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15 April 1959

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CENTRAL


INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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15 APRIL 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

East German rank and file apathetic toward Soviet moves on Berlin and German problem.

Khrushchev's grudging endorsement of Gomulka seen posing long-range alternative for Kremlin of crushing Gomulka or permitting other satellites similar "heresy."

Peiping appears concerned over strain on Sino-Indian relations from Tibet incident.

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
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
II. ASIA-AFRICA

Intercepts confirm Iran is arming Resistance Force.

Turkey, alarmed over growth of Communist power in Iraq, probably revising earlier advocacy of all-out support for Qasim.

Iran desires to improve relations with USSR.

British airline seeks pooling agreement with Indian international carrier.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 April 1959

DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

East Germany: [East German party leaders have been unable to evoke any enthusiasm for Moscow's policies concerning Berlin and Germany among the populace and party members. Even high party functionaries are convinced that "Big Brother" will make all decisions and that any East German action would be pointless.]

MO [some party members are against a separate peace treaty on the grounds that it would finalize the Oder-Neisse boundary.]

USSR-Poland: Commenting on the recent party congress in Warsaw,

MO [stated that Khrushchev's grudging endorsement of both Gomulka and Poland's special brand of Communism is, in time bound to have an impact on Communists throughout the world. Moscow may be faced eventually with the alternative of crushing Gomulka or permitting other satellites the same degree of autonomy as Poland, which would weaken Soviet control.]

(Page 1)

MO Communist China - Tibet - India: [Peiping's statements and dealings with India have been increasingly cautious since the Tibet revolt started last month. Communist China has thus far made no formal protest concerning Indian Government statements critical of the Communist handling of the revolt. Reflecting this policy, Peiping recently instructed the managing editor of two Hong Kong Communist newspapers to "make no attacks on India."]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq: [redacted]

[redacted] small arms have been issued to the Communist-controlled Popular Resistance Force. Priority is being given units stationed near the Iraqi frontiers. However, the quantities and types of arms distributed suggest that the primary purpose at this time is training. [redacted] (Page 2)

MO

Turkey-Iraq-Egypt: [redacted] Top Turkish officials are becoming increasingly pessimistic over developments in Iraq, reflecting a significant change in Turkish policy toward that country. Ankara has agreed to cooperate in any joint approach to impress Qasim with the danger of Communist engulfment. It continues to warn, however, that if Nasir gains in the Middle East, the free world will be no better off, because Nasir will "tumble" to the Communists whenever it suits him. [redacted]

MO

[redacted] (Page 3)

Iran-USSR: [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Soviet-Iranian negotiations may be in the offing. [redacted]

MO

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, in reply to the urging of the new Iranian ambassador that Soviet propaganda attacks be halted, asked: "If these statements are stopped, are you willing to come to an agreement with us?" [redacted] (Page 4)

India: [redacted] British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) apparently is attempting to secure an agreement with Air India International providing for pooling of revenues and facilities. Such an agreement would provide for equipping Air India with British jet aircraft and would improve BOAC's competitive position vis-a-vis US airlines. Air India officials state that they are dubious of the value of the proposed British agreement. They feel they cannot compete with BOAC unless they obtain new aircraft, and they have informally requested US aid to enable them to purchase US aircraft. [redacted] (Page 5)

OK

15 Apr 59

DAILY BRIEF

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

III. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

[The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions were to be used in context with SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that estimate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959):]

[1. Evidence of preparations for evacuation of Soviet control elements from Berlin continues to mount. While the USSR will not turn over access controls to the GDR in the near future, the physical transfer of access controls could be accomplished with little or no advance warning.]

[2. There are no reliable indications of a bloc intent in the near future to blockade Allied or West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin from the bloc. However, the USSR could take such actions with little or no warning. The recent completion of new facilities at the Marienborn checkpoint suggests that the East Germans may impose tighter controls on railroad traffic between West Germany and Berlin.]

OK [3. There are as yet no clear indications of specific Soviet tactics at the forthcoming foreign ministers' meeting in Geneva. Moscow is using propaganda media and covert channels to play down East-West tensions and attempt to soften Western positions on the basic issues involved.]

[4. It is still too early to determine what effect, if any, Chancellor Adenauer's decision to seek the presidency will have on Bonn's foreign policy.]

[5. Tension throughout West Berlin has noticeably abated and the upward trend of the stock market is a significant indicator of confidence. There is still considerable apprehension about the confusion surrounding international debate on Berlin and all-German problems. Most West Berlin political leaders prefer the status quo, despite its weaknesses, to any compromise.]

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Possible Impact on the Bloc of Khrushchev's Endorsement
Of Gomulka

[redacted] Khrushchev's grudging endorsement of Gomulka and Poland's own special brand of Communism is bound in time to have its impact on the Communist world. In the long run, Moscow may be faced with the alternatives of having to crush Gomulka or of permitting certain other satel-
lites a degree of autonomy which would weaken its control.]

[The truce between Khrushchev and Gomulka is based on mutual necessity, [redacted] As a Communist, Gomulka, in the final analysis, can look only to Moscow for support and dares not defy the USSR openly. On the other hand, trouble in Poland could mean only trouble for Khrushchev, who does not want to risk another Hungary while he is so deeply involved in important international political maneuverings.]

