

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

25 April 1959


Copy No. C 62

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 37
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS 2010
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE 4.14.80 REVIEWER:

~~TOP SECRET~~



25 APRIL 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev's letter to Nasir.

II. ASIA-AFRICA


Iranians protest against Soviet overflights; their count believed exaggerated.

Yemen - Crown Prince Badr tightens security measures.

Power struggle in Sudanese military government appears to be approaching showdown.

Morocco to resume negotiations on US air bases; will press for further steps toward evacuation.


Britain decides to sell heavy weapons to Iraq; delivery will not take place before 1960.



- ⑦ Afro-Asian Economic Conference to take up question of admitting USSR.
- ⑧ Burmese Army using Tibet situation to stimulate sentiment against Communist China.
- ⑨ Japanese elections disclose no major shift in party strengths.

III. THE WEST

- ⑩ West German public opinion poll.
- ⑪ Britain - Deferral of elections will tend to put Macmillan under pressure to compromise in East-West negotiations.



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

25 April 1959

DAILY BRIEF

SI RAB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-UAR: [redacted]

[redacted] the USSR in supporting Iraq, is merely fulfilling requests Nasir made when he visited Moscow following the Iraqi revolution. Khrushchev again denied that the USSR controls local Arab Communist parties, and warned Nasir not to look to the West for assistance. [redacted]

[redacted] he does not intend to slacken his campaign against Communism. He may, however, curb his attacks on conditions in the Soviet bloc. [redacted]
(Page 1)

OK
delete last
& P's add
brief from
27 Apr CIB

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iran-USSR: (The Iranian ambassador in Moscow told Ambassador Thompson on 23 April that he had protested against Soviet overflights and that he will soon present the Iranian reply to the Soviet memorandum of last December which warned Iran of the "serious deterioration" of Soviet-Iranian relations. He states further that continued propaganda attacks against the Shah could lead Iran to break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Some Soviet overflights of Iranian territory undoubtedly occur, but the large number of violations reported recently by the Iranians is believed exaggerated.) [redacted]

No

~~TOP SECRET~~

Yemen: [redacted] Crown Prince Badr's representatives in the northern capital at Sana on 20 April moved to arrest plotters believed attempting to seize control of the city. Stringent security measures in Sana are being tightened further. [redacted]

*OK
delete
1st #*

[redacted] contrary to the claims of Yemen's deputy foreign minister, Badr has not received full assurance of support from the influential northern tribal leaders. Several Yemeni officials, meanwhile, have indicated to the American chargé in Taiz that [redacted] Badr is planning to curtail Soviet bloc activity in Yemen. Such action would probably reflect assurances of additional Egyptian support for Badr.) [redacted] (Page 2)

Sudan: The behind-the-scenes struggle for power within the Sudanese military government seems to be approaching a showdown. (Brigadier Shannan, spokesman of the junior officers movement, is reported to have alerted troops and officers loyal to him to be ready for a coup attempt on short notice.) A majority of the Supreme Military Council opposes Shannan, and a meeting of all military commanders has been called for 10 May. As a special precaution in the meantime, Army Headquarters has issued orders to all regional commands requiring 24 hours' notice before any officer of the rank of major or above travels to Khartoum. [redacted] (Page 3)

*OK
delete last
sentence of
FP1 and end
of last FP
after "10 May"*

Morocco: (Rabat apparently will soon resume formal negotiations--suspended since last fall--regarding the five American air bases located in Morocco. The government is almost certain to press the United States to take further steps toward the evacuation of the bases. Premier Ibrahim, under mounting pressure to eliminate all foreign troops from Morocco, has already raised with Madrid the question of withdrawing the 10,500 Spanish troops from northern Morocco, and King Mohamed V has asked that an agreement on the 28,000 French troops be reached during his projected meeting with De Gaulle.) [redacted]

No

[redacted] (Page 4)

No

Britain-Iraq: (The British cabinet has decided to sell Iraq Centurion tanks, Canberra bombers, heavy weapons, and other arms. In informing Premier Qasim of this decision, Ambassador Trevelyan will stress British expectations that Iraq will remain free of Communist control, keep oil flowing to Europe, and improve trade ties with Britain. If Qasim reacts favorably, it is planned to deliver some equipment this year. London points out that its decision can be reversed before delivery of heavy weapons begins in 1960.)

