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24 March 1958

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
# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN




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### **TOP SECRET**

Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03177783



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 March 1958

#### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR - possible suspension of nuclear tests: The USSR may be preparing to announce some form of suspension of nuclear tests. In early March Khrushchev told a Western official that the Soviet Union was going to stop testing and production of thermonuclear weapons, and the Soviet ambassador to Vienna recently told Chancellor Raab that Moscow would soon announce suspension of nuclear weapons tests. The tempo of Soviet nuclear tests in the first three months of 1958 has been the highest yet observed.

Kremlin leaders probably feel that unilateral action—which could later be reversed if the other nuclear powers fail to follow suit—would have a tremendous psychological impact. They may also believe that it would undercut Western efforts to enforce any ban on tests through an inspection system.

(Page 1)

Soviet nuclear tests continue: The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee issued the following statement at 1600 22 March:

The Atomic Energy Detection System has reported that an explosion occurred at 0750 hours GMT (0250 EST) on 22 March 1958, in the vicinity of Semipalatinsk.

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This test is the third since 20 March, activity having been divided between the Novava Zemlva and Semipalatingk proving grounds.

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#### ASIA-AFRICA TT

z (c)	remains fluid, have the upper advantage. Th Bukittinggi are that the Russia in Djakarta car	The military state but central gover hand in that area eir main objective in Central Suman merchant ships ried small arms.	nment forces and to be pr e, however, atra. There which recen	s appear to essing their is the Padang- are reports
s R	commander of Syria removes influential in Sy with Egypt and that he had sus by 'outside for	he resignation of the United Arab F the last of the pr yrian politics at t reflects Nasir's f pected pro-Soviet ces," and when B he issue of army	Republic First ominent pro- he time of the firm control, t Bizri of besi izri submitte	st Army in Soviet Syrians Se recent union Nasir claims Se controlled Sed a hasty res-
Mindiete Entrelandensen Grad Hi	for a second co He says that he as a counter to that he is awar	President Cham ensecutive term notes is providing arm Moslems armed that a major cond army should be	nay lead to cons to Christi by Syria and onflict may do	ivil disorder. an elements I Egypt and evelop. The handling any
T. C.	in the 4 May el sembly. The tunable to resol dates in the fie working hard.	he Communists collections for 21 never woo leading conserve their difference avoiding controvers of Buddhism, ons.	w seats in the rvative partices and still nists, in con ersial issues	e National As- es have been have 53 candi- trast, have been , and are posing
	94 Man 50	DAILV RI	शहर	ii

24 Mar 58

Japan - Taiwan - Communist China: The Chinese Nationalist Government may take further action to pressure Tokyo to deny any Chinese Communist trade delegation the right to fly Peiping's flag in Japan. Such action might include an attempt to promote a boycott by pro-Nationalist Overseas Chinese of Japanese goods and attempts to seize Japanese shipping bound for Communist China.

(Page 6)

#### III. THE WEST

De Gaulle - USSR: Efforts to foster an understanding between General De Gaulle on the one hand and the French Communist party and Moscow on the other appear to be under way in France. Soviet ambassador Vinogradov has been active in this respect, and a leading Gaullist has tried to sound out the French Communist party. De Gaulle has frequently proclaimed his hostility to Communism. The French Communist party, however, might see his return as precipitating a popular front, and Moscow may see possibilities of weakening NATO and facilitating a French-Soviet rapprochement. (Page 7)

Haiti: There are indications that an attempt to oust the weak Duvalier government may be made shortly by a combination of Duvalier's political rivals and former army strong man Kebreau. Dominican dictator Trujillo may be involved in the plot, which could result in considerable bloodshed. (Page 8)

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DAILY BRIEF

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#### LATE ITEM

\*Saudi Arabia: Mecca radio's announcement on 22 March that King Saud had granted "full powers" to Crown Prince Faysal in formulating and executing domestic, foreign, and financial policies of the Saudi Arabian Govern-/ K ment indicates that the King has yielded to family pressure to relinquish his highly centralized authority. Exercise of greater influence by Faysal would probably result in a relaxation of tensions with the United Arab Republic and in a more critical approach to relations with the United States.

