TOP SECRET O



22 November 1958

Copy No. C 60

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

L'I DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: 15810


NEXT REVIEW DATE:

DATE REVIEWER:

Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232646

TOP SECRET

_____Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232646-



Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232646

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

22 November 1958

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

SIRAB

*Berlin situation: West German Foreign Minister Brentano and other top officials are strongly opposed to any Western concession to East Germany's control over access to Berlin. Brentano feels that Berlin is a test case and that any concession would eventually lead to catastrophe for the West. American officials in Berlin feel that East Germany will move progressively to intensify controls on traffic between East and West Berlin but is unlikely to attempt a sudden move to seal off West Berlin.

[Page 1]

USSR-Albania: The Soviet Navy apparently is establishing a permanent base at the Albanian port of Valona. There has been considerable construction activity at the port, continuing visits there by Soviet naval auxiliary ships, and the port has been closed to Western shipping since 1 November. Four Soviet W-class submarines and a small tender have remained there since their arrival on 31 August. (Page 3) (Map)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq:

ican consula	r personnel might be er	xenophobia is increasing occurred last month. Ameridangered should a new outes are closed at the end of (Page 4)

TOP SECRET

OF SECKET

Cyprus: At the Cyprus debate in the UN, scheduled to begin on 24 November, India's Krishna Menon is expected to lead a bloc of Asian-African countries in support of a Greek resolution calling for eventual independence for Cyprus, a solution firmly opposed by Turkey. Archbishop Makarios has indicated willingness to accept a resolution calling for a conference among British representatives and leaders of the two communities on Cyprus. (Page 5)

Iran: Persistent rumors of military or civilian plots against the government reflect the basically unstable political situation in Iran. The Shah's current efforts to combat corruption and inefficiency in the government are viewed with cynicism by the general public and are opposed by those elements benefiting from the status quo. Failure to implement the Shah's reform measures, however, will further increase popular support for a change in the regime. (Page 6)

Indonesia: Most military and civilian officials, including President Sukarno, are anxious to reach a peaceful settlement with the dissidents as soon as possible, according to Prime Minister Djuanda. Government leaders have avoided publicizing rebel approaches in order not to give an impression of softness. (Page 7)

III. THE WEST

France: Several French Army officers stationed in West Germany are reported to have been arrested for 'plotting' against De Gaulle because of his offer to discuss cease-fire arrangements with Algerian rebel leaders. De Gaulle has previously shown his awareness of the continuing threat posed by some of the military and European settler elements responsible for the 13 May coup in Algeria. (Page 8)

22 Nov 58

DAILY BRIEF

ii

Colombia: Supporters of former dictator Rojas insist that a plot to overthrow President Lleras has widespread support in the armed forces and is in too advanced a stage to be halted. Any coup would probably be timed for mid-December, when the Colombian Senate plans to begin prosecution of Rojas for unconstitutional acts during his term in office. However, the military thus far has seemed loyal to Lleras. (Page 9)

OK

LATE ITEM

*Australia:		the Australian
Labor party, c	ampaigning on a ''pie-in-the	-sky'' platform,
had made consi	derable gains among the ele	ctorate. Most
observers still	believed the Liberal-Country	ry party coalition
would be return	ned to power by the parliame	entary elections on
22 November,	but they did not predict the e	easy victory that
-	ted earlier. An upset Labor	
·	ırred last year in New Zeala	-
prime minister	ship to the leftist. Herbert	Evatt.

No

22 Nov 58

DAILY BRIEF

iii

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Berlin Situation

West German Foreign Minister Brentano told British, French, and American officials, following Soviet Ambassador Smirnov's talk with Chancellor Adenauer, that Bonn strongly opposes Western acceptance of even de facto East German control over Western access routes to Berlin. Brentano feels that the Berlin situation is a test case in which any weakening would eventually lead to a catastrophe for the West. He emphasized that the first talks between the Western powers and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) would be the end of the policy "we have been following." As an example of West German feeling on the Berlin situation, Brentano said that Bundestag President Gerstenmaier advocates that Bonn break relations with Moscow if the USSR transfers control over Berlin to East Germany. However, when Adenauer strongly hinted at such a course, Soviet Ambassador Smirnov was unimpressed.

The Christian Democratic Union faction leader in the Bundestag, Heinrich Krone, has repeatedly stressed the same views to American officials. He said that to show travel documents to GDR officials would have disastrous political consequences, and would make a laughing stock of Chancellor Adenauer's foreign policy. Krone also stated that Western concessions would dangerously strengthen neutralists in West Germany.