OK

Afro-Asian Economic Conference: A planning committee of the Afro-Asian Economic Conference, whose temporary headquarters is in Cairo, is meeting in Indonesia to study the terms of a permanent constitution for that body. Two problems which are to be resolved by the committee are whether the USSR should be made a member of the conference, and where the permanent headquarters of the conference should be. A draft constitution reportedly forwarded from Cairo envisages Soviet membership and a Cairo headquarters. There is strong opposition to Soviet participation, however, and several nations feel the headquarters should be in South or Southeast Asia. (Page 5)

No - was in Friday's CID

Burma: The Burmese Army is attempting to exploit the Tibetan situation to stimulate sentiment against Communist China. The army is arranging for political and Buddhist groups to distribute throughout Burma 100,000 copies of a pamphlet on Tibet on an unattributed basis. Fear of China as well as the desire for a border settlement with Peiping prevent Prime Minister Ne Win from adopting an openly anti-Communist foreign policy. (Page 7)

OK

Japan: The ruling conservatives under Prime Minister Kishi maintained their predominance over the Socialists in the 23 April elections by winning the key governorships of Tokyo, Osaka, and Hokkaido. The contest in the crucial Tokyo race was close and the Socialists won the important governorship of Fukuoka as

25 Apr 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

~~TOP SECRET~~

was anticipated. The elections revealed no major shift in the relative strength of the two parties.

*Nevertheless, conservative success in stemming the pro-Socialist trend of recent years should exert an important psychological influence in favor of the conservatives in the June upper-house elections, as well as strengthen Kishi's personal position. [redacted] (Page 8)

III. THE WEST

OK
West Germany - West Berlin: A public opinion poll in West Berlin and West Germany on the Berlin crisis reaffirms that faith in the West, particularly in the US, remains strong, both in terms of Western power and Western determination to protect Berlin. The Germans are not so confident of the West's negotiating position, but they discount the danger of war and believe the USSR will back down or compromise. West Germans favor accepting East German control over Allied access rather than risking war and nearly two-thirds of them would have Bonn negotiate with the East German regime on reunification. On this latter question opinion is divided in West Berlin, but a substantial majority in both areas agree that free elections are essential for reunification. [redacted] (Page 9)

HO
Britain: (Macmillan's decision not to call general elections this spring will tend to increase pressures on his government to promote compromises in coming East-West negotiations. The elections, mandatory by May 1960, are now most likely to be called in October. The American Embassy has noted that holding elections soon after summit talks would place Macmillan under maximum pressure to secure agreement there in view of the expected closeness of the electoral contest.) [redacted]

25 Apr 59

DAILY BRIEF

iv

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Moscow Continues Efforts to Mollify Nasir

[REDACTED]

(The USSR is continuing its efforts to convince Nasir that he would best serve his own long-term interests by relaxing his anti-Communist, anti-bloc campaign. [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] Moscow's arguments that the UAR's attacks on Communism and the bloc aid only Western "imperialists," [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the USSR, in aiding Iraq, is merely fulfilling requests Nasir made when he visited Moscow following the Iraqi revolution)

(Khrushchev reportedly again denied that the Soviet Union controls Arab Communist parties and apologized for his remark on 16 March accusing Nasir of using the "language of imperialists" on the grounds that he did not mean to imply that Nasir--"a true nationalist" and "the only leader in the Arab world"--is an imperialist.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Soviet radio propagandists have taken up this theme, with one Arabic commentary on 23 April claiming the West cannot market Egyptian cotton and that "Israeli influence" prevents Western participation in the Aswan high dam project.) [REDACTED]

(The UAR Embassy in Moscow notified Cairo on 15 April that it was receiving an increasing number of letters and telegrams from Soviet citizens protesting the UAR's policy. Two days later the UAR chargé in Moscow reported that Soviet presidium member Mukhitdinov had said he hoped UAR Ambassador Kuni would soon return to his Moscow post in view of Kiselev's return to Cairo. [REDACTED])

(Nasir [REDACTED] does not intend to slacken his campaign against Communism. It is possible, however, that he will curb his attacks on conditions in the Soviet bloc.) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Opposition to Crown Prince Badr Increasing in Northern Yemen

Crown Prince Badr, who has been left in charge in Yemen during his father's medical treatment in Italy, was informed on 20 April that his representatives in the northern capital of Sana had arrested several conspirators who were planning to seize control of the city. [redacted] Badr's representatives intended to obtain details of the conspiracy by torturing the suspects. The already stringent security measures taken by Badr in Sana have been tightened further, and Badr's agents have requested authority to issue ammunition to loyal troops in the city. [redacted]

[redacted] Badr is attempting to move army reinforcements to Sana, somewhat to the concern of some local commanders. [redacted]

[redacted] contradicts earlier reports that the influential tribal leaders who are opposed to Badr's succeeding his father when the latter dies, had nevertheless assured him of full support as regent in the Imam's absence. Prior to his father's departure for Italy, Badr sent units of his personal bodyguard to Sana, replaced officials of questionable loyalty, and appointed an Egyptian officer in charge of the Sana police. Badr is in Taiz, the southern capital, where his position is less insecure.)

