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5 August 1958

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## CENTRAL


# INTELLIGENCE


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#### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

5 August 1958

#### **DAILY BRIEF**

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Tunisia - Algeria: Tension between the Tunisians and
the Algerian rebels inside Tunisia appears to be mounting.
Algerian rebel forces in Tunisia, who may outnumber and
are probably better equipped than the Tunisian security forces,
are said to be looking increasingly to the leadership of Nasir
and the USSR.
the Algerians are "only waiting for the order to attack the Tu-
nisians" tends to substantiate other reports that the rebels
may move to overthrow the Bourguiba regime.
(Page 1)
Morocco: King Mohamed V is uneasy about the rapid

Morocco: King Mohamed V is uneasy about the rapid growth of extreme nationalism in Morocco since the Iraqi coup and US-British landings in the Middle East and about his ability to maintain control. There are rumors that coups are being planned both within the ruling Istiqlal party and by opposition groups. (Page 3)

been in secret, high-level contact with the governments of the Sudan, Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia for over a year, and hopes to help these countries develop a capability to halt further expansion of Nasir's influence. Ben-Gurion wants the United

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	Lebanon: Pressure is increasing for the resignation of the pro-Western cabinet and for President Chamoun to leave the country.  Rebel forces were attacking loyalist elements southeast of Beirut on 3 August. Foreign Minister Malik has sent an urgent inquiry to New York to find out whether the conditions of a summit meeting there would be such that Chamoun. Prime Minister Sulh, and Malik could attend.
	Iraq: Foreign Minister Jumard has told Under Secretary Murphy that his government is still studying the question of Iraq's attitude toward the Baghdad Pact. Jumard observed that the original decision to join the pact in no sense reflected popular opinion in Iraq. The new Iraqi Government probably intends eventually to withdraw from the pact. However, a member of the government has asked "unofficially" whether the United States is prepared to continue to supply Iraq with arms.  (Page 5)
40	Cyprus: A suspension of "all operations" against Turkish Cypriots and the British on Cyprus was proclaimed by the leader of EOKA, the Greek-Cypriot terrorist organization on 4 August. EOKA warned that operations may be resumed after 10 August if the Turks and British "continue provocation."  (Page 6)
ok	Indonesia: Dissident forces in North Sumatra, who claim to have the support of Moslem extremists, are said to be planning an early move against government-held Medan.  (Page 7)

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DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Early Move by Algerian Rebels Against Tunisian Regime Possible

guiba and the several thousand Algeria Liberation Front (FLN) based in Tunis ing and could culminate in an early me	an rebels of the National sia appears to be mount-
tension betw	een the Algerians and
Tunisians was becoming more acute d	
National Guard was gathering Algeria	
whom there now are about 80,000 in T	
away from the frontier area in an atte	
and maintain control.	FLN troops in this re-
gion are heavily influenced by Cairo r sympathetic toward the USSR, and are	
to Nasir for leadership.	Flooring more and more
to simple tox toward single.	
military and the language of the development Africa	Managara and Almoniona

This growing breach between the Tunisians and Algerians was further underscored on 31 July when Tunisian Foreign Secretary Mokaddem, in a conversation with the American ambassador, criticized the FLN leaders and deplored the degree to which the FLN seemed to be falling under Nasir's influence.

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FLN troops in Tunisia may outnumber Tunisian security forceswhich total less than 7,000and are almost certainly better armed and equipped. Ultimately, however, the success of any coup attempt in Tunisia may depend on the extent to which Bourguiba's popular support, especially in his dominant Neo-Destour party, may have been eroded by his pro-Western reaction to recent developments in the Middle East.	

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#### Moroccan King Depressed Over Middle East Situation

King Mohamed V appeared depressed to a British writer to whom he recently granted an audience. The King expressed disillusionment with the American Government, which he felt had failed to demonstrate to Morocco the value of an alignment with the United States.

The King's uneasiness reflects in part the rapid growth of nationalist extremism in Morocco since the Iraqi coup and has been reinforced by popular critical reaction to the Anglo-American landings in the Middle East. Members of the King's privy council and moderate officials within the government have expressed disappointment with an apparent lack of firmness by the King since the assassinations of the Iraqi royal family.

