
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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 June 1958

DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Yugoslavia: Reported arrests in Yugoslavia, involving possibly as many as 200 individuals alleged to be sympathetic to the USSR, are probably precautionary measures rather than steps directed against any specific plot to overthrow Tito. Moscow has made it clear that it will try to undercut Tito in an effort to bring Belgrade to heel. Prosoviet elements within Yugoslavia are not sufficiently numerous to necessitate the extensive arrests which followed the 1948 break.

USSR-Japan: Moscow has appointed Deputy Foreign
Minister N. T. Federenko, its leading Far Eastern expert,
to succeed the late I. F. Tevosyan as ambassador to Japan.
The Japanese ambassador in Moscow believes the Federenko
appointment presages a more active Soviet policy toward
Japan, and he agrees with Ambassador Thompson's view
that the USSR was dissatisfied with recent Japanese election results.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Lebanon: Rebel bands in the countryside are being subjected to heavier air attacks by government forces. Coordinated rebel action has not materialized; neither has the government's promised all-out attack against the rebel-held quarter of Beirut. Against a background of long disagreement

i

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Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194452

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| | over the use of government forces, President Chamoun now professes to be somewhat encouraged that army commander General Shihab may take more vigorous action. (Page 1) |
|-----|---|
| | *Cyprus: Retaliation by Turkish Cypriots, touched off by a bomb explosion outside the Turkish Information Office in Nicosia on the night of 7 June, continued on 8 June and spread to other areas on the island. Athens has asked for an extraordinary meeting of the NATO Council to consider the matter. In Istanbul, in order to prevent a repetition of |
| No | the 1955 anti-Greek riots, troops supported by tanks were stationed at key points in the city on 8 June during an authorized demonstration in favor of demands that Cyprus be partitioned. Britain is still expected to announce a new policy for Cyprus on 17 June. |
| 0 | Indonesia: Lt. Col. Sumual, dissident commander in North Celebes, expects central government landings in the Menado area within a week. In Djakarta, top government officials are said to have agreed on a cabinet reshuffle which excludes the leftists. President Sukarno favors retaining them in the cabinet as ministers without portfolio. (Page 3)(Map) |
| yes | Southern Rhodesian election: The crushing defeat of candidates who favored liberal racial policies will further convince the native African population throughout the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland that it is futile to hope for liberal policies from the dominant white minority. This development will strengthen organized efforts by the Afri- |

9 June 58

DAILY BRIEF

can nationalists to oppose any move to advance the federation

toward dominion status.

ii

(Page 4)

TOP SECRET

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III. THE WEST

France - De Gaulle: General de Gaulle continues his efforts to maintain momentum toward a "solution" in North Africa in the face of opposition from extremists and some military elements in Algeria. In France, there is mounting pressure from the extreme right for a complete revision of the parliamentary system. Although the French Communists are preparing for clandestine activity, their principal aim is to make the party the rallying point of all anti-Gaullist forces for opposition by legal means. (Page 5)

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9 June 58

DAILY BRIEF

iii

TOP SECRET

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC No Back-up Material

II. ASIA-AFRICA

The Lebanese Situation

Military action in Lebanon from 6 to 8 June consisted primarily of government efforts to disperse rebel bands by air strafing. One large band near Tripoli suffered heavy casualties. Larger scale rebel operations, which government officials had feared might come on 7 June, have not yet materialized. The Lebanese Army's operation against the rebel stronghold in the Basta quarter of Beirut was discontinued on 7 June on the ground that not enough forces were available.

Lebanese government leaders profess renewed optimism concerning the situation.

President Chamoun, after a meeting with Lebanese Army Commander Shihab on 7 June, described him as elated over limited army success in the Tripoli area that day and apparently willing to take more forceful action against the insurgents. Chamoun was enthusiastic about a plan Shihab has advanced according to which the army, security forces, and progovernment civilian partisans would be redeployed in an effort to prevent the opposition from receiving equipment and personnel from Syria. Chamoun's optimism seems excessive in view of the fact that Shihab has already put forth several plans for combating the rebels without effectively implementing them, and Chamoun himself has been basically pessimistic about the army chief.