(Page 9)

24 Mar 58

DAILY BRIEF

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#### U I. THE COMMUNIST BLO


#### Moscow Hinting Unilateral Suspension of Nuclear Tests

In early March Khrushchev told a Western ambassador that the Soviet Union was going to stop producing and testing thermonuclear weapons since its present bomb design "functioned perfectly" and it "already had enough to blow up the world." He added that tests of "normal bombs" would be continued. The Soviet party chief, in a speech on 14 March, predicted that public pressures will eventually force governments to undertake unilateral stoppage of weapons manufacture. The Soviet ambassador to Austria recently told Chancellor Raab that the USSR will make a unilateral declaration suspending nuclear tests.

While such statements might be deliberately designed to "soften" the current Western position on disarmament, there are certain factors including impending United States tests including thermonuclear weapons which make a unilateral Soviet suspension of thermonuclear tests particularly timely. The current series of Soviet thermonuclear tests has been conducted at a rapid pace, and achievement of the immediate objectives of the USSR's thermonuclear weapons development program may be imminent. The Kremlin probably estimates that the public impact of its demonstrations over the past six months in the field of weapons systems would eliminate any appearance of military weakness which a unilateral action might otherwise suggest.

A major advantage, from the Soviet point of view, of a unilateral declaration in the nuclear weapons field would be to undercut Western efforts to enforce a suspension of tests or weapons manufacture through an inspection system. Soviet leaders probably believe that a test suspension would also have a heavy impact in Britain, where the Labor party is advocating a temporary test suspension and some of its members are publicly demanding a complete halt in nuclear weapons production.

Such a declaration would require a dramatic setting. The most obvious occasion would be the convening of the new Supreme Soviet, which has been hurriedly called for 27 March.



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### II. ASIA-AFRICA

## Situation in Indonesia

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to encounte reinforcen	ral government forces in North Sumatra continue er dissident resistance in the Medan area, but nents have arrived, and the government appears
to hold the	advantage,
mishes" w	heavy loses are being inflicted in 'skir- ith the dissidents and that government casualties light.
of Sumatra appear to h Col. Gahan Gaharu rep reached an	while, the Atjehnese in the northern-most area, who have long been in revolt against Djakarta, have made deals with both the dissidents and Lt. ru, the local pro-government army commander. Donted on 15 March, for instance, that he had agreement with the Atjehnese for the mainthe the truce which has existed since June 1957.
reported re reluctantly of aiding D under two o hills" and i	ident commander Hussein in Central Sumatra is elieving officers in his command who are only supporting his movement or who are suspected jakarta. A group of army troops and police of these officers has already moved "into the is generally understood to have declared itself lissident movement.
permission	Indonesian ambassador in Moscow has requested from Djakarta to grant visas for 36 Soviet pilots 4 aircraft to Indonesia,
of unidentif April.	The request probably refers to a ferry flight ied aircraft which has been arranged for early
<del>-</del> -	
There	e have been reports that the recently arrived
merchant s	hips purchased from the Soviet Union carried
small arms	The Indonesian Government,
	however continued,
ohomma Alesk	however, continues to refute the
charge that	it has made any direct purchases of arms from
the USSR.	
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Lt. Gen. Afif Bizri submitted his resignation in a

#### Nasir Accepts Bizri's Resignation

"huff" over Cairo's insistence on overseeing the appoint-
ment of personnel under his command in the United Arab
Republic's First Army in Syria,
Bizri, the last of the prominent pro-Soviet Syrians, had used the tactic before, but this time Nasir quickly accepted and announced it in the Cairo press without Bizri's knowledge.
Nasir is also reported to have stated that he had given Bizri many chances to "prove himself" following the union of Egypt and Syria, but he believed Bizri was controlled by "outside forces." He added that he had determined earlier to dispense with Bizri, and took advantage of this opportunity.
It was generally believed that Nasir would not allow Bizri to remain in any prominent position for long and his recent promotion to lieutenant general and command of the First Army was considered a "kick upstairs." The fact that he forced the resignation at this time demonstrates Nasir's confidence that his authority in the military and political affairs of the new union is absolute.

