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[Many schools which did try to reopen were soon forced to close because of fighting among Red Guard factions. For example, the important Huanan Technical College in Canton opened on 28 November, but was closed nine days later when army troops were called in to stop student clashes. The same thing happened at the Wuhsi College of Light Industry in East China in mid-November.]

[It is now apparent that Peking, in ordering schools to reopen, failed to provide specific guidance on curriculum, textbooks, qualifications for new students, and authority of teachers. There has not even been an attempt to restore vandalized school facilities in many areas. As a result, the real situation contrasts sharply with Peking's propaganda, which tries to convey the impression that classes are gradually resuming everywhere.]

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
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[The chances are slim that the Peking leadership can impel warring student factions to resume class-work before settling its own problems. The regime's failure to follow through on last fall's educational program suggests that top leaders are fully occupied with more pressing issues. [redacted]

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
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Rumania-USSR: Major differences remain between the two countries in the wake of the official visit to Moscow on 14-15 December of Rumanian party and state chief Ceausescu.

The communiqué ending the visit noted that the two merely "exchanged opinions" on the implementation of existing economic and trade agreements, one of the major issues believed to be dividing them. At the Rumanian national party conference on 6 December, Ceausescu, alluding to the USSR, charged that long-term economic agreements are sometimes not fully carried out in practice.

On other topics, such as Vietnam and Germany, the communiqué's language did not commit the Rumanians to support specific Soviet positions. In addition, the communiqué failed to mention the Middle East or an international Communist meeting, suggesting differences continue on these matters.

The only agreement apparently reached was that a Soviet party and government delegation will pay an official visit to Rumania "in 1968."

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Yemen: Premier al-Aini, who had been absent from the country for some weeks, is reported to have resigned yesterday.

He has recommended that General Hasan al-Amri, the chief of staff, be asked to form a new cabinet. The resignation may reflect Egyptian pressure, since Nasir has long disliked al-Aini. A former ambassador to Washington, al-Aini is considered a liberal as well as an intellectual in Yemeni circles. His resignation will give conservative military and tribal elements a freer hand in the republican government.

Meanwhile, there has been little change in the military situation, and sporadic royalist pressure on a number of republican positions continues. [redacted]

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USSR - Eastern Europe: The meeting of European Communist foreign ministers in Warsaw today is the fourth such attempt to put on a show of unified Communist support for the Arabs since the June war. The Soviets, who welcome any such opportunity to draw their European allies together, probably arranged the gathering. Moscow may want to stiffen the resolve of some of the European states who are only lukewarm toward backing the Arabs, particularly with material support. Soviet involvement in Yemen, a new element in the picture since the last meeting in September, will be the most topical of the current issues under discussion.




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Dahomey: The new provisional government headed by Major Kouandete seems likely to be weak and ineffectual. The eight military men who dominate it have no political experience and probably will soon split along regional lines. Lt. Col. Alley, who was detained briefly, probably remains a power and may continue as chief of staff.

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