[Concern over the possible effect of the outcome of the Berlin crisis on Poland's unique position in the bloc has been expressed to [redacted]

[redacted] if the United States makes too many concessions to the Soviet Union in the current crisis over Berlin, the USSR would regard its dominance in Eastern Europe as assured and would no longer feel it necessary to tolerate the Polish differences. As long as there is some uncertainty in the USSR about the American attitude toward Eastern Europe, it will maintain the status quo in Poland and in some of the other countries.]

[Currently many Poles, including Gomulka, [redacted] [redacted] are concerned that the Soviet Union, despite Khrushchev's assurances to the contrary, will make "territorial adjustments," stripping Poland of its highly prized western territories in order to effect a German settlement. While Poland would prefer the Oder-Neisse border to be established for good, it fears the possible results of negotiations over Germany and will settle for a continuation of the status quo.] [redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

The Iraqi Situation

Rapid expansion of Iraq's Communist-controlled Popular Resistance Force (PRF), presently estimated to number as high as 50,000, is continuing, with new organizational and training centers being established throughout the country. As yet there has been no general order to issue arms to the PRF, but weapons are being furnished to PRF units stationed near the Iraqi frontiers and to the training centers. On 10 April, Baghdad ordered the issuance to the southern area PRF of 1,600 rifles, 60 Bren light machine guns, and 480 grenades, and smaller quantities to the central area PRF. Observations by American Embassy personnel indicate that in Baghdad PRF members must turn in their arms when they come off night patrol.

The growth of the PRF is probably causing concern among some Iraqi Army elements. Whether or not such elements have the capability to resist the steady expansion of Communist power is problematical, especially in the wake of Qasim's sweeping purge of high-ranking anti-Communist officers. Qasim's speeches to military personnel in Baghdad on 9 April were notable, nevertheless, for the great stress which he placed on the danger stemming from "poisons of division" within the army.

In his 14 April speech to the Communist-front Peace Partisans' rally in Baghdad, Qasim again warned against "divisive and reactionary elements." He aligned himself with the "democratic forces" who embody the "main inclination" in Iraq and whose objective is "to safeguard and preserve this immortal republic," but indicated there was room for "all parties of various inclinations if the objective of their leaders is to serve the country, freedom, and peace." [redacted]

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

[REDACTED]

Turkey Takes Harder Line on Iraq

[In contrast to Turkey's past attitude, which minimized the possibility that Iraqi Premier Qasim would fall entirely under Communist influence, Prime Minister Menderes informed the American ambassador on 10 April that both he and President Bayar now are alarmed and concerned over the Communist danger in Iraq. Menderes further said Turkey is prepared to participate in any concerted Western diplomatic activity to impress on Qasim the danger he faces.]

[Menderes stressed the continuing danger that UAR President Nasir will return to close relations with the USSR, reflecting the previous Turkish contention that the UAR rather than Iraq is the greater menace to the West. Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu has consistently minimized the Communist danger in Iraq and has sought to avoid putting pressure on Qasim.]

[Turkey made only mild protests over the Kirkuk disorders last October in which Iraq's Turkish-speaking minority was involved. In March 1959 Zorlu made the gesture of offering Qasim transit facilities in Turkey in order to assist the Iraqi Army to put down the Mosul rebels. Despite these initiatives, the Turkish ambassador to Baghdad, who is being replaced, has apparently been unsuccessful in his efforts to reassure both Qasim and the Iraqi public of his country's friendly attitude.] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Iran Seeks to Improve Relations With USSR

The new Iranian ambassador to Moscow, Abdol Hosein Masud-Ansari, tried during an interview with Foreign Minister Gromyko on 12 April to set the stage for improved Iranian-Soviet relations [redacted]

[redacted] Gromyko responded to Masud-Ansari's complaints over Radio Moscow's anti-Iranian propaganda with the query, "If these statements are stopped, are you willing to come to an agreement with us?" In response to Masud-Ansari's retort, "Let us not use coercion, and let us not ask to be rewarded for stopping a bad action," Gromyko said, "But we do not want to use coercion." The Iranian ambassador requested Tehran to note "in the next few days" whether this friendly interview results in any modification of the hostile tone of Radio Moscow. No substantial change in the Soviet broadcasts beamed to Iran has been noted by American monitors.

[redacted] [Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Minister Hekmat informed Ambassador Wailes in Tehran on 13 April that Iran hopes the Gromyko interview will re-establish a friendly atmosphere, and is prepared to discuss outstanding problems with the USSR. Ambassador Wailes believes Hekmat intended to indicate that Iran may be planning further negotiations of some type with the USSR.]

Iran's relations with the Soviet Union have been strained since negotiations for a nonaggression pact broke down on 10 February. Tehran's conclusion of a defense agreement with the United States on 5 March, despite a strenuous Soviet campaign to forestall it, has caused additional strains. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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BOAC Seeks to Pool Resources With Air India

British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) is attempting to secure an agreement with Air India International providing for pooling of revenues, according to an Air India official. The agreement would also provide for sharing of terminal facilities, maintenance operations, and booking offices, and would involve a realignment of routes of the two airlines between London and Tokyo via India. It would result in India's giving BOAC preference over other airlines on routes through India. BOAC has also offered to purchase Air India's Super Constellations and to supply it with Comets to modernize its fleet.

Air India officials, who claim they must make a decision by 1 June, say they fear such an agreement would cost their airline its independence. They feel, however, that they cannot compete with BOAC and other airlines unless they obtain new aircraft. They are not impressed with the Comet and would prefer Lockheed Electras or Boeing 720s to supplement the three Boeing 707s now on order. For this reason, they have informally requested US aid in financing the purchase of US aircraft.

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