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#### Lebanese Internal Crisis Approaching

Opponents of Lebanese President Chamoun are predicting "bloody civil war" if he tries in May to push through parliament a constitutional amendment allowing him to run for a second consecutive term as president. These opponents, known as the "Third Force" and including Christians as well as Moslems, are reported to have prepared an ultimatum to be presented to Chamoun on 27 March. They argue that the president's withdrawal would strip anti-Western and pro-Nasir extremists of their best campaign issue. If Chamoun refuses to withdraw, the group plans to call a general strike which would end in violence. Chamoun has stated that as a counter to Egyptian and Syrian arming of Moslems in Lebanon, he is providing friendly Christian elements with weapons.

Chamoun, who appears to believe that Lebanon's pro-Western orientation can be preserved only by his continuance in office, is conducting his campaign in a manner deliberately calculated to portray his opposition as enemies of the traditional pro-Christian character of Lebanon. His objective is to make the Christians believe that their survival depends on his retaining the presidency.

While there is a good possibility of civil disturbances in the next few weeks, widespread open conflict is not likely. The gendarmerie and army could cope with local outbreaks, and Christian-Moslem strife probably would be averted by the intervention of army chief General Fuad Shihab, who might take over the government for an interim period pending new parliamentary elections. A similar situation arose in 1952, when President Khuri was forced to resign.

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# Communists in Laos May Make Good Showing in May Elections

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma estimates that the Communist-dominated Neo Lao Hak Zat party (NLHZ) will win from four to eight seats in the critical 4 May national elections for 21 new National Assembly seats. Unless the two main conservative parties—the Nationalist and Independent—are able to compose their present differences, the prospects are that the Communists will do even better.

The winning of five seats by the NLHZ would be regarded in Laos as a good showing for a party so recently organized. Victory in ten or more constituencies would be considered an upset and put the Communists in a strong position to demand greater participation in the government. It would also greatly enhance their prospects in the 1959 elections for all 60 assembly seats.

The NLHZ is pressing its campaign with zeal. It is attempting to pose as the true champion of Buddhism, the crown, and established Laotian traditions. Except for its strong advocacy of neutralism, it is avoiding controversial issues and de-emphasizing its Communist complexion.

The Nationalists and Independents who were supposed to have agreed to the formation of a consolidated slate by 1 April still have 53 candidates in the field. Moreover, a meeting of party leaders on 21 March to work out a joint propaganda campaign, establish provisional headquarters, and devise methods of popularizing candidates ended in failure

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#### Chinese Nationalists May Take Further Action Against Japan

Nationalist China's Foreign Minister George Yeh has informed Ambassador Drumright that he is under "increasing pressure" to step up retaliatory measures against Japan designed to prevent the flying of Peiping's flag by a Communist Chinese trade delegation in Japan. Yeh said that Nationalist legislators and others were urging "drastic steps" including a boycott of Japanese goods, but that he prefers to limit action to suspension of trade between Taiwan and Japan and is not encouraging these proposals.

Whether Yeh will succeed is doubtful. The Japanese ambassador is scheduled to return to Taipei about the end of March with an explanation of Tokyo's position. During the interim, Chiang Kai-shek may decide to increase pressure for a favorable reply by promoting an Overseas Chinese boycott of Japanese goods. He also may order seizure of Japanese shipping bound for Communist China.

Ambassador MacArthur reports that the Japanese Government tentatively plans a public statement by Prime Minister Kishi next week, approving the trade agreement and promising the government's support and cooperation to the Communist trade mission, but announcing that the government is unable to "take cognizance of the raising of the national flag of Communist China on the building of its private trade mission." Such a statement almost certainly would not satisfy Chiang Kai-shek.