On the political scene, maneuvers for a compromise solution of the crisis now seem halfhearted, and the belief apparently is widespread that a compromise is no longer possible. Chamoun is reported to have told a Lebanese cabinet meeting on 7 June that Foreign Minister Malik had cabled from New York that most UN delegations seemed prepared to support

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Page 1

| Lebanon's case in the Security Council. Chamoun discussed with the cabinet the possibility that, if Lebanon should fail to obtain satisfactory action from the Security Council on the complaint of United Arab Republic intervention in Lebanon on the rebel side, the government could then submit the case to the UN General Assembly. Failing satisfaction there, he said Lebanon could call for intervention by the United States, Great Britain, or France, jointly or individually, under terms of their Tripartite Declaration of 1950. | |
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
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58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Indonesia

| Sumual, believes the central government's amphibious as- |
|---|
| sault on the Menado area will occur by 15 June. His esti- |
| mate apparently is based in part on the growing activities of |
| government infiltration units, some of which have been cap- |
| tured by the dissidents. |
| they are counting on the success of these infiltration teams |
| to reduce dissident resistance to a minimum. |
| statements of |
| army spokesmen, have pointed to the imminence of a move |
| against the dissident capital. Warehouses at Tarakan, Borneo, |
| required immediate inspection, |
| in preparation for the receipt of supplies 'for the attack on |
| Menado which will take place shortly." |
| |
| army chief Nasution plans to |
| go there in mid-June. The use of Morotai air base, recently |
| recaptured by government forces, for tactical support of land- |
| ing units was recently suggested by the commander of the Am- |
| bon naval area, who asserted Morotai had sufficient supplies |
| of aviation fuel and was safe from dissident attack. |
| |
| |
| continue to discuss prospects |
| for cabinet changes which would limit or exclude leftist partici- |
| pation in the government. Sukendro claims that President Sukar- |
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| no. Nasution. Prime Minister Diuanda, and Foreign Minister |
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Segregationists Make Large Gains in Southern Rhodesian Voting

The almost exclusively European electorate of Southern Rhodesia gave significant support to a segregationist party and repudiated every candidate offered by the relatively liberal party of former Prime Minister Todd in the general elections held on 5 June. In the voting for the 30-member legislature, the governing moderate United Federal party won 17 seats and retained control, but the segregationist Dominion party increased its strength from 4 to 13 seats and had a plurality of votes on the first count in four other constituencies. The system of proportional representation used in Southern Rhodesia provides that, if no candidate in a three-party contest receives a majority, the second-choice votes of the weakest candidate are divided among the other two.

The results are in line with recent voting in the parliamentary elections in South Africa and by-elections in Southern Rhodesia which indicated a stiffening of the European electorate's defense of white supremacy. Such an attitude will help to convince the African population of the futility of hoping for racial liberalism from the dominant European minority and strengthen the position of African nationalist extremists who advocate increased political and economic resistance by non-Europeans. Any resultant deterioration in Rhodesian racial relations would strengthen those in London who oppose granting early independence to the Rhodesian federation because of a distrust of its racial policies.

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Page 4

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De Gaulle Faces Mounting Rightist Pressure

There is further evidence that local extremists in Algeria put considerable pressure on Premier de Gaulle during his recent visit, seeking to exploit the occasion to push for a "public safety government." According to one report De Gaulle even felt it necessary to summon General Massu and rebuke him for the manner in which he had presented the "wishes of the committee."

In France, De Gaulle is faced with mounting pressure from the extreme right to "complete the revolution" which began in Algiers. Public safety committees, quiet since De Gaulle's investiture, are reviving and spreading, with six formed in Paris, 22 in surrounding communities, and others in 14 of the departments of France. The committees, reportedly working closely with veterans' organizations. have announced their aim as total reform of the present parliamentary system. The American Embassy in Paris reports that Leon Delbecque. civilian member of the Algerian junta, plans to organize a nationwide committee of public safety in France. The embassy comments that such action, which might evolve into a new political movement, could provoke immediate counteractivity on the left from which only the Communists could benefit.

and selectivity" of current Communist party tactics has aroused active rank-and-file support and enhances the possibility of unity of action with other anti-Gaullist elements. The party stepped up preparations for clandestine activity last week, but will pursue mainly a nonviolent, legal course of action, at least until De Gaulle's program is made clear. Nevertheless, there is a widespread attitude, inside as well as outside the party, that De Gaulle should be given a chance.

Meanwhile, De Gaulle is seeking to maintain the momentum for a solution in North Africa by personally taking over the Ministry for Algeria and calling for Algerian municipal elections to be held in about a month. The press has also suggested that an Algerian Moslem may be added to the cabinet, along with other possible changes or additions.

inet, along with other possible changes of additions.

9 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5

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