


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3 October 1958



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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3 OCTOBER 1958

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR explodes two more nuclear devices at Novaya Zemlya.

Moscow offers Afghanistan new \$30,000,000 loan.

Taiwan Strait - Indian UN delegation offers to mediate dispute.



II. ASIA-AFRICA

Pro-Western Libyan prime minister may be replaced; King rumored considering abdication.

Kuwait's Ruler denies he will join Arab League.

Guinea - Arabs may follow Ghana in according recognition.

Indonesian rebels continue operations in Sumatra.



III. THE WEST

⑧ Greece considering withdrawal from NATO over Cyprus issue.

⑨ Columbia - Imminent return of former dictator Roia causing government great concern.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

3 October 1958

DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet nuclear tests: The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee released the following statement at 1630 hours, 2 October 1958:

"The Atomic Energy Detection System has reported two explosions occurring at 0800 and 0920 hours Zebra, on 2 October 1958, both in the vicinity of the Novaya Zemlya test site. Signals from the first explosion have been reported by acoustic and electromagnetic stations; the second by acoustic stations. A preliminary estimate of the yield of the first shot is in the range of 100 to 1,000 KT, with the most probable value being about 300 KT. Very preliminary yield data on the second test indicate about 50 KT. Nuclear confirmation cannot be expected prior to 5 October 1958."

No

*These explosions bring to 59 the total number of Soviet nuclear tests, two tests also having been held on 30 September. the devices in all four recent tests were delivered by TU-16 medium jet bombers and that widely separated drop zones in the Novaya Zemlya area were used on both occasions.

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OK
USSR-Afghanistan: A new Soviet \$30,000,000 loan intended for "development projects" in Afghanistan was announced in Kabul on 2 October by visiting Soviet President Voroshilov. At least a part of this loan may be used to finance the cost of a civil air development program offered by the USSR in late August. [redacted] (Page 1)

[redacted]
*Taiwan Strait situation: The Indian UN delegation has advised Ambassador Lodge of its desire to aid the Warsaw talks by providing an informal interpretation of the American position to the Chinese Communists. Krishna Menon, who claims to be in close touch with the Chinese Communist premier, stated that Peiping would agree to let the Nationalists withdraw from Chinmen without shooting at them, take the island as soon as possible thereafter, and agree to renounce the use of force against Taiwan.

The Chinese Nationalists have declared that the maintenance of large military forces on the offshore islands is a "military necessity" and a reduction of this "defensive strength" will not be countenanced. There were no significant military developments in the Taiwan Strait on 2 October.

[redacted] (Page 2)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

No
Libya: Significant political changes may soon occur in Libya, including replacement of pro-Western Prime Minister Kubaar, possibly by someone more sensitive to popular sentiment favoring closer relations with the UAR. King Idriss is rumored to be considering abdication in the near future in favor of his nephew, Crown Prince Hassan al-Rida.

[redacted] (Page 4)

[redacted]
Kuwait: The Ruler of Kuwait has denied that Kuwait would join the Egyptian-dominated Arab League, as earlier announced in Cairo by a league spokesman and by Kuwait's deputy ruler, Abdulla Mubarak. [redacted] (Page 5)

3 Oct 58

DAILY BRIEF

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OK
Guinea: On 1 October, Ghana recognized Guinea. It is likely that certain Arab nations will also extend early recognition in the hope of gaining greater influence in West Africa. [redacted] (Page 6)

OK
Indonesia: The rebels in Sumatra continue to operate freely in a major portion of North and Central Sumatra and have recently captured several towns from government garrisons. Damage continues to be inflicted on US-owned estates. [redacted] (Page 7)

NO
Cyprus: Britain's efforts to implement its new plan are being accompanied by an island-wide general strike of Greek Cypriots, increased but sporadic violence by EOKA, and extensive precautionary measures by the security forces. The British expect that a serious campaign of violence may yet occur. In Greece, members of the Karamanlis government have warned that resignation of the government and Greek disengagement from NATO are under serious consideration. [redacted] (Page 8)