American officials in Berlin feel that East Germany will move ''progressively'' to intensify controls on the border between East and West Berlin with a view to reducing the refugee flow and to closing the window to the West. They note, however, that recent East German emphasis on ''normalization'' has been aimed at increasing the ties between the two parts of the city, while lessening West Berlin's links with West Germany. In line with this analysis, quotes a Soviet official as stating recently that, in his opinion, every effort would be made to draw the Germans in East and West Berlin closer together.

In Bonn, Soviet Ambassador Smirnov told reporters that the USSR was going "to give Berlin to the Germans" and added:

- SECRET

"I believe everything will be settled by Christmas."	11

- SECRET



USSR Developing Naval Base in Albania

Four Soviet W-class submarines and a small sub tender which arrived in the Albanian port of Valona from the Baltic Sea are still at Valona. Other indications that the USSR is developing a naval base in the Mediterranean are the closure of the port of Valona to commercial shipping on 1 November, the presence of a large number of Soviet technicians in the area, the visits of Soviet naval auxiliaries to the port, and recent construction activity. Most of the known construction work has been carried out in the Pasha Liman area, on the south side of Valona Bay.
Although the port of Valona is the best natural harbor in Albania, it can support only limited naval operations at this time because of insufficient workshop and drydock facilities. The USSR may intend to use the port mainly as a base for conducting intelligence operations against US and Allied military forces in the Mediterranean.

TOP SECRET

Anti-Qasim Coup Planned in Iraq
The UAR-supported plot of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani to over- throw Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim, still in the planning stage, appears to have wider ramifications than were first reported
"tribes in all parts of Iraq will revolt," seize government centers, and sever communications. The army will refuse to move against the rebels, and "free officers" will go to Qasim and demand his resignation. If he refuses, he will be killed.
The plotters plan to appoint al-Gaylani as prime minister and Abd al-Latif Darraji, commandant of the military college, as military governor general. Darraji's antiregime sentiments are well known in Baghdad and he may already be under surveillance.
There are indications that senior military officers remain dissatisfied with the leftist trend in Iraq and have warned Qasim against his close association with the Communists. These officers too may be planning to oust Qasim and follow a more neutral policy between right and left.
Neither of these groups would be likely to move to join Iraq to the UAR, but would pay lip service to Arab "unity" and follow a pan-Arab foreign policy based on military cooperation against Israel and a united diplomatic front toward both the West and the Soviet bloc.
Local tension is reported to be intensifying in Kirkuk, Iraq's oil center, where anti-Turkish riots occurred last month. Hostility toward foreigners has increased, and apprehension among foreign nationals employed in the oil industry is growing. Should the security situation deteriorate, large-scale demonstrations and riots may endanger foreigners.

Cyprus

The UN Cyprus debate scheduled to begin on 24 November will probably only increase bitterness. Greece and Archbishop Makarios, apparently determined to push for independence, are willing to accept an interim period of self-government and a final settlement granting minority guarantees and a prohibition against union of the island with Greece.

This position, however, appears unacceptable to Britain and Turkey. London continues to oppose UN endorsement of a specific final settlement of the Cyprus problem and hopes that the UN instead will call for a conference among interested parties to the dispute. After the debate, the British plan to renew attempts to convene a conference under NATO aegis. Such a conference, however, is most unlikely in view of Makarios' adamant opposition and his influence on the Greek Government. Turkey, which still regards partition as the only acceptable final solution for Cyprus, is willing to support the British drive for a conference but would fight a UN resolution favoring eventual independence.

Makarios, realizing that the independence resolution,
while supported by many Afro-Asian and Communist-bloc
nations, probably will not receive the necessary two-thirds
majority, has indicated that he might reluctantly accept a
resolution merely calling on the British Government and leaders
of the two communities on Cyprus to confer. It is unlikely,
however, that Ankara would agree to any resolution omitting
the Turkish Government from such a conference

SECRET

The Iranian Internal Situation

The Iranian internal situation remains basically unstable. The Shah has ordered anticorruption reforms, but implementation will be resisted by government officials, landowners, and businessmen, all of whom are benefiting from conditions as they are.

The Shah is aware that forceful action on his part may provoke a reaction which would upset the orderly government and administration of the country. To ensure success for his reforms, however, he may have to tighten his authoritarian control, thus further alienating significant sectors of the middle classes.