(Several Yemeni officials have indicated to the American chargé in Taiz that Badr is planning some unspecified curtailment of Soviet bloc activity in Yemen. This presumably relates to earlier reports that all foreign diplomatic installations in Yemen may be closed, and Yemen's foreign relations handled in Cairo through the mechanism of the United Arab States, the federation of the UAR and Yemen. Such action by Badr would probably reflect assurances of additional Egyptian support.) [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

New Crisis in Sudanese Military Government

Brigadier Abd al-Rahim Shannan, who spearheads the dissident junior officers' movement, has encountered increasing opposition from Brigadier Hasan Beshir Nasir and a coalition of senior officers in the Supreme Military Council, the Sudan's highest government organ. While Shannan's group has obtained some of its demands--rehabilitation of a number of pro-Egyptian officers and establishment of a committee to purge the government ministries--its attempts to obtain full control of the government have been frustrated. [redacted] Each faction has had some success in having its own supporters assigned to key middle-ranking army jobs. [redacted]

[redacted] (Impatient with the progress of his efforts, on 20 April Shannan is reported to have alerted troops and officers loyal to him to be ready for a coup effort on short notice.) On 23 April, he and the two other brigadiers who used troop movements on 4 March to force their way onto the Supreme Council allegedly left Khartoum to line up adherents in their former regional commands.) [redacted]

The senior officers of the Supreme Council who oppose Shannan are consolidating their support in preparation for a showdown, while Premier Abboud appears to be attempting to avoid violence and hold his military government together. [redacted] The council has called a meeting of all military commanders for 10 May, and as a special precaution in the meantime, army headquarters has ordered all regional commands to give 24 hours' notice before any officer of the rank of major or above travels to Khartoum. Abboud himself plans to visit the Central and Western Commands early next week, presumably in an attempt to ensure their backing. [redacted]

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]



Morocco Appears Ready to Resume Negotiations on American Air Bases

(The Ibrahim government appears ready to resume formal negotiations regarding the status of the five American air bases in Morocco. Discussions were initiated in May 1955 and suspended last fall. Premier Ibrahim, who unexpectedly brought up the subject with Ambassador Yost on 18 April, seems certain to press the United States to take further steps toward evacuating the bases.)

(Ibrahim is under mounting political pressure to obtain the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Morocco. Earlier this month he raised with Madrid the question of withdrawing the 10,-500 Spanish troops from northern Morocco. King Mohamed V has indicated he desires to conclude an agreement on the 28,-000 French troops in Morocco during his projected meeting with De Gaulle which may take place in mid-June.)



~~SECRET~~

Consultative Committee of Afro-Asian Economic Conference
Meets in Indonesia

An eleven-member consultative committee appointed by the Afro-Asian Economic Conference in Cairo last December is meeting in Indonesia from 25 to 30 April to study the terms of a constitution for a permanent Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Cooperation and to decide on a site for its headquarters. Japan, Communist China, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Iraq, the UAR, Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Ghana are represented on the committee.

The committee's major constitutional problem is to decide whether to admit the USSR as a full member of the new organization. An Indonesian, who was a key figure in the conference in Cairo, says he has received a draft constitution from Cairo which provides for Soviet membership and for an organization headquarters in Cairo. The draft also provides for a powerful secretary general and a significant reduction in the influence of member delegations--an arrangement which would give the UAR a strong hand if the headquarters were to be established in Cairo.

Several nations at the Cairo Conference in December opposed Soviet membership, and Indonesia, Pakistan, India, and Japan will probably oppose it again. Ethiopia and Libya may also oppose. The UAR, Iraq, Sudan, Communist China, and possibly Ghana may favor Soviet participation. The vote at the consultative committee meeting will therefore presumably be close.

On the location of a permanent headquarters, the committee may also be widely divided. Indonesia apparently favors Bandung or Djakarta, though it would support Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, or New Delhi. Other nations opposing the UAR's previous attempts to dominate Afro-Asian meetings probably would also favor a shift from Cairo.

