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8 April 1959

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
INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172476



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

8 April 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq-UAR: In the face of a number of reports that attacks into Iraqi territory by UAR-equipped Shammar tribesmen may soon be intensified and of persistent rumors of impending internal disturbances, Baghdad on 4 April ordered all divisional security units and all armored units in the capital to what is believed to be their highest state of alert.

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VAR propaganda has been intensified to exploit tensions within Iraq by spreading stories of major uprisings and army mutinies and by establishing a "Voice of Free Iraq" radio station in UAR territory. Meanwhile, UAR jet fighters have for the first time at Deir-ez-Zor South, a new airfield in eastern Syria near the Iraqi frontier. On 2 April, six MIG-17s and one AN-2 transport were there. This deployment probably is designed to cope with reported Iraqi overflights and to provide air reconnaissance for any indication of an Iraqi build-up in connection with recent border incidents.)

*Singapore: The British Government, increasingly fearful that the Communist-infiltrated Peoples Action party (PAP) will swamp its moderate opposition in the 30 May Singapore general elections, has approved covert financial aid for the moderate party of Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock.

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the PAP will form the next government, and they will probably support some selected PAP candidates, but they hope that their aid to Lim will help his party to emerge from the elections as a significant moderating force.) (Page 3)

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III. THE WEST

*West Germany: Under strong pressure from leaders of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Chancellor Adenauer accepted the nomination for the presidency apparently in the hope of playing some role in choosing his successor and retaining a voice in the new government. Discontent within the CDU over Adenauer's leadership and methods has been gaining momentum since the opening of the Berlin crisis. Despite public assurances by CDU leaders that foreign policy played no part in the decision to move Adenauer into the largely ceremonial office of the presidency, the action probably stems at least in part from the desire by certain key government supporters for greater flexibility on East-West questions. Economics Minister Erhard will probably be the next chancellor. Although no wholesale changes in major offices are likely before 15 September, when the presidential term expires, some reshuffling before that date is possible in order to avoid having a lame-duck administration during crucial East-West talks. (Page 4)

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Greece: Preliminary returns from the 5 April country-wide Greek municipal elections indicate that the Communist-sponsored EDA party has failed in its effort to discredit the government. However, claims of a "smashing defeat" for EDA appear to be exaggerated. The results do not necessarily indicate a popular anti-leftist trend, but suggest that the Greek Government's anti-EDA propaganda and pre-election police measures have been effective. (Page 5)


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*Argentina: The riots of 3 April, led by the Communists and joined by Peronista extremists, demonstrated the Communists' capability for subversion. The Frondizi government has declared at least five Soviet diplomats persona non grata, charging interference in internal affairs. Although the riots apparently were brought under control rapidly, there are reports of increased apprehension, especially among the military, over the government's capacity to meet the threat of continued labor agitation. One military group has reportedly given Frondizi a 30-day ultimatum to rid the government of Communists. fellow travelers, and corrupt elements.

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC (No Back-up Material)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

UAR-Iraqi Situation

On 4 April Baghdad ordered all armored units in the cap-
ital and all divisional security units in Iraq to what is believed
to be their highest state of alert. This appears to be a reaction
to persistent rumors of impending internal disturbances and to
the threat of intensified attacks into Iraqi territory by UAR-
equipped Shammar tribesmen.

The first known move of UAR regular ground forces toward eastern Syria was observed on the night of 2-3 April moving toward Deir-ez-Zor, (and on 2 April, six MIG-17 (FRESCOs) and one AN-2 (COLT) transport were reliably reported on Deir-ez-Zor South airfield)

UAR propaganda media have intensified their efforts to exploit tensions within Iraq. They are spreading stories of a major uprising and army mutiny in the Kirkuk area, and of lesser disturbances and army defections elsewhere. Cairo's Middle East News Agency reports that three Soviet merchant ships which passed through the Suez canal on 5 and 6 April carried "19,000 tons of military equipment" for Iraq and "855 armed Kurdish volunteers" who allegedly are to enlist in a pro-Communist Iraqi "foreign legion." The "volunteers" referred to are, in fact, Kurdish repatriates from the USSR. A"Voice of Free Iraq" radio station has been established in Egypt, and a Cairo magazine says that "certain Iraqi personalities" have sought UAR help to set up a "free Iraqi government" in one of the Arab countries.

In addition to alerting military units and strengthening outposts near the Syrian border, Baghdad has accelerated expansion

of the Communist-dominated Popular Resistance Forces (PRF) and has ordered the immediate issuance of arms to PRF units in northern Iraq. On 6 April Qasim promised amnesty to any Shammar "rebels" who would return peaceably to their Iraqi villages. The sustained UAR pressure—and Qasim's reaction to it—appear to be strengthening still further the hold on the government of Communist and pro-Communist elements.

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British Plan Financial Support for Moderate Singapore Political Party

The British Government has approved significant financial aid to the party of Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock, the Singapore People's Alliance (SPA), during its campaign for the 30 May Singapore general election. The previous "hands-off" policy of the British toward the elections stemmed from a desire to avoid any action which might jeopardize their chances of working with the "moderate" wing of the Communist-infiltrated People's Action party (PAP) following its anticipated election victory.)

