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31 May 1958

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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31 MAY 1958

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR resumes missile tests on Kapustin Yar 950-mile range.

①

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Lebanon - New rebel military threat developing in south.

②

Cairo continues efforts to increase Egyptian influence in Morocco.


③

French military leaders in Algeria hope to continue public safety committees.

④


Tunisians, expecting their appeal to UN will have little effect, fear French attack.

⑤



III. THE WEST

⑥ France - De Gaulle's investiture vote awaits caucus of Socialist deputies and formation of cabinet.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

31 May 1958

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

no
Soviet missile activity: The USSR has apparently resumed testing 950-nautical-mile missiles on the Kanish-Yar test range. [redacted]

[redacted] the first such missile launching on this range since August 1957 occurred on 27 May.

[redacted] (Page 1) (Map)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

no
 * Lebanon: A new military threat to the government may be developing in the southern part of the country, where rebels have been reported forming into large bands with the ultimate aim of attacking the ports of Sidon and Tyre. Sidon is the terminus of the American-owned pipeline from Saudi Arabia, and the pipeline company is making preparations to evacuate families of its employees. Political maneuvering, both internal and international, continues on behalf of the government and the opposition. The Arab League council was scheduled to meet in Benghazi, Libya, on 31 May to consider the Lebanese Government's complaint of foreign intervention. [redacted] (Page 2)

no
Watch Committee conclusion -- Middle East: A deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Middle East is considered unlikely in the near future. However, serious incidents are likely to recur. In Lebanon the continuing crisis represents a grave threat to the nation as presently constituted. There

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is evidence of increasing intervention by UAR irregulars and of the infiltration of considerable quantities of UAR arms. There is, however, no evidence of UAR intention to interfere with regular military forces, a step which may not be required for UAR purposes. Lebanese armed forces have not been employed to the extent of their capabilities. Available evidence does not indicate an intention by the Soviet bloc or by Israel to become militarily involved. (TOP SECRET) [redacted]

no
Watch Committee conclusion -- Indonesia: Significant numbers of Soviet bloc arms and technicians are continuing to arrive in Indonesia. There are no developments indicating a Sino-Soviet bloc intention to become directly involved in military operations in Indonesia. The situation continues to favor local Communist and Sino-Soviet bloc exploitation. (TOP SECRET) [redacted]

no in Thursday's [unclear]
UAR-Morocco: Cairo is continuing its efforts to achieve a special position in North Africa. The Nasir government is investigating the purchase of a Moroccan radio station as an outlet for its propaganda and is attempting to establish a branch of the Egyptian-controlled Middle East News Agency at Rabat. [redacted] (Page 4)

no
* Algeria: At least some French leaders in Algeria intend to keep the committees of public safety functioning after the anticipated installation of a De Gaulle government in Paris. The committees would be used to "support" De Gaulle, and probably to press the campaign of "reconciliation" with the Algerian Moslems, to which local leaders assign a high priority. [redacted]

[redacted] stressed the "absolute necessity" of stepping up terrorism in all centers where Moslems have participated in demonstrations supporting the new regime in Algeria. [redacted] (Page 5)

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DAILY BRIEF

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no * Tunisia: The Tunisian UN delegation, which has demanded an urgent Security Council hearing of Tunisia's complaint against France, concedes that council action could have only limited effectiveness but states that its government had no other recourse. Tunisian officials claim that French units from Algeria entered Tunisia on 27 May, and that French naval units are standing off Tunisia's eastern coast. The Tunisian order that all French civilian residents turn in their arms--including some 3,000 covered by permit--is likely to create new incidents. (SECRET NOFORN) (Page 7)

no Watch Committee conclusion --North Africa: The Tunisian situation remains explosive. A serious incident could lead to the internationalization of the crisis. No evidence is available of Soviet bloc efforts to exploit the current crisis in North Africa, except in propaganda. (TOP SECRET)

III. THE WEST

no * France: General De Gaulle's parliamentary investiture still awaits a caucus of Socialist deputies as well as the general's own formation of a cabinet. He is apparently trying to include both party leaders and technical experts in his cabinet. The Communists are not expected to protest his investiture by violent means. (SECRET NOFORN) (Page 8)

IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

no Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 66-58. The Outlook for the Philippine Republic. 27 May 1958. (SECRET)

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC


Resumption of Missile Testing on Kapustin Yar 950-mile Range

[redacted]
[redacted] a ballistic missile was probably launched on 27 May 1958 to the 950-1,000 nautical-mile impact area of the Kapustin Yar missile test range. This is believed to be the first missile fired to this impact area since the series of seven launchings noted from June to August 1957. [redacted]
[redacted]

Since 15 May, eight practice countdowns have been conducted involving facilities in this impact area, probably for the purpose of testing communications, instrumentation, and range coordination preparatory to the recent firing. [redacted]
[redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Lebanese Situation

The principal military action from 28 to 30 May appears to have centered in southern Lebanon, according to the American military attaché in Beirut. Two groups of rebel partisans, possibly numbering as many as 4,000, were preparing to attack villages in their vicinity, possibly as a preliminary to a march on the ports of Tyre and Sidon. Officials of the American Tapline Company, whose oil terminal is in Sidon, feel the security situation there is so precarious that families of their employees should evacuate.

Rebels holding strong points in Tripoli have also become more aggressive and have made some small sorties against the security forces. However, there has been no significant change in the situation there, and other northern areas are reported relatively calm. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the strategic importance of the northern Lebanese town of Halba, and suggested that if the rebels could hold this town, they might develop a secession movement in the north. [REDACTED] such a movement would be useful for general propaganda abroad, and for argument in the United Nations Security Council.

Internal political activity still appears to center around army commander in chief General Shihab. About 25 May, [REDACTED] Taki al-Din al-Sulh, Prime Minister Sami al-Sulh's nephew, who has been in Egyptian pay, approached Shihab with the proposition that the general become "vice president," exercising effective power while Chamoun takes a trip abroad. As there is no constitutional provision for a vice president in Lebanon, it is not clear how this scheme would be worked out. [REDACTED]

A possible moderation of the opposition demand for Chamoun's resignation has been noted since the government's

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announcement that it would not seek to amend the constitution--an implicit abandonment of Chamoun's second-term ambitions. One pro-UAR opposition leader, Husayn Uwayni, has stated he would now be willing to serve as prime minister under Chamoun if the President would restrict himself in effect to a figurehead role. Uwayni claimed he would have the concurrence of other opposition leaders in such a move. Chamoun, however, said on 28 May he is still determined to fight to the end and remain in office for the expiration of his term "with or without Western support." [redacted]

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~Egyptian Activities in Morocco

Cairo is continuing its efforts to expand its influence in North Africa. Despite Morocco's recent threat to retaliate if antimonarchist propaganda did not cease, Colonel Hassan Fahmy, believed to be responsible for UAR intelligence and propaganda activities in Morocco, is reported to be investigating the purchase of a radio station to serve as an outlet for Egyptian propaganda and is helping a representative of the Egyptian-controlled Middle East News Agency establish a branch office at Rabat.

Fahmy is said to be interested in acquiring the broadcasting facilities of the Pan American Broadcasting System, which is one third American-owned and operates the smallest commercial station in Tangier. Local broadcasting facilities would supplement Radio Cairo, which is widely popular throughout North Africa. Fahmy is reported to be a close personal friend of Moroccan Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, an association which should facilitate his activities.

Some Moroccans believe that if Nasir makes his long considered visit to Madrid, he may offer his good offices to reduce Spanish-Moroccan difficulties. Although many Moroccans, including Istiqlal leaders, admire Nasir for his accomplishments in the Middle East, they are likely to be less than enthusiastic should he offer his services as an arbiter in North Africa.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Situation in Algeria

An attempt will apparently be made by some leaders in Algeria to perpetuate the joint military-civilian public safety committees established throughout Algeria since 13 May. Leon Delbecque, one of the original instigators of the Algerian "insurrection" and an influential civilian member of the all-Algeria committee, told a press conference on 29 May that the committees, formed only to bring De Gaulle to power, would continue to function in support of the anticipated De Gaulle government. Delbecque said he believed these organizations would be dissolved if De Gaulle so ordered, but made it clear that in any case he thought it desirable for the army to continue in the political role it has openly assumed in Algeria since mid-May.

[redacted] a continuing role, at least for a while, for the committees as "leaders of public opinion" and instruments for "burning away the past" and "transforming into reality" the Algiers junta's much-publicized offer to Algerian Moslems of "full integration." Whatever their function, continued existence of the committees would inevitably perpetuate to some extent the present greatly expanded influence in the Algerian administration of the local Europeans, who predominate in their memberships.

Meanwhile, the Algiers leaders are anxiously awaiting clarification of De Gaulle's views on their integration program, which, as they envisage it, would treat Algeria as a French province. There is manifest concern over past De Gaulle statements which seemingly favor some type of federal status for the area. However, junta leaders are outwardly professing confidence that the general either has recently altered his views or soon will recognize the "validity" of their arguments. Local pressures for some such program--or at least against any alternative which might lead to negotiations with the Moslem rebels of the National

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Liberation Front (FLN)--have now become so intense that the American consul general in Algiers doubts whether even the envisaged De Gaulle regime could overcome them.

For its part, the FLN appears disturbed by the possible effects of the local integration campaign on noncombatant Moslems, and determined to discourage further Moslem participation in demonstrations hailing the "new French Algeria."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stressed to rebel field units the "absolute necessity to retort in all centers where demonstrations have taken place" and stated that "terrorist action is more necessary than ever to show the people we are present and will continue the struggle."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~The Tunisian Situation

The Tunisian delegation at the United Nations insists that its government had no other recourse but an appeal to the UN following the second French attack in a week on the remote outpost of Remada in southern Tunisia. Tunisian officials claim French ground units from Algeria entered Tunisia on 27 May, and that French naval vessels are standing off the eastern coast. France has replied to the Tunisian action at the UN by asking that its complaint of 14 February against Tunisia be revived, stating that Tunisia has disrupted the modus vivendi established at that time.

President Bourguiba is reported embittered because the French air force bombardment of Remada on 25 May has not aroused editorial and official commentary in the United States similar to the French attack on Sakiet Sidi Youssef on 8 February, and because there has been no official American declaration firmly supporting the Tunisian Government in this crisis. Tunisian officials displayed fragments of bombs to the American ambassador which they claim were from Remada and were of American manufacture.

[redacted] after the first clash at Remada, there was danger that Tunisian civilians would attack French military establishments, but [redacted] had been able to maintain control. [redacted] the Neo-Destour party was carefully organizing well-policed demonstrations as outlets for the public's emotions. Except for a report that a French civilian was roughed up during a demonstration on 28 May, there apparently have been no attacks on French residents. However the Tunisian order that all French residents turn in their arms--including about 3,000 which are authorized by permits--is likely to create new incidents. (SECRET NOFORN)

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III. THE WEST

The French Crisis (Information as of 0100)

The time for General De Gaulle's investiture vote has not yet been set, pending the outcome of Socialist party deliberations and the completion of his cabinet list. Socialist leader Mollet's efforts on behalf of the general apparently encountered heavier opposition than anticipated in the intermittent meetings of the Socialist deputies on 30 May.

The new cabinet, according to one press report, will consist of 14 political leaders and ten technical experts drawn from industry and labor. De Gaulle apparently hopes to achieve a semblance of "national unity" by including as "political counselors" the leaders of the three largest non-Communist parties. His ability to win the support of the labor leaders remains in some doubt; they have been even more critical of him than left-of-center political leaders.

De Gaulle has agreed to a six-month tenure of office, a term which may be renewed on its expiration. During this period, he is expected to send parliament on vacation while a new constitution is prepared. There is speculation that he may make a personal visit to Algeria immediately after his investiture.

Earlier fears that De Gaulle's investiture would lead to Communist-inspired violence have largely disappeared. The Communist-dominated General Labor Confederation on 29 May issued a communiqué which reasserts the organization's opposition to De Gaulle, but stops short of a call to action.
(SECRET NOFORN)

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