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26 May 1959

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## CENTRAL

## INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Tibet: The Chinese Communists apparently are having some success in inducing Tibetans remaining in Lhasa to identify themselves with the regime,

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### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq: Qasim's press conference of 23 May contained a stronger warning to the Iraqi Communists and associated elements whose leaders intend to continue their party activities. He declared that obstruction by any group of his plan to suspend political activities would be viewed as action against "the safety of the republic, even though unintentional." (Page 2)

Laos: The Laotian Army staff reportedly is pessimistic about the value of further negotiations with the commander of the escaped Pathet Lao battalion but is still willing to integrate these troops. The local army commander has been instructed to contain this unit--elements of which exchanged fire with Laotian troops on 23 May--andultimately to attack it if it does not return to its camp on the Plaine des Jarres.

The 25 May letter of Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi to the Geneva Accords cochairmen-Britain and the USSR-called on them to reconvene the International Control Commission (ICC) in Laos "immediately." (Page 3)

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#### III. THE WEST

France-Spain: A meeting between President de Gaulle and General Franco in the French Pyrenées is reported planned for sometime after the Geneva conference. De Gaulle has been trying to improve relations between Paris and Madrid and now is backing NATO membership for Spain. He probably hopes to obtain Spain's political cooperation in North Africa and enlist its support for a greater French role in the NATO command areas adjacent to Spain and in the western Mediterranean. (Page 4)

West Germany - USSR: Recent efforts to achieve an understanding among NATO governments against long-term government-guaranteed credits to the USSR are threatened by contracts concluded by a government-owned West German shippard. Credits extending for at least five years have been arranged to finance the construction of three merchant vessels costing ten million dollars, and negotiations are continuing for shipbuilding contracts involving at least an additional thirty million dollars. Bonn defends the projects as necessary to meet competition from other Western European countries and alleviate serious unemployment in the shippards. The British have reaffirmed their willingness to give guaranteed credits of just under five years in their effort to expand Anglo-Soviet trade.

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DAILY BRIEF

ΪΪ

Tibet Situation
Peiping is having some success in inducing Tibetans re-
maining in Lhasa to identify themselves outwardly with the
Communist regime. Tibetan officials there have cut off their
pigtails and have shifted from wearing traditional cloaks to
Communist-style coats and trousers,
Life is returning to "normal," and
the sole Lhasa cinema has been reopened as the "People's
Cinema House' to show propaganda films.
Military operations against the rebels in other areas of Tibet
continue.
Peiping apparently is seeking to transfer the Dalai Lama's
prestige to the tractable Panchen Lama, who is being used to
eliminate the Tibetan theocracy's political power. While Pei-
ping has not abandoned its claim that the Dalai Lama is in
India "under duress," it has sharply curtailed press attacks.
The strain in Sino-Indian relations continues, and the Indian
ambassador to Peiping states that he feels "isolated" even
though treated with "courtesy." The Soviet ambassador, the
Indian diplomat reported, felt New Delhi "had gone too far"
in criticizing Chinese actions in Tibet.
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The Indians are attempting to repair the surface damage
to relations with Peiping but, as Nehru said, the presence
of the Dalai Lama in India will be the subject of continuing
strain. India's Foreign Secretary Dutt stated on 21 May that
Nehru has no hope the Dalai Lama will ever return to Lhasa
in a status comparable to that which he held before his flight.
Indian attitudes toward Communist China will also be adversely
influenced by the psychological effect of the suppression, of
which the 13.000 Tibetan refugees will serve as a remindent

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## Qasim Warns Iraqi Communist Party

Iraqi Communist leaders insist that party activity should continue, although they have announced the abandonment of their "educational" campaign for appointment to the cabinet of acknowledged Communist party representatives and have dropped their demand that political parties be given official sanction immediately.

In a press conference on 23 May, Prime Minister Qasim warned that "unintentional" obstruction by any group of his plan to suspend partisan political activities would be considered "unintentional action against the safety of the republic." The official Communist newspaper omitted this passage in reporting Qasim's statements, and the following day it published a long editorial stressing the need for "sincere party activities" to "assure the success of the republic."

Elements of the Communist-penetrated left wing of the socialist National Democratic party have denounced the decision of the party's leadership to suspend party activity and have declared, 'We will persist in our party work.''

There are signs that the Communists' open dispute with Qasim has cost them a measure of their control over Baghdad's press and radio. Three Baghdad newspapers which usually echo the Communist line have veered away on the question of legal sanction for political parties. Director General of Guidance Ayyub has gently criticized the press and radio for unfounded charges against some Iraqi officials. On 24 May, Radio Baghdad broadcast the text of a Canadian journalist's interview with Qasim on 20 May, in which Qasim was more friendly toward the West than previously and indicated that the Iraqi people should no longer have reason to hate the Western allies of the old regime.