The British now fear that moderate forces are in danger of being swamped by the PAP. This could prove dangerous to Britain's position in Singapore, for it not only would destroy the strongly anti-Communist influence of Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock, but also would almost certainly enhance Communist prospects of taking over the PAP. The strongly entrenched PAP Communists presumably would be reluctant to attempt to over-throw the present "moderate" leadership of the party if control of the government rested on a coalition or a narrow majority which required the continued leadership of PAP's moderate secretary general, Lee Kuan Yew,

Britain's maximum goal probably is to prevent an absolute majority by the PAP in the 51-member legislative assembly. Its minimum aim is to elect enough moderates so that Chief Minister Lim will be able to form an effective moderate opposition. The British have also indicated that they may support a few selected PAP candidates, probably in order to avoid alienating Lee Kuan Yew, the probable first prime minister of the new partially self-governing State of Singapore.)

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III. THE WEST

Erhard Likely to Succeed Adenauer as West German Chancellor

Ludwig Erhard, West German economics minister and vice chancellor, will probably become the next chancellor, following Adenauer's decision to move into the ceremonial office of President. Adenauer apparently preferred to bow out gracefully rather than risk a bitter intraparty struggle, apparently hoping thus to retain some influence in the formation of a new government. Although no changes in the chancellorship are expected before 15 September, when the presidential term expires, some reshuffling of cabinet posts is possible to avoid having a lameduck administration during forthcoming East-West negotiations. The presidential elections are scheduled for 1 July, and Adenauer is assured of election.

Discontent with Adenauer's leadership has been gaining momentum within the CDU since the opening of the Berlin crisis.

One CDU faction led by Bundestag President Gerstenmaier had differed sharply with Adenauer over foreign policy and has advocated a flexible approach to unification, European security, and negotiations with Moscow in general. Gerstenmaier also favored more cooperation with the opposition parties, including the possibility of a "government of national unity." Other CDU elements, meeting in February, considered Adenauer too old and rigid to cope with the Berlin crisis. The final factor setting off the revolt may have been Adenauer's instruction to Brentano during the NATO meeting, rejecting the new approaches to unification or European security that had been previously agreed upon. These instructions are reported to have been sent by Adenauer without consultation with the cabinet or party leaders.

Erhard, a professional economist, has been relatively disinterested in international political affairs and is considered to be substantively weak on foreign-policy questions not involving economic policy. He is decidedly more anti-French and less in favor of European integration than Adenauer, and he has opposed, on financial grounds, the increasing build-up of the armed forces.

The party will probably choose a foreign minister from among the party leaders who advocate a more flexible approach to East-West negotiations. Adenauer may retain some influence on government policy and in party affairs, but a review of foreign and defense policy can be expected. His retirement will probably have a serious impact on West Berlin opinion, which will interpret his removal as a major concession to Moscow.

Greek Municipal Elections

Despite Greek Government claims that the pro-Communists suffered a "smashing defeat" in last Sunday's municipal elections, the alleged "solid victory" for progovernment candidates should not be regarded as indicating a definite popular trend away from the Communist-sponsored United Democratic Left (EDA). Preliminary reports show increased popular support for the incumbent National Radical Union (ERE), some weakening in the political stature of the EDA, and a further trend toward elimination of the center parties. The local administrative picture will not be altered significantly, but the government's drive against pro-Communist elements begun before the election may have considerable impact.

The governing ERE entered no official slates and neither did EDA, except in certain isolated centers of known strength such as Piraeus, Mytilini, and Naoussa. Nonetheless, the main contest was between these two parties. EDA was determined to roll up a massive antigovernment vote and to secure popular support for attaining "bourgeois legality." It failed in both attempts, largely because of the effective anti-EDA campaign by the government and because the issues on which it focused, especially Cyprus and missile bases, failed to stir the electorate.

EDA-supported candidates, who as a result of an agreement with the Liberal faction led by Sophocles Venizelos ran mostly as Liberals, virtually everywhere received fewer votes than EDA-supported candidates in the national election last May. EDA polled nearly 25 percent of the total vote in 1958. However, according to government statistics, EDA strength in last Sunday's election ran as high as 49 and 56 percent in some localities. Despite the loss in total comparative strength, when viewed in terms of the 1958 parliamentary elections, pro-Communist strength was impressive in several localities.

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Argentine Communists Demonstrate Strong Subversive Capability

	pursued."
	continuing strikes had weakened confidence in the
	government to the point where a small determined force could
	topple it. one military group had channeled through the army secretary a de-
	mand that President Frondizi rid the government of Commu-
	nists, fellow travelers, and corrupt elements within 30 days.)
)
	The Soviet Embassy counselor was declared persona non
	grata on 7 April, and as many as four other Bloc diplomats
	may be expelled as a result of official investigations indicat-
	ing foreign Communist participation in the riots. Mexico just
	took similar action against two Soviet diplomats accused of in-
	volvement in the recent railway strikes there.
	vorvement in the recent ranway attines there.
	Argentine Commu-
	Argentine Communista leaders told local meetings in late March that the USSR
•	Argentine Communist: leaders told local meetings in late March that the USSR was supplying them with dollars to fight the Yankees and that
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	Argentine Communista leaders told local meetings in late March that the USSR was supplying them with dollars to fight the Yankees and that

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

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