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12 January 1959

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CENTRAL

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
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Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03015526



Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03015526 12 January 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Moscow probably expects rejection of its treaty proposal on Germany. Netherlands apparently accepts Molotov as ambassador. II. ASIA-AFRICA Iraq - Nasir approves Iraqi military plot against Qasim; no date set. Chinese Communists reportedly offering military assistance to Cambodia in face of Vietnamese and Thai plots. 4 III. THE WEST Belgian Congo - Belgium will offer new liberal policy on 13 January, but Congolese will continue restive. Cuban Communist movement to operate legally.

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03015526

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

12 January 1959

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: The Soviet note of 10 January calling for a conference in Warsaw or Prague within two months to conclude a German peace treaty and to discuss the Berlin question are elaborations of the basic points made in Mikoyan's aidememoire to Secretary Dulles. The Soviet leaders probably believe the West will reject a conference on these terms and that this reaction could be used to justify a subsequent Soviet move transferring to the East Germans control of Allied access to West Berlin. The harshly restrictive nature of the military and territorial provisions of the Soviet proposal is likely to antagonize West German elements hitherto favorable to peace treaty negotiations leading to reunification. (Page 1)

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USSR-Netherlands: The Hague has apparently agreed to accept Vyacheslav Molotov as Soviet ambassador to the Netherlands. If carried out, Molotov's appointment would remove him from an area important in Sino-Soviet relations, and would indicate that he has temporarily escaped any further punishment for his "antiparty" activities. It would also place one of the USSR's most experienced diplomats near the center of NATO activity in Europe. (Page 3)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

No

Iraq - UAR: "Iraqi division commanders" had on 9 January nearly completed plans for the overthrow of Premier Qasim and are now believed to have received Nasir's approval and advice; the source may be used by Nasir as a channel of information to the United States. No

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	free
	date for the move was mentioned. The commanders were re
	ported confident of success, apparently in spite of Qasim's
	recent moves to improve the security of his regime, includ-
	ing the formation of a new army division subservient to him.
	(Page 4)
	Thailand - Cambodia - South Vietnam: Cambodian Premier
	Thailand - Cambodia - South Vietnam: / Cambodian Premier Sihanouk, has been informed
Г	that Thais
L	
,	reportedly urging Sihanouk to accept military assistance from
, , ž	Communist China. Sihanouk allegedly has not yet decided
<i>,</i> ~	whether to accept the offer.
1	Thai and South
	Vietnamese agents expect to have a force of 1,200 men 'ready
	to go into action" by the end of January. This force, probably
	recruited from Cambodian dissidents in the Thai-Cambodian
	border area. is being assembled in Thailand.7
3	(Page 5)
	III. THE WEST
	Delvisor Delvisor Congres Who new policy for the Congres to be
	Belgium - Belgian Congo: The new policy for the Congo to be announced by Brussels on 13 January is said to be liberal in
	scope and envisages Congolese independence in 'a few years.'
	African political leaders, however, will probably distrust Bel-
	gian promises and will continue restive. The reported new
	policy could also provoke the European settler minority in the
	eastern Congo.] (Page 7)
	Cuba: Fidel Castro and other leaders of the politically dom-
	inant 26 of July Movement have declared that the Popular Social-
	ist (Communist) party (PSP) will now be permitted to operate as
	a legal party "since freedom of political action is guaranteed by
	the constitution." (Page 8)

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR Calls for Conference on German Peace Treaty

The Soviet notes to the Western powers calling for a conference in Warsaw or Prague within two months to conclude a German peace treaty and to discuss the Berlin question are intended as a major demonstration of Soviet flexibility and desire to negotiate. The Soviet leaders probably believe the West will reject a conference on these terms but that this initiative, combined with possible future "concessions," such as including East Berlin in the free-city proposal, will make it more difficult for the West to react firmly to subsequent Soviet action to transfer control over Allied access to West Berlin to the East Germans.

The Soviet draft treaty is essentially a formula for the neutralization of Germany. The central theme of the Soviet draft is that Western recognition of the existence of two German states is the indispensable precondition for any progress toward a German settlement. According to the draft treaty, representatives of both German states would participate in the negotiation and signing of a treaty, as well as representatives of a German confederation if this should be formed by the time a treaty is ready for signature.