### Pathet Lao Battalion Commander Breaks Off Surrender Negotiations

The commander of the escaped Pathet Lao battalion broke off his negotiations with Laotian Army representatives in the field following an exchange of fire between advance elements on 23 May. The Laotian Army staff, reportedly pessimistic about the value of any future negotiations with the Pathet battalion, nevertheless is still willing to integrate these troops if they return to their camp on the Plaine des Jarres. Laotian Army strategy is to contain these troops and to seal off all trails leading to the North Vietnamese frontier. The army is prepared ultimately to attack the Pathet unit but apparently would prefer to effect its surrender through psychological-warfare methods.)

A high-ranking Lao Army officer says he has advised Premier Phoui Sananikone to require former Pathet Lao chief Souphannouvong to appeal to the unit in person. He also said that Crown Prince Savang told Phoui on 23 May that the government should take immediate and drastic repressive measures against the Neo Lao Hak Zat-the Communist-dominated legal political successor to the Pathet Lao. Phoui reportedly replied he was not yet prepared to do so.)

The 25 May letter from Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi to Geneva Accords cochairmen Britain and the USSR, which called on them to reconvene the International Control Commission (ICC) in Laos "immediately," is designed to maintain the momentum of the Communist campaign and embarrass the British, who have been actively seeking to avoid a reconvening.)

Lao military officials have received reports from Laotian irregular forces that an estimated 50 Communist Vietnamese soldiers wearing Laotian Army uniforms had	
crossed into Laos, but this is unconfirmed.	
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## Meeting Between De Gaulle and Franco Planned

Plans for a meeting between President de Gaulle and Gen-	
eral Franco have been tentatively arranged by high-level French	
and Spanish officials who met in Madrid in mid-April,	
The two leaders are to meet	
somewhere in the French Pyrenées sometime after the Geneva	
conference.	

De Gaulle has been trying to improve French-Spanish relations, which have generally been strained since 1936. A series of contacts between French and Spanish officials—mostly military officers—have occurred over the past year, and Paris now is publicly sponsoring Spain's entry into NATO. De Gaulle has long maintained that Spain's exclusion from Western defense was "ridiculous" and that the character of its political regime was irrelevant.

The French President probably hopes, in return, to obtain a friendly Spanish attitude toward French policy in Africa, particularly North Africa. Paris may also be seeking Spanish support for activation, under a French admiral, of the NATO "Iberlant" command—the eastern Atlantic area adjacent to Spain between Brest in the north and Dakar in the south—as well as support for changes in defense arrangements for the western Mediterranean.

Socialist opposition to Franco in Norway, Denmark, and certain other NATO countries is still a substantial obstacle to Spain's admittance to NATO, but the French Socialist party is no longer sufficiently strong to block a Paris-Madrid rapprochement. De Gaulle's most difficult task will probably be to allay Spanish suspicions that France is seeking to expand its influence in North Africa at Spain's expense.



## West German - Soviet Negotiations For Ship Construction

Contracts concluded by the West German governmentowned Howaldt shipyard threaten to undercut a proposed ban against the participation of NATO governments in longterm credits for the USSR. Credit extending for more than five years has been arranged to finance the construction of three fruit carriers, costing ten million dollars, and negotiations are continuing for contracts involving at least thirty million dollars for the construction of five or six floating fish canneries. Half the payment is to be made on delivery, with the balance to be paid in five annual installments. The time from the beginning of construction to final payment will exceed the five-year limit being sought among NATO countries for medium-term credits.

Bonn officials argue that their position in NATO opposing such credits is not affected because the deal is guaranteed by a state government rather than by the Federal Republic and is a "one-time exception" which does not vitiate Bonn's general policy. Bonn officials maintain the projects are necessary to alleviate serious unemployment in the shipbuilding industry. They feel that if West Germany refuses the contracts, other Western nations are sure to fill them. Previous negotiations by a Hamburg shippard for the construction of passenger ships for the USSR failed because of Soviet insistence on long-term financing. Bonn claims the contracts were later awarded to Dutch shipbuilders. West German approval of the contracts appears likely, and arrangements are pending for an additional 19 ships.

These developments coincide with the conclusion of an extensive British-Soviet trade agreement calling for a substantial increase in trade during the next five years. Increased British exports will, at least in part, be financed through government-guaranteed "intermediate" credits-for less than five years--which the British have made available in an attempt to obtain a substantial share of the Soviet program of purchasing chemical plants.



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