Rumors are circulating in Morocco that both the left wing of the Istiqlal party and a coalition of opposition parties are planning coups. Led by former Premier Si Mbarek Bekkai, a close friend of the King, the opposition coalition is said to include adherents of the Democratic Independence party (PDI), which maintains close relations with the embassy of the United Arab Republic, and has at one time at least had links with Moroccan Communists and received subsidies from French right-wing sources. This group is reputed to have arms caches in traditionally dissident tribal areas of eastern Morocco--areas from which France is now withdrawing its troops. The right wing of the Istiqlal is aware of these activities, and one of its officials claims that the party has ample armed resources to meet any aggression on the part of the PDI. However, it is questionable whether the right wing could similarly contain such activities by the left wing.

rity forces are not have the re	ccan Royal Army, numbering 31,000, and secu- e reported to be loyal to the King but probably do esources to quell widespread armed dissidence, the dissidents receive support from the UAR or	
other sources.		Opt .
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### Israel Suggests Informal Middle East Alliance Against Nasir

Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion has proposed that the United States support the "quiet and informal" development of a tacit alliance between Israel, Turkey, Iran, Ethiopia, and the Sudan for the purpose of limiting the further expansion of Nasir's influence in the Near East and Africa. Ben-Gurion told Under Secretary Murphy on 31 July that Israel has had very confidential and high-level contacts with the other four countries during the past year or more and that it is encouraged at the interest they have shown in possibilities for mutual cooperation. The immediate objective of Ben-Gurion's proposed alliance would be to strengthen the existing regimes in Iran and the Sudan, which the Israelis believe "could be overthrown in the near future. The long-term objective assertedly would be economic development in the five states to give the people the kind of life which Nasir "glitteringly promises" his followers.

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The Israeli plan apparently results from the increasing sense of isolation Israeli leaders have felt since the Suez crisis and which has been heightened by the overthrow of the Iraqi Government. This sense of isolation is especially acute with regard to Jordan, where, Ben-Gurion said, "if Nasir comes in, I'm afraid we will have to fight."

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#### Iraqi Situation

Sadiq Shanshal, minister of guidance and information in the new Iraqi regime, "unofficially" has attempted to sound out Under Secretary Murphy as to whether the United States is willing to continue military aid to Iraq. Shanshal, who probably is the most influential civilian figure in the cabinet, is a friend of Nasir and has been a proponent of union with Syria.

Foreign Minister Jumard, while emphasizing Iraq's desire for friendship with the United States, stated that the question of continued Iraqi participation in the Baghdad Pact was still under consideration. However, he stated that the pact had been signed without the authority and knowledge of the Iraqi public, which was ignorant of the country's obligations under the pact. Jumard's lengthy explanation is probably a sign that the pact will be scrapped in the near future.

Murphy received the impression that the members of the new government are not unfriendly, although they are suspicious of American actions, and that they are an alert and earnest group.

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#### EOKA Proclaims Suspension of Operations on Cyprus

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The 4 August announcement by EOKA leader George Grivas of an immediate suspension of operations against the Turkish Cypriots and the British follows the worst month of bloodshed on Cyprus since the campaign of violence began in 1955. Appeals for an end to bloodshed had been made by the British, Greek, and Turkish premiers and by Greek-and Turkish-Cypriot leaders. The suspension, if it can be maintained by the EOKA leadership, would mean the end of intercommunal warfare on Cyprus, as the Turkish-Cypriot underground organization, TMT, has previously called on the Turkish community to forego violence, except in self-defense. Grivas warned, however, that he reserved the right to order a renewal of violence after 10 August if British or Turkish "provocations" continued.

Grivas' reasons for suspending operations are unknown. The recent large-scale British security drive may have deprived EOKA of much of its striking power. Repeated statements by British officials promising the return of Makarios to the island if violence ceased for a period of time may also have been a contributing factor in EOKA's decision. Finally, the fact that continued intercommunal violence supports the Turkish contention that the two communities cannot live together and the island must, therefore, be partitioned pointed to the desirability of a truce.

Regardless of the cause for the announced suspension of violence, its implementation will permit passions to cool on the island. It will also give NAC Secretary General Spaak an opportunity to proceed with informal conversations among the
NATO representatives of the three interested powers in his
attempt to find a formula for an interim Cyprus solution.

#### SECRET

### Dissidents May Attempt to Seize Medan in North Sumatra

Medan in the near future with the help of Moslem extremists in Atjeh and the territorial commander in Medan, Lt. Col. Gintings, The central government is aware of the impending coup and of Gintings' possible defection and has him under surveillance. In view of the government's knowledge of their intentions, the dissidents anticipate military resistance to an attempt to take Medan.  the dissidents had scheduled an important move somewhere in North
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sidents had scheduled an important move somewhere in North
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Sumatra in early August. This would be the second dissident
attempt to secure Medan, the first having been made in mid-
March.
Apparently the dissidents do not yet have a firm commit-
ment from either Gintings or the Moslem insurgents. Both Gint-
ings and the Atjehnese are reported to have responded favorably
to advances from the dissidents on previous occasions but failed
to follow through with positive assistance. Their failure to give
assistance now would either force a postponement of the attack on
Medan or result in an abortive attempt.
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