The proposal for a peace conference within two months is intended to place Moscow in the most advantageous position to exploit growing pressures, particularly in West Germany and Britain, for a general review of the West's policy on German reunification and European security. The draft treaty provides for such key "disengagement" features as the withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany, a ban on German possession and production of nuclear weapons and other instruments of mass destruction, as well as bomber aircraft and submarines, and a prohibition on German participation in any military alliances directed against any of the signatory powers.

The Soviet proposals on Berlin are made an integral part of the draft treaty. The Soviet notes again warn that Western refusal to negotiate will not prevent the USSR from "renouncing its functions in Berlin" and transferring control over Allied access to the East Germans.

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East German party boss Walter Ulbricht has already called for preparatory discussions between Bonn and his regime concerning the Soviet proposals. East German official statements are even more uncompromising than Moscow's notes and appear to be setting the stage for advancing the claim that East Germany is the only legitimate German state and the East Berlin municipal council, the only legitimate government for the whole city.

The treaty's emphasis on restrictive military, territorial, and political provisions, which would reduce a reunified Germany to the status of a satellite, will probably antagonize even those West German elements who have supported peace treaty negotiations as a means of expediting reunification. Bonn circles have already pointed out that denial of political asylum and prohibitions on "revanchist" activities would enable the Soviet Union to interfere at will on the pretext of a treaty violation. A weak German confederation within present boundaries will be unacceptable to all West German political parties, although opposition parties will probably insist on accepting the principle of negotiations, in the hope of bargaining for better terms.

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Netherlands Agrees to Molotov as Soviet Ambassador

The Hague has apparently agreed to accept Vyacheslav Molotov as Soviet ambassador to the Netherlands. The Kremlin proposed the appointment several weeks ago, presumably before Khrushchev's latest attack against the "antiparty group" at the Soviet party central committee plenum last month. If now carried out, this assignment would effectively end any contacts with Peiping Molotov may have made during his tour as ambassador to Outer Mongolia. It had been rumored that he and the Chinese Communists have been conspiring to force Khrushchev to adopt a hard line in Soviet foreign affairs. It would also place one of the USSR's most experienced diplomats near the center of NATO activity in Europe.

A new diplomatic post for Molotov would indicate that he has escaped, at least temporarily, any further punishment for his antiparty activities. This would not necessarily be true for the other members of the anti-Khrushchev faction. There have been several recent indications that further action-perhaps expulsion from the party--is being planned for some of its members.

Actually, Molotov has always received favored treatment as compared with other members of the group, even though he has been under verbal attack almost as much as has Malenkov. Molotov has been able to spend more time in Moscow and probably received a better job in comparison with those given Malenkov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, and Shepilov. Molotov as a symbol of the link with Stalin and Lenin continues to have considerable prestige within the party, which may inhibit Khrushchev from removing him completely from the public scene.

II. ASIA-AFRICA				
Iraqi Division Commanders Plan Qasim Overthrow [Iraq's ambassador in Cairo stated on 9 January that the anti-Qasim army division commanders had nearly completed plans to overthrow the Iraqi premier, according to an Egyptian source who may be used by Nasir as a channel of information to the United States. The commanders had requested Nasir's advice, which was to be forwarded to them on 11 January.]				
In his reply, Nasir reportedly refrained from suggesting a date for their move, but urged that it be carried out swiftly, in the belief that the USSR would do nothing if taken by surprise. Nasir advised limiting bloodshed, although he recommended the execution of Qasim and "about 20 key leftists." He was said to be against the commanders' reported desire to join Iraq to the UAR following the coup, feeling that the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union would all oppose such a move.)				
It does not appear that Nasir has committed himself or UAR assets as fully as in the abortive December plot. He is probably uncertain of the will and capabilities of the commanders, who are reported "confident of success," however, in spite of the failure in December and Qasim's subsequent efforts to increase his regime's security, including the recent formation of a new division personally loyal to him. The commanders had been referred to as "hypocrites"				