The 40-nation Afro-Asian Economic Conference held in Cairo last December was nongovernmental and supposedly nonpolitical in nature. The Egyptians, however, invited the USSR to be a member of the conference and asked delegations from several other Communist countries to be observers. Communist propaganda efforts

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

at the conference were set back by a conflict over the legitimacy of the USSR's membership, and the resolutions produced were more moderate than originally anticipated. They were concerned mainly with economic collaboration among member countries, the effect of the European Common Market on the Afro-Asian world, means of resolving transfer-of-payments difficulties, and the establishment of a permanent Afro-Asian economic organization.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Burmese Army Using Tibetan Revolt in Internal Anti-Communist Propaganda Campaign

The psychological warfare section of the Burmese Army is exploiting the strong popular reaction to developments in Tibet in what will apparently be a continuing internal propaganda campaign aimed at discrediting the Chinese Communists as well as Burma's own Communists. The army is discreetly sponsoring [redacted] distribution of 100,000 copies of a pamphlet on Tibet, as well as additional copies of a pamphlet prepared by the army itself purporting to describe the attitude of Burmese Communists toward religion. These tracts will be distributed by various Buddhist organizations and by local "solidarity committees," which the army has established throughout the country to mobilize popular support for the Ne Win government.

The army is also believed to have been responsible for a series of recent statements by prominent Buddhist clerical and lay leaders strongly denouncing Chinese Communist actions in Tibet and expressing sympathy for the Tibetan lamas. The army's deputy director for psychological warfare is reported, for example, to have been the actual drafter of a recent letter to the press signed by the president of a powerful organization of monks promising that protest meetings would be staged by the monks throughout the country and inviting the Dalai Lama to seek asylum in Burma.

This army campaign is a further manifestation of the strongly anti-Communist policy the Ne Win regime is pursuing internally. Despite their strong personal feelings, however, General Ne Win and his army advisers are apparently still unprepared to risk Chinese Communist pressure by officially denouncing Peiping's actions in Tibet or taking other overt actions to bring Burma's foreign policy more in line with its internal policy. [redacted]

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Japanese Conservatives Maintain Superiority Over Socialists
In Nationwide Elections

Prime Minister Kishi's Liberal Democratic party maintained its predominance over the Socialists in the 23 April elections held throughout Japan for gubernatorial and municipal offices. Although the elections do not reveal a major shift in the relative strength of the two major parties, the prestige of the conservatives has risen as a result of their winning the key governorships of Tokyo, Osaka, and Hokkaido on which national attention was focused. Hokkaido has been a Socialist stronghold during most of the postwar period.

While local issues and personalities played the major role in the outcome, both parties made an effort to present international issues in the major contests. However, the narrow margin of the conservative victories in Tokyo, Osaka, and Hokkaido, where such issues normally would have the most impact, precludes any assessment of popular reaction to the Socialist leadership's identification with the Chinese Communist position on Asian issues on the one hand, and the conservatives' policy of cooperation with the United States on the other.

Conservative success in stemming the pro-Socialist trend of recent years should exert an important psychological influence in favor of the conservatives in the important upper-house elections in early June. It should also strengthen Prime Minister Kishi's personal position in the party, since conservative dissidents had warned that they would demand that Kishi "take responsibility" if the conservatives did poorly. Conversely, the Socialist leadership is certain to come under fire, and their adverse showing will possibly weaken the unity of the party.

A conservative-led administration in Hokkaido will probably improve civilian-military relations in a major defense area where there is a relatively large concentration of Japanese forces and American installations. In addition, the conservative gubernatorial victory in Tokyo may clear the way for Japanese Defense Agency plans to establish a missile testing center on Niijima Island which would have been opposed by a Socialist governor.

~~SECRET~~

III. THE WEST

West German and West Berlin Public Opinion Survey

In an unpublished public opinion survey concluded on 19 April by a reputable private polling institute, almost two thirds of the West Germans interviewed favored direct political negotiations between Bonn and the East German governments on unification. These results indicate that Bonn's policy of rejecting such negotiations is apparently no longer supported by the majority of the public. West Berlin opinion on the question was almost evenly divided. Free elections, however, are considered an essential condition for unification by a majority of those polled.

On the question of accepting East German control over Berlin access routes or sending a convoy through at the "risk of war," there were greater differences between West German and West Berlin opinion. Over 50 percent of the Berliners would prefer a risk of war, while only 21 percent of the West Germans would advocate such a move. Some dealings with East Germans would be acceptable to 41 percent of West Germans, while 38 percent were undecided.

A majority of both West Germans and Berliners believed that the Western powers will "stand firm" in insisting on free access to Berlin. Although the chances for unification were considered poor by more than 50 percent, a majority of those interviewed expected some worthwhile results from the forthcoming East-West conferences. Eighty percent in Berlin and 59 percent in West Germany expected the Soviet Union to back down or compromise on the Berlin question.

The poll shows a general indecisiveness over East-West troop withdrawals from Germany prior to unification. While 39 percent felt such a move would endanger German security, 37 percent believed it would not be dangerous or would make no difference, and 24 percent were undecided.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~