Many Iranians believe the Shah is acting largely under American pressure and out of fear aroused by the Iraqi revolution. They apparently expect the regime to slip back into the old established pattern as soon as these external pressures are removed.

There are persistent rumors of impending micivilian coups, including one allegedly set for 23. Popular belief that the weaknesses of the regime remedied sustains conspiratorial tendencies amo of military leaders who now have apparently mere plans with those of some political figures also plot the regime. The establishment of revolutionary gimes elsewhere in Asia and the Middle East is a couragement to some Iranian military elements.	November. cannot be ong a number ged their otting against military re-
	·

Indonesian Government Anxious for Early Settlement With Dissidents

Prime Minister Djuanda told the American ambassador that he, President Sukarno, and the military are anxious for a peaceful settlement with the dissidents as soon as possible. He said the government had been approached several times by the rebels regarding possible surrender terms. One approach had even come from Naingolan, a rebel commander in North Sumatra who has offered more effective resistance than any other dissident leader to government reoccupation efforts. Djuanda said, however, that these approaches are being held in strictest secrecy because any public statement indicating a desire for a settlement might undercut Djakarta's bargaining position.

Foreign Minister Subandrio stated privately in late October that the government cannot bargain openly with the dissidents, but he did not rule out the possibility of a covert understanding. This attitude probably still prevails. The government reportedly has made its own soundings of the dissidents' position on surrender. Government hopes for a settlement may rest on the expectation of a gradual moderation of dissident terms to a point at which Djakarta would find them acceptable. Publicly government leaders have stated that they will accept no compromise and that it will take two years to eliminate rebel activities completely.

TOP SECRET

III. THE WEST

French Officers in Germany and Algeria Reported Plotting Against De Gaulle

Several French Army officers stationed in West Germany and Algeria are reported to have been plotting against Premier de Gaulle. The premier was informed of these activities and has taken "precautions."

10 or 15 French field-grade officers in Germany were arrested for planning to move an armored division to the French border to demonstrate against De Gaulle's public offer to arrange a cease-fire with Algerian rebel leaders.

The American Embassy in Paris forwarded "with reservations" a similar report from a close associate of former Mayor Chevallier of Algiers and noted that Chevallier's entourage had informed US officials in Algiers of military plotting prior to the 13 May coup. According to Chevallier's associate, the French commander in Algiers, General Salan, fears an incident similar to that in which he narrowly escaped assassination at the hands of French extremists in Algiers in early 1957.

De Gaulle's moves to bring the army under control have included promotions, decorations, and transfers from Algiers of many leaders of the 13 May action. Military obedience to his dramatic order in mid-October for officers to withdraw from the public safety committees in Algeria demonstrates the extent to which he has succeeded. Nevertheless, some of the 13 May leaders continue to favor a political role for the army, particularly concerning Algeria. They want a stepped-up military effort in Algeria rather than any form of negotiation with the rebels, and can be expected to cause further trouble as De Gaulle gropes for an early Algerian settlement.

SECRET

Coup May Be Attempted Soon in Colombia

Supporters of former Colombian dictator Rojas state that a plot to overthrow President Lleras, who heads the Liberal-Conservative National Front, has widespread support in the armed forces and is in too advanced a stage to be halted. The coup would probably be attempted in mid-December, when the Colombian Senate plans to begin prosecution of Rojas for unconstitutional acts during his 1953-57 term as president.

The Rojistas might be supported by some dissident Conservative elements opposing the National Front regime, especially the faction led by defeated presidential candidate Jorge Leyva. The Dominican Government, which first gave asylum to Rojas after his ouster in May 1957, has reportedly sold arms to the movement.

The armed forces thus far have appeared loyal to Lleras, whose popular support was reflected in the overwhelming vote he received in last May's election. The only key officer whose loyalty has been questioned seriously is air force commander General Pauwels. On the other hand, Rojas is believed to have a considerable military following, especially among junior and noncommissioned officers, and he has recently been renewing his military and political contacts outside the capital.

Rojas returned to Colombia on 11 Octobe	r, allegedly to
clear his name of the charges of misconduct i	n office. He has
caused considerable tension and government	concern, and his
name has figured in numerous plot rumors.	
•	

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Special Adviser to the President

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director


National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

-CONFIDENTIAL



TOP SECKET