III. THE WEST

NO
Colombia: Former dictator Rojas Pinilla is expected to return to Colombia by 6 October. His imminent return is causing grave concern in government circles. [redacted] (Page 10)

IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

NO
 National Intelligence Estimate No. 32-58. The Outlook for Greece's Stability and Foreign Position. 23 September 1958 [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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TAIWAN STRAIT TALLY SHEET

Air Situation

(Losses claimed through 1 Oct)

	<u>Destroyed</u>		<u>Probably Destroyed</u>	
	<u>Today</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>	<u>Today</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
Communist planes	0	28	0	4
Nationalist planes	0	4*	0	0

*Includes 1 C-46, 2 F-84G's, and 1 F-86

Chinmen Supply Situation - (Tonnage through 30 Sept)

	<u>Sea</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>Total</u>
Delivery - 29 & 30 Sept	191	130	321
Totals (since 7 Sept)	2,407.5	665.5	3,073
Average Daily Rate			128
Minimum Austere Daily Requirements			309
Cumulative Deficiency Since 7 Sept			4,343

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR Grants New Loan to Afghanistan

Despite Afghanistan's statements to American officials in January 1958 that it would not accept any new loans, Kabul apparently has accepted a \$30,000,000 Soviet loan which was announced by Soviet President Voroshilov in Kabul on 2 October. At least a part of this loan may be used to finance a civil air program offered by the USSR in late August. The program reportedly includes modern aircraft, the construction of additional new airports, and training of Afghan personnel. The terms of this aid were to be even more favorable than those of earlier Soviet loans and would require no Afghan contributions.

Kabul may have changed its policy because of these favorable terms together with the USSR's agreement last July to deliver goods under existing loans which Kabul could sell to meet local costs of other Soviet development projects.

This new loan raises total Soviet bloc aid to Afghanistan to \$190,000,000, including \$32,000,000 worth of military loans.

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Taiwan Strait Situation

Krishna Menon and Arthur Lall of the Indian UN delegation told Ambassador Lodge on 1 October of their desire to be helpful regarding the Warsaw talks by providing an informal interpretation of the American position to the Chinese Communists. Lall suggested the need of some sort of "foreshadowing" of what would happen if "shooting stops" and asserted that an exchange of the US and Communist negotiating positions could be accomplished by correspondence between Menon or Nehru and Chou En-lai.

Menon, who said that he had received a letter from Chou on about 21 September and was in close touch with the Chinese premier's thinking, also stated that Peiping would agree to let the Nationalists withdraw from Chinmen without shooting at them, take the island "as soon thereafter as they could," and agree to renounce the use of force against Taiwan.


The Chinese Nationalist Foreign Ministry announced on 1 October that maintenance of large military forces on the offshore islands is a "military necessity" and that Nationalist China cannot "countenance reduction of this defensive strength." The American Embassy comments that if the impression becomes general that the United States is considering renouncing support for the Nationalists or turning over the offshore islands to the Communists, Nationalist-US relations would be seriously impaired and demonstrations and riots would become probable. The embassy also reports, however, that the native Taiwanese, in contrast to the mainland-born population, probably would welcome withdrawal from the islands.

The Chinese Nationalists on 2 October conducted their first aerial resupply mission over Chinmen during daylight hours.

[redacted] Communist fighters were scrambled in an apparent reaction but no engagement resulted. [redacted]
[redacted] Rough weather forced sea convoys to suspend operations on 2 October.

The Nationalists have reported that the Communists are using 160-mm. mortars from Amoy Island against Little Quemoy.

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However, the maximum range of the 160-mm. mortar is 5,468 yards which is just about the shortest distance between Little Quemoy and Amoy Island. Therefore, the use of the 160-mm. mortar appears doubtful, but it is possible that the Communists are using larger weapons, perhaps the 203-mm. howitzer.

Japan has formally rejected a recent Soviet allegation that Tokyo is permitting the use of American bases in Japan to support operations in the Taiwan Strait and stated that "the crisis was brought about by the use of arms by Chinese Communist forces." Tokyo remains fearful of involvement in the crisis and hopes that use of American bases in Japan can be avoided.