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Plotting Against Cambodian Premier
An extraordinary meeting of Premier Sihanouk's close advisers was called by the premier on 9 January, to discuss
how to counter the plot against the regime by former royal councilor Sam Sary abetted by Thailand and South Vietnam. The session was allegedly provoked by a joint letter from the Soviet and Chinese Communist embassies informing Sihanouk of the plot and claiming that the United States was giving tacit support.
General Dap Chhuon, military commander of western Cambodia, was assigned to investigate the charges and, if they were true, he was to find Sam Sary, who is now actually in Saigon, and either jail or assassinate him. Dap Chhoun himself recently expressed a desire to remove Sihanouk, and the Thais and South Vietnamese plan to approach him for help later in staging their planned coup.
Peiping has been urging Sihanouk to accept an agreement to provide for the stationing of Chinese soldiers in Cambodia to discourage any external threats from South Vietnam or Thailand. Sihanouk is said to have not yet made up his mind. He told American Embassy officials after his trip to Peiping last August, however, that he had rejected an offer of military aid from Chou En-lai but that Communist China would come to his aid if Cambodia were attacked from the outside. Peiping is probably aware of Sihanouk's reluctance to accept Chinese military aid offers and would be well pleased if circumstances should compel him to do so. Should Cambodia request assistance from Communist China, Peiping would probably take pains to assure an appearance of legitimacy and correctness in its response.
Meanwhile, Thai and South Vietnamese agents working agains Sihanouk are accelerating their activity. the assembly of a force of 1.200 men began on 7 Jan-

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uary in Thailand at three places and was to be completed in five days. These men, probably Cambodian dissidents from the Thai-Cambodian border area, were to undergo training for 15 days 7

by Thai "technicians" and be ready "to go into action" by the end of January. A psychological warfare plan has been written and includes the distribution of leaflets all over Cambodia at "Hotel hour." Also, a "plan of aid addressed to the President
of the USA" has been prepared.

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III. THE WEST

New Belgian Policy Toward Congo	
The Belgian Government's new policy toward the which will be announced on 13 January as originally without reference to the recent riots in Leopoldville liberal in scope, portedly, it will grant limited autonomy preparatory independence in "a few years." Specifically it calls fequality between Belgians and Congolese and for electhis year by universal male suffrage. Territorial cwill be set up to consider local matters, and "subset a deliberative assembly with legislative powers will lished. Economically the Congolese will be treated same basis as the Europeans, with equal access to and public institutions.	drafted , is to be Pur- to full for full ctions ouncils quently," be estab- on the
Although the new policy is quite forward-looking likely to ease appreciably the present nationalist and unrest in the Congo. African political leaders are I suspicious, and in view of the sharp break with Belg "paternal" policies and desires for a Belgo-Congole tion, they may distrust the Belgians' desire to imple a revised policy. The leaders in the Leopoldville are aroused at the Belgians' wholesale arrest of leading particularly Joseph Kasa-Vubu, the president of Ableading nationalist organization. Most of the Africa of Leopoldville districts have reportedly threatened in protest.	d economic ikely to be gium's se federa- ement such rea are Africans, ako, the n mayors
The new policy may provoke reactions from oth of the Congo which have not been affected directly by poldville rioting. The European settler minority, p in the eastern Congo, has on occasion expressed apparent about proposed reforms to increase native participal European agitation against the proposed policy could an African reaction in the highly developed and mines Katanga area beyond that attributable to the present in the area which has spread from Rhodesia.	y the Leo- particularly prehension tion. Any provoke pral-rich

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New Cuban Government Will Apparently Permit Communists Considerable Freedom

Communists will probably be excluded from most offices of the new Cuban Government, but it is doubtful that the Communists will be repressed,

nearly all officials of the government of Provisional President Urrutia are anti-Communists, but seem completely unaware of the Communist threat. Leaders of the Montecristi group, a small organization of respected business leaders which actively opposed the ousted Batista regime, are concerned over the emergence since the fall of Batista of the Communists' Popular Socialist party (PSP) and intend to encourage the government to take a stand against the Communists.

Fidel Castro and other leaders of the politically dominant 26 of July Movement have declared that the PSP will now be permitted to operate as a legal political party, 'since freedom of political action is guaranteed by the constitution." The PSP, with a membership last reported at 8,000 to 12,000, has already gained a recognized minority voice in organized labor since Batista's fall, although there are some indications that labor groups loyal to Fidel Castro may actively oppose it in labor. On 10 January, the Communists in Havana held their first public rally since Batista outlawed their party in 1953. The Communist daily newspaper, Hoy, has resumed publication, and the party has opened offices in Havana and Santiago.

Top Communist labor leader Lazaro Pena is reported by the Cuban press to have returned from exile on 9 January. He is a dynamic, intelligent Negro who has probably retained much of the considerable popularity he enjoyed when last in the country. In exile since 1954, he is an official of both the Communist Confederation of Latin American Workers and the World Federation of Trade Unions and has made frequent trips to Prague and Moscow during the last four years.

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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

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Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

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Special Adviser to the President

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The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

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The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

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The Secretary of the Navy

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Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

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Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

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