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#### III. THE WEST

### Communist Efforts to Promote Understanding With De Gaulle

Efforts to establish some sort of understanding between General de Gaulle, on the one hand and the French Commu- nist party (PCF) and Moscow on the other have been reported recently		
Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov is actively cultivating French business leaders and advocating a "nation-		
al independent position" for a De Gaulle-led France. He		
promises Soviet "support" for a solution of North African problems to enable France to assume a strong position be-		
tween the US and the USSR. Vinogradov may have mentioned this during his recent visit to De Gaulle.		
an ardent Gaullist, Senator		
Edmond Michelet has adopted Vinogradov's suggestion that the		
PCF be sounded out concerning its attitude toward the general.  Michelet appears to feel that De Gaulle's "liberal" ideas for		
an Algerian solution will ultimately alienate many rightists,		
but may stir up substantial support among leftists.		
De Gaulle himself has attacked Communism both publicly and privately. Nevertheless, the PCF, while continu-		
ing its public opposition to De Gaulle, might consider his re-		
turn desirable in the long run as facilitating its hitherto futile efforts to rally leftist parties in a popular front. Further-		
more, Moscow sees in De Gaulle's return possibilities of		
weakening NATO and fostering a French-Soviet rapprochement.		
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# Dominican Republic May Be Involved in Plans to Oust Haitian Government

General Kebreau, former Haitian strong man who was relieved as army chief of staff by President Duvalier on 12 March, may be the key figure in plans by Duvalier's political rivals and by Generalissimo Trujillo of the Dominican Republic to oust the seriously weakened Duvalier regime. Trujillo has long distrusted Duvalier and had hoped to use Kebreau to control the president.

Despite categorical denials by Dominican officials
including the generalissimo himself,
Kebreau
is either in the Dominican Republic or somewhere on the
Haitian-Dominican border.
the Dominicans have given Kebreau a clandestine radio
station at a border hideout where he is working with
followers of Clement Jumelle, a bitter rival of Duvalier
Another indication of Dominican intrigue was the arrival
in Port-au-Prince on 19 March of John Abbes, head of
Dominican intelligence who directed Dominican subversion
in Guatemala last year.
Underground activity by followers of Jumelle is
being "feverishly organized,"
Duvalier's other principal rival Louis Dejoie
has indicated,
Kebreau can count on his support. A determined move
against the government now would have a good chance of
ousting Duvalier. The army is divided and the public al-
ready apprehensive.

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#### LATE ITEM

#### King Saud Delegates Broad Powers to Crown Prince Faysal

In granting unprecedented broad powers to Crown Prince Faysal on 22 March, King Saud has apparently bowed to pressure from key brothers and uncles to relinquish much of the authority which he had gradually concentrated in his own hands. The extent to which Saud's authority has been diminished, however, is not yet clear since he apparently retains the loyalty of the armed forces. The King's previous conduct of affairs was particularly galling to Faysal, who, although prime minister and foreign minister, had been largely excluded from policy formulation in recent months. Faysal's apparent willingness to effect a reconciliation with the King indicates an awareness by all that the increasingly serious split in the royal family gravely threatened the future of the Saudi dynasty.

Faysal, in his new role, may try to lessen the tensions with the United Arab Republic, but his active participation may be limited by his poor health. He will probably re-examine Saudi relations with the United States, possibly modifying them along more nationalistic lines. Chances are increased that diplomatic relations may eventually be resumed with the Soviet Union. In response to widespread criticism of Saud's mismanagement of the economy, he will undoubtedly make an effort to strengthen the country's finances.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 March 1958

#### DAILY BRIEF

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dates in the field. The Communists, in contrast, have been				
working hard, avoiding controversial issues, and are posing				
as the champions of Buddhism, t	he crown, and established			
Laotian traditions.	(Page 5)			

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Soviet nuclear tests continue: The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee issued the following statement at 1600 22 March:

The Atomic Energy Detection System has reported that an explication occurred at 0750 hours GMT (0250 EST) on 22 March 1958, in the vicinity of

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This test is the

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