Communist China on 2 October issued its "20th serious warning" against the "grave military provocations" of the US.



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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Possible Libyan Government Changes

King Idriss of Libya has decided to remove Prime Minister Kubaar, [redacted] Under Kubaar the Libyan Government has tried to maintain a middle-of-the-road position in Arab affairs, avoiding direct conflict with the UAR while making generally ineffective gestures to combat Egyptian propaganda and subversive efforts throughout the country. Kubaar was recently reported to be attempting a reconciliation with two leading figures in Libya's pro-Egyptian clique, perhaps in a last-minute effort to secure his own political future.

The King's choice to replace Kubaar is said to be Libya's ambassador to London, Ali Sahli. [redacted] [redacted] Egypt would favor this change, since it expects Sahli to prove more sensitive to Libyan popular sentiment which favors closer alignment with the UAR.

Concurrently, there are numerous rumors that the aging Idriss is contemplating abdication in favor of his nephew, Crown Prince Hassan al-Rida. An orderly succession prior to the King's death, along with a change in the Kubaar cabinet, might work to forestall pro-Egyptian and radical nationalist agitation for a republican government. The relatively unknown crown prince would have trouble obtaining popular support without the personal influence wielded by Idriss. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Kuwait Ruler Denies Plans to Join Arab League

The Ruler of Kuwait has denied recent reports that Kuwait would join the Arab League, as earlier reported in Cairo by a league spokesman and by Kuwait's deputy ruler, Abdulla Mubarak. In Cairo, however, Arab League Secretary General Hassouna expressed surprise at a British Foreign Office statement discounting reports that Kuwait would join the league. The Cairo press has announced that Hassouna has been invited to visit Kuwait in mid-October. Hassouna is likely to raise the question of Kuwait's adherence at that time.

Even if the reports that Kuwait might join the league are Egyptian misrepresentations, they will probably arouse Kuwaiti nationalists and some of the sheiks to press the Ruler for closer association with the UAR. The deputy ruler, who commands Kuwait's army, may have made the statements, however, in an attempt to cultivate favor with Nasir and the Kuwaiti nationalists at the expense of the more conservative Ruler.

Although Britain by treaty and custom handles Kuwait's foreign relations, the Ruler, who has in the past acknowledged that an accommodation with Nasir might be desirable, has assumed an increasingly independent position in Arab affairs. Following the Iraqi coup in July, the Ruler for a time considered joining the league. The British may, therefore, be unable to sustain the Ruler's present aversion to league membership.

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Guinea Receives Diplomatic Recognition From Ghana

Ghana on 1 October became the first nation to extend diplomatic recognition to the new state of Guinea. Prime Minister Nkrumah is vitally interested in helping the territories of West Africa achieve independence and also hopes to establish himself as the leading spokesman of West Africa.

The UAR may follow suit in the hope of establishing influence among Guinea's Moslems, who constitute 68 percent of the population, in furtherance of its program of strengthening contact with West African nationalists. Recognition by several of the Asian Communist nations is probable, but the USSR may withhold recognition for the time being in deference to France's official request on 28 September that nations not recognize Guinea immediately.

Premier Sekou Toure of Guinea has expressed his desire to retain close ties with France and to remain within the franc zone. However, if continued economic assistance is not forthcoming from France, or if Paris is able to discourage aid from other Western sources, he may feel obliged to seek non-Western help.

Following Paris' acknowledgment of its de facto independence, Guinea proclaimed itself a republic on 2 October. However, Paris has previously indicated that it would accord de jure recognition only after bilateral economic and political negotiations, which are expected to take at least 60 days. The large favorable vote given to the new constitution in the seven other territories of the French West African federation appears to have hardened the French attitude toward Guinea. Paris may seek to make Guinea an object lesson to other French African nationalists who aspire to independence.

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Indonesia

Seizure by the Indonesian rebels in the past ten days of several towns in Sumatra, including Sibolga--a major center in Tapanuli--and at least two small towns in the Djambi area of Central Sumatra, has been followed by a central government counterattack which began on 29 September. Dissident successes probably were facilitated by government clearing operations in both North and Central Sumatra which drew troops away from garrisoned areas.

