


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
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
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
Congo (Kinshasa): Mobutu may seek compromise on mercenaries now in Rwanda. (Page 4)



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*Vietnam:

South Vietnam: The Lower House of the National Assembly has decided to draft its own mobilization law and has asked the government to restrict implementation of the present law until a new one is promulgated.

This decision by the Lower House on 6 January goes far beyond the action of the Upper House which merely requested restrictions and clarification of the present government decree. Although the new bill may be drafted within the next few days, approval may well be delayed until the start of the next regular session of the Lower House in April.

There are indications in communications intelligence that the Communists may soon launch new attacks in northwestern III Corps.

Reconnaissance elements of the Viet Cong 9th Division, which in the past have been active prior to and during major 9th Division offensives, have been located three miles west of An Loc, capital of Binh Long Province. The division's 273rd Regiment has recently been moving westward to a position 15 miles east of the city. Although the two other regiments of the 9th suffered heavy casualties in recent fighting in northwestern Tay Ninh Province, the division has shown remarkable resilience in recent months and continues to pose a serious threat.

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[Seaborne cargo delivered to North Vietnam during December totaled about 128,400 tons. This was equal to the monthly average during the first half of 1967 and approximately 38,000 tons above the average for the preceding five months. Food deliveries constituted about one third of the total and brought food deliveries for the year to 447,000 tons. Only 55,000 tons of food-stuffs were imported during all of 1966.]

[Hanoi exported 41,400 tons by sea during December, mostly coal. This was significantly less than the average tonnage exported in the first half of 1967.]

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Communist China - US: [Peking is apparently seeking to return Sino-US ambassadorial meetings to the less strident tone which prevailed prior to the Cultural Revolution excesses of last summer.]

[Ambassador Gronouski reports that at the meeting in Warsaw on 8 January the Chinese representative spoke "sharply," but was generally polite. In contrast with the encounter last June, the Chinese made only one reference to Mao and no references to Mao's "thought." The language of the Chinese statement was comparatively inoffensive and it did not take a particularly belligerent or provocative line.]

[The Chinese reverted to Peking's standard position that US "occupation" of Taiwan is the principal obstacle to improvement in Sino-US relations. At the meeting last June Ambassador Wang had stressed the idea that hostility between China and the US was mainly a result of the Vietnam war, and of US opposition to "world revolution" in general.]

[At the latest meeting the Chinese chargé, substituting for Wang who is in China, made no polemical statements concerning Vietnam. Although he asserted that the US was "clamoring" for hot pursuit into China, he issued no specific warning about the Chinese response, noting only that if the US should expand the war it would meet "thorough and ignominious defeat."]

[Ambassador Gronouski commented that the chargé was obviously somewhat ill at ease and adhered so closely to his prepared text that he delivered rebuttals to points that had not been raised by Gronouski.]

[The Chinese agreed to another meeting on 29 May, but gave no assurance that they would be represented by an ambassador at that time.] [REDACTED]

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Congo (Kinshasa): President Mobutu may be seeking a compromise on the problem of the mercenaries now in Rwanda.

Several recent reports suggest that Mobutu is growing tired of the mercenary problem and would be glad to see the mercenaries out of Africa permanently. According to Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko, Mobutu plans to recommend that the OAU special subcommittee authorize Rwanda to repatriate most of the mercenaries. Mobutu might still press for the extradition of five or six leaders including Lt. Col. Schramme.

Rwandan President Kayibanda, however, would probably be reluctant to go along with a proposal under which any mercenary would be extradited to the Congo.

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