Government troops are thinly spread throughout Sumatra, with towns and cities lightly held. [redacted] [redacted]

[redacted] army commanders in Java were "preparing their share" in the planned counterattack implies that additional troops may be detailed to disturbed areas.

[redacted] Army Chief of Staff General Nasution stated recently that rebel guerrilla activity would require months to subdue.

In the plantation area of North Sumatra, south of Medan, the dissidents are continuing their attacks on foreign estates. One hundred armed dissidents destroyed a number of processing buildings on a US Rubber estate on the night of 25-26 September, and on 23 September 200 armed men threatened the large Goodyear rubber estate with destruction unless large monthly payments were instituted. [redacted] [redacted]

[redacted] attacks on economic targets must be continued. [redacted]

In Djakarta, Indonesian businessmen report that Soviet-bloc countries persist in their efforts to fill the economic vacuum created by the forced withdrawal of the Dutch in late 1957 and early 1958. Several informants state that Communist-influenced trade unions plan a drive in November to force Indonesian companies to accept Soviet-bloc offers.

Eight of the IL-28 jet bombers purchased by Indonesia early this year from Czechoslovakia reportedly have been assigned to the air force for training purposes. [redacted]



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III. THE WEST

Cyprus

Isolated armed attacks on British servicemen, acts of sabotage and a general strike, and demonstrations have thus far been the Greek Cypriot answer to implementation of the British plan for Cyprus on 1 October. The all-out campaign of violence, long threatened by EOKA leader Grivas and other Greek Cypriot spokesmen if the British proceeded with their plan, has not yet occurred. Governor Foot believes, however, that EOKA is merely waiting for the result of present diplomatic activities in Athens, Paris, London, and Ankara before launching its attack.

NATO Secretary General Spaak's plan to convene a conference attended by representatives of Greece, Turkey, Britain, and possibly other NATO states, at which the British plan for Cyprus could be discussed and possibly modified, is being examined in the three capitals concerned. At the 6 October meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the three governments are expected to indicate their official response to Spaak's suggestion. Britain appears receptive to the idea of a conference, as long as discussion is based on the British plan, but both Turkey and Greece are reluctant to attend.

A Turkish official has implied that Turkey will refuse to attend on the basis that the conference is doomed to failure. Refusal, however, would probably be based more on fear that Turkey would be asked to make further concessions to secure Greek acceptance of the British plan. Spaak's efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus impasse are regarded with suspicion in Ankara, where he is accused of being a "Greek pawn."

The Greek Government has reacted angrily to recent changes in Spaak's original proposals for a conference--proposals which Greece had previously indicated were acceptable. Officials in Athens now believe Greece will refuse to attend the proposed conference as the agenda will be too limited in scope. Foreign

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Minister Averoff continues to warn that the present lack of support for the Greek position by the Western powers will force either the resignation of the Karamanlis government or its withdrawal from NATO. King Paul's sudden return to Athens on 2 October from his Austrian vacation may indicate that far-reaching decisions are being made in Athens regarding Greece's future relations with the West.



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Return of Former Colombian Dictator May Cause Disorders

Former dictator Rojas Pinilla, who was ousted from office in May 1957, intends to return to Colombia by 6 October to refute charges of corruption during his administration, [redacted]

He apparently believes that a bold attempt to clear his name will rally his followers and eventually restore him to power. His scheduled return is causing grave concern to President Lleras Camargo, who fears the disorders, which Rojas' followers might instigate in the event of an attempt on the ex-dictator's life. Lleras has guaranteed Rojas' safety and has redoubled precautionary measures to ensure order.

Clandestine meetings of retired military and political supporters of Rojas are said to be in progress and the loyalty of the chief of the air force, General Pauwels, as well as that of some discontented army noncommissioned officers, is uncertain. A coup may be attempted against the popular Lleras government using Rojas as a rallying point. The bulk of the armed forces, however, appear loyal to the government and capable of preventing serious disorders. [redacted]

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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Special Adviser to the President

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

